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ABSTRACT 
"Accountants on the UK boards of directors 
and the market for accountancy and audit services" 
ILIAS G. BASIOUDIS 
Supervisors: Professor Anthony Steele 
Dr Martin Conyon 
September 1999 
Several previous studies have provided empirical evidence concerning the pricing of 
audit services among different accountancy firms. These studies have examined the 
form of the auditor fee function by generally performing cross-sectional regressions of 
audit fees on a set of explanatory variables. 
This study is the first to investigate whether an "alumni effect" prevails the UK audit 
market and whether any "alumni effect" influences the pricing of audit services. The 
"alumni effect" has been defined in this study as the association between the auditor 
of the company where the director/chartered accountant is currently employed and the 
accounting firm that the director/chartered accountant originally qualified with, as a 
chartered accountant. The study has constructed an alumni network by matching the 
current director of the UK public company with the accountancy firm s/he qualified 
with as chartered accountant. By doing this, the "alumni effect" variable has been 
created which is a non-price factor conjectured to translate into price effects. 
The study provides a theoretical analysis and explanation of the "alumni effect" by 
combining several theories in microeconomics, organisational behaviour and 
socialisation of accountants. Using chi-square tests it provides evidence that an 
"alumni effect" does prevail the UK audit market for publicly traded companies. A 
classical regression model was constructed for the functional relationship between 
external audit fee and independent variables measuring the "alumni effect" and audit 
firm size. Other factors such as client size and complexity, client risk to fail, etc. are 
controlled for in the cross-sectional models. 
The findings show that the "alumni effect" leads to higher audit fees when a finance 
director, chairman or/and chief executive is/are alumni of the incumbent auditor in the 
large companies segment of the audit market. The findings also indicate that when the 
audit firm size is partitioned into three classes then a price premium is revealed. 
xv 
However, this premium is disappeared because of the existence of an alumni of the 
auditor on the boards of directors. 
The results of this investigation indicate significant audit price differentials in the UK 
audit market when different factors hypothesised to affect audit fees are taken into 
consideration. In other words, the findings suggest that the structure in the market for 
audit services is more complex than the usually applied Big-Six/non-Big Six 
dichotomy and different explanations are provided. 
xvi 
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CHAPTER I 
PRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction to the thesis 
Amongst the major industrialised economies, the UK is distinguished by the 
prominent role played by professional chartered accountants in management, in 
corporate governance, in consultancy and in auditing. Professional accountancy has 
been the modal first employment destination for British undergraduates (at the 1987 
peak, 1 in 10, of all undergraduates from whatever discipline), "but only because that 
is the most obvious, most prestigious and best remunerated way to prepare oneself 
with credentials for a general career in business or management" (Handy Report, 
1987). This investment in training has resulted in approximately one in eight of UK 
directors being professionally qualified chartered accountants, compared to only one 
in twenty being professionally qualified engineers (the next most frequent professional 
background) (Anderson, 1994). Surveys reveal that over 90% of companies have a 
Finance Director and that 50% of the finance directors of the UK companies are 
members of the ICAEW and ICAS (Hussey and Jack, 1994; Olins and Steiner, 1997). 
The historically low output from the UK graduate business schools, by comparison, is 
reflected in the statistic that on average only 6% of Finance Directors are holders of an 
"7 
MBA (Masters in Business Administration). UK boards of directors seem to be 
dominated by chartered accountants. 
The major route to qualifying as a chartered accountant requires a number of years 
training in a professional practising office as an auditor. Chartered accountants have 
an allegiance to "the profession", and are "alumni" of the accountancy firm that 
provided their training. Prior to the 1970's student accountants were articled clerks, 
apprenticed to a principal, even paying a premium for the privilege of their 
employment. There is a well trodden path of qualified chartered accountants from the 
practising offices into industrial and commercial employment with their former audit 
clients'. For example, Anderson et al (1997) mention that more than 50% of ICAEW 
members are currently in various business positions, and Hussey and Jack (1994) 
report that of the directors who qualified as chartered accountants 28.7% did so with 
the incumbent auditor. Indeed some accountancy firms operate commercial services in 
the professional appointments, executive search and recruitment market. Further, 
Beattie and Fearnley (1998) and Hussey and Jack (1994) rank the personal chemistry 
between the finance director and the auditor as the most important. The connections 
and networks that professional accountancy offices have developed through the 
dominant positions that their former employees hold in Britain's boardrooms have 
never been researched. The aims of this study are to investigate the importance of such 
professional associations, particularly as it affects the market for accountancy services. 
On the other hand, competition in the market for audit services, dealing with auditors 
switches, low balling, auditor appointment and independence, the impact of non-audit 
services, changes in audit fees, has been the subject of discussion and research in the 
last two decades. Over the same period there have been a number of attempts at 
modelling external audit fees. These models have provided explanations for the level 
and variability of audit fees. Many of the prior studies have as their primary focus the 
modelling of audit fees and the establishment of determinants which cause the 
1 For a dramatic illustration of this dimension consider the Prudential audit. In 1988 
Mr Michael Lawrence, who 
was a partner in Price Waterhouse, joined the Prudential 
Assurances Company as the group Finance Director. In 
1990, the Prudential, after 100 years with the same auditor, put its audit out to tender. Price Waterhouse won the 
contract to audit the Prudential. However, 
it emerged that Price Waterhouse bid 40% less than the incumbent 
auditors. This discount was not dissimilar 
from the prices offered by Price Waterhouse's unsuccessful competitors. 
2 
A `w 
variability in audit fees. This literature is widely seen as rigorous. However, no 
previous work has examined the relationship between audit fee and non-price factors 
such as the one this study proposes, i. e. the relationship between audit fee and 
accountancy firm alumni. In other words, this study proposes to investigate the 
following issues: what are the links between accountancy firms and their former 
employees, and whether these links make a measurable difference to audit fees. Do 
alumni relations matter? 
1.2. Significance and objectives of the study 
The determinants of audit fees, therefore, is not a "new" topic for the researchers. 
Instead, it remains a hot topic. Research into the determinants of audit fees is now 
well established and focuses on examining whether there is evidence of competitive or 
uncompetitive practices within the audit market. Formal governmental inquiries about 
the competition in the audit market have also been taken place in many parts of the 
English-speaking world. The presence of such literature merely suggests that there is 
lack of knowledge about the operation of the market for audit services. The current 
study contributes to a greater understanding of that market in that it examines the 
underpinning variables which explain the variability of audit fees and moreover, 
examines some other variables which have never been addressed before as possible 
explanators of variability in audit fees. 
The central focus of this study is, therefore, to examine: 
" the distribution of UK chartered accountants-directors by accountancy firms; 
" the factors associated with the level of audit fee; 
" the magnitude of the association of those factors with the audit fee; 
" an explanatory model of audit fee variability; 
" whether an "alumni effect" prevails the UK audit market; 
" the presence and extent of the "alumni effect" as it reflects on audit fees. 
The "alumni effect" is defined in this study as the association between the auditor of 
the CADRE's current employer and the CADRE's alma mater. CADRE means the 
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director (executive or non-executive) of the UK public company who is simultaneously 
a qualified chartered accountant with the ICAEW. ALMA MATER is the ex- 
employer (i. e. qualifying accounting firm) of the CADRE. These definitions will be 
used hereafter in the thesis. 
1.3. Research hypotheses 
Hypotheses 1 through 6 form a replication of previous work. This has been done in 
order to control for differences in the audit fees. Hypotheses 7 through 11 are used to 
test the main objectives of the study. The research hypotheses that are tested in this 
study are: 
HI: for the large companies sub-sample, there will be no differential pricing of audit 
services between Big Six2 and non-Big Six accountancy firms. 
H2: for the small companies sub-sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee than (or 
equal to) the non-Big Six firms. 
H3: for the small companies sub-sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee than (or 
equal to) the second-tier accountancy firms. 
H4: for the small companies sub-sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee than (or 
equal to) the local/regional accountancy firms. 
H5: for the small companies sub-sample, the second-tier firms charge lower audit fee 
than (or equal to) the local/regional accountancy firms. 
H6: the pricing of audit services is related to the pricing of non-audit services. 
H7: for the large and small companies sub-sample, it makes no difference on audit 
fees when gn director is an ex-employee of the auditor. 
H8: for the large and small companies sub-sample, on average it makes no difference 
on audit fees when a non-executive director is an ex-employee of the auditor. 
H9: for the large and small companies sub-sample, there is no audit fee difference 
when the chairman, chief executive or f finance director are an alumni of the auditor. 
2 The Big-Six firms are Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Price Waterhouse, and 
Touche Ross. They are listed here in alphabetical order. 
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H10: for the large and small companies sub-sample, the audit fee charged will not be 
lower or higher as the CADRE becomes older. 
HI1: there is no different relationship between audit and non-audit fee because of 
existence of auditor alumni. 
1.4. Research methodology 
For the literature reviews and description of the problem setting, the main research 
technique utilised is a familiarisation with the relevant literature, both in the auditing 
and economics areas. In the auditing area, this includes the large body of literature on 
the audit fees and audit market. In the economics area, this covers the large and 
distinct body of literature on the investments on human capital, internal organisation 
of accounting firms, employment policies and individual opportunism. 
With regard to the data collection, the following steps are taken: The population that 
will be examined in this study consists of the publicly held corporations in the UK and 
their auditors for the period 1995/1996 and, thus, is homogeneous with respect to the 
last factor. The investigation will draw on publicly available information. The names 
of directors for quoted companies made available to us from the Price Waterhouse 
(PW) corporate register. 
In brief3, the alumni network is constructed as follows: The Directory of Members for 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), and also for 
the Scottish Institute (ICAS) provide, in addition to a correspondence address for each 
member, the year of qualification. The examination pass lists for the year of 
qualification are published in the Accountant Magazine for the years prior to 1956, 
and directly from the ICAEW since 1956. They list, against the name of each 
successful candidate, the accountancy firm and the town in which the candidates 
received their professional training. By this means the network links between 
Directors and Accountancy Firms can be reconstructed. Prior to 1983, the examination 
3 Chapter IV offers a detailed description of the step-by-step laborious collection of the data concerning the 
accountancy firms alumni. 
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pass lists record, instead of the name of the accountancy firm, the name of the partner 
to whom the trainee chartered accountant was articled. The ICAEW Directory of 
Members needs to be consulted to give the accountancy firm for each partner. From 
these sources it was possible to research the professional background of the 
accountancy directors who qualified prior to 1983. The PW dataset identifies the 
auditors for each company, and One-Source or Datastream provides accounting data. 
With due diligence a dataset was constructed to provide survey evidence on the 
objectives of this study. A classical cross-sectional multiple regression model is used 
to test the research hypotheses of the study. This model has been widely used in prior 
audit fee studies. This study enjoys the benefit of a non-intrusive data collection 
approach to construct a unique dataset. 
1.5. Major contribution of the thesis 
The thesis makes contribution in the following areas: 
i. The determinants of audit fees 
The study incorporates the "alumni effect" variable in the determinants of the audit 
fees. To the author's knowledge, this is the first study to use the particular measure in 
the audit market analysis. From the proposed investigation, specific propositions 
about the market structure for audits are derived. 
ii. The economics and sociological perceptions 
This study brings together a number of different theories in microeconomics and 
sociology. To the author's knowledge, the combined application of those theories in 
the accounting literature has not been considered before. This study has sited the 
theory of the audit firm in human capital theory as well as the concepts of socialisation 
and alumni identification. The main proposition derived is that the accounting firm 
alumni have a predisposition to benefit their alma mater. 
iii. Future considerations 
6 
The author has established that the non-price factors such as the alumni effect merit 
serious attention from the researchers of the audit market. The alumni effect may need 
to be taken into consideration when public policy makers and the accountancy 
profession consider changes in professional regulations and audit standards, and 
statutory audit requirements. Auditors and clients are symbiotic at a deeper level than 
mere buyers and sellers of services. 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
In order for the study's objectives to be achieved, the thesis is broken down in the 
following manner: Chapter II and III include reviews of the literature in areas that are 
relevant to the study. Chapter II builds the formal theoretical analysis of the 
inclination of CADRE to favour their alma mater. Chapter III reviews the existing and 
relevant literature on the audit fee determinants and structure of audit market. Chapter 
IV provides a detailed explanation of the steps followed concerning the data collection 
and construction of the alumni network. Chapter V looks at the issue of the alumni 
effect for different definitions of CADRE and alma mater and whether the alumni 
effect prevails the audit market. The specific hypotheses proposed in this study are 
discussed in Chapter VI. In the same chapter, the explanatory variables are selected 
and defined. Chapter VII provides the descriptive statistics and Chapter VIII discusses 
the model specification. It also replicates the "basic" audit fee model. Testing the 
main hypotheses of the thesis is the principal subject of Chapter IX. Finally, Chapter 
X provides a summary, discussion of the audit fee differentials found in the study, 
conclusions, limitations of the thesis, and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE THEORY 
OF THE AUDIT FIRM 
This chapter brings together a number of different theories in microeconomics, such 
as portfolio theory, agency theory, human capital theory, implicit contracts theory. It 
also draws on sociological and psychological literature. Each of these theories 
individually are familiar to economists and sociologists, nevertheless their 
combination produces a different theoretical framework on the principal concerns in 
this study. We investigate here the accountancy firms and their connections with their 
alumni. But the ultimate goal is to explain the predisposition of ex-employee 
accountant to favour his alma mater. In doing so, the importance of outplacement to 
the management and conduct of audit firms is theorised. Also, the internal 
organisation of accountancy firms, and especially the critical issue of profit division 
and risk-sharing, the investment in firm-specific human capital and the historical 
dominance of the up-or-out promotion policy as well as the auditor's client acceptance 
decision and engagement risk are analysed and offered as potential explanation of the 
audit firms' emphasis on outplacement of their employees. Finally, making use of the 
literature on the sociological field-based work, in organisational behaviour and on 
8 
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alumni of universities, the importance of the socialisation of accountants and their 
identification with the former firm is enhanced. Each of the above are discussed in 
depth in the sections that follow. 
2.1. Internal organisation of accountancy firms 
It is known from portfolio theory that by diversifying, investors' capital assets are of 
greater value. Also, portfolio theory argues that by diversifying a portfolio, an investor 
can eliminate all unsystematic risk (i. e. the risk associated with holding a particular 
asset) but not the systematic risk (i. e. the risk of events that will alter the value of all 
assets)'. 
For chartered accountants, their most important capital asset is their investment in 
human capital (more specifically in firm-specific human capital) and once we 
recognise this, portfolio theory's emphasis on diversification highlights a critical 
characteristic about this asset: it is very difficult to diversify an investment in human 
capital, and moreover, to eliminate the unsystematic risk through diversification. 
Large accountancy firms are a response to this difficulty. They provide an opportunity 
to achieve portfolio diversification gains for human capital. 
The creation of a full-service accountancy firm - an agreement among accountants that 
each will make human capital investments in different specialties and that the returns 
to those investments will be shared on a predetermined basis2 rather in accordance 
with actual outcomes - eliminates the employee's unsystematic risk (ie the risk 
associated with holding the particular capital asset, the investment in human capital) 
because it facilitates (succeeds) diversification of chartered accountants' human 
capital. Accountancy firms can be seen then as risk-sharing or insurance mechanisms 
(Land and Gordon, 1995). Therefore, the existence and organisation of the large 
1 Detailed discussions of portfolio theory and models can be found in Fama & Miller (1972), Jensen (1972), Fama 
(1976) and other traditional financial theory textbooks. 
2 What precise formula should be applied for distributing partnership income, see Moldenhauer (1972), Reed 
(1979), and Farrell and Scotchmer (1988). See also Basile and Sandbach (1981) who introduce the profit centre 
concept to income distribution. 
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accountancy firms increase the value of chartered accountant's human capital 
investment, allow chartered accountants to take advantage of gains from 
diversification, and also, achieve specialisation (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
However, understanding the accountancy firm as a means of capturing the gains from 
diversification also requires understanding how it prevents self-interested behaviour 
from destroying these gains (Fama, 1980). In other words, we have to consider what 
could happen to a chartered accountant's view of the gains from diversification 
between the time he agrees to share his future income in order to benefit from 
diversification and the time when the agreement (i. e. income sharing) must be 
performed. The problem is apparent when a chartered accountant favoured by fate 
actually must share his earnings with a colleague in a less profitable specialty. At the 
time the two initially agree to share, the future is uncertain: both stand to gain from an 
agreement to pool their future earnings. The situation changes markedly, however, 
when the passage of time eliminates the uncertainty. At this point the winner (one who 
must share his good fortune with the loser) may refuse to comply with his original 
bargain: he no longer has anything to gain by sharing. The potential for individuals to 
pursue their own self-interest - in our setting, to thwart diversification - and the role of 
organisational structure as a means of constraining it (or as an effort to minimise the 
cost of holding the parties to the terms of their bargain) is the province of agency 
theory (Demsetz, 1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Monsen 
and Downs, 1965). 
The selection of organisation structure, therefore, affects the level of gains from 
diversification as well as the level of agency costs. Producers benefit from lower costs, 
thus, incentives exist for organisations to adopt a form which most effectively reduces 
agency costs, and therefore, most effectively captures the gains available from 
cooperation. An accountancy firm whose organisational form minimises these agency 
costs will have a competitive advantage because it bears less risk than an undiversified 
accountancy firm, i. e. that firm that specialises in a single area. It need not charge a 
premium that takes the risk of obsolescence into account (this risk 
is eliminated 
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through diversification). It is, therefore, able to underbid the competition in an auction 
by charging a lower unit price3 
So far we combined two theories: the portfolio theory and the agency theory. The 
former identifies an important source of gains from diversification (cooperation) 
among chartered accountants, the latter highlights the barriers to capturing these gains 
and the methods by which these barriers can be partially, but never entirely, 
surmounted. Furthermore, both of the theories direct attention to precisely the same 
subject: the manner in which firm income is divided. 
Diversification, the core recommendation of portfolio theory, is achievable only by 
means of an agreement specifying how future income will be shared. Agency theory, 
in turn, highlights the likelihood that those chartered accountants who turn out to be 
more successful than their peers will threaten to leave the firm unless they receive 
their real value -a demand for a quite different manner of dividing firm income. The 
method of dividing firm income, therefore, may determine whether an accountancy 
firm has successfully created an institutional structure that constrains ex-post 
opportunism. 
The most significant constraint on grabbing and leaving in a sharing model4 is the 
concept of firm-specific, as opposed to individual or general, capital. A sharing firm 
has the potential to create firm-specific capital more effectively than does a firm 
5 pursuing a marginal product approach. 
See Jensen (1983) for a fruitful discussion on how particular organisation forms can achieve low cost control of 
agency problems and enable them to survive. 
4 See also Alchian & Demsetz (1972), Demsetz (1983) and McChesney (1982) for an explanation of why the so- 
called professional firms adopt the profit sharing model than the marginal product approach. 
Also, Van Lent 
(1999) for the drawbacks of the marginal product approach in the accountancy firms. 
5 Under the marginal product approach, no-one would have been willing to 
invest in a specialty that is not 
profitable, simply because the individuals' earnings are 
based on the assessment of their productivity. Thus, no 
FSHC would have been created. 
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2.2. Firm-Specific Human Capital (FSHC) 
The firm-specific capital is defined as the capitalised value of the difference between 
firm's earnings as an ongoing institution and the combined value of the human capital 
of its individual employees (partners, managers and juniors), if this human capital 
were deployed outside the firm in its next most productive use. The value, therefore, 
of the firm-specific capital is larger than the combined value of the individual human 
capital, and consequently, the return on this capital is greater too. Also, firm-specific 
capital can be neither easily removed from the firm nor duplicated outside the firm. 
However, the creation of firm-specific human capital depends upon whether the 
trainee chartered accountant is willing to exert effort or to shirk. It has been shown 
(Cantor, 1990), that intermediate-length, fixed wage contracts with known expiration 
dates can improve training investment and effort. If contracts are "too long"6, the 
worker anticipates too little in the way of post-contract rewards and shirks during 
training (resulting in wasting firm's expenditure, and the worker's instantaneous 
productivity and market wage outside and inside the firm remaining constant for the 
rest of his/her career). In contrast, if contracts are "too short", the ex-post division of 
the quasi-rents provides inadequate investment incentives to the firm. An intermediate 
contract length then is desirable, because during its life, all the quasi-rents (i. e. the 
returns to firm-specific human capital) accrue to the firm, but the trainee put forth 
efforts because future quasi-rents can be appropriated after the contract expires7. But 
again, the trainee's willingness to exert effort will depend upon his expected return, ie 
his anticipated share of the future quasi-rents which in turn should be higher than its 
costs (Klein et al, 1978). 
Accountancy firms offer intermediate-length contracts8, an apprenticeship, which 
allows (1) their trainees to acquire firm-specific human capital and (2) the firms to 
capture all the rents during the life of the apprenticeship (this part is analysed in the 
6 Becker (1962) argues that "an effective long-term contract would insure firms against quits .... ". See, also, Telser 
(1980), and Milgrom & Roberts (1992). However, noone has quantified in reality the length of those long-term, 
short-term or intermediate contracts. See also Klein et al (1978) for a discussion on how implicit and explicit long- 
term contracts prevent opportunistic behaviour from both the employee or the firm. 
7 In other words, the trainees in accountancy firms accept a lower wage during the apprenticeship period and 
expect a higher reward at contract expiration (or soon after). Lazear (1979; 1989) argues that these systems are 
employed by firms as bonding devices to induce worker honesty. 
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next section). Trainee chartered accountants exert effort to acquire firm-specific 
capital because they anticipate bargaining for some of the quasi-rents at contract 
expiration. This bargaining leads to an ex-post division of rents such that the trainee 
will receive a constant share (i. e. partnership). Knowing, therefore, the trainee 
chartered accountant that his/her effort to acquire firm-specific human capital will be 
rewarded after his/her contract expires, he/she is provided with the correct ex ante 
incentives to invest in firm-specific capital (Carmichael, 1983). 
Let's now see how the organisational structure (i. e. sharing model) and the 
development of firm-specific human capital together control the potential for 
individual opportunism. The absence of firm-specific capital means that the ex ante 
sharing bargain is subject to ex post cheating9: more productive partners may claim, 
after the fact, a larger share than they are entitled to under the sharing bargain. 
However, the strength of their claim depends on whether they can earn a greater return 
on their individual capital in its next best deployment if they grab and leave the firm. 
But, following from the preceding paragraphs, the return on partners' individual 
capital is not greater than the return on firm-specific capital, and consequently, a threat 
of grabbing and leaving for more money is unrealistic and ineffective. Also, an 
accountancy firm that has created firm-specific capital provides returns on its assets 
(i. e. its clients) which are unavailable to individual chartered accountants if they left 
the firm. The creation, therefore, of firm-specific capital develops constraints on 
grabbing and leaving which means that the gains from diversification can be 
maximised and then an adoption of a sharing model is preferablelo 
By relying on profit sharing, accountancy firms are able to deter or reduce shirking too 
(Demsetz, 1983). "In artistic or professional work" (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), team 
inputs are more cerebral than physical which means more costly to monitor, and 
therefore, according to Alchian & Demsetz, for that reason professional firms make 
greater use of profit sharing in reducing shirking (partners do share in profits and thus, 
8 In contrast to Bartel & Borjas' (1981), and Mortensen's (1978) argument that there is a positive correlation 
between investment costs (specific training) and longer job tenures. 
9 Williamson's (1975; 1985) and Klein eta! (1978) initial insights suggested exactly this. The decision to invest 
will be distorted by the anticipation of bargaining after the investment. 
10 Recall that diversification is eliminated by the marginal product approach. See also footnote 5 above. 
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have a greater incentive to increase profits and a smaller incentive to shirk)". 
v In other 
words, partners in accountancy firms that adopt the sharing in profits model have an 
incentive to curtail voluntarily the degree of shirking, simply because of their 
involvement in generating and sharing the firm's income (Demsetz, 1983; Carr and 
Mathewson, 1990; Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Moreover, exactly because production 
is done in teams which increases the difficulty of measuring directly the value of an 
individual's marginal product (McChesney, 1982), the sharing model is preferable. 
Finally, accountancy firms create a constraint on shirking through some combination 
of selection of new trainees (many interviews, elite business school recruitment, 
training techniques, mentoring approach, and so on) and of socialisation (the social 
mechanisms which serve to instil the non-shirking values such as the concept of being 
a "professional", the recruiters' emphasis on producing only high quality work, the 
concept of producing a "professional" quality product without regard to economic 
reward, and so on). Screening or monitoring techniques, therefore, and even more 
"philosophia"12 put an anti-shirking culture into trainee chartered accountants' mind 
and create a powerful internalised work ethic (Maister, 1985). 
2.3. The Socialisation of Accountants 
The role of socialisation of accountants in putting a constraint on shirking has been 
outlined at the end of the preceding section. This section examines in more detail the 
process of socialisation in accounting professional firms and how this professional 
socialisation influences the behaviour of professional accountants and their 
organisational identity. By elaborating on these issues, it is hoped to show that through 
socialisation accountants acquire "appropriate" forms of professional behaviour (Grey, 
1998) as well as to highlight that social relations within the audit firms are regulated 
11 McChesney (1982) concludes that "it seems unlikely that profit sharing in law [professional] firms is primarily 
explained as a technique to reduce shirking" (emphasis added). 
12 Derived from the relevant Greek word which applies the basic concept or set of rules on how things are running 
inside an organisation. Other definitions could be given are firm structure, institutional loyalty, identity, or 
ideology. 
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RM and reproduced in such manner that being a professional in these firms seems to create 
an anti-shirking culture and specific organisational identity 
To qualify in the UK as a chartered accountant and become a professional, there are 
two formal requirements. First, it is necessary for trainees to pass the examinations set 
by the various Institutes of Chartered Accountants in the UK and, second, to undertake 
a minimum period of training within public practice. The acquisition and application 
of certain technical knowledge or expertise and, more particularly, the control and 
licensing of specialist knowledge or expertise - perhaps in the public interest - by the 
professional who subsequently is able to practice as an accountant, lawyer, etc. erects 
an effective barrier between him/her and the lay person who is disallowed from such 
occupational tasks (Johnson, 1972; Abbott, 1988). This knowledge is, inter alia, 
essential for professional success at both individual and institutional levels. But the 
period of public practice (mentioned above) should not be seen simply as a form of 
apprenticeship into the craft of accountancy and audit. Performing technical services 
to clients is only part of the experience and practice of becoming the professional 
person. Learning more broadly how to be a member of a certain profession is also very 
important. The process of adopting the values, norms and behaviours of the profession 
(and specific organisation) is vital for professional success too. This process that 
involves individuals learning to conform to prevalent social and cultural norms is 
termed socialisation. Demonstration of these characteristics permits group 
membership for the individual professional and acts as a sign of that group 
membership to those outside the profession. Consequently, an individual's 
incorporation of the values and norms of a profession into their identity and repertoire 
of behaviours (which norms and values are transmitted through the specific 
organisational culture) is just as vital to successfully becoming a professional as the 
formal education process and achievement of the professional qualification (Hanlon, 
1994; Anderson-Gough et al, 1998). 
The starting points for any analysis of organisational socialisation are the formal 
systems of recruiting, training, and rating and appraising trainees. Other aspects of the 
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trainees' experience (such as mentoring, daily contact with colleagues, socialising13, 
and early contact with clients) also impact on their socialisation. These formal systems 
and the nature and form of informal socialisation processes involve a "regulation of 
self'. In other words, an individual becomes an entrepreneur of the self by using the 
techniques of self-management (Rose, 1989). Within the project of self-management, 
career has a particular role to play since it is a powerful "technology" in enabling the 
construction of, precisely, a project (Grey, 1994). In other words, an (occupational) 
career offers a relatively well-defined scenario within which individuals may develop, 
express and create themselves. Career offers a vehicle for the self to "become", 
according to Grey (1994). Further, work itself (including socialisation) is a part of the 
entrepreneurial project of the self: a place where the self may become that which it 
truly is or desires to be. It is this sense of a process of the achievement of self through 
work which is offered within organisations as career and which is expressed by 
individuals through career (Grey, 1994). In other words, the objective of "success" in 
career means individuals strive to demonstrate the "appropriate" types of professional 
behaviour. 
Having identified the main vehicles of socialisation - namely, the recruitment process, 
training, rating and appraisal techniques, mentoring, and socialising - and how career 
shapes the behaviour and values of individuals, next the values and attitudes 
transmitted to the trainees through these vehicles of socialisation, especially as regards 
those relating to professionalism, are considered. According to the findings of 
Anderson-Gough et al (1998), the dominant understanding of being a professional 
learnt by trainee chartered accountants relates to codes of behaviour. It means that the 
trainees do not understand professional identity in terms of the possession of 
knowledge, nor in accreditation to practice, nor in terms of commitments to public 
service. The meanings of being a professional for the trainees themselves are that of 
appropriate dress (following the contemporary business attire) and appearance 
generally (hair, beards, make-up, jewellery, etc. ). In addition, behaving seriously, 
soberly and enthusiastically (actually seeking work and looking busy) is a vital aspect 
of the demonstration of being professional and of commitment. Time management is 
13 Whilst socialising (in its everyday sense of informal leisure-time friendships) is certainly not the same as 
socialisation, it is nevertheless part of the socialisation process. 
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seen to reflect both trainees' "professionalism" and also their commitment to the firm. 
Time-keeping includes the willingness to work "after hours" (and, therefore, 
sacrificing personal time) as and when necessary or not to record all the hours worked 
at a particular client (Coffey, 1994). Passing the professional examinations is well 
understood by trainees formally as the process of becoming a professional, but is also 
integral to the possibility of advancement within the firm and securing external 
opportunities for exploiting the accountancy qualification (Anderson-Gough et al, 
1998). Finally, another meaning of being professional for the trainees in Anderson- 
Gough et al (1998) study is the "art of impression management". In other words, the 
professional is a character that trainees are expected to stage or perform for their 
clients as well as their peers. It is a role that most trainees seem to have realised that 
they are "playing" rather than "being". 
The accounting firm charged with the socialisation of the newcomer, therefore, 
teaches the trainee how to become a professional (via learning and internalising the 
formal and informal values and beliefs of its culture) and the trainee absorbs the 
values and traits presented to him/her. All cultures encourage some behaviour whilst 
discouraging other behaviour (Anderson-Gough et al, 1998). The norms of conduct 
and behaviours learnt in this formative period are likely to remain with the individual 
in years to come. Consequently, the focus on the need to learn to act in appropriate 
ways and to deploy appropriate rhetoric helps trainees to create a specific 
organisational identity (Iyer et al, 1997). Hence, the emphasis on socialisation and 
"fitting in" creates an identity not only for the firm but also for the individual 
members of the firm. This identity, for better or for worse, is readily identifiable to the 
outside world (Maister, 1985). 
Finally, it seems the ideology within accountancy is changing. At the heart of this is 
the general move towards "commercialisation" or the "commercialised professional"; 
but it is also represented by other changes, for example innovation in services offered 
by the practices, the use of advertising, global expansion, creation of new products, 
and so on. In essence it means giving the client what s/he requires in as many different 
areas as possible. It means that today the emphasis is very firmly on being commercial 
and on performing a service for the customer rather than on being public spirited in 
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behalf of either the public or the state (Hanlon, 1994). It appears that the professional 
qualities of the accountant are exercised for the benefit of the client (and not the 
public). Accountancy is now a fully fledged, profit orientated business. As it has been 
outlined above, an accountant's training is not really about developing technical 
expertise, although everyone recognises that this obviously is a factor, it has much 
more to do with becoming acceptable, trustworthy, commercially aware and so on. In 
short, the accountant's training and socialisation is centred in developing "business 
virtue" (Hanlon, 1994). 
Thus, the idea of client service appears to have a paramount importance to the survival 
and success of the audit firms. The appropriate behaviours in terms of appearance, 
manner, presentation, self-conduct and so on (i. e. the processes of socialisation within 
the accountancy firms) are a vital part of giving good client service (and pursuing and 
achieving career success) and that failure in these respects may lead to loss of clients 
(and subsequent career failure). Provision of client service is elevated as perhaps the 
central value transmitted by socialisation. Professional (i. e. acceptable social and 
business) conduct centres upon behaviour towards the client. Hence, it is not 
surprising that the understanding of the "professional" from trainees is primarily in 
terms of behaviour, as Anderson-Gough et al (1998) study shows. 
In sum, therefore, what is obvious from the above analysis is how the notion of 
professionalism refers to a mode of conducting oneself. Also, the meaning of being a 
professional becomes inextricably bound up with the culture of the firm, and the firm 
arrogates to itself a certain conception of what being a professional means (Grey, 
1998). Finally, it appears that the trainees acquire and sustain an identity (and 
probably an allegiance to the audit firm) through espousing the corporate values to 
which they belong. By learning and accepting the "correct" behaviours and norms, 
non-shirking values are also instilled to trainees' mind. 
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2.4. The Up-or-Out System14 
We have seen so far that chartered accountants increase their value of human capital 
investments and take advantage of gains from diversification by agreeing to share 
future earnings. We have also seen how the individual opportunism puts barriers to 
capturing these gains and how the creation of firm-specific human capital by the 
accountancy firms surmounts those barriers. Further, we have emphasised that the 
FSHC can only be created when a sharing model is adopted. Nevertheless, we have 
not showed yet why accountancy firm alumni have an inclination to favour their alma 
mater. Recall that the main objective of this chapter (and the thesis) is to explain this 
predisposition of alumni towards their ex-employer. However, this is where the up-or- 
out promotion policy comes into the discussion. 
The existence of firm-specific human capital facilitates the selection/adoption of the 
up-or-out personnel policy employed by the accountancy firms 15. An up-or-out rule 
means that those denied promotion must leave the organisation, even if they were 
successful at their current level in what they were doing. 
At the time when the trainee chartered accountant is first hired, the trainee and the 
firm each face a different kind of uncertainty with respect to the trainee's career path. 
The firm is uncertain about who among the pool of trainees hired will come to possess 
the ability, knowledge and personal attributes thought necessary to partnership. 
However, the organisational response to the firm's uncertainty concerning how a new 
trainee will develop is an apprenticeship: a period between initial hiring and the 
partnership decision that gives the trainee chartered accountant the opportunity to 
demonstrate that he or she has acquired the required skills for which the firm is 
looking16 (Cantor, 1982; MacDonald, 1980). 
14 Recent research studies (e. g., Van Lent, 1999; Maister, 1982 and 1985) indicate that accountancy firms adopt an 
up-or-out promotion policy. There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence that audit firms employ such promotion 
policies (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Hanlon, 1994; Anderson-Gough et al, 1998). However, it is recognised here 
that the chartered accountancy qualification is widely perceived to offer a good general business qualification that 
is used for gaining entry into managerial posts in industry. In fact, the mobility that the audit training gives may be 
a trainee's preferred option from the outset. 
15 Baker et al (1988) in their analysis argue that "up-or-out systems work better in situations where the required 
human capital is general rather organisation-specific". We argue the firm specific human capital is not destroyed 
by the up-or-out policy and one presumption is the fact that the big accountancy firms employ thousands of 
trainees each year and in effect forcing the unsuccessful candidates for partnership to leave the firm creates no loss 
of firm specific human capital. 
16 Prescott and Visscher (1980) named the information about the employee's performance as organisation capital. 
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Also, the firm is uncertain about whether the trainee will behave opportunistically, 
once he or she has been paid to make the investment. Familiar human capital theory 
(Becker, 1962; Hashimoto, 1981) specifies that the firm as well as the trainee must 
pay for the trainee's investment in firm-specific human capital'7. The problem for the 
firm, however, is to assure that, after it pays for the trainee's investment, it actually 
receives the returns. The solution to this uncertainty concerning trainee's ability to 
threat and quit after the investment has been made is a deferred compensation, a 
premium: the trainee chartered accountant actually receives the compensation for 
acquiring firm-specific human capital only as, or after, the firm reaps the benefit of it. 
In other words, the promise of partnership - in effect, the right to share in the future 
returns from firm-specific capital - is the compensation to those trainees who 
successfully acquire firm-specific human capital and also, serves as a constraint on 
trainee opportunism. This exactly potential future promotion to partner constrains the 
behaviour of non-partner from acting opportunistically (Van Lent, 1999). 
However, in order the apprenticeship solution to the firm's uncertainty to be viable, 
another uncertainty must be eliminated: the trainee's uncertainty. Indeed, the trainee's 
uncertainty is created by the apprenticeship period itself; it arises from the firm's 
incentive to behave opportunistically in evaluating the trainee's performance and in 
reaching the partnership decision (Telser, 1980). At that time, the firm is making a 
substantial profit from the trainee's labour by buying the trainee's time at "wholesale" 
and selling it to the client at "retail" (Maister, 1982). Promoting the trainee to partner 
rather than continuing the trainee as an employee is costly to the firm; it diminishes 
the profits accruing to existing partners. At the same time, however, the trainee is in 
an unenviable position to insist that the firm keeps its promise, because during the 
apprenticeship period the trainee has made a substantial investment in firm-specific 
capital. Recall from the previous analysis that the firm-specific capital is worth 
significantly less in its best use in other organisations and puts constraints on grabbing 
and leaving. For the apprenticeship period, therefore, to be a viable response to the 
firm's uncertainty, the firm must have some bonding mechanism that will assure 
trainees at the time they are considered for partnership. 
'7 See Donaldson and Eaton (1976; 1977) who argue that the investment in firm-specific 
human capital is not 
shared, since the firm reaps the benefit and gets 
the whole return on the investment (i. e. there is no shared return). 
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To see this, recall precisely how the firm behaves opportunistically at the time of the 
partnership decision; it seeks to continue earning profits from the trainee's efforts by 
retaining as a trainee a chartered accountant who actually meets the partnership 
standards. By committing itself to fire anyone who is not made a partner, the firm 
effectively eliminates its incentive to undertake the very opportunistic behaviour that 
creates the trainee's uncertainty18. With the up-or-out system in place, the firm cannot 
manipulate the partnership decision so as to retain in some other capacity the services 
of a trainee whose performance really merits partnership (Kahn and Huberman, 1988). 
Moreover, the up-or-out promotion policy provides incentives for the monitors 
(partners) as well as the employees (trainee chartered accountants and managers) to 
invest large amounts or resources in performance measurement and evaluation (Baker 
et al, 1988; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; McChesney, 1982). In team-based firms such 
as the accountancy firms, worker A has incentives to monitor co-workers if the co- 
workers' performance affects worker A's compensation and vice versa (Kandel and 
Lazear, 1992; Van Lent, 1999). 
In summary, then, the up-or-out system is an organisational, structural response to the 
dual (or two-sided) uncertainty confronting the accountancy firm and the trainee at the 
time the trainee is hired. It responds to the trainee's uncertainty by eliminating the 
incentive for the firm to cheat and by succeeding this, the up-or-out practice enhances 
18 Bartel & Borjas (1981), and Becker (1962) argue that the firm has a smaller incentive to lay off the employee 
and lowering the probability of separation when there are specific investment costs in human capital. In other 
words, the parties become locked into the existing relationship (Williamson, 1975; 1981). An argument quite 
opposite to our analysis. See also Waldman (1990) who argues that the up-or-out system is equally valid where the 
human capital is general rather than specific. 
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the viability of the apprenticeship period as a solution to the firm's uncertainty about 
the abilities of the pool of trainees it hires19. 
However, from the trainee's perspective, although the up-or-out system reduces the 
risk the firm will cheat on the partnership decision it increases the risk of investing in 
firm-specific human capita120. Therefore, in order for the up-or-out policy to be stable 
and because trainees are risk averse (i. e. do not want to lose their investment), the 
increase in risk that results from it must be ameliorated. 
The firm's answer to this increased risk is that it offsets this increase in the risk of the 
trainee's investment by facilitating outplacement21 and minimising firm-specificity. 
The accountancy firm does this by providing an external consolation prize: a 
successful and prestigious job position in industry, professional services or commerce 
through the networks of contacts that the accountancy firms have created during the 
years (Maister, 1985). Also, the accountancy firm minimises the negative implications 
of a trainee not making partner, or put differently, it overcomes the firm-specific 
character of the trainee's human capital by revealing the trainee's general abilities 
(such as general business skills, technical skills, good work habits, interpersonal 
skills, passing the accounting training programme and examinations, and so on) 22 and 
possibly by subsidising the whole process by offering an implicit promise to send 
them referral business. In addition, audit firms know that their employees are carriers 
of the firm's reputation as well as of the reputational goods afforded by qualification 
in a prestigious profession (such as the accountancy profession) which makes them 
attractive and mobile to move on into lucrative, high-paying jobs outside the 
professional practice areas. 
19 In other words, the bilateral opportunistic bargaining problem pointed out by Klein et al (1978) is surmounted 
with the selection of the up-or-out policy. 
20 In other words, if a trainee fired (due to up-or-out policy) after he had partially paid for the 
investment in FSHC, 
then he would be unable to collect any return and, therefore, would suffer a capital 
loss (Becker, 1962; Weiss, 
1986). 
21 In his analysis, Becker (1962) believes that "an employee who pays for specific training would suffer a 
loss 
being laid off because he could not find an equally good job elsewhere" (emphasis added). 
Obviously, Becker did 
not take into consideration the possibility for firms to 
facilitate outplacement. 
22 The training the trainee chartered accountant receives is not completely specific but indeed is a combination of 
general training as well as specific. In a survey contacted 
by Marxen (1996) who used structured telephoned 
interviews, alumni of the Big 6 referred to these general training abilities and skills when they were asked what 
they had gained during their Big 6 tenure. 
See also Eastman (1977) and Spence (1974). 
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Conclusively, then, with the up-or-out system in place, existing partners routinely earn 
the surplus value of the juniors without having to repay them when the apprenticeship 
period ends in the form of promotion (making them partners). The firm, too, willingly 
accepts the up-or-out system simply because it allows a significant degree of 
screening/sorting so that only the "best" stay in the firm and become partners23. On the 
other hand, the trainee chartered accountant have two types of incentive. First, there is 
the chance of success in the system's terms and becoming one of the "best". Second, 
even relative failure offers excellent cover opportunities and indeed these 
opportunities may be a trainee's preferred option from the outset. So the trainee has a 
double incentive to accept paying some of the cost and invest in FSHC, although 
he/she is aware of the high turnover rate (due to up-or-out policy). At first, return on 
this investment is recouped by the accountancy firm during the apprenticeship period, 
but the employee does receive high subsequent return on his investment through 
internal success or through being outplaced in a good position by his/her employer. 
This kind of job separation described above makes both parties (i. e. the large 
accountancy firm - especially its partners - and the employees of these 
firms) better off 
by taking advantage of the benefits of institutional structure of the accountancy firms. 
This is consistent with the position taken by Becker et al (1977) and Barzel (1982) 
who argued that separations always occur when they are to the mutual benefit of both 
parties. 
Accountancy firms' employees/alumni, therefore, receive return on their investment in 
human capital even when they are released by their employers. Through the use of 
alumni networks, accountancy firms outplace their employees in positions with their 
clients. The return on investment made by both the accountancy firm and the 
employee chartered accountant is not lost (due to up-or-out policy), although the time 
realisation of this return differs between these two investors. Accountancy firms 
receive a major part of their return during the apprenticeship period, while the 
employee auditor receives mainly his return later when outplaced (or 
becoming a 
23 Another useful explanation for the adoption of up-or-out system provided 
by Van Lent (1999) is that audit firms 
cannot afford an unlimited growth of their personnel. 
Thus, auditors who are not promoted would block the way 
up for juniors at lower levels of the 
firms. Consequently, they must leave the firm. 
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partner). The "failed partners", i. e. those auditors who are not promoted are 
outplaced by the accountancy firms using effectively their alumni connections and 
contacts. As a direct result of this, there ought to be some form of "alumni effect". In 
other words, one looks an association between the auditor of the company where the 
"failed partner" has been outplaced, and the "failed partner's" alma mater. Although 
we predict an effect in the market for audit services due to existence of accountancy 
firms' alumni on the boards of directors of publicly traded companies, nevertheless, 
we cannot determine at this stage the sign of this effect. 
However, the following two sections attempt to frame an initial answer to the above 
inquiry and specifically, establish the direction of the sign of the "alumni effect" by 
making use of the literature on the client acceptance decision and auditor's 
engagement risk, as well drawing on sociological and psychological research. Chapter 
V later investigates empirically the extent to which an "alumni effect" prevails in the 
UK audit market, and Chapter IX undertakes a statistical analysis of the direction of 
the sign of this effect, and its magnitude. 
2.5. The client acceptance decision and auditor's engagement risk 
The audit engagement process is complex and decisions are made by both the 
prospective client and proposing accounting firm. The selection of external auditors 
by companies has been extensively researched (Burton and Roberts, 1967; Chow and 
Rice, 1982; Eichenseher and Shields, 1983; McConnell, 1984; Simon and Francis, 
1988; among others), but to date there are only a few studies of auditor's decision 
process in accepting a new client (Huss and Jacobs, 1991; Johnstone, 1998; Francis 
and Reynolds, 1998)25. 
Professional standards suggest that accountancy firms should establish procedures for 
making the client acceptance/continuance decision. However, professional standards 
24 Note, that the term CADRE has been used in the Chapter I for those directors who are simultaneously chartered 
accountants. 
25 These are the only published relevant papers on the client acceptance decision and auditor's engagement risk 
that I am aware of. 
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do not provide any guidance about how to actually make the decision, although the 
client acceptance decision is an increasingly important auditing task; Huss and Jacobs 
(1991, p. 20) specifically stated that "... the pre-engagement decision process is a- 
perhaps the most - critical step in the audit process". 
On the other hand, audit partners' judgements may be affected by the fact that they are 
compensated based, in part, on the amount of revenue that is generated via new clients 
(Asare et al, 1994) as well as by the enormous competition between audit firms for 
new clients. As a result, partners' judgements may be less conservative, that is that 
client-related risks and the auditor engagement risk may be ignored or minimised in 
order for new clients to be recruited, or on the other hand, they may be more 
conservative due to audit firms' increased litigious operating environment. In any 
event an evaluation of the risks involved is a necessary consideration for auditors 
when they make auditing acceptance decisions (Simunic and Stein, 1990; Jones and 
Raghunandan, 1998). 
Johnstone (1998) has examined the client acceptance decision. She developed a risk- 
based model where the client-related risks are evaluated and then the audit firm's risk 
of loss on the engagement is assessed. In other words, she found that auditors' 
evaluations of the (prospective) client's inherent and control risks affected their 
evaluations of the client's future financial prospects. These significant evaluations, in 
turn, affected auditors' evaluations of their firms' risk of loss on the engagement via 
lack of engagement profitability or future litigation. Johnstone concluded that auditors 
do use their evaluations of client-related risks and their own firms' risk of loss on the 
engagement to screen out undesirable clients. Huss and Jacobs (1991), Francis and 
Reynolds (1998), Jones and Raghunandan (1998), Pratt and Stice (1994), Hill et al, 
(1994) and Clarkson and Simunic (1994) have all reached similar conclusions, that is 
pre-engagement risks assessments are regarded as an important determinant in the 
engagement outcome. 
In order for the auditor to form an overall evaluation of the riskiness of the client, 
three relevant and interrelated risks must be evaluated, according to Johnstone. These 
risks involve the client's business risk (i. e., the client's financial condition and 
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industry membership), the audit risk (i. e., inherent risk, control risk), and the auditor's 
business risk (i. e., the likelihood that the auditor will suffer a loss from the 
engagement). For example, Jones and Raghunandan (1998) showed that there is 
significant reduction in the likelihood that Big-Six firms would audit clients who are 
in financial distress or are in high-tech industries, simply because these clients are 
perceived as having high litigation risks. In contrast, Francis and Reynolds (1998) 
provided evidence that there is an increase in the riskiness of the Big-Six clientele in 
their study of publicly held companies undertaken for the period 1976 and 1996. 
Johnstone's paper (1998) concluded that audit partners do not use risk adaptation 
strategies (e. g., adjusting the audit fee, etc. ) to mediate the effects of the client's 
business risk, audit risk, and auditor's business risk evaluations on the client 
acceptance decision. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that auditors have 
difficulty shifting auditor's business risk to clients via certain risk adaptive behaviours 
(Arthur Andersen et al., 1992; Morgan and Stocken, 1998). This finding implies that 
risk adaptation strategies are not appropriate for making an otherwise "unacceptable" 
client (due to extremely high client-related risks evaluations and consequent, audit 
firm's risk of loss on the engagement) more acceptable. As a result of auditors not 
using more active risk adaptation strategies, it would appear that the only other 
possible way of accepting an engagement, ceteris paribus, is by reducing the risks 
associated with client acceptance decision. 
The theoretical analysis in the last section of this chapter has shown that the internal 
organisational structure of the accounting firms drives them to adopt some form of the 
up-or-out personnel policy as a response to the dual uncertainty the audit firm and the 
trainee chartered accountant are confronted with. However, remember that the up-or- 
out system risks destroying the investment in firm-specific human capital unless the 
auditing firm is able to reduce the risk of this investment. It does that by facilitating 
outplacement. In other words, we argued in the preceding section that the up-or-out 
system has been developed as a least bad alternative solution by the accounting firms 
as a result of the institutional structure of those firms. 
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In this section, we extend the reasoning behind the adoption of the bonding 
mechanism that this solution implies. We suggest that by enthusiastically working 
towards outplacing their alumni onto the fast track for promotion and ultimately into 
the boardrooms of existing (and prospective) clients, accountancy firms seek to 
meliorate the client-related risks and consequently the firm's risk on loss on the 
engagement. They succeed in doing so, we argue, because the appointment of their 
alumni into fast-track and seniority networks in major companies provides auditors 
with valuable information on management26, and even more the presence of alumni on 
boards is likely to be regarded by auditors as a positive sign that the company is 
willing to set up strong and more reliable financial reporting systems which in turn 
lead to the expectation that auditors assess lower inherent (and control) risk(s). 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, auditors do evaluate the client-related risks before they 
assess the audit firm's level of risk of loss on the engagement. Not only that, but, as 
we have suggested, auditors seek actually to reduce the risks associated with the client 
inquiry audit process. This is in accordance with prior research in auditing whereas 
auditors appear to be sensitive to the objectivity of the source, to the expertise 
(competence) of the source and to the communication style of the client. Joyce and 
Biddle (1981), Hirst (1994) and Reimers and Fennema (1999) all demonstrate that 
auditors assess information from the more objective source as more diagnostic than 
information received from a less objective source. In addition, previous studies have 
shown that auditors receiving an estimate or explanation from a source of high 
expertise (competence) are more confident in their own re-estimate than auditors 
receiving an estimate or explanation from a source of low expertise (competence) 
(Bamber, 1983; Rebele et al, 1988; Hirst, 1994; Anderson et al, 1994). Finally, 
Comunale et al (1999) explore auditors' judgements in the presence of differing levels 
of client presentation skills and their findings suggest that the communication style of 
the client influences auditors' judgements and assessments of client credibility. In 
other words, the outplacement of audit firm's alumni on the clients' (prospective or 
not) boardrooms enhances the perceived objectivity, expertise, competence and the 
26 Kaplan and Reckers (1984) found that management integrity was not a significant factor in the auditor's 
assessment of error likelihood. However, this research finding is regarded as unexpected, as the given firm's audit 
pre-engagement decision processes would presumably preclude affiliation with a client of highly questionable 
integrity, in most cases at least. 
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linguistic delivery style of clients' management which in turn leads the auditors to 
assess lower inherent risk. 
The inherent and control risks mentioned above are two components of the audit risk 
model. The audit risk model specifies that audit risk is a function of three risk 
components: inherent risk (the likelihood that the environmental factors will produce 
a material misstatement before considering the quality of internal controls); control 
risk (the likelihood that the material misstatement will be not be prevented or detected 
by the internal control system); and detection risk (the likelihood that audit procedures 
will be ineffective in detecting a material error not previously detected by the internal 
control system). The higher the level of inherent risk, ceteris paribus, the more audit 
effort will be required to reduce detection risk to achieve a given level of audit risk. 
In sum, audit firms facilitate outplacement because of their organisational structure, 
but they also exploit effectively this service in order to assist them in (using, 
producing) pre-engagement analyses prepared by them, making the client 
acceptance/continuance decision and "screening" out prospective undesirable clients. 
Auditors are expected to assess lower levels of inherent risk for companies with 
chartered accountants on their boards which, in turn, results in lower audit effort and 
auditors charging lower audit fees. This argument is consistent with previous studies 
on the role of outside directors on boards of directors which have shown that the 
presence of independent non-executive directors on corporate boards is expected to be 
associated with higher monitoring and lower agency costs which is likely to affect 
assessments of inherent risk and lower the audit fees (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; 
Forker, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994; Chen and Jaggi, 1997; Gul et al, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the next section tells us a different (though perhaps complementary) 
story from the foregoing analysis. Using the literature in organisational behaviour and 
on alumni of universities, what follows is an analysis of some reasons why alumni 
may develop personal commitment to a continued identification with, and 
predisposition to benefit, their past employer. 
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2.6. Accounting firm alumni identification with their ex-firm 
As it has been outlined in the preceding sections, client service (as well as of course 
retention of existing client and acquisition of new clients) has a paramount importance 
for the survival and success of the audit firms. Accountants have been part of the 
"commercialised", private sector service class (Hanlon, 1994). On the other hand, 
development of career in the professional firms involves "networking" (Grey, 1994). 
The network of contacts becomes a primary significance since they represent selling 
opportunities. Accounting firms seem to recognise the marketing potential associated 
with their network of contacts and expend time and resources to develop it. Alumni 
(i. e., former colleagues) of these firms play an important role in this regard. Further, 
when the former employee retains an identification with the audit firm, this 
identification may help the firm to procure new business. What follows is an analysis 
of the above issues. 
Accounting firms, especially the Big-Six firms, have a large number of alumni due to 
high levels of staff turnover. Prior research, however, focuses on documenting mainly 
the negative effects of accounting staff turnover, and understanding the cause of the 
high turnover in order to reduce its dysfunctional consequences (Dillard and Ferris, 
1979; Bullen and Flamholtz, 1985; Rasch and Harrell, 1990; Gregson, 1992). On the 
other hand, there are some studies, e. g. Waller (1985), Iyer et al (1997) and Iyer 
(1998), which recognise that there can be mutual benefits from this turnover. 
All recruits, while being trained and employed by the accountancy firm, inhabit an 
environment which is set up to develop a sense of esprit de corps within the firm and 
promote long-lasting loyalties with colleagues and supervisors. There is plenty of 
anecdotal evidence that trainee intakes retain links long after qualification, and that 
firms actively promote such loyalties through annual reunion events (Grey, 1994; Iyer 
et al, 1997; Anderson-Gough et al, 1998). In such ways alumni maintain their 
knowledge about the firm's services and its reliability. Therefore it is not surprising in 
sociological terms, that the accountancy firm alumni retain an identification with the 
firm, and that this identification may influence the former employee when s/he 
participates in hiring an accountancy firm or may direct business to the firm. Again 
here, available anecdotal evidence suggests that alumni do favour their former 
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employer when they are in a position to choose or recommend an audit firm (Denney, 
1983; Kotler and Bloom, 1984) 
In the attempt to specify the nature of this identification more closely, Iyer et al (1997) 
have developed an experimentally testable model based on previous research in 
organisational behaviour and on alumni of educational institutions. Their model is 
concerned with the nature of the identification of accounting firm alumni with their 
former audit firm, and how this may affect alumni's subsequent inclination to benefit 
their former employer. The model, as developed and tested by Iyer et al (1997) and 
Iyer (1998), grows out of a broader theoretical framework which is concerned with the 
analysis of different processes of attitude change resulting from social influence27. The 
starting point of Kelman's (1959) theoretical analysis was the observation that 
changes in attitudes and actions produced by social influence may occur at different 
"levels". These differences in the nature or level of changes that take place correspond 
to differences in the process whereby the individual accepts influence (or conforms). 
In other words, the underlying processes in which an individual engages when he 
adopts induced behaviour may be different, even though the resulting overt behaviour 
may appear the same. Kelman has distinguished three different processes under which 
an individual can accept influence: compliance, identification and internalisation. In 
brief, compliance occurs when an individual adopts the induced behaviour (i. e., 
accepts influence) because he expects to achieve a favourable reaction from another 
person or group (and avoid specific punishment or disapproval by conforming), and 
not because he believes its content. Identification occurs when an individual accepts 
influence because he wants to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining 
relationship to another person or a group. The individual adopts the induced behaviour 
because it is associated with the desired relationship. The individual derives strength 
and a sense of self-identity from his connection to another person or a social group. 
Finally, internalisation occurs when an individual accepts influence because the 
content of the induced behaviour is intrinsically rewarding. He adopts the induced 
behaviour because it is congruent with his value system. Further, according to 
Kelman, each process is characterised by a distinctive set of antecedent conditions 
27 A detailed description of this framework and its features can be found in the work of Professor Kelman of 
Harvard University (1959). 
29 
under which influence takes the form of compliance, identification, or internalisation 
respectively. Similarly, each process is characterised by a distinctive set of consequent 
conditions. 
Iyer et al (1997) proposed an experimental way of classifying how, for accountancy 
firm alumni, some form of identification may take place, mediating between a distinct 
set of antecedents and a distinct set of consequents. Their experiment relates the 
antecedents postulated for the identification process to the consequents postulated for 
that process (i. e., the conditions of performance of the induced response). Their model 
was adapted from a study of college alumni's identification with their alma mater 
undertaken by Mael and Ashforth (1992) and was designed to vary the antecedents of 
identification - defined as the organisational prestige, socialisation process, personnel 
policies (i. e., personnel recruiting and personnel counselling), alumni relations, tenure, 
time elapsed, mentor relationship and sentimentality - and to observe the effects of 
this variation on one of the consequents - the inclination to benefit the former 
employer. 
The findings of Iyer et al (1997) indicate that some of the antecedents mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph (i. e., organisational prestige, socialisation process, mentor 
relationship and sentimentality) are positively related to accounting firm alumni's 
identification with their former audit firm, whilst others (i. e., personnel recruiting and 
time elapsed) are negatively associated to alumni's identification with their former 
firm. Personnel counselling, alumni relations and tenure are not significantly 
associated with alumni's identification, nevertheless they are proved to have a direct 
influence on alumni's inclination to benefit the alma mater. In addition, organisational 
prestige is also directly associated with alumni's predisposition to favour their former 
firm. Finally, identification is significantly positively related to inclination to benefit. 
It has been shown in an earlier section that the processes of formal and informal 
socialisation within the accountancy firms influence the behaviour of professional 
accountants and their organisational identity. The study by Iyer et al (1997) has 
demonstrated the validity of this argument (i. e., as outlined above, the socialisation 
process is shown to foster organisational identification), but it has also revealed the 
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importance of socialisation of accountants in the success of the audit firms. The 
returns to the firm from the efforts to facilitate socialisation continue (through 
established identification) after professional staff have left the firm. 
Iyer et al (1997) work has indicated that alumni relations are positively related to 
accounting firm alumni's inclination to favour the alma mater, however they do not 
have a significant impact on the alumni's identification itself, perhaps because the 
alumni's identification is already established when the accountant is involved in a 
career move. In other words, what seems to happen is that an accountancy firm 
follows a production process in which trainees with a pre-existing background, ability 
and so on are recruited and evaluated for future long term retention. The trainees are 
then gradually trained and finally qualify as chartered accountants, and those who 
finish the process (and do not continue in employment with the firm) turn into alumni. 
The audit firm then pursues a second process in which (already achieved) alumni 
identification with the organisation is retained and enhanced by applying development 
effort to alumni. 
For example, audit firms devote considerable resources to their alumni relations 
programmes in keeping track of their alumni, publishing alumni directories containing 
alumni's names and other personal details, emphasising job placement services for 
departing employees and maintaining formal and informal contacts with their alumni, 
through alumni directories, annual social events, picnics and gatherings, newsletters 
and continuing education programmes (such as periodic technical seminars). In 
addition, many of the audit firm alumni belong to an alma mater club even years after 
they have left the firm. 
The fact, therefore, that accounting firms maintain communications with their alumni 
suggests that the firms believe that these alumni relations influence positively the 
alumni's identification with their alma mater, and that these efforts are still valuable 
and expected to benefit the firm. This is partially consistent with Iyer et al (1997) who 
found that one of the antecedents of identification - i. e., alumni relations - is 
significantly associated with alumni's tendency to benefit the former firm. Probably 
this positive association between alumni relations and inclination to benefit 
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enhances the already established organisational identification and improves the 
strength of the bond forged between the organisation and its alumni (although no 
significant relationship between alumni relations and identification was advanced by 
Iyer et al (1997)). However, the above argument is in accordance with prior studies 
where organisational identification appears to increase when there is increased contact 
with an organisation (Dutton et al, 1994), when these contacts remind firm alumni of 
their connection to the organisation (Stern, 1988), and highlight the organisation's 
attractive attributes (Bruner, 1957; Baade and Sundberg, 1996). Increased, therefore, 
alumni's identification with their former accounting firm is likely to affect their 
willingness or inclination to benefit the audit firm when the opportunity arises. 
Moreover, reading the social psychological research literature, one cannot fail to 
notice the use of congruent determinants of alumni identification with the ones 
mentioned in the foregoing analysis in order to predict monetary and non-monetary 
contributions to victims "in distress" (such as universities, sports teams, charities and 
so on). For example, Fisher and Wakefield (1998) used a similar model to Iyer et al 
(1997) to show a strong association between the strength of identification and the 
incidence of group-supportive behaviours for members of a two-group professional 
sports fans. Piliavin et al (1981) showed that one factor which increases the 
bystander's perception of similarity to a group is the common group membership 
which in turn increases the probability of helping behaviour. In other words, the 
stronger the relationship between an organisation and its members, the greater the 
willingness of individual members to engage in behaviours that support the group. 
Diamond and Kashyap (1997) used also a similar model to Iyer et al (1997) to find 
reciprocity and individual attachment (i. e., identification) as determinants of 
obligation to benefit the alma mater. Alumni are predicted to feel more obligated if 
they feel the alma mater has benefited them personally or professionally. Some may 
wish to repay the former firm for their success in life after professional qualification 
and outplacement, because they feel that their alma mater has taught them things 
which have been important in their personal and professional lives. Equity theory 
predicts that alumni benefit the alma mater to the degree their success derives from or 
is perceived as deriving from the alma mater (Adams, 1965; Walster and Piliavin, 
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1972). Others may feel most obligated to benefit the former firm because of their 
strong identification with the firm. Hunter et al (1999) reached similar conclusions in 
their study. Baade and Sundberg (1996) applied a log-linear regression model to 
explore what determines alumni giving. Their results indicate that both institutional 
characteristics as well as trainee (student) characteristics are correlated with alumni 
giving. Similarly, a logit regression model was used by Okunade and Berl (1997) to 
investigate the propensity of business school alumni to donate cash to the alma mater. 
Again, alumni identification with the business school under study is one of the factors 
that shapes alumni giving behaviours. 
In sum, it seems that accountancy firm alumni are important assets for the firms. 
Today's trainee chartered accountants become tomorrow's alumni (unless they are 
retained and promoted to attain gradually the partnership level), and also may wind up 
as tomorrow's potential clients. Accountancy firm alumni are developed into valuable 
marketing contacts for the audit firms (Denney, 1983). The accountancy firms 
themselves do recognise the marketing potential associated with their alumni, and they 
expend time and resources to develop and maintain their links with alumni (Grey, 
1994; lyer et al, 1997; Iyer, 1998). Moreover, it is likely that the prestige of having 
trained with a specific audit firm, the socialisation received in this firm and the 
sustained development effort to alumni continue to colour the values and 
identification of some alumni. The degree of identification affects individuals' 
willingness to support groups, and certain antecedents have been experimentally 
proven to be important determinants of identification and inclination to benefit the 
alma mater. Consumers often communicate their identification with or support of an 
organisation through the purchase of an organisation insignia products (Tom and 
Elmer, 1994). Accountants may communicate their identification by feeling obligated 
to benefit their alma mater. 
2.7. Summary and conclusions 
We have put together in this chapter a range of explanations derived from economics, 
psychology and sociology to show why the alumni of the (mainly large) accounting 
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firms may select to be associated with their "alma mater" (i. e. past employers) years 
after having been outplaced. The insights derived from these various sources can be 
summarised as follows: 
From the economics perspective, the only significant input of the accounting firms is 
human capital but because the human capital is difficult to diversify, the need for risk- 
sharing is an important influence on organisational structure. Sharing of profits on a 
predetermined basis reduces the risk of individuals' human capital investment. Human 
capital, however, is susceptible to opportunism, and the development of firm-specific 
human capital protects the firms against some partners and non-partners grabbing, 
shirking, or leaving. The up-or-out personnel policy serves two dimensions: it protects 
employee accountants against the firm reneging on its promise of a fair partnership 
decision when the apprenticeship period ends; it, also, allows a significant degree of 
screening so that only those with high post-investment productivity will be retained. 
Nevertheless, as we have analysed in the preceding sections of this chapter, the up-or- 
out policy destroys the investment in firm-specific human capital unless the firm is 
able to reduce the risk of this investment. It does that by facilitating outplacement. 
Although the accounting firm has outplaced its alumni, they are still important assets 
for the audit firm. After the outplacement, the alumni become prospective customers 
of the audit firms and the accountancy firms do exploit their ability to manage their 
alumni asset in order to maximise the benefits derived from their alumni base. 
From the economic rationale, the "failed partners" get return on their investment in 
human capital by being outplaced to an audit client. The ability to successfully use 
alumni connections and networks allows the return on investment not to be lost. This 
helps to reduce the likelihood of the alumni of accountancy firms being resentful 
towards their alma mater. Instead, we argued, it creates the "alumni effect" where 
there is an association between the accountancy firms' alumni and their alma mater. 
Using an analysis drawing on information economics and auditor's engagement risk, it 
was shown that auditors evaluate the client-related risks and this in turn affects the 
level of audit fees charged by audit firms. By outplacing their alumni into the 
boardrooms of existing (and prospective) clients, accounting firms reduce the client- 
34 
Mal x'r! ý. 
related risks, and as a result the firm's risk on loss on the engagement. The presence of 
audit firm alumni, therefore, into client management positions leads to expectation 
that the auditors assess lower levels of inherent and control risks which, in turn, 
results in lower audit effort and auditors charging lower audit fees. 
Thereinafter, a more explicit cognisance of literatures which have looked into the 
wider context of accountancy training, professionalisation and identification was 
taken. From the sociological perspective, therefore, a number of antecedents were 
experimentally proven to be associated to the identification of audit firm alumni with 
their former firm. Moreover, identification itself affects alumni's propensity to favour 
the alma mater. One of the antecedents of identification was the process of 
socialisation in accounting firms. It was shown that through socialisation accountants 
acquire appropriate forms of professional behaviour and also an organisational 
identity and anti-shirking culture through espousing the corporate values to which they 
belong. Alumni relations also appear to be positively related to audit firm alumni's 
inclination to benefit the alma mater. Accountancy firms devote considerable 
resources to their alumni relations and they recognise the marketing potential 
associated with their alumni. For example, they organise annual reunion events, 
publish alumni directories and newsletters, etc. Thus, the degree of alumni 
identification with their former audit firm is likely to affect their willingness to 
support the alma mater. 
Our primary concern was to develop a theoretical framework to provide insights into 
an unexplored social phenomenon - the association between accountancy firms' 
alumni and their alma mater. Practitioners are always far along in understanding and 
exploiting this phenomenon (as any other phenomenon or problem). We attempted to 
arrange things into "theories" but always the challenge exceeds our competence - if 
only because we are not fully embroiled in the rich detail that the practitioners cope 
with and understand (Wilson, 1983). However, we hope that the application of this 
body of theory to a real world institution will have the positive side effects of both 
extending the reach of the theory itself and helping to demonstrate its usefulness. 
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A LITERATURE REVIEW 
OF THE 
AUDIT FEE RESEARCH STUDIES 
It is rarely the case that a whole research literature can be traced to a single origin, but 
that distinction belongs to Simunic's (1980) paper which was the first study to 
consider auditing from an industrial economics perspective. Prior to Simunic, audit 
research comprised two strands: the philosophy and public policy of auditing, e. g. 
ethics, independence, auditing standards, etc.; and the application of statistics to the 
auditing context. Subsequent to Simunic, a new strand has developed which explores 
the audit industry from an economics perspective and addresses issues such as: what is 
the nature of competition in the industry; is the market for audit services segmented; 
what are the determinants of switching; is the low-balling occurred on initial 
engagements justified; is risk adequately priced in audit fees. This new strand is 
sometimes referred to as audit market research or audit fee studies. 
Having identified the importance for audit firms of their alumni from a human capital 
perspective in Chapter II, it is necessary to explore whether there are affects of alumni 
reflected in audit prices. As a prelude to this main investigation of the thesis, it is 
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appropriate to review first the related prior literature. It should be clear at the outset of 
this review that no prior research has considered the role of accounting firm alumni in 
audit market. A number of other factors affecting the audit fee have been investigated 
as we discuss in this chapter. Given the seminal nature of Simunic's (1980) analysis, 
the review starts with an exposition and critique of his work. 
3.1. Simunic's (1980) seminal study 
The objective of Simunic's (1980) landmark research was to examine the principal 
determinants of prices of the financial audit services rendered to companies by the 
accounting firms. He identified as a possible price determinant the structure of the 
accounting services market, especially the exercise of monopoly power by the Big- 
Eight (now Big-Five)' audit firms. The purpose of his study, therefore, was to test 
whether price prevailed throughout the US market for the audits of publicly held 
companies, irrespective of the share of a market segment which is served by the Big- 
Eight firms. 
Simunic first developed a positive economic model of the audit price (fees) formation 
process, and then based on this model, a general set of factors which may cause prices 
to vary across audit engagements and hypotheses concerning specific price 
determinants were formed and tested through collection and analysis of a sample 
cross-section of audit transactions. 
Since the audit fee is a product of unit price, denoted by p, and the quantity of audit 
services demanded, denoted by q, cross-sectional differences in audit fees may stem 
from either price differences or quantity differences. The model was developed to help 
identifying likely determinants of audit demand or audit quantity2, such that unit 
prices could be examined. Based on the normative, co-operative, auditee-auditor joint 
utility maximisation model of Demski & Swieringa (1974), Simunic considers the 
1 Note that the number of large dominated accountancy firms was eight during the 1980's. During the 1990's, the 
number of the large accountancy firms became six, today are five. 
2 For a fixed set of audit conditions, variations in the quantity of audit service rendered represent variations in 
audit quality. 
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external audit as a subsystem of an auditee's overall financial reporting system. In 
other words, the external audit is viewed as part of an overall financial reporting 
process designed to "authenticate" (Hirschleifer, 1973) the information disseminated 
by the auditee to third parties. 
Auditee and external auditor are assumed to be jointly and severally liable to third 
parties for losses attributable to defective audited financial statements and, therefore, 
any actual losses incurred will be somehow divided between the two parties. The audit 
service is viewed as an economic good to the auditee, which has substitutes and 
complements in consumption. Consequently, the demanded quantity of auditing will 
result from equalisation of marginal private benefits and costs of the audit service. In 
other words, Simunic hypothesises that the amount of resources which the auditee will 
devote to the above mentioned "authentication", or else the audit benefits, are in the 
nature of a joint auditee-auditor expected third party liability loss avoidance (expected 
cost minimisation). 
Simunic models audit pricing both in a competitive and non-competitive market 
setting, and also analyses the effects of audit production economies. Each of these 
three models are summarised in the next three sections. 
3.1.1. The auditee's decision problem under competition 
The decision problem of the auditee is expressed as an unconstrained minimisation of 
the expected total costs of its financial reporting system, denoted E(TC). In 
particular, demand for internal control and external audit services is modelled as the 
auditee's choice of the system design variables (a, q), such that the following function 
is minimised: 
min E(TC) = va + pq + E(d 
l 
a, q)(1- E(8 )) [Function 1] 
where: 
a= the quantity of resources utilised by the auditee in operating its internal 
accounting control system. The value of (a) describes the quality of internal 
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control; 
q= the quantity of resources utilised by the auditor in a particular audit 
engagement. The value of (q) can be called the quality of a given audit; 
v= the per-unit factor cost of internal control resources to the auditee; 
p= the unit price of external audit services to the auditee, that is, the price per 
unit of (q) purchased by the auditee from the auditor. It will depend on the 
state of competition in the market for audit services; 
J= the discounted present value of possible future losses; 
E(d l a, q) = the expected present value of possible future losses which may 
arise from this period audited financial statements and which is conditional3 on 
a and q; 
9= the ex post fraction of residual losses borne by the auditor; 
1- E(8) = the auditee's expected share of losses. 
Simunic does not explicitly model an internal control system and external audit 
production function, but assumes that resources are utilised efficiently so that a and q 
denote both inputs and corresponding unique quantities of output constructs. 
The auditor's minimum supply (asking) price, p, per unit of q is the marginal cost. 
Thus, the minimum audit fee, which is the product (pq), for different levels of audit 
quantity will be equal to the expected incremental total cost, denoted E(C) , or 
pq = E(C) = cq + E(d 
I 
a, q)E(9 ) 
where: 
[Function 2] 
c= the per-unit cost of external audit resources to the auditor, including all 
opportunity costs and therefore a provision for a normal profit. 
3 Diminishing marginal benefits from internal control and external audit demand are assumed. In particular: 
(WX 0 
a2 E( 
)0 
dE(d) 
0 
a2 E(d) 
20 
a2 E(d/th>o 
are assumed to 
Oh 
<2 °lq a9 
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For any profit maximising auditor p>c, or pq >_ cq . Since, by definition, the 
parameter c includes all costs of a unit of q including a normal return, when the 
market for audits is competitive, p=c, and the auditor's price/quality schedule under 
competition becomes the [Function 2]. 
The auditor's expected costs are, thus, a function of the auditee's financial reporting 
system. Therefore, by substitution to [Function 1], the auditee's decision problem can 
be re-specified as: 
min E(T) = va +cq+E(dla, q)E(Ö)+E(dla, q)(1- E(9)) 
which again reduces to: 
min E(TC) = va + cq + E(d 
f 
a, q) [Function 3] 
As a result, the demanded quantities of internal control and external auditing will 
result from equalisation of marginal benefits and costs. Also, the expected incidence 
of third party liability has no effect upon the auditee's optimum utilisation of internal 
control and external audit resources. This is so because the auditee expects to incur all 
financial reporting system costs (including internal control and external audit) and so 
is indifferent to the cost form, whether the cost of internal control systems, external 
audit price, or expected discounted residual liability losses. Alternatively, the result 
follows from Coase (1960), who showed that, in the absence of transaction costs, a 
change in the assignment of legal liability for negative externalities does not affect the 
allocation of resources. The mechanism which leads to the result is the opportunity for 
a costless transaction through which external effects are internalised. 
The necessary conditions for a minimum in the above [Function 3] are: 
hold. A further assumption is that there is diminishing substitutability between a and q, or that: da/dq<O and 
d2a/dg2>0 holds. 
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da da +v=0, 
and 
9(Te) dE(d 
+c=0, 
dq - dq 
dE(d) 
or -=v 
aE (d ) 
or -=c aq 
Note, that when the market for audits is competitive, as it is assumed in this case, 
p=c. 
These conditions require that auditee will demand quantities of a and q up to the point 
where the marginal reduction in expected liability losses is equal to the marginal cost 
of system resources to the auditee. 
3.1.2. The auditee's decision problem in a non-competitive market 
To model audit demand in a non-competitive market setting, Simunic assumed that a 
dominant subset of audit firms (i. e. the Big-Eight firms), through some form of 
collusion, agrees to limit price competition_so as to introduce an element of monopoly 
profit, denoted by m, into the unit price, p. 
Under monopoly p=c+m, and similar to [Function 2], the fee schedule of an 
auditor who is one of the Big-Eight and, therefore, part of the cartel, is then: 
pq = E(C) -- (c+m)q+E(dla, q)E(8) 
and the auditee seeks to minimise the following objective function: 
minE(TC) = va+(c+m)q+E(dja, q). 
The necessary conditions for the minimisation become: 
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The effects of monopolistic auditor behaviour are that the quantity of audit services 
demanded q decreases relative to the competitive case, and that the quantity of desired 
internal control resources a increases4. Furthermore, because of the diminishing 
substitutability between internal control (a) and external audit resources (q) in 
controlling liability losses, the desired quality level of the financial reporting system 
decreases, where quality is implicitly measured by the joint reduction in expected 
residual losses. In other words, monopoly leads to lower quality audits and a lower 
quality financial reporting system. As a result, the level of expected residual liability 
losses will be larger under monopoly pricing, and so will be the total financial 
reporting system costs. 
Although monopolisation through collusion among the Big-Eight firms increases the 
unit price of external audit services p above the competitive level, the implication on 
the level of the audit fee pq is indeterminate (p increases, and q decreases)5. The 
direction of the change in audit fees depends upon the price elasticity of the demand 
for external auditing (which itself depends on the goodness of available substitutes). 
Inelastic demand would result in an increase in audit fees, whereas elastic demand in a 
decrease in audit fees. 
3.1.3. The effects of auditor production economies 
Simunic also theoretically addresses the effects of production economies on audit 
quantity demanded, unit prices and auditee financial reporting system costs. Assuming 
that there is competition among auditors who achieve such economies, the auditor 
client's necessary condition for the minimisation of expected costs with economies 
becomes: 
4 This is so because reduction of q makes the value of cE(d )loci more negative at any a, since 
82 E(d)/oädq >0 holds. 
5 However, monopoly pricing increases the audit fee, pq, in the absence of external audit substitutes such as the 
services of internal auditors. 
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where: 
A= the relative efficiency of an auditor in reducing residual expected losses. 
The characteristics of this solution are the reverse of the results under monopoly 
pricing. That is: (1) the quantity of external audit services demanded increases and the 
quantity of desired internal control decreases; (2) the unit price p decreases; (3) the 
sum of the auditee's observable total system costs (va + pq) decreases; and (4) as in 
the case of monopoly, the effect on audit fee pq is indeterminate and depends upon the 
elasticity of substitution between internal control (a) and external audit resources (q), 
i. e. it depends on the price elasticity of demand for external auditing. 
3.2. The logic of the test for competition in the audit market 
For the empirical test of competitive pricing, Simunic assumes that the sub-market for 
audits of smaller publicly traded companies is competitive (due to the large number of 
audit firms active in that market), and tests for the effects of increased Big-Eight 
concentration on prices charged to large clients6. Moreover, the research was designed 
under the assumption that different audit pricing for large and small auditees might be 
a result of (1) scale economies which can be exploited by large accounting firms, or 
(2) product differentiation7. In other words, he recognises that the Big-Eight firms can 
be a source of production economies, and also, that it is possible the Big-Eight 
auditors may sell a differentiated service for which clients are willing to pay a higher 
price. Simunic states that the market for audit services is thought of as a hedonic 
market (Rosen, 1974) in which differentiated products are not observed directly by the 
customer but rather are revealed by differences in observed prices which are 
associated with differences in observed product (audit) characteristics. A possible 
6 In effect, Simunic assumes that the large client segment of the audit market is not competitive. However, see 
Pearson and Trompeter (1994) for providing the counter-argument that high levels of concentration may not 
necessarily result in low levels of audit price competition. 
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source of differences in auditee utility and I the principal differentiating characteristic 
of the audit service may simply be the identity of the supplier, and again it is the Big- 
Eight firms which enjoy visibility, brand-name recognition and reputation among 
buyers8. 
Table 3.2. A: Test for competition: interpretation of possible differences in average audit prices when 
quoted companies use Big-Eight or non-Big Eight auditors across market segments 
Results for the "large" 
auditee segment 
Results for the "small" auditee segment 
CREI8 > CREI CREI8 = CREI 8 CREI8 < CREI 8 
CREI8 > CREI 8* LIJ+ Competition with Monopoly pricing MPr by the Big-Eight 
differentiated product (MPr) by the Big-Eight together with scale 
(DPr) to the Big-Eight economies to the Big- 
Eight 
CREI8 = CREI 8 
Competition with DPr j Competition (6) MPr by the Big-Eight 
to the Big-Eight together throughout the market together with scale 
with diseconomies to non- without any scale economies to the Big- 
Big Eight with large economies to the Big- Eight 
auditees Eight 
CREI8 < CREI 8 
Competition with DPr Competition with Competition with 
to the Big-Eight together diseconomies to non- scale economies to the 
with diseconomies to non- Big Eight with large Big-Eight 
Big Eight with large auditees 
auditees 
* CREI8 denotes the average residual costs of auditees using a Big-Eight firm and CREI 8 denotes the 
average residual costs of auditees using a non-Big Eight firm 
+ The numbers 1-9 (in bold and underline) denote the 9 different scenarios (have been added to original 
table to simplify subsequent discussion) 
Source: Simunic (1980) 
Simunic collected relevant data through a survey of a sample of publicly held 
companies which were stratified by auditee size. In particular, a questionnaire, sent to 
1,207 companies, yielded 397 usable responses directly from quoted industrial and 
commercial companies. Also, the sample was stratified by auditor group (Big-Eight 
versus non-Big Eight audit firms). To test the hypothesis that price competition 
prevails throughout the market for the audits of publicly held companies it was 
necessary to control for differences in the quantity of audit service purchased, q, and 
internal control quantity, a. A number of control variables were chosen in 
7 Product differentiation refers to audits of different quality. For a fruitful discussion of the relationship between 
auditor size and audit quality, see DeAngelo (1981b). Also the footnote 14 below. 
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correspondence of the audit pricing model9. Simunic computed and compared the 
cost residuals for both the small (defined as sales less than US$125million) and large 
auditee segment (defined as sales more than US$125million). Cost residual was 
defined in Simunic's study as the audit cost not explained by the control variables. 
Differences in the average cost residuals between auditees using Big-Eight and those 
using non-Big Eight auditors were interpreted using the following Table 3.2. A. 
Simunic found no significant differences in cost residuals, and hence in audit prices; 
he showed that the audit fee determinants in the small and the large auditee segment 
are homogeneous in the US audit market. This result was interpreted by Simunic as 
being consistent with the competitive market structure scenario and no certain scale 
economies or product differentiation to the Big-Eight firms (scenario 5, in the Table 
3.2. A). 
3.3. Patterns in the pricing of audits 
Simunic's (1980) stimulating work has been expanded by other researchers using 
similar cross-sectional methodologies and testing models and hypotheses in a number 
of alternative audit markets (see Table 3.3. A below). As in Simunic's study, cross- 
sectional multiple regression models are developed relating external audit fees to 
auditee firm characteristics. These studies have gathered survey data for the dependent 
variable (audit fee), and for a number of auditor and firm-specific independent 
variables. Auditor-related variables have been considered as important test variables, 
whereas auditee-related variables have often been merely regarded as control variables 
for audit effort or audit quantity. Appendix I gives an overview of the hypothesised 
explanatory variables for most studies under review, indicating which variables were 
found to be significant and giving the sign of their coefficients. Table 3.4. A in section 
3.4 below provides an brief outlook of the popular independent variables across 
" Note, however, that a general definition of audit quality has not yet evolved. For a discussion of this issue, see 
Moizer (1993), Sutton and Lampe (1990). See also Chapter X for a discussion of product differentiation 
explanation. 
_ 9 Simunic made a distinction between control variables for differences in liability loss exposure, E(d), and 
control variables for differences in the assessed loss-sharing ratio, E(q). There will be a discussion about the 
control variables later on this chapter. 
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Firth (1985) AFEE = bo + b1ASSETSO'5 + b2RECV + b3INV + b4SUBS + b5LOSS + b6PROFITVAR + 
b7UNSYSRISK + b8PROFIT + b9AUDITOR + bloCCA +u 
Simon, et al InFEE = bo + b1InASSETS + b2INVRECV + b3LOSS + b4SUBS '+ b5OPINION + 
(1986) b6AUDITOR +u 
Palmrose InFEE = bo + biInASSETS + b2InREPORTS + b3AUDLOC + b4FEERED + b5LISTED + 
(1986a) b6OPINION + b7INDSPEC + b8AUDITOR + b9IND +u 
Chung & Lindsay AFEE/ASSETS "= bo + b1SUBS + b2DIVERS + b3FORGN + b4RECV + b5INV + 
(1988) b6PROFIT + b7LOSS + b8TIME + b9AUDITOR +u 
Johnson et al InAFEE = bo + b1InASSET + b2SUBS '+ b3INVREC + b4FEERED + b5TENURE + 
(1995) b6LOSS + b7OPINION + b8InRPTS + b9LISTED + bj0AUDITOR +u 
Ezzamel et al InAFEE = bo + b1InSALES + b2ROCE + b3DELAY + b4HIRF + b5SIG + b6LOC + 
(1996) b7AUDITOR + b8UKSUBS + b9OSSUBS + bloNAS + b11REG +u 
Description of variables: 
SUBS = number of consolidated companies; 
DIVERS = number of two digit SIC codes minus 1; 
FORGN = ratio of foreign assets to total assets; 
RECV = ratio of receivables to total assets at year-end; 
INV = ratio of inventory to total assets at year-end; 
PROFIT = ratio of net profit to total assets; 
LOSS = dummy variable, coded 1 if loss in current or one of prior two years, 0 otherwise; 
OPINION = dummy variable, coded 1 if a qualified audit report received in current year, 0 otherwise; 
TIME = length of auditor-client relationship; 
AUDITOR = dummy variable, coded 1 if Big-Eight (Big-Six), 0 otherwise; 
CURRASSETS(%) = current assets to total assets at yea-end; 
QUICKR = cash and receivables and short-term investments divided by current liabilities; 
EQUITYDEBT = total equity to total debt ratio; 
ROI = return on investment = PROFIT (see above); 
MONTH YR-END = the month the fiscal year ends; 
PROFITVAR = variance of the return on shareholders' equity over a ten year period; 
UNSYSRISK = variance of the return on shareholders' equity less the variance of the market; 
CCA = dummy variable, coded 1 if companies produced Current Cost Accounts, 0 otherwise; 
INVREC = the percentage of total assets held in inventory and receivables; 
REPORTS = number of reports; 
AUDLOC = number of audit locations; 
FEERED = the percentage fee reduction given for audit assistance provided by the client; 
LISTED = dummy variable, coded 1 if the auditee is a public company, 0 otherwise; 
INDSPEC = dummy variable, coded 1 if auditor is an industry specialist, 0 otherwise; 
IND = dummy variable, coded 1 if the client is operating in a particular industry, 0 otherwise; 
TENURE = dummy variable, coded 1 if the same audit firm has been used for 3 years or less, o otherwise (a test for 
lowballing); 
RPTS = number of additional audit-related reports provided by the audit firm; 
ROCE = return on capital employed; 
DELAY = interval between the end of the accounting period and the signing of the audit report measured in days; 
HIRF = index of diversification based on Herfindahl; 
SIG = the proportion of the company's equity held by directors and "significant shareholders"; 
LOC = coded 1 if the audit report has a London address, otherwise 0; 
UKSUBS = number of UK subsidiaries; 
OSSUBS = number of non-UK subsidiaries; 
NAS = non-audit services; 
REG = coded I if the company is operating in a regulated industry (electricity, telecommunications, water). 
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studies, whereby each of these is allocated to a particular category and/or sub- 
category. 
In the following sections, a review of the empirical evidence found in the relevant 
audit services' pricing research literature is provided. 
3.3.1. Prior research about pricing of audit services 
Audit pricing research has extended Simunic's (1980) original work both to consider 
different sizes of firm (for example, Francis & Stokes, 1986; Francis & Simon, 1987), 
and to different national settings, apart from the US market (Simunic, 1984; Wallace, 
1984; Simon, 1985; Palmrose, 1984,1986a, 1986b; Simon & Francis, 1988; Turpen, 
1990; Ettredge & Greenberg, 1990; Gist, 1992; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994). For 
example, to the Australian market (Francis, 1984; Francis & Stokes, 1986; Craswell et 
a1,1995), to the Canadian market (Chung and Lindsay, 1988), to the New Zealand 
market (Firth, 1985; Johnson et al, 1995), to the Singapore market (Low et al, 1990; 
Simon et al, 1992), to the Hong Kong market (Simon et al, 1992; Gul, 1999), to the 
Indian market (Simon et al, 1986), to the Bangladesh market (Karim and Moizer, 
1996), to the UK audit market (Taylor & Baker, 1981; Taffler & Ramalinggam, 1982; 
Ramzy, 1988; Chan et al, 1993; Pong & Whittington, 1994; Ezzamel et al, 1996). One 
study (Haskins & Williams, 1988) has made a comparison between audit fees 
determinants across countries (i. e. Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) and across Big-Eight auditing firms. In most of the 
above studies similar independent variables are used and almost similar findings have 
been shown10. However, the main focus of most of these studies was not to identify an 
exhaustive list of significant audit fee determinants as such, but rather: 
(1) to investigate whether there exists an audit firm size effect on audit fees, i. e. 
whether there are identifiable differences between fees charged by the Big-Eight (or 
Big-Six) firms and those charged by non-Big Eight both in the market segments for 
the audits of small and large auditees, and hence, to draw conclusions with respect 
to price competition, product differentiation and economies of scale in the market 
for audit services; and/or 
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(2) to examine whether there is evidence of underpricing on initial audit engagements; 
and/or 
(3) to understand the effect of the provision of non-audit services by the external 
auditor on the pricing of external audit services 
3.3.1.1. Big-Eight (or Big-Six) auditor premium 
There does not exist consensus as to the impact of different classes of auditor on 
differential audit fee pricing and as to whether the impact differs between the small 
and the large auditee market segment. Simunic (1980) found that the US audit market 
was generally competitive. Seven of the Big-Eight audit firms (Price Waterhouse was 
the eighth firm) charged lower audit fees than small audit firms overall (consistent 
with large audit firm economies of scale - scenario 9 in Table 3.2. A); however, there 
was no difference in audit fees between large and small audit firms after client control 
costs were taken into account in both the small and large auditees market (consistent 
with a competitive market structure, and no scale economies or product differentiation 
to the Big-Eight - scenario 5 in Table 3.2. A). Firth (1985) also reported a non- 
significant auditor size effect in the New Zealand market for audit services (without 
partitioning into large and small auditees). 
However, other studies which tested for the existence of a Big-Eight premium found 
significant results. In a study of 136 Australian companies, Francis (1984), who 
replicated Simunic's (1980) model for price competition in the Australian market, 
found evidence that the Big-Eight firms charged 16.5% higher audit fees than non-Big 
Eight firms both in the large and small auditees market, consistent with a competitive 
audit market structure with product differentiation (scenario 1 in Table 3.2. A). One 
explanation for the difference between the above two studies is that Simunic's sample 
contained much larger companies than did that of Francis. Also, Chan et al (1993) 
reported a significant Big-Eight premium of 36.70% charged in both the small and the 
large company segment of the market for a sample of 280 UK auditees. 
In an attempt to reconcile the above different results, Francis & Stokes (1986) re- 
examined the Australian audit market and controlled for size effects by estimating 
1' The above mentioned studies are discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections of the chapter. 
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separate audit fee regression models for samples of large and small companies 
(Francis' (1984) sample was used). Their analysis indicated that the Australian audit 
market is segmented by company size. In the large company segment of the market, no 
significant differences in audit fees between large and small audit firms were 
observed, suggesting that non-Big Eight diseconomies offset any Big-Eight premiums 
(scenario 5 in Table 3.2. A). This result is consistent with Simunic (1980), but is in 
contrast with Johnson et al (1995). For the small companies segment though, Francis 
& Stokes reported that Big-Eight firms charged significantly (18.8%) higher audit fees 
than non-Big Eight (scenario 4 in Table 3.2. A). This result is similar to Brinn et al 
(1994) who found a significant Big-Eight audit premium (28%) for independent 
unquoted companies in the UK (they compared their results with the relatively small 
quoted companies). 
Subsequent studies of the US audit market by Palmrose (1986a) and Francis and 
Simon (1987) have also reported that the Big-Eight firms were associated with higher 
audit fees with respect to smaller companies. In fact, Palmrose replicated Francis & 
Stokes (1986) result, while Francis and Simon found a significant Big-Eight premium 
existed with respect to both second tier national firms (29.7%) and local or regional 
firms (27.1 %). Another study indicated higher Big-Eight premiums charged to smaller 
companies was that one of the British market by Taffler and Ramalinggam (1982), 
although detailed comparisons with other studies should be made with care, since the 
auditor size variable in this study was chosen somewhat very crudely and 
idiosyncratically (since Arthur Andersen was grouped as one of the small audit firms). 
The above results are supportive for a competitive audit market with product 
differentiation to the Big-Eight firms and diseconomies of scale to the non-Big Eight 
in the audits of large companies (scenario 4 in Table 3.2. A). However, a more recent 
study has failed to provide evidence of Big-Eight firms premium in the medium-size 
UK auditees (Che-Ahmad & Houghton, 1996). 
Taken together, it seems that monopoly pricing does not prevail in the audit markets, 
since scenarios 2,3 and 6 in Table 3.2. A, do not appear to have been matched by any 
researchers' findings. In other words, the empirical evidence indicates that the market 
for audit services is indeed competitive, in the sense that it reveals that the audit fees 
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charged by the Big-Eight accounting firms in the large auditee market segment have 
never been significantly and strictly higher, ceteris paribus, than the audit fees 
charged by the Big-Eight accounting firms in the small auditee market segment". 
However, although there is a competitive audit market structure, there exists no 
consensus about the existence of product differentiation and scale (dis)economies. 
Most results (i. e. those supporting scenarios 1 and 4 in Table 3.2. A) point in the 
direction of product differentiation. Note that this lack of consensus does not 
necessarily derive from country-specific elements. Inconsistent evidence with regard 
to differential audit fee pricing by different classes of auditors was found within 
countries. For example, Simunic (1980) and Palmrose (1986a) both examined US 
samples and report such contradictory evidence; the same holds for Francis (1984) and 
Francis & Stokes (1986) with respect to Australian samples. One explanation, 
however, may be, as mentioned earlier, the average auditee size in the respective 
samples of small and large clients12 and/or different periods of data. 
The evidence reviewed in the preceding paragraphs enables us to explain some of the 
magnitude of the Big-Eight firms fee premiums ranged between 4% and 56% for 
different countries and periods. The existing literature suggests that there is a 
systematic difference between the fees charged by the Big-Eight (or Six) as opposed to 
non-Big Eight (or Six) audit firms. Researchers have classified auditors into two 
distinct groups, that is Big-Six (or Big-Eight depending on when the studies were 
undertaken) and non-Big Six firms, and tested for the effect of differences in supplier 
concentration upon the audit prices. As developed in section 3.2 earlier, the test for 
competition involves a comparison of the prices paid to Big-Six relative to non-Big 
Six firms in the small auditee segment (which is assumed to be competitive), and the 
large auditee segment (where the Big-Six auditors are highly dominant and may 
behave as a cartel). 
With particular reference to Table 3.2. A, if CREI8 > CREI 
8 holds for the large auditee segment, then CREI8 = 
CREI 8 and CREI8 < CREI 8 never hold for the small auditee segment; and 
if CREI8 = CREI 8 holds for the large 
auditee segment, then CREI8 < CREI 8 never holds 
for the small auditee segment. 
12 The definition of small and large auditees varies across studies. 
The average client size, measured in terms of 
total assets, for the small auditee samples was 
$40million (US) in Palmrose (1986a); $8 million (Australian) in 
Francis (1984); $1.8million (Australian) in Francis & Stokes (1986). 
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However, within the two auditor groups, individual firms may not be homogeneous, 
that is, all firms may not within a group be associated with above (or below) average 
fee levels. To resolve this, researchers have performed tests of homogeneity to 
evaluate whether there are differences in average audit fee (or other dependent 
variable used) across the firms within a group and whether the possible individual 
firm effects on the dependent variable could be controlled. So for instance, Simunic 
found in his (1980) study that Price Waterhouse was a high-value outlier in average 
deflated audit fee among different Big-Eight audit firms, and more recent studies have 
added dummy variables for each Big-Six firm to see if there are any audit fee 
premiums or discounts enjoyed by those firms and, in essence, to check whether a 
better fit of the model used could be obtained. Table 3.3.1.1. A presents summary 
results of the premiums or discounts identified in various audit fee studies. 
The audit fee results show that in the majority of the studies a general audit fee 
premium for Big-Six auditors as a group exists in the market for audit services. In 
addition, some other differences have been detected within the Big-Six firm group. 
For example, Price Waterhouse seemed to charge higher audit fees in the 1980s in the 
USA, Canada and New Zealand (Firth, 1985; Chung & Lindsay, 1988; Balachandran 
and Simon, 1993). Deloitte & Touche had fee premiums in South Africa and USA 
(Balachandran and Simon, 1993; Simon, 1995), Arthur Andersen in Norway (Firth, 
1997a), and so on. It is apparent from Table 3.3.1.1. A that there is a lack of published 
research work into audit fees in Japan, other European Union countries such as 
France, Germany, Spain, Greece, etc., as well as in the newly developing Eastern 
European countries such as Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, etc. 
3.3.1.1.1. A note on the large auditor premium percentage 
As developed in the previous sections of this chapter, cross sectional multiple 
regression models have been used thoroughly in the audit market research literature to 
relate audit fees to auditee and auditor characteristics (see Table 3.3. A above for a list 
of the models specified in prior studies). Researchers have gathered data for the 
dependent variable (mainly audit fee), and for a number of auditor and firm-specific 
independent variables. Auditor-related variables have been considered as important 
test variables, and include among others a variable representing either the name of the 
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accountancy firm or the distinct group to which the firm belongs (see Table 3.4. A 
below for the other auditor-related variables); auditee-related variables have often 
been merely regarded as control variables for audit effort, and include a client size 
variable (total assets or sales), client complexity variables (balance sheet ratios, 
number of subsidiaries, etc. ), client risk variables (liquidity ratio, etc. ), and other 
variables (for a full list and description of the audit fee determinants employed in prior 
empirical studies, see section 3.4 and Table 3.4. A later in this chapter). 
Table 3.3.1.1. A: Summary of premiums or discounts as identified in various audit fee studies 
Craswell, Francis & Sneddon (1996) Australia 
Francis (1984) Australia 
Francis & Stokes (1986) Australia 
Craswell & Francis (1999) Australia 
Karim & Moizer (1996) Bangladesh 
Chung & Lindsay (1988) Canada 
Gul et al (1997) Hong Kong 
Gul (1999) Hong Kong 
Simon, Teo & Trompeter (1992) Hong Kong 
Simon, Teo & Trompeter (1992) Malaysia 
Firth (1985) New Zealand 
Firth (1997a) Norway 
Simon, Teo & Trompeter (1992) Singapore 
Simon (1995) South Africa 
Brinn, Peel & Roberts (1994) UK 
Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam (1993) UK 
Ezzamel, Gwilliam & Holland (1996) UK 
Ezzamel, Gwilliam & Holland (1998) UK 
Davis et al (1999) UK 
Che-Ahmad & Houghton (1996) UK 
Palmrose (1986) USA 
Simon & Francis (1988) USA 
Turpen (1990) USA 
Francis & Simon (1987) USA 
Palmrose (1986) USA 
Gist (1994) USA 
Balachandran & Simon (1993) USA 
30% Industry Specialist (D) 
16.50% None 
18.80% None 
None 
18% None 
None Price Waterhouse (P) 
37% None 
29-39% None 
31% None 
None None 
4% Price Waterhouse (P) 
None Arthur Andersen (P) 
26% None 
None Deloitte Touche (P) 
Ernst & Young (P) 
28% London Office (P) 
36.70% London Office (P) 
23.4-32.7% None 
23.4-46.2% None 
5-18.9% None 
None None 
22.80% None 
16.20% None 
55.70% None 
24.6-29.6% None 
16.60% None 
5% None 
None Price Waterhouse (P) 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells (P) 
Peat Marwick (D) 
For those studies using a regression model which is a Cobb-Douglas production 
function (that is, a regression linear in the log of the dependent variable), each of the 
model regression coefficients is the (partial) elasticity of the dependent variable with 
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respect to independent variables. On this basis, the audit fee percentage change 
(premium or discount) accruing to individual audit firm or the large, dominant auditor 
group (that is, the Big-Eight or Big-Six audit firms) is calculated employing the 
following function: 
C= ln(1+d) 
where: 
C= the value of the regression coefficient for the Big-Eight (or Big-Six) firms 
group or individual audit firm; 
d= the percentage difference in audit fees attributable to membership in the 
Big-Eight (or Big-Six) firms group or individual audit firm. 
The unknown parameter in the above function is the d. For small values near zero, 
C=d, but if C is larger than, say, 0.15 or 0.20, the antilog of C is usually taken to 
obtain an estimate of d (Berndt, 1991, p. 164; Lewis, 1986, p. 1140; Moizer, 1997). 
3.3.1.2. The pricing of initial audit engagements 
Another issue discussed in the audit fee research studies is the links between the 
pricing of audit services and the independence of the external auditor. In particular, 
attention has been focused on whether there is differential pricing of new (initial) 
audit engagements and whether the auditor's search for client-specific quasi-rents may 
lead to compromises of auditor independence. Researchers have been directed towards 
this type of empirical work after the strong pricing concerns identified by the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (AICPA, 1978). The Commission's 
allegations that the practice of low-balling (that is, setting audit fees below total 
current costs on initial audit engagements) impairs auditor independence by creating a 
future economic interest in clients' 3 were opposed by DeAngelo (1981 a). DeAngelo 
shows that low-balling is a competitive response to the expectation and ultimate 
capture of future quasi-rents (i. e. the existence of client-specific learning-by-doing 
advantages, positive transactions costs of changing auditors, and competition in the 
market for audit services) to incumbent auditors, and therefore, low-balling does not 
13 Future economic interest arises because the existence of learning-by-doing advantages, and the presence of 
positive transaction costs of changing auditors which provides an incumbent auditor with a comparative cost 
advantage over competitors in future periods. This cost advantage enables the incumbent auditor to charge higher 
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impair auditor independence 14. A model of auditor-client contractual relationships 
with low-balling which explains the equilibrium pricing of audit services was 
formulated and a critical assertion here is that the initial fee reductions (i. e. the 
practice of low-balling) are sunk costs to incumbents in the future periods and hence 
they have no subsequent effect on either (i) the magnitude of future rents, or (ii) 
auditor independence. 
Magee & Tseng (1990) have extended DeAngelo's (1981 a) model to identify 
conditions under which a client-specific quasi-rent may lead an auditor to compromise 
independence. They report that, when contingent fees or bribes are not allowed, when 
auditees and clients cannot enter into multiperiod contracts that are binding, and when 
the auditors' structure and abilities are identical, then an auditor's value of 
incumbency (i. e. DeAngelo's quasi-rents) creates a direct threat to auditor 
independence under limited circumstances. These are: (i) auditors must disagree 
among themselves about the proper application of a reporting issue applied by the 
client; (ii) auditors are not aware of their own positions on the reporting policy at the 
time of initial engagement; (iii) the auditee cannot observe incumbent auditor's 
position on the reporting issue when this arises; (iv) the reporting issue must extend 
beyond a single reporting period and affect the client for a number of periods; (v) the 
client's benefit from the preferred reporting strategy is unaffected even after an auditor 
switch. However, even when all the above conditions hold, a positive value of 
incumbency will not vitiate the independence of the auditor on reporting issues that 
are considered as very important by either the client or the auditor. 
The US empirical evidence with respect to the presence of price cutting on initial 
audit engagements is quite consistent. Francis and Simon (1987) tested whether low- 
balling exists on initial audit engagements, and whether audit quality is affected15 
Price cutting behaviour was observed on initial engagements, although the number of 
(than total costs) future fees, thus creating the "future economic interest" in client. This economic interest, in turn, 
provides the incentive for auditor opportunism, i. e. impairs auditor independence. 
14 See, also, Lee and Gu (1998) for a theoretical explanation on how the low-balling practice does enhance auditor 
independence as long as the shareholders have some influence over the appointment and dismissal of the auditors. 
Also, Dye (1991) who predicts no low-balling in settings where audit fees are publicly available. 
15 The large audit firms (the Big Six) are hypothesised to provide higher quality audit services than those provided 
by smaller audit firms (the non-Big Six) postulating therefore product differentiation in the audit market. See also 
Dopuch & Simunic (1980 & 1982) and DeAngelo (1981 b). 
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the observations was very small (only 12) and hence, generalisation of the result 
concerning audit quality and auditor independence should be cautious. In the same 
line, Simon and Francis (1988) found evidence of substantial audit fee discount in 
both the initial year (of 24%) and over the next two years (of 15%) during the first half 
of the 80's. The discount disappears by the fourth year. Turpen (1990) reports 
consistently lower audit fees on initial audit engagements regardless of the type of the 
audit firm, and price cutting seems to occur even on new audits of relatively 
unprofitable companies (although the sample size for this conclusion is quite limited - 
only 17 initial audits). Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) reported also price cutting on 
initial audits during the mid-1980's and their variables found significant proxied for 
the change in the auditors' relative cost advantage or disadvantage in auditing a given 
client, the change in auditor class, the number of auditors bidding on the initial 
engagement, and the difference in auditor industry or situational expertise. Walker and 
Casterella (1998) examined the role of the auditor industry expertise and client 
profitability in pricing new engagements. Their results suggest that auditor industry 
expertise leads to reduced audit fees, whereas when the client reports losses in the 
financial statements in the prior year, the auditor is less willing to offer discounts to 
new engagements. Craswell and Francis (1999) report existence of initial engagement 
discounting (i. e. low-balling) only for upgrades from non-Big Eight to Big-Eight audit 
firms. The UK evidence finds evidence that low-balling particularly pronounces where 
newly appointed auditors were not from the ranks of the largest audit firms (Pong & 
Whittington, 1994). All the above studies lend further support to the product 
differentiation hypothesis advanced by Simunic (1980). Also, the results from these 
studies are consistent with DeAngelo's (1981a) low-balling model, but inconsistent 
with Palmrose (1986a) who reported an insignificant result with respect to the price 
cutting on US initial engagements. Finally, Simunic (1980) and Francis (1984) do not 
cite evidence of lower audit fees after an audit change for the US and Australian audit 
markets respectively. 
3.3.1.3. The provision of non-audit services by the external auditor 
Over the last two decades many studies have focused on the role of non-audit services 
and the links between fees received from audit and non-audit services. The audit 
market literature focuses on "spillover" effects in explaining possible 
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interdependencies in audit and non-audit fees charged to clients16. However, this 
approach is one of the two approaches that have been followed by prior studies. The 
second theoretical approach focuses on the differential benefits from the purchase of 
non-audit services. Non-audit services in this second approach have been broken 
down by type, i. e. recurring and non-recurring non-audit services. 
The first approach, pioneered by Simunic (1984), theoretically analyses the underlying 
associations between audit and non-audit services when the production functions for 
these two services are interactive (interdependent) which results in "beneficial 
knowledge spillovers" or efficiencies. Simunic's analysis demonstrates that the 
provision of non-audit services (resulting in knowledge spillovers) involves reducing 
the fixed or marginal cost of either external audit services or non-audit services or 
both, and hence, provided that the external audit is relatively a price elastic 
commodity, the quantity of the audit and therefore total client expenditure on audit 
(audit fees) will increase, at the expense of the demand for audit substitutes (i. e. 
control systems or internal auditing) which will decrease. 
Most of the pricing studies, followed Simunic, have reported a significant and positive 
relationship between audit and non-audit fees. For the US market such evidence was, 
for example, reported by Simon (1985), Palmrose (1986b), Dye (1989), Turpen 
(1990), Barefield et al (1993), Davis et al (1993). In Australia, Francis & Pollard 
(1979), Craswell et al (1995), Butterworth & Houghton (1993), Barkess and Simnett 
(1994). One study in the UK, Ezzamel et al (1996), and one study in Norway, Firth 
(1997a). All but Simon & Francis (1988), Abdel-Khalik (1990), O'Keefe et al (1994), 
Craswell et al (1996), Ezzamel et al (1998), have shown a significant positive 
correlation between the pricing of audit and non-audit services. 
Moreover, most of the above studies have used aggregate figures for non-audit fees 
with the exception of Palmrose (1986b), Davis et al (1993), O'Keefe et al (1994), 
Ezzamel et al (1998) which also examined the specific effects on audit fees of 
16 That is, audit fees may depend upon whether the auditor also supplies non-audit services 
to a client because the 
provision of non-audit services influences (spills over into) the cost of providing 
the audit by transferring the 
knowledge that occurs when non-audit services are provided 
by the incumbent auditor. However, see Solomon 
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different categories of non-audit services , such as tax services , accounting related 
MAS, non-accounting related MAS. 
The second approach, developed by Beck et al (1988a; 1988b), brings together the 
agency theory'7 and the provision of non-audit services. Beck et al illustrate that the 
frequency of other services purchased from the incumbent external auditor reflects the 
level of incremental economic bonding between auditor and client and, therefore, 
determines whether the auditor's independence (or appearance of independence) has 
been impaired. Such bonding, perceived as an impairment to auditor independence (in 
order for the auditor to ensure continued tenure), reduces the expected monitoring 
value of an audit (and increases the agency costs) and motivates the client to restrict 
non-audit purchases18. Recurring non-audit services are perceived as an annuity with 
high economic bonding. On the contrary, the non-recurring non-audit services are 
"one-off' engagements and thus, the bonding effects of the non-recurring services are 
minimal. Any impairment to auditor independence and credibility caused by this 
minimal economic bonding is limited. 
Beck et al (1988b) find also evidence of a positive association between the provision 
of recurring non-audit services and the length of the auditor's tenure whereas Barkess 
& Simnett (1994) find no association between recurring non-audit services 
consumption and auditor tenure. DeBerg et al (1991) report that the level of recurring 
non-audit services purchased from the incumbent auditor declines following a change 
of auditors. Also, Parkash & Venable (1993) reach a similar conclusion with Beck et 
al, i. e. that auditees anticipate the potential impairment of their auditor's 
independence and accordingly control the proportion of joint audit and non-audit 
services. Furthermore, expanded interpretations of earlier studies' findings support the 
above implications (Glezen & Millar, 1985; Schemer & Kiger, 1982; Schemer, 1984). 
(1990) for a number of other possible explanations for any perceived positive association between fees paid for 
audit and non-audit services. 
17 For a review of the agency literature, see for example Jensen & Meckling (1976), Watts (1977), Watts & 
Zimmerman (1981; 1983), Fama & Jensen (1983a; 1983b). 
18 Firth (1997b) provides empirical UK evidence that companies with high agency costs purchase smaller amount 
of non-audit services from their auditor. See also Wines (1994) who uses a probit analysis and provides evidence 
that auditors are less likely to express a qualified opinion when higher levels of non-audit services fees are derived 
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Cready (1992) applied a reservation price model where the units of a service 
(provision of external audit services) either are acquired or are not acquired by the 
consumer (auditee)19 to explain for audit and non-audit fee interdependencies. Cready 
demonstrates that a relation between the auditor's pricing of audit and non-audit 
services occurs as a reflection of underlying correlations in the bivariate distribution 
of the reservation prices for audit and non-audit services provided by the auditor 
across clients. Cready explains that a positive correlation exists between the 
reservation prices for audit and non-audit services across clients and therefore the 
following function holds: 
E(RAIRNA > CNA) > E(RAIRNA < CNA)20 
where: 
RA = the reservation price for audit services; 
RNA = the reservation price for non-audit services; 
CNA = the constant unit cost for an auditor to provide non-audit services; 
PA = the price charged by the auditor for the provision of audit services. 
The above inequality means that RA, and thus PA, for clients who acquire non-audit 
services (i. e. clients with RNA > CNA) on average exceeds RA, and thus PA, for clients 
who do not acquire non-audit services. Hence, Cready clearly is consistent with 
Simunic's (1984) findings which suggest that accounting firms charge a premium for 
the joint production of audit and other services to auditees. 
Also, Cready (1991) in an earlier study proposes another related explanation for 
higher audit fees when non-audit services are purchased. Specifically, he presents 
evidence consistent with the use of "premium bundling"21 by the accounting firms in 
and, thus, the independence of auditors may have been jeopardised. For a theoretical analysis of the circumstances 
under which auditor independence may be affected by offering non-audit services, see also Dye (1989). 
19 In contrast with the traditional supply and demand curve models like that of Simunic (1980) where consumers 
(auditees) do acquire partial or multiple units of the service. 
20 In order for the inequality to hold, the auditor sets PA = RA for each audit client with RA > CA and sets PNA = 
RNA for each audit client with RNA > C. If the auditor sets PA > RA, the auditee will not purchase the service from 
the potential auditor. 
21 In premium bundling, sellers price discriminate by offering products both separately and as bundles, but bundles 
are sold at a premium (rather than at a discount) relative to the prices charged for the individual components. In 
order such a strategy to be implemented, sellers must prevent potential bundle purchasers form either directly or 
indirectly acquiring all of a bundle's components at component prices. This ability to exclude buyers is clearly 
product or market specific and therefore sellers of services, with their direct knowledge of customer 
identities and 
purchases, can readily implement premium bundling strategies. In our case, audit firms know which of their clients 
are audit-only buyers, which are other services-only buyers, and which are joint audit/other services buyers, and 
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the market for audit services, wherein the auditor offers the client a choice of audit 
services provision (A) at price PA, non-audit services production (NA) at price PNA 
and a bundle consisting of both audit and non-audit services at price PB where PB > PA 
+ PNA. Under such circumstances, the prices allocated to the bundle components (A & 
NA) when purchased by bundle purchasers should exceed the prices charged for the 
sale of bundle components to non-bundle purchasers, since the implicit price being 
charged to bundle purchasers for bundle components exceeds the explicit price 
charged to single-component purchasers. Thus, auditees that have purchased non-audit 
services implicitly pay more for audit services than do auditees that have purchased 
only audit services. Again, this analysis is consistent with Simunic's results. 
3.4. Determinants of audit quantity 
This subsection reviews the major surveys and analyses of audit fees to identify 
factors to be included in our analysis. Most of the earliest research used surveys; more 
recently, statistical analysis of data has largely supplanted surveys. This previous work 
has collected data for the dependent variable (audit fee), and for a number of auditor 
and auditee independent variables. Audit effort proxies are the test variables and 
auditee-related variables are the control variables. The rationale for such an approach 
is that it reveals to some extent what is priced in the audit market, or put it differently, 
what determines audit quantity. 
In most of these studies a list of independent variables is regressed against the 
dependent variable, that is the audit fee. The independent variables typically include a 
1. client size variable (total assets, sales or other combinations); 
2. client complexity (the No of subsidiaries, the ratio of inventory to total assets, etc. ); 
3. client risk variable (liquidity ratio, gearing ratio, etc. ); 
4. auditor size dichotomous variable (Big-Six vs. non-Big Six); 
plus some other variables as discussed below. 
consequently, they can prohibit single-service clients from acquiring the joint audit/other services without paying 
the required premium. 
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3.4.1. Client Size 
Client size is considered as a proxy of the amount of audit work performed and hence 
for the audit fee charged. It accounts (together with client complexity) for the most 
variance explained by the regression models previously developed. All the major 
studies (for example Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Francis & Stokes, 1986; Francis 
and Simon, 1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Chan et al, 1993) have proxied auditee 
size with turnover or total assets, and all have shown a dominant effect on the level of 
audit fees. 
As a result of potential scale economies in the auditor's production function, for 
example those derived from using sampling techniques, and the probability of more 
advanced internal control procedures in larger companies, the relationship between 
client size and audit fee is unlikely to be linear in specification and, therefore, log or 
square root22 transformations of client size measures are typically applied. 
3.4.2. Client Complexity 
Another measurable factor that is commonly tested and appears to be generally a 
significant explanatory variable in determining audit fees is client complexity. 
Increased client complexity may increase the requisite audit effort and hence the level 
of the audit fees. Client complexity variables control for such difficult audit areas as 
subsidiary companies, inventory, debtors and accounts receivable. The explanatory 
variables used in previous studies have either related to the (square root of the) 
number of subsidiaries (for example, Simunic, 1984; Ettredge & Greenberg, 1990; 
Turpen, 1990; Chan et al, 1993; Brinn, et al, 1994; Ezzamel et al, 1996; Pong & 
Whittington, 1994), and (the log of) the number of their geographical locations (for 
example, Palmrose, 1986; Chan, et al, 1993; Ezzamel et al, 1996), or to particular 
balance sheet figures such as the inventory to total assets ratio and accounts receivable 
to total assets ratio (for example, Simunic, 1980 & 1984; Simon & Francis, 1988; 
Ettredge & Greenberg, 1990; Johnson et al, 1995). All the above studies have reported 
significant positive coefficients concerning client complexity. 
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3.4.3. Client Risk 
The estimation of client risk offers a number of alternative measures and a quite 
distinct amount of auditee-related variables were used as proxies for clients' operating 
risk. Two reasons are cited for measuring the client risk. First, the auditor's 
assessment of client's "inherent risk" may be affected23. The riskier the auditee's 
operations (i. e. the larger the probability of business failure by the client), the greater 
the perceived risk of audit failure and, therefore, a possible increased audit effort and 
direct cost. Second, the auditor's perception of "business risk" associated with a client 
situation may be influenced24. The greater the risk of audit failure, the larger the 
possibility of legal action for auditor negligence and/or the greater the possible loss of 
income from future audit services and, thus, the higher the audit fee charged by the 
auditor (to compensate him/herself for the high business risk)25. Unlike the previous 
two categories (client size and complexity), the empirical evidence on the direction 
and the power of the relationship between the client-risk variables and audit fee is 
ambiguous. 
A comparison of the empirical findings across studies (see Appendix I) reveals, from 
the list of client risk-related variables in Table 3.4. A, that only prior audit 
qualifications and profitability appear to be significant in determining cross sectional 
variations of audit fees. However, no consensus exists for the gearing and liquidity 
measures, and the results for the other types of client risk variables are very mixed or 
weak. 
22 The majority of studies has log transformed the client size variable whereas Elliot & Korpi (1978) and Taylor & 
Baker (1981) have used the square root sign over the client size (turnover-total assets respectively) variable in their 
multiple regression technique. 
23 By "inherent risk", we mean the susceptibility of the client financial statements to material errors before any 
audit work has started. The inherent risk is part of the audit risk model in which the great majority of audit firms 
base their audit approach. The auditor assesses which financial statements areas are more likely to have a material 
misstatement and plans the audit programme accordingly. If the inherent risk (together with the control risk, the 
second component of the audit risk model) is high, then the amount of audit work and the detailed testing must 
increase in order for the auditor to avoid failure. 
24 By "business risk", we mean the risk that the auditor will suffer financial loss or injury to their reputation from 
litigation or adverse publicity in connection with an audit. 
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3.4.5. Other 
There are few more categories of independent variables that have been applied in a 
limited number of the audit fee studies. These may be classified as external audit 
substitutes and audit timing (1. D and 1. E in Table 3.4. A below). Both are variables 
that related to the client. Other variables are the cost of audit and non-audit services 
provided by other non-principal audit firms (3. A and 3. B in Table 3.4. A below). 
First, the client-related variables, and Wallace (1984), Palmrose (1986a; 1986b) and 
Turpen (1990) have included a client-participation variable (such as internal audit 
functions, internal control systems, auditor's utilisation of client accounting staff) that 
reduce the audit scope and fees in their regression models, and all have reported a 
negative and significant correlation between audit fees and audit substitutes. However, 
any findings about fee reduction from client inputs should be interpreted with care as 
typically the data is derived from client estimates of such savings. The other client- 
related variable is related to the timing of the audit. "Audit-timing" or "busy-audit- 
season" models the effect on audit fees of the client's accounting year-end and has 
been investigated by four studies (Francis, 1984; Firth, 1985; Francis & Stokes, 1986; 
Chan et al, 1993) to account for off-peak pricing. None of these studies shown a 
significant effect. "Audit-delay" variable refers to the lag between the client 
accounting year-end and the audit report date. Long lags might indicate audit 
problems requiring additional audit effort, whereas short lags might reflect tight 
reporting deadlines which may, in turn, lead to inefficient and higher cost auditing. 
This variable has only been tested in two studies (Firth, 1985 and Chan et al, 1993) 
which report contradictory findings. A final client-related variable is the "number-of- 
25 See Houston et al (1999) on why audit fees include risk premiums when the risks associated with an audit 
cannot be controlled sufficiently by applying normal audit procedures. 
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separate/additional/special-audit-reports-required" which affect the number of full- 
scope audits needed beyond what is required by statute and auditing standards and 
which leads to higher audit fees. Firth (1985) and Palmrose (1986b) explore the 
association of this variable with the audit fees and both report significant results. 
Table 3.4. A: Overview of the audit quantity (audit fees) determinants employed in previous audit fee 
empirical studies 
A. Size Total Assets(TA); Turnover; Operating Profit 
B. Complexity No of Subsidiaries; Diversification; Foreign 
Assets/TA; No of Locations; Receivables/TA; 
Inventory/TA; Current Assets/TA 
C. Risk Liquidity Quick Ratio; Current Ratio; Working Capital/TA 
.. ............. 
Gearing or leverage Total Liabilities/TA; Long-term Liabilities/TA 
......... ....... _ .... . 
.. _. _. _------- _.. _. ____. __. ____ . 
Profitability ROI; ROS; ROTA; ROCE 
---. . .......... _.... .... .. Variability of return . _.... _. _ ... ............. ------- _. __-- Systematic/Unsystematic Risk 
Nature of business Industry Indicator; Regulated/Unregulated; Age 
Financial distress Audit qualification; Loss; EBIT/TA; D/E; D/TA 
External parties Ownership; Private/Public Company 
D. External Audit Internal Audit Expenses; Reduction in Audit Fee 
Substitutes from Internal Audit 
E. Audit Timing Busy Audit Season; Audit Delay; No of Separate 
....................... .............. .............................. .. _.. --..... .......... _. _,..... _.. __ . _..... _......... _.. 
Reports 
_..... __ ... ----... _........ .......... ....................... ......... ----------- .............. .......................................... 
: 
2. Auditor ýj gal 
A. Size Big-Eight (or Big-Six) Audit firm/Ion Big Eight 
B. Experience Auditor Tenure; Industry Specialisation; New 
Audit Engagement 
C. Non-audit MAS; Accounting Services; Non-Accounting 
services Services; Taxation Services 
D. Other Auditor Location 
Non-Principal 
Auditor 
A. Fee for (non- Audit fees paid to non-principals 
principal) audit 
services ............... ............... _. _... _. _. _. _. _...... __......... ... _.... _....... _......... _.... _...... _............. . _.... B. Fee for non-audit Consultancy fees paid to non-principals 
services 
-- - ----- ---- 
Secondly there is the issue of joint appointments. The production of non-principal 
audit services refers to the audit fees attributable to the audit services performed by 
other (non-principal) audit firm(s) - for example, in the case of an engagement 
involving more than one auditor where e. g. the non-principal audits distant 
subsidiaries - as a proportion of the total audit 
fee charged. Turpen (1990) investigates 
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the effects of concurrent service purchases from the incumbent auditor and other audit 
firm(s) and shows a positive significant result. The final non-principal auditor-related 
variable is the non-incumbent non-audit services fee variable and has been included in 
the regression model of Palmrose (1986b). She shows a positive significant 
association with the audit fees charged by the incumbent auditor in the large auditee 
segment of the market. This result is in contrast with Palmrose's prediction sign where 
she hypothesised that there should be no joint-supply benefits between the audit 
services of the incumbent auditor and the non-audit services of non-incumbent(s). 
3.5. Audit fee studies: a critical examination 
The last twenty-five years have witnessed a surge in litigation against the accounting 
firms. Dopuch & Simunic (1980; 1982) and DeAngelo (1981b) among others assert 
that larger audit firms supply a higher level of audit quality and lend greater credibility 
to clients' financial statements than smaller firms. Two theoretical explanations for 
the positive correlation between auditor size and audit quality have been provided: 
these relate to auditors' reputation and the depth of auditors' pocket. The "reputation 
hypothesis" states that large audit firms have more incentive to issue accurate audit 
reports because they have more extensive investments in brand name reputations and 
therefore their reputations are more valuable (DeAngelo, 1981b). If the auditor's 
reputation (or credibility) is called into question, then the credibility of clients' 
financial statements may be questioned and the auditor could suffer a loss of rent 
through client losses or lower fees. The "deep pockets/insurance hypothesis" (see, for 
example, Wallace, 1980 and Dye, 1993) states that large auditors have more 
incentives to issue accurate audit reports because they have greater wealth in risk from 
litigation26. The auditor appears to have an implicit co-insurer role (together with the 
client) in the event a bankrupt client is unable to pay losses from litigation, and 
functionally serves as an indemnifier of losses sustained as a result of alleged financial 
statement misrepresentations27. Large accounting firms are perceived as having the 
26 Note that accountancy firms are partnerships with unlimited liability. Recently however audit firms have gained 
the ability to adopt limited liability (LLP) in some countries. 
27 Note, that in order for the auditor to be sued, an allegation that the financial statements contain a material error 
is required. Then, users who suffer investment or credit losses may seek reimbursement or indemnification from 
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resources to provide additional insurance for potential claimants (Scwartz & Menon, 
1985). 
It seems that little formal empirical work has been done on the market effects of 
auditor litigation on auditor quality. In other words, the liability deep 
pockets/insurance rationale for audit demand has not been investigated. A reason is 
that auditor professional liability rules have not been employed in prior models of 
audit demand. Although Simunic's (1980) model of audit demand assumes loss 
sharing between auditee and auditor based on their joint and several liability for losses 
to users of material distorted financial statements, the model was clearly not 
developed to investigate the impact of liability rules on the client financial reporting 
system (including internal control required and external audit quantity demanded)28. 
A suggestion for future research is to investigate the impact (on audit quality) of a 
minimum legal norm of due care for auditees and auditors which will then determine 
each party's actions and corresponding legal responsibility. Krishnan & Krishnan 
(1995) show that auditor resignations are positively associated with litigation risk. 
Auditor lawsuits possess information content in the sense that investors react 
negatively (i. e. the share prices for client companies drop in the market) to those 
lawsuits that are perceived as material to an accounting firm's ability to pay damages 
(or provide insurance) or reducing the audit quality provided by the sued auditor 
(Pacini, 1999). These negative share price reactions provide empirical support for the 
deep pockets/insurance hypothesis and this result is consistent with Lennox (1999). 
Future research could clarify the issues raised above. 
Furthermore, a major problem with the past audit fee research studies is the fact that 
the proxies for audit effort (or audit quantity) used as control variables in the multiple 
the accountants. Hence, implicit in an auditor lawsuit is the notion that financial statements reliability (or auditor 
quality) is below some expected minimum standard. 
28 Recall that the "legal" environment in which auditees and auditors behave is taken into account in Simunic's 
pricing model. In particular, the legal exposure of the auditee's financial statements is assumed to drive the choice 
of the level of internal control and external audit work. However, the legal setting in Simunic's model has been 
severely simplified. First, the impact of ex ante regulation by professional auditing standards on audit production 
is ignored. Simunic's model is basically an audit demand model, and the analysis only generally addresses auditor 
production issues in relationship with their impact on audit demand and pricing. Second, the model does not take 
into consideration the process by which losses are to be distributed over both parties (auditee and auditor), as the 
loss sharing ratio, 9, is assumed to be a random variable. 
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regression techniques have rarely been subject to experimental interest. As a result, 
there are no insights about the way the control variables affect audit quantity in the 
statistical models, as their impact on audit cost and audit production is not known 29 
Consequently, ad hoc non-experimental models were built where the dependent 
variable (audit fee) has often been transformed logarithmically. By doing this, a 
universal multiplicative interaction among the independent explanatory variables is 
assumed. Pong & Whittington (1994) explore the theoretical rationale of the empirical 
models of audit fees and criticise the ad hoc nature of prior audit fee regression 
models. Instead, they have developed an alternative statistical model, which takes the 
following quadratic (algebraic) form: yt = A+ 32x, +, ß3x, + e,. Furthermore, they 
have argued that the previous studies on the determinants of audit fees have implicitly 
been estimating the supply curve of audit services (i. e. the willingness of accounting 
firms to supply audit services at different audit fee levels), although this has been 
implicitly assumed but has not been explicitly discussed in these studies. Expanding 
on this, they assert that demand for audit services is inelastic to audit fee, since the 
audit is a statutory requirement and, thus, it is mainly dependent upon the amount of 
work required, as determined by the client size. The above argument is very 
interesting and in contrast with the demand model for auditing developed by 
Simunic's (1980) pioneered work, and subsequently followed by other researchers, 
who have chosen the control variables in their pricing models in accordance with the 
auditee demand. 
Without regard to what is observed (supply, demand or a meaningless hybrid), the 
quantity of audit services demanded, q, and the unit price of external audit services, p, 
have not been able to be tested by the previous audit fee literature. Also, no 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to what constitutes audit quality, as it is 
assumed that audit quality (i. e. product differentiation? ) is determined by audit firm 
size (DeAngelo, 1981a; 1981b). 
29 This does not imply that the values of economic variables can indeed be experimentally observed and generated 
beforehand (in order to be consistent with the economic and statistical models). In accounting, economics and, 
generally, social sciences, many of the experiments are uncontrolled and in a sense designed and carried out by 
society. Thus, we are passive observers of the process by which the data we use are obtained. 
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To summarise, the use of proxies for audit effort in ad hoc regression models may 
lead to inferences about audit pricing that are distorted. Inferences about unit prices in 
a market are only possible if the product that is priced is fully understood. Future 
research along the following dimensions may help clarify the issues discussed above. 
The first dimension of research could examine the impact of re-specifying the 
regression models employed so far on the findings in prior research. The robustness of 
the pricing evidence obtained so far could then be established. Some recent studies 
have already addressed this issue (Pong & Whittington, 1994; Ezzamel et al, 1996). 
Second, more attention could be devoted on future research to test audit pricing using 
actual data on audit effort (hours) instead of proxies (Rankine & Felix, 1993; Davis et 
al, 1993; O'Keefe et al, 1994; Deis and Giroux, 1996). Third, future research could 
solicit information from accounting firms on audit hours and client characteristics, and 
study the effects on audit hours of client size, complexity and risk. By studying the 
determinants of audit effort, the audit production function is investigated. Davis et al, 
(1993) and O'Keefe et al (1994) have reported that cross-sectional variation in the 
quantity of labour inputs can largely be explained by the same auditee category of 
independent variables found to be significant in prior studies on audit fees. However, 
more studies including other accounting firms and clients required to establish faith in 
audit effort proxies. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CCOU FIRM ALUMNI 
DATA COLLECTION 
This study investigates the connections and networks that professional accountancy 
firms have developed through the dominant positions that their alumni hold in 
Britain's boardrooms. Network construction is a complex and laborious task, since 
most of the necessary sources of data are available only in hard copies. 
The present survey is based on merging the following sources of data: 
1. Price Waterhouse Corporate Register March 1996. 
2.1953-1995 List of Members and Firms of the ICAEW. 
3.1998 Official Directory of the ICAS. 
4.1953-1993 Examination Pass Lists of the ICAEW. 
5.1953-1973 The "Accountant" magazine. 
6.1953-1993 The "Accountants' Magazine". 
7.1974-1979 "Accountancy" magazine. 
8. Quantitative data from One-Source, FAME, Datastream. 
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From these sources it is possible to research the professional background of the 
CADRE, and the network links between directors and accountancy firms can be 
reconstructed. Since mergers have played an important role in the evolution of the 
accountancy profession (Basioudis, 1995), a brief discussion of the effect of mergers 
in our study is also held. In addition, a historical reference regarding the development 
of the Big-Six accountancy firms is made, and some statistical information about our 
sample CADRE is offered. The following sections in this chapter, therefore, describe 
step-by-step the laborious collection of the data concerning the accountancy firms 
alumni; give a tabular presentation of the alumni data; discuss how the presence of 
mergers is tackled in constructing the alumni networks; show the main predecessors 
of the Big-Six accountancy firms; and, finally, assemble some descriptive statistics 
regarding the CADRE involved in this study. 
4.1. PW database 
The Price Waterhouse Corporate Register provided us with the biographies and 
educational background of nearly 15,000 directors working in all UK stockmarket 
companies. Those directors who hold a chartered accountancy qualification from the 
ICAEW or ICAS were extracted from the PW database. This variable is named as 
"LNAME". As a result, the number of directors in the UK quoted companies who are 
chartered accountants in 1996 is 2,286, which means that 15.24% (nearly one in six) 
of the UK directors have received training in a professional accountancy firm. More 
specifically, 1,508 (10.05%) of the directors are Fellows of the ICAEW (FCAs), 447 
(2.98%) are Associates of the ICAEW (ACAs), and 331 (2.21%) are Chartered 
Accountants of the ICAS (CAs). 
Other information extracted from the PW database concerns the gender (abbreviated 
to "SEX") and the date of birth for the directors-chartered accountants ("BIRTH"), the 
directorship position they hold ("DIR. POSITION"), their qualifications ("QUAL"), 
the name of the UK quoted company they work for (`BUSADD 1 "), and the auditors 
name ("AUDITORS")(and the town ("AUDTOWN") where available) for each 
company that has a chartered accountant in its board of directors. Each CADRE is 
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given a unique recognition number for identification reasons appeared in the dataset 
as "OFF_RECNO" (see Table 4.1. A). 
Knowing the names of the directors that hold a chartered accountancy qualification 
from the ICAEW or ICAS, the next step was to find out when they had been admitted 
to membership of the two Institutes. For this purpose the 1995 List of Members of the 
ICAEW and the 1998 Official Directory of the ICAS were consulted. The 
membership admission date was made available from these directories. It was a labour 
Table 4.1. A: Example 1 from the database (the entries in this table are not necessarily real) 
OFF-RE SEX LNAME QUAL .1 AUDITORS AUDTOWN 
000016 M LANE, Kenneth W FCA 24/03/46 Queensborough ExD, FD Coopers & Liverpool 
W, FCA Holdings PLC Lybrand 
000799 M EVANS, Stephen BSc 15/09/55 Park Food ExD, CS KPMG London 
Geoff re , BSc ACA ACA Group PLC & MD 
000659 M HUGHES, Richard FCA 17/10/46 Tay Homes PLC ExD, FD Arthur Leeds 
John, FCA & CS Andersen 
30873 M BOURNE, Robert FCA 16/05/50 Ex-Lands (The) ExD, Ernst & Manchester 
Anthony, FCA PLC JChEx Young 
Source: PW Price Waterhouse PW PW PW PW PW PW 
(PW) Database 
intensive job, mainly due to the unavailability of the membership directories in 
computer readable format but only in hard copies. This meant that we needed to look 
for each single director/chartered accountant in both directories and transfer the 
corresponding membership admission year in a different column beside the name of 
that director. This variable is named "MEMBADM" (see Table 4.1. B). See also the 
following subsection 4.2.1. 
Table 4.1. R: Example 2 from the database 
OFF-RE LNAME QUAL BIRTH MEMBADMIS 
CNO 
000016 M LANE, Kenneth W W, FCA FCA 24/03/46 1972 
000799 M EVANS, Stephen Geoffrey, BSc 15/09/55 1982 
BSc ACA ACA 
000659 M HUGHES, Richard John, FCA 17/10/46 1969 
FCA 
30873 M BOURNE, Robert Anthony, FCA 16/05/50 1973 
FCA 
Source: PW Price Waterhouse (PW) PW PW ICAEW List of 
Database Members 
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4.2. Building the alumni database/network 
Building the database requires consulting the directories of members for the two 
Institutes of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, and in England and Wales. These 
directories provide, in addition to a correspondence address for each member, the year 
of membership admission to the Institutes. The ICAEW examination pass lists and 
two accountancy magazines are also searched. 
4.2.1. Membership Admission 
In this subsection, the information collected by the directories of members of the two 
Institutes of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), and in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) as well as extracts of the directories are presented. 
4.2.1.1. The 1998 Official Directory of the ICAS 
Searching the directories to point out the director/chartered accountant was not an 
easy task. The directory of the ICAS, as the two extracts show below, is divided into 
two parts, whereas the members are listed alphabetically in the first part of the volume 
and geographically in the second one. Nevertheless, the alphabetical list of members 
(i. e. the first part of the directory) gives only the name of the members in alphabetical 
order and their geographical location. In other words, it does not contain information 
on members' dates of admission to the Institute (see Extract 4.2.1.1 . 
A) 
Extract 4.2.1.1. A: The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
Extract from the 1998 Official Directory (Alphabetical List of Members 
, Jeremy David Philip, 
MA, 
Cooke, John Synnot, Leamington 
Spa, Warwickshire 
Cooke, Mrs Ruth Inbar, MA, 
London 
Coombs, David Campbell, MA, 
Edinburgh 
Cooper, Alan Richard, MA, 
Inverness 
Cooper, Calum Dewar, BA, 
Edinburgh 
Cooper, Miss Elizabeth Jane, BA, 
Frankfurt, Germany 
Cooper, Ms Gillian Tina, BAcc, 
London 
Cooper, John Alexander, 
Aberdeen 
BCom, Singapore 
Cope, Michael, Buena Park, 
California, USA 
Cope, Mrs Susan Mary Tudor, 
Bristol 
Copeland, Jack Derek, Glasgow 
Copestick, Lewis, Oakville, 
Ontario, Canada 
Copland, Colin, Coulsdon, Surrey 
Copland, Gregor George lain, BA 
Vancouver, British Columbia, 
Canada 
Cordiner, John Mark, BSc, 
Guernsey. Channel Islands 
Cordiner, Robert Wilson, 
Glasgow 
Corley, Mrs Susan Hope, 
BAdmin, Aberdeen 
Cormack, Anthony James, 
Edinburgh 
Cormack, lain Matheson, BSc, 
Glenrothes, Fife 
Corrnack, John London 
Cormack, John Ford, BSc, Wick, 
Caithness 
Cormie, John Alastair Dawson, 
Edinburgh 
Cormie, William Dawson, MA, 
London 
Cornelius, Ian, MA, Birmingham 
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The dates relating to dates of admission to the Institute are shown in the second part of 
the directory whereas the names of the members are listed again, but according to 
their geographical area. Therefore, knowing the name of the CADRE (who is a 
member of the ICAS) from our dataset and then the geographical location of those 
directors from the first part of the ICAS directory, the second part of the directory had 
to be consulted to give the member's date of admission to the Institute (see Extract 
4.2.1.1. B) 
Extract 4.2.1.1. B: The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
from the 1998 Otticial 
Wands, Peter David, PD Wanda, Dundee Dumbarton--- 
16 Station_ oad FK14 7EJJ 1973 Allison, 'I+ rv Robie Neve, Bsr Allen., 1;, hur Paul, B. 1, ý. r itu 
Henderson . 'v -. ie, Royal Ltd, 1, eit urn 
Avenn;, 
Dornoch, Sutherland Exchane_e, Cý ;? ! DZ 19$91 Broadmo. adow, Indusr. -i ,! E ease 
Freir, David Stanley, Wester Anderson '. 4;? inlay, Wright G82 lL [19761 
1-memorejV2 a 3RW _119381 
Health, Group Lui, Industrial Anderson, Andrew, J %i . 
I\noxland 
Mackay, hui vlunro, BCotn, Estate, Kings y West, D11_ Street, Knoxland Cat :;, G92 WE 
Mackay & (o, SA Castle Street 19 " 1951 
IV253Si>7 i1 9731 Anderson, David George, MA, Andrews, Mrs Leslie, BA, 
Dundee College. . d; Constitution Andre: 
vs& Co, 129 Hjlh -i t-', 
Daune, Perthshire Road, DI73 ti (1976 2nd Floor, G82 LLE 01 
Daly, Richard Henry, Kerilha, 3 Anderson, James Stewan, 
Gilbert Gro I'I 1k 6FI 1- CraiLhall, 20 Glands Rod ID 
Knowles. ., es 
Strachan IND 
Dou Aria, k' "JA, Maltbarn House, 
. Main Strti !F KiG (LBW 1961 
4.2.1.2. The 1995 List of Members and Firms of the ICAEW 
The task of identifying the year of admission to the membership of the Institutes is 
different between the two institutes. The ICAEW directory presents the list of its 
members in a different format than the ICAS directory discussed above. The members 
of the ICAEW are listed in the ICAEW directory alphabetically. The difference from 
the ICAS directory is that the ICAEW directory provides directly the date of 
admission to the Institute in the same section where the names of members are listed 
alphabetically (see Extract 4.2.1.2. A). 
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4.2.2. Partner's Name and/or Accountancy Firm 
Having completed this task, in other words having obtained the relevant year of 
admission to membership in the two institutes for each director/chartered accountant 
(and in effect the year for qualification for most of the directors), the accountancy firm 
and the town in which the then-trainee chartered accountants have received their 
professional training were needed next. For this purpose, four different public sources 
were used and many journeys to two different libraries in the UK (Birmingham & 
Edinburgh) had to be made. 
Extract 4.2.1.2. A: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
-. ,rII nn r. T-. V ILK Iun 11 L'. AL1a L 110111 L11G 177. ) LdJL Ul 1ViG111UUlb. U. JOU 
LODER, Mr John, FCA 1972; 60 Augustine Way, 
Bicknacre, CHELMSFORD, CM3 4ET. 
LODGE, Miss Amanda Jane, BSc ACA 1994; 8 
Hurle Road, Clifton, BRISTOL, BS8 2SY. 
LODGE, Mr David John, ACA 1986; 22 Station 
Road, Barton-under Needwood, BURTON ON 
TRENT, Staffs, DE13 8DR. 
LODGE, Miss Jane Ann, BSc FCA 1979; Touche 
Ross & Co., Colmore Gate, 2 Colmore Row, 
BIRMINGHAM, B3 2BN. 
LODGE, Mr Mark Vincent, FCA 1977; 31 
Whitby Court, Parkhurst Road, LONDON, N7 OSU. 
LODGE, Mr Philip Charles, FCA 1945; 
Harwood, The Green, Goathland, WHITBY, N 
Yorkshire, YO22 5LX. 
LODGE, Mr Trevor Drabes, FCA 1971; KPMG 
Peat Marwick, Peat House, 1 Commercial St, 
Forster Square, BRADFORD, W Yorkshire, BDI 
4AS. 
LOEB, Mr Jeremy Ian, BSc ACA 1982; 11 
Hoober Road, Ecclesfield, SHEFFIELD, S 11 9SF. 
LOEBL, Mr John Charles, BA ACA 1987; 17 
Rushton Drive, Bramhall, STOCKPORT, Cheshire, 
SK7 3LB. 
LOMAS, Mr Anthony Victor, BA FCA 1982; 
Price Waterhouse, Southwark Towers, 32 London 
Bridge St, LONDON SEI 9SY 
Note: the the year of admission to the membershi 
The ICAEW examination pass lists for the year of qualification were published in the 
"Accountant" and "Accountancy" magazines whereas the ICAS list of members and 
membership admission were published by the "Accountants' Magazine". 
4.2.2.1. The "Accountants' Magazine" for the ICAS members 
The "Accountants' Magazine" has been publishing the list of members for the ICAS 
until 1990 (see Extract 4.2.2.1 . A) and here no "real" problem was created as the 
magazine provides directly the name of the accountancy firm and the town against the 
name of each successful candidate (see Table 4.2.2.1. A). However, the University of 
Warwick library does not hold the "Accountants' Magazine" in its shelves, which 
meant that we had to find out which library is subscribed to the magazine. The 
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National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh holds all the issues of the "Accountants' 
Magazine" since its first issue of January 1897 and, therefore, several journeys to this 
library were needed. 
Extract 4. L. L. 1. A: 'l he Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, List of new members in 1958 
LIST OF NEW MEMBERS Bentley, Mark Traill (Thomson McLintock & 
Co., London). 
One hundred and seventy-two applicants were Brown, Gillian Gilders (McLay, McAlister & 
admitted to Membership of the Institute at the McGibbon, Glasgow). 
Annual General Meeting held in Edinburgh on Cunningham, John Douglas Grieve (R. C. 
March 26,1958. Their names are set out in Thomson & Murdoch, Dundee). 
alphabetical order, the names of the firms with Davidson, James Breckenridge (Reid & Mair, 
whom they served their apprenticeships being Glasgow). 
shown in brackets. Downie, John (A. & J. Robertson, Edinburgh). 
Espitalier-Noel Bertrand (Peat, Marwick, 
Abercromby, Eric James (Finnie, Ross, Welch Mitchell & Co., London). 
& Co., Glasgow). Finlay, Jonh Livingstone (Jolin M. Geoghegan 
Anderson, Wilma (James Meston & Co., & Co., Edinburgh). 
Aberdeen). Friend, Bernard John (Peacock & Henry, 
Armour, Robert Leslie Grant (Kidston, Goff & Glasgow). 
Harvey, Glasgow). Gallacher, James (Nelson, Gilmour, Scott & 
Baker, Wilfred Oliver (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Glasgow). 
Co., London). 
Beaton, John Fyffe (Anderson & Menzies, 
Kirkcaldy). 
Source: The Accountants' Magazine, August 1958 
i apse 4. h. h. l. A: exam ie irom the aatanase concernin g the iti- memners 
- BIRTH -, ACCYFIRM " MERGE 
004060 M MACKENZIE, Donald 17/02/39 1964 McClelland, Moores Glasgow see s. 
Roderick, CA & Co 4.2.2.3 
004088 M STEVEN, Ian W, CA 1972 Thomson McLintock Glasgow see s. 
& Co 4.2.2.3 
004150 M WATERS, Donald 17/12/37 1961 Roderick MacLean & Inverness see 
Henry, OBE CA FRSA Co, Howden & & section 
Molleson Edinburgh 4.2.2.3 
004320 M SMITH, Alastair 19/06/36 1959 Wilson, Stilring & Co Glasgow see s. 
Moray, CA 4.2.2.3 
Source: PW Price Waterhouse (PW) PW List of List of Members in the as in 
Database Members Accountants' Ma azine ACCYFIRM 
4.2.2.2. The "Accountant" & "Accountancy" magazines for the ICAEW members 
The ICAEW examination pass lists record, against the name of each successful 
candidate, the accountancy firm and the town. However, we encountered two major 
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difficulties: (1) prior to 1983, the examination lists of successful candidates list, 
instead of the name of the accountancy firm, the name of the partner to whom the 
trainee was articled (see Extract 4.2.2.2. A), (2) the publication of the full examination 
pass lists is discontinued in the "Accountancy" magazine since 1973 and in the 
"Accountant" magazine since 1979. 
Extract 4.2.2.2. A: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
Extract of the Results of Professional Examination II held in December 1980 
1'he names of the partners are being shown in brackets 
LIST OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES 
The following candidates by passing the 
examination are eligible to apply for 
membership. 
Astles, S. D. (R. T. Magson), Birmingham 
Atalianis, C. (A. Pinkney), I ondon 
Atkinson, A. (R. E. Crav). Newcastle upon 
Tvne 
C 
Caine, K. M. (Miss) (J. A. Cook), Stockton-on- 
Tees 
Caldwell, D. (J. F. Jee), Nuneaton 
Callaghan, S. (D. D. Kidson), Manchester 
A 
Abbot, D. J. L. (M. E. Maskall), London 
Adams, R. J. (R. Ham), Manchester 
Northampton 
Aleyan, S. (D. T. Holm), Colchester 
Allan, J C. (N. H. Broxham), Hull 
Al 
Ian, R. A. L. (D. W. Malpas), Bournemouth 
Allan, S. R. (E. D. Cox), Birmingham 
Allenza, A. (D. T. Guest), Wolverhampton 
Allmark, E. G. (Miss) (D. J. Illingworth), 
Manchester 
Applebs, R. C. (J. M. Stanley), Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
Armstrong, J. 1.. (N. F. Marshall), 
Southampton 
B 
Bagley, D. J. (P. B. Kirby), London 
Bailey, A. S. (Miss) (B. H. Hawes), Cambridge 
Bailey R. C. (R. N. E. Clark), Leeds 
Baker C. M. (J. G. Goodin), London 
Bale, A. P. (P. Hale), London 
Bali, S. A. (G. C. C. Capon), London 
Ball, C. J. (H. R. Brown), London 
Banerjee G. (J. Burley), London 
Bardwell A. W. (G. Selbv), London 
Carey, A. (G. J. Holbourn), London 
Carrick, B. B. (Mrs) (C. G. W. Bathwayt), 
Bath 
Carroli, A. J. Q. S. Craig), Birmingham 
Carroll, S. J. (D. Blatcher), Maidstone 
Cartwright, S. M. (Miss) (R. G. Noake), 
Birmingham 
.ýj 
Matching each director/chartered accountant with the partner or the accountancy firm 
that trained them was another labour intensive exercise, as it involved, apart from 
extracting manually the relevant information, visiting and using material from the 
Central Library of Birmingham. The library of the Warwick University does 
subscribe to both magazines, but unfortunately it does not hold all the relevant issues 
and most importantly, most of the lists of the successful candidates to the ICAEW 
examinations are being missed from the Warwick libraryl. 
' These lists were published as supplements to the magazines not bound together with the rest of the published 
material/magazine. 
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The second problem (i. e. discontinue of the publication of the exam pass lists in the 
"Accountancy" and "Accountant" magazines) was resolved by ordering from the 
ICAEW's Education and Training Department in Milton Keynes the examination 
lists from 1980 to 1993. The post-1983 examination lists report the name of the 
accountancy firm against the name of each successful candidate (see Extract 
4.2.2.2. B). 
Extract 4.2.2.2. B: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
Extract from the Results of Professional Examination 2 held in December 1993 
The names of the accountancy firms are being shown in brackets 
A 
Abbott D. T. (Casson Beckman), London 
Abbott M. (Ernst & Young), London 
Abdul Rahim A. Z. (Anhur Andersen), Loodon 
Abel P. W. (KPMG Peat Marwick), Bristol 
Aboobaker R. A. G. (Newby Castleman), 
Leicester 
Abraham D. L. (Stoy Hayward) London 
Abram P. J. (Price Waterhouse) Birmingham 
Acum G. A. (Touche Ross & Co. ), Manchester 
Adams C. J. (BDO Binder Hamlyn), London 
Adams C. T. (Anhur Andersen), London 
Adams D. L. (KPMG Peat Marwick), 
Birmingham 
Adams T. M. (Touche Ross & Co. ), Bristol 
Adam-Smith M. A. (Grant Thornton), London 
Adamson M. R. (Price Waterhouse), Hull 
Addy C. J. (Touche Ross & Co. ), Leeds 
Aggarwal A. (Coopers & Lybrand), 
Maidstone 
Ahmad M. S. (KPMG Peat Marwick), London 
Ahmed N. (KPMG Peat Marwick), London 
Ahmed U. (Neville Russell), London 
Aird A. GS. (Price Waterhouse), London 
Aizlewood J. H. (Touche Ross & Co. ) London 
Akdeniz S. O. (Touche Ross & Co. ), Milton 
Keynes 
Alderson K. J. (Coopers & Lybrand), London 
Alexander N. (Coopers & Lybrand), London 
Alibegov D. (Price Waterhouse), London 
Allen F. S. (Clark Whitehill), London 
Allen H. C. M. (Coopers & Lybrand), London 
Allen J. (Touche Ross & Co. ), London 
Allen L. D. (KPMG Peat Marwick), Stoke-On- 
Trent 
Allen N. A. (KPMG Peat Marwick), London 
Allen S. M. (Rouse & Co), Beaconsfield 
Alsop S. J. (Bellman Messik), London 
Americanos A. (Frankson S W. & Co), Hayes 
Amphlett J. J. R. (Daffern & Co), Coventry 
B 
Baker M. L. (Coopers & Lybrand), London 
Bakhshi R. (Haines Watts), Slough 
Balaam M. A. (Touche Ross & Co. ), Leeds 
Baldock G. M. (Blakemores), London 
Ball C. J. (Ernst & Young), Birmingham 
Ball D. W. D. (Touche Ross & Co. ), London 
The first problem (i. e. exam lists give the name of the partner instead of the name of 
the accountancy firm) was tackled by consulting the ICAEW Directory of Members 
for each year since 1953. But, firstly, another time-consuming and laborious task had 
to be completed. Given the fact that the ICAEW examination pass lists do not record 
prior to 1983 the name of the accountancy firm against each successful candidate but 
the name of the partner the trainee was apprenticed, we had to correspond the name 
of the CADRE with the name of the partner to whom the director was articled. The 
number of directors/chartered accountants that have qualified with an accountancy 
firm prior to 1983 was 1,469 names. This meant that having the membership 
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admission year from the 1995 ICAEW List of Members, then we had to look at each 
single examination pass list (two examinations take place each year) from 1953 to 
1983 to trace the 1,469 partners' names and the town. This involved visiting 
regularly Birmingham's Central Library, looking at the examination lists published in 
the "Accountant" or "Accountancy" magazines and transferring manually the 
relevant information (abbreviated as "PARTNAME" & "TOWN" respectively) to the 
existing database with the names of the directors/chartered accountants (see Table 
4.2.2.2. A). 
Table 4.2. 2.2. A: Exam le 3 of the Database 
000016 M LANE, Kenneth W W, FCA FCA 24/03/46 1972 Watt I. G. London 
000799 M EVANS, Stephen BSc 15/09/55 1982 Judd D. J. Swansea 
Geoff re , BSc ACA ACA 
000659 M HUGHES, Richard John, FCA 17/10/46 1969 J. G. Hurst, Liverpool 
FCA jun. 
30873 M BOURNE, Robert FCA 16/05/50 1973 Sober P. London 
Anthony, FCA 
Source: PW Price Waterhouse (PW) PW PW List of ICAEW Exam ICAEW 
Database Members Pass Lists Exam List 
In summary so far, from the original PW dataset which contained detailed information 
for over 15,000 directors in the UK quoted companies, we have created another 
smaller database with only the directors who hold the chartered accountancy 
qualification. It contains the names of 2,286 directors and other relevant information. 
Then we created another column called "membership admission" and the year they 
have been admitted to membership was entered there. Later, another two columns 
were added with the name of the partner and the town to whom the director/chartered 
accountant today (a trainee chartered accountant then) was articled. 
irms 4.2.2.3. Current list of accountancy firms 
Using the yearly published ICAEW List of Members for each year since 1953, we 
were able to trace the partner names back to the name of the accountancy firms. 
Therefore, another column in the database was created containing the name of the 
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chief accountancy firm that the chartered accountant/director was qualified with 
(abbreviated as "ACCYFIRM"). 
Table 4.2.2.3. A: Exam le 4 of the Databa se 
" 
000016 LANE, Kenneth W W, FCA Watt I. G. Thomson McLintock & Co KPMG 
000799 EVANS, Stephen Geoffrey, Judd D. J. Deloitte Haskins & Sells Coopers & 
BSc ACA Lybrand 
000659 HUGHES, Richard John, J. G. Hurst, jun. Arthur Young, McClelland, Ernst & Young 
FCA Moores & Co 
30873 BOURNE, Robert Anthony, Sober P. Stoy, Hayward & Co Stoy Hayward 
FCA 
Source: Price Waterhouse Database ICAEW Exam ICAEW List of Members History Books and 
Pass Lists 1953-1983 Famil Trees 
Some of the accountancy firms though, that the CADRE have qualified with, have 
been merged with other firms and consequently these merged firms have disappeared 
from the list of the current accountancy firms. Most of those firms were small in size 
and have merged with larger practices. Furthermore, some firms have very complex 
family trees and, therefore, the full and detailed make-up of these firms was 
impossible to be unfolded/discovered. As a result, for some of the firms was infeasible 
to find out where they have gone and the process by which they disappeared. We 
assumed that some of these firms have remained independent throughout their 
existence and some have become "defunct" due to mergers. The former firms have 
classified in this study as Non-Big Six (NB6) while the latter carry the current name 
2 that created after the merger(s). 
Thus, with the help of the family trees, the origins of the accountancy firms made 
possible to be traced, and another column needed to be created in the database 
(abbreviated "TODAYACCYF") which shows the names of today's accountancy 
firms (see Table 4.2.2.3. A above). This was another labour intensive work, as we had 
to investigate the development of each single firm that doesn't appear in the list of 
today's firms and attempt to determine with which today's firm have merged with. If 
this was infeasible, then that firm was classified as NB6, as we mentioned earlier. 
2 See section 4.3 below for a discussion on the effects of mergers in this study. 
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4.3. The effect of mergers 
Another problem we encountered during the collection of the directors' data was the 
very big number of accountancy firms that trained the directors/chartered accountants. 
More specifically, 604 different accounting firms appear in our dataset between 1953- 
19913, and many (if not the majority) of them have now disappeared mainly due to a 
wave of mergers during the last 40-50 years. These "disappeared" firms have become 
mainly part of today's "top-twenty" firms - Coopers & Lybrand, Arthur Andersen, 
KPMG, Ernst & Young, Price Waterhouse, Touche Ross, Grant Thornton, BDO Stoy 
Hayward, Pannell Kerr Forster, Clark Whitehill, Kidsons Impey, Moore Stephens, 
Robson Rhodes, Neville Russell, Moores Rowland, Baker Tilly, Smith & Williamson, 
Haines Watts, Casson Beckman and Saffery Champness4. 
A previous from the preceding problem was to trace the partners names back to the 
name of the accounting firms. After solving that, going through the ICAEW Lists of 
Members between 1953 and 1983, and trying to identify the 1,469 partners names, we 
faced another dilemma. How would we be able to show which firms have disappeared 
and trace the continuing development of the largest firms of chartered accountants? 
The problem became bigger realising that the merger activities were accelerating 
during the 60s, 70s and 80s, and that mergers have been prevalent throughout the 
history of the British accounting firms. As a result, many of the previously long- 
established names in accountancy such as "Barton Mayhew & Co" or "Harmood 
Banner" have disappeared. 
What we needed was a historical database reference containing information about the 
development of professional firms. The ideal would have been for us to be able to find 
such a database in a PC readable format. Unfortunately, there was not anywhere 
available such a database, to our knowledge, but we discovered that many of the 
accountancy firms have published their histories, although most of these histories are 
already out-of-date. These books untangle the events in the history of the firms and 
3 See Appendix IV for the full list of accountancy firms that trained today's CADRE. 
4 Listed, in order of fee income, as published in Accountancy, July, 1995. 
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explain their evolution. The most recent book is the history of Price Waterhouse 
(Jones, 1995) as shown in Table 4.3. A. 
Table 4.3. A: some of the published histories of accountancy terms' 
Date Title Author 
1995 True & Fair: A History of the Edgar Jones 
1984 
Price Waterhouse 
The Early History of Coopers & Coopers & Lybrand 
1982 
1981 
1981 
1974 
1958 
Lybrand 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Accountancy & the British Economy: 
The Evolution of Ernst & Whinney 
Tauche Ross & Co. 1899-198 1: The 
Origins and Growth of the UK Firm 
The Growth of Arthur Andersen & Co 
Deloitte & Co. 1845-1956 
TA Wise 
Edgar Jones 
Archibald B. Richards 
Leonard Spacek 
Russell Kettle 
Another interesting overview of the beginnings and evolution of the British 
accountancy firms is provided in the "Accountancy" magazine, which published a 
series of articles titled "What's in a name". Peter Boys (1989,1990) during this series 
charted the changes in the names of accountancy firms through a maze of mergers 
from 1780 to 19906. In that way the family trees of the largest accounting firms in 
British practice in 1989 were followed to their beginnings. 
In addition to the above mentioned sources, the most fruitful historical record was the 
survey of accounting firms archives financed by the ICAEW and carried out in 1991 
and 1992. Wendy Habgood conducted the survey, and she also compiled and edited 
the guide "Chartered Accountants in England and Wales: A Guide to Historical 
Records" published in 1994. The larger section of this book comprises lists of 
historical records, and brief histories of 182 firms of chartered accountants. This 
figure includes practising firms, "founder" firms7, and a number of "defunct" firms 
whose names have become extinct as a result of mergers. 
5A complete list of bibliographies of accountancy firms' histories can be found in Habgood's guide (1994, pp. 46- 
55). 
6 For example, Josiah Wade established in 1780 is probably the oldest firm to trace its "continuous existence" and 
became part of the Deloitte Haskins & Sells in 1969. 
7 Founder firms are defined in the guide as those which can claim continuous partnership descent from a signatory 
to the Charter or a member of the first Council, or which had been in existence for at least 100 years in 1965 
(Howitt, 1966, p. 227). A list of the founder firms is available at the Habgood's guide (1994, pp. 55-59). 
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4.4. Historical findings from our database 
In this section some historical reference will be made regarding the evolution of the 
Big-Six accountancy firms. It aims to provide some background information about the 
names and the number of accountancy firms that (1) have trained the today's 
directors/chartered accountants, and (2) have merged with one of the Big-Six audit 
firms, that is, alphabetically, Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, Price Waterhouse, and Touche Ross. 
As it has been mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, there are 1,955 ICAEW 
directors/chartered accountants in 1996 in the UK stockmarket companies. 55% of 
1,792 CADRE (163 directors were unable to be identified and traced in the 
directories) has trained with one of the Big-Six firms, or one of their predecessors. 
More specifically, 105 directors/chartered accountants have trained with firms that 
make up the Arthur Andersen family tree, 212 with Coopers & Lybrand family tree, 
144 with Ernst & Young family tree, 216 with KPMG family tree, 174 with Price 
Waterhouse family tree and 126 with Touche Ross family tree. 
More analytically, each of these firms consists of several once-famous (or not) names 
of accounting practices and the main names of these disappeared firms are disclosed 
in the following tables: 
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MOW 
W' 9. Ord 
ICAEW 
Arthur Andersen 105 
Dangerfield, Brewis & Co 
James, Edwards, Dangerfield & Co 
Tansley Witt & Co 
Barrowcliff C. Percy & Co 
Smaller 
Arthur Andersen 
212 
Cooper Brothers & Co 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
Harmood Banner & Co 
Tribe, Clarke & Co 
Wallace Cash & Co 
Winter, Robinson, Sisson & Benson 
Smaller 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Ernst & Young 144 
Arthur Young 
Arthur Young, McClelland, Moores & Co 
Baker Sutton & Co 
Barton, Mayhew & Co 
Brown, Fleming & Murray 
Ernst & Whinney 
Josolyne Layton-Bennett & Co 
Josolyne, Miles & Co 
Layton-Bennett, Billingham & Co 
Smith & Garton 
Turquand, Youngs & Co 
Whinney Murray & Co 
Smaller firms 
Ernst & Young 
, ý, ý; ý., s ý- ý.. 
. ý..:, r: ý ý . _. _ __ý- 
KPMG 216 
2 Armitage & Norton 
2 Hays Allani 
4 KMG Thomson McLintock 
4 Peat Marwick McLintock 
5 Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co 
88 Thomson McLintock 
105 Smaller 
KPMG 
Price Waterhouse 174 
35 Hodgson Impey (Hull offices only) 
66 Howard, Smith, Briggs & Co 
14 Mellors, Basden & Co 
2 Smaller 
2 Price Waterhouse 
5 
21 
67 
212 
Touche Ross 
11 Kemp, Chatteris & 
Co 
17 Mann Judd & Co 
3 March R. H., Son & Co 
11 Spicer & Oppenheim 
3 Temple, Gothard & Co 
24 Touch (George A. ) & Co 
5 Smaller 
3 Touche Ross 
5 
3 
10 
19 
22 
8 
144 
126 
9 
3 
4 
9 
18 
25 
18 
130 
216 
2 
2 
4 
8 
158 
174 
4 
7 
2 
43 
3 
2 
10 
55 
126 
82 
4.5. Statistics concerning CADRE 
This section presents some descriptive statistics about the chartered accountants- 
directors (CADRE) on the boards of the UK public companies. 
In the introduction of this chapter we referred to the total number of directors who 
hold a chartered accountancy qualification, that is 2,286 CADRE have received their 
qualification from the ICAEW or ICAS. However, CADRE who hold an ICAS 
qualification have not been considered in this study. Subsequent to collecting the data 
with regard to the accountancy firm and town in which these CADRE have received 
their professional training, there were extensive missing data problems in respect of 
financial information for the listed companies that the ICAS CADRE were employed. 
We decided to continue the current study with those CADRE who hold an ICAEW 
qualification only, and drop the 331 ICAS CADRE. The total useful sample, 
therefore, becomes 1,955 chartered accountants-directors. As we will see during the 
course of the analysis, this number will fluctuate for each different variable discussed. 
For example, we have managed to trace the current job position of directors for only 
1,897 of those 1,955 CADRE. As we can see below, there are in the sample 725 
Finance Directors, 105 Chairmen, 83 Chief Executives, and so on. 
ExD ChiefAcct Chairm ChiefExD CS FD MD NExD Treasurer Total 
100 115 105 83 236 725 67 424 42 1897 
5.27% 600% 5.54010 438% 12.44% 38.22% 3.53% 22.35% 2.21% 100.00% 
Table 4.5. A: Number and percentage of directorships (ExD = Executive Diroector, ChiefAcct = Chief 
Accountant, Chairm = Chairman, ChiefExD = Chief Executive, CS = Company Secretary, FD = 
Finance Director, MD = Managing Director, NExD = non-Executive Director, Treasurer = Treasurer) 
Figure 4.5. A: D 
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From the 1,955 total CADRE, 163 CADRE could not be traced in the exam pass lists 
or members' directories resulting in only 1,792 CADRE for whom we know the 
accountancy firm that trained them. For example, 105 CADRE have trained with 
Arthur Andersen, 212 with Coopers & Lybrand, 216 with KPMG and so on. In this 
analysis the Big-Six audit firms include their predecessors, we subsequently explore a 
narrower definition of association. 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Other Total 
105 212 144 216 174 126 815 1792 
5.86% 11.83% 8.04% 12.05% 9.71% 7.03% 45.48% 100.00% 
Table 4.5. B: Number and percentage of alma mater 
When we merge the above two tables, they give the combined Table 4.5. C below 
where it shows how the positions of directors are distributed by accountancy firm. The 
total useful number of CADRE becomes 1,749 CADRE. For example, 691 from the 
725 Finance Directors were able to be matched with the accountancy firm that trained 
them. Of these 691,56 have trained with AA, 77 with CL, 50 with EY and so on. 
Again in this stage, the Big-Six audit firms include their predecessors. 
Tahle 4.5_C_ Directors and alma mater 
Alma Mater 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Other Total 
ExD 6 5 10 16 5 6 42 90 
ChiefAcct 5 13 13 17 9 5 41 103 
Chairm 3 11 6 4 13 3 54 94 
Directors ChiefExD 3 9 7 11 3 10 34 77 
CS 7 30 13 26 12 14 120 222 
FD 56 77 50 94 86 52 276 691 
MD 2 10 5 6 8 5 26 62 
NExD 17 49 34 29 27 22 191 369 
Treasurer 2 4 3 9 4 6 13 41 
Total 101 208 141 212 167 123 797 1749 
In the United Kingdom, company law requires the public companies to have an audit. 
All the 1,955 CADRE of our sample are directors on the boards of the UK listed 
companies and in effect run corporate Britain. The majority of these companies - 1437 
companies, i. e. 75.16% - are audited by the Big-Six accounting firms. For example, 
105 CADRE companies use Arthur Andersen as auditors, 295 use Coopers & 
84 
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AA TR EY PW CL KPMG Other Total 
105 295 221 396 217 203 475 1912 
5.49% 15.43% 11.56% 20.71% 11.35% 10.62% 24.84% 100.00% 
Table 4.5. D: Number and percentage of the CADRE companies audited by audit firms 
Lybrand, 203 use KPMG and so on. Data is missing regarding the auditors of 43 
companies. 
Historically chartered accountants work as apprentices when they were initially hired 
by the accountancy firms. Table 4.5. E gives the regional areas where the sample 
CADRE have undergone their lengthy and rigorous accounting training. For example, 
Table 4.5. E: UK regional areas where 
CADRE were trained 
North 58 3.35% 
North West 180 10.41% 
North East 163 9.43% 
W. Midlands 146 8.44% 
E. Midlands 51 2.95% 
E. Anglia 26 1.50% 
Gr. London 981 56.74% 
S. West 68, 3.93% 
S. Coast 33 1.91% 
Wales 23 1.33% 
Total 1729 100.00% 
Britain's boardrooms are dominated by 
chartered accountants - 981 CAD G- 
57% - who have been trained in the 
London area. Data of 226 places is missing 
regarding the town where CADRE trained 
as auditors. 
Analysing further the data, We 
Table 4.5. F gives the areas where the 
number of directors have taken their apprenticeships. For example, 376 out of 669 
finance directors were apprenticed in London. North England has produced 19 finance 
directors-chartered accountants, West Midlands 71, and so on. We were not able to 
trace the directorship for 44 of the 1,729 accounting firm alumni. 
Table 4.5. F: Directors and accounting firm alumni town 
D irectors Job Position 
ExD ChfAcct Chrm ChfExD CS FD MD NExD Treas Total 
North 3 6 5 3 7 19 2 11 2 58 
N. West 15 13 12 9 26 55 8 36 5 179 
Alumni North East 9 8 9 10 20 73 6 22 1 158 
Town W. Midlnds 8 5 6 4 24 71 5 18 3 144 
E. Midlnds 3 1 6 1 6 21 3 8 1 50 
E. Anglia 2 1 0 0 6 10 2 5 0 26 
Gr. London 45 57 48 41 106 376 30 221 25 949 
S. West 2 4 4 3 11 23 0 18 2 67 
S. Coast 1 1 3 3 4 14 2 4 0 32 
Wales 1 2 2 2 3 7 1 3 1 22 
Total 89 98 95 76 213 669 59 346 40 1685 
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The absence of women from the Britain's boardrooms has well been documented (e. g. 
PW Corporate Register, September, 1995, p. 7). The preponderance of the male elite 
with accounting training is prevalent in our sample too. Women remain a minority. 
Just 52 of the 1,955 directors-chartered accountants - 2.66% - are women. 
Finally, while the average age of a director is in the early fifties, there are some very 
young and very old directors thrown up by our database. The youngest appear to be 
born later than 1970. They are chief accountant, company secretary and finance 
director of Lionheart, Alphameric and Epic Multimedia Group PLCs respectively. In 
fact, of the CADRE in the database who own up to a date of birth, forty-eight are 
under thirty. Interestingly, nine of these forty-eight are women8. But two directors- 
chartered accountants have seen it all before. At 76 they are the oldest CADRE in the 
database as a company secretary and a non-executive director at Penna Holdings and 
Transtec PLCs respectively. 
Concluding, this chapter has presented analytically the steps by which the data 
concerning the accounting firms alumni was collected. Having constructed the alumni 
network, therefore, the next step is to identify whether there is an association between 
the auditor of the CADRE's current employer with the CADRE's alma mater. This is 
the main analysis of the next chapter. 
R There is an influx of women into accounting training (Business Week, 1997). This gender shift and leavening of 
female talent in accounting might be a signal of a more equitable distribution between sexes in the future 
boardrooms. 
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CHAPTER V 
J, Iam 
ACCOUNTANCY FIRMS, ALUMNI, AND DIRECTORS 
ON THE BOARDS F THE U. K. QUOTED COMPANIES 
This chapter sets out and presents the evidence on directors (executive and non- 
executive) who sit on the boards of the public limited companies in the UK and at the 
same time hold a chartered accountancy qualification from the ICAEW. The analyses 
in the following sections shed new light on the market for audit services, and on the 
role of chartered accountant-directors in understanding this market. The evidence 
allows us to address the theoretical issues discussed in Chapter II, and to consider 
more specifically whether there is an association between the auditor of the company 
and the accountancy firm that the chartered accountant-director trained with, and how 
the distribution of the alumni differs among the Big-Six accountancy firms. A number 
of tests will be performed which identify the "alumni effect" and shows how the 
"alumni effect" varies by accountancy firm. The dataset that has been assembled is as 
far as the literature concerned unique world-wide and its assembly constitutes an 
important contribution to public scientific knowledge in its own right. 
The following section discusses the problems and solutions dealing with the analysis 
of the dataset and also, it describes the sections to follow in more detail. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Accountancy firms employ thousand of trainees each year. They are able to do so 
partially because these firms are characterised by high levels of staff turnover (Iyer et 
al, 1997) as a result of the up-or-out system that these firms employ. Accordingly the 
number of the alumni of those accountancy firms is comparatively high as one would 
expect. Recall that the number of alumni (i. e. chartered accountants qualified with an 
accountancy firm) by the year 1996 who are also directors on the boards of the listed 
companies in the UK is 1,955. These chartered accountants-directors carry on the 
abbreviation CADRE. Also, the mnemonic used to characterise the accountancy firm 
that a CADRE has trained and qualified with is named ALMA MATER. 
The association of CADRE with the auditor and with the accountancy firm that 
trained with presents quantitative analysis with a number of problems. The solution 
adopted is to define quite closely the definition chosen, and to duplicate the analysis 
for alternative definitions to see if the results are robust to alternative definitions. For 
illustration, a major problem in the association of a CADRE with his/her ALMA 
MATER is that the training accounting firm may have subsequently merged, as was 
discussed in Chapter IV. Accordingly our analysis considers association under two 
definitions: a broad definition, which includes the accountancy firm (i. e. alma mater) 
and all its predecessor firm(s), and second a narrow definition, which excludes 
predecessor firm(s). For the broad definition the predecessor firm(s) are those set out 
in the tables of section 4.4. in the Chapter IV. 
Another major problem in the CADRE association with his/her auditor is the multiple 
CADREs on the boards of directors. There are cases in the dataset where more than 
one CADRE are employed as directors in the same company. Accordingly, the 
association is explored under three definitions: a broad definition, which all CADREs 
are counted (and consequently, some companies appear in the database as many times 
as the number of CADREs on their boards); a narrow 1 definition, which only one 
CADRE per company is included (the problem of which director(s) is eliminated is 
discussed later in the chapter); and a narrow 2 definition, which only the Finance 
Director, Chairman and/or Chief Executive are considered. 
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The remainder of the chapter is divided as follows: the next section presents the 
broad-broad test in which the number of CADREs who qualified with accountancy 
firms including their predecessor(s) are counted. The broad-narrow test is performed 
in section 3 where only those CADRE who have qualified with a founder firm appear 
in the tables. Section 4 analyses the narrow 1-broad test in which only one CADRE per 
A. LML 
MATER 
BROAD NARROW 
. FOUNDER & 
FOUNDER 
DISAPPEARED 
A. E I)ITOR BROAD SECTION 2 SECTION 3 
AUDITOR NARROW 1 SECTION 4 SECTION 5 
AUDITOR NARROW 2 SECTION 6 SECTION 7 
public company is counted (selected initially in CADRE alphabetical order, second by 
the eldest director and third by the youngest) under the founder and disappeared alma 
mater category. In section 5 the narrowl-narrow test is presented, taking the narrow 
definition of alma mater as the founder firm category. The corresponding narrow2- 
broad test is performed in section 6 in which CADRE are restricted to only the 
Finance Director, or Chairman or Chief Executive under the founder and disappeared 
alma mater category. In section 7 the narrow2-narrow test is shown combining the 
results of these two definitions. 
5.2. The Broad-Broad Test 
This section presents an analysis of the data as a whole. The decompositions are 
discussed later in the chapter. The CADRE who have qualified with one of the Big- 
Six firm or its predecessor(s) are counted and analysed in this section. 
5.2.1. Specifying the data involved for the test 
The data used for the Broad-Broad test is discussed in this section in which the 
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number of CADRE who qualified as chartered accountants with one of the Big-Six 
firm or their predecessor(s) are merely counted. Every CADRE is designated a matrix 
position (i, j), where: 
i= the name of the accountancy firm with whom the CADRE trained (i. e. 
ALMA MATER) 
j= the name of the auditor of the CADRE's company. 
The summation/tabulation of these matrix positions for all CADRE is the basis of 
constructing the contingency table presented below. 
Table 5.2.1. A: Total CADRE on the boards (read horizontally only) 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other Auditor Total 
AA 21 14 16 14 14 12 91 12 2 105 
ALMA CL 10 58 21 38 18 15 160 49 3 212 
MATER EY 7 26 38 22 11 15 119 23 2 144 
KPMG 10 35 22 66 16 19 168 47 1 216 
PW 8 26 13, 40 39 17 143 27 4 174 
TR 4 17 11 27 11 31 101 23 2 126 
Subtotal 782 977 
Other 41 97 83 162 87 72 258 15 815 
Missing 4 22 17 27 21 22 36 14 163 
Total 105 295 221 396 217 203 475 43 1955 
The row total gives the number of CADRE who trained with each accountancy firm or 
its predecessor(s), for example 105 CADRE with AA, 212 with CL, 144 with EY and 
so on. The columns give the firms that these chartered accountants-directors use as 
their auditor. So, for Arthur Andersen, twenty-one CADRE use AA, fourteen CL, 
sixteen EY, fourteen KPMG, fourteen PW, twelve TR and twelve "other" (non-Big 
Six) accountancy firms. Thus out of 105 former employees of AA, twenty-one favour 
their alma mater. The same table shows that fifty-eight out of 212 CADRE who 
qualified with Coopers & Lybrand use them as auditors. Following a similar pattern 
for the rest of the Big-Six firms, the following Table 5.2.1. B and Graph 5.2.1. A can be 
constructed. 
It is important to note here that the columns in Table 5.2.1 .A give 
just the name of the 
accountancy firms that CADRE use as their auditor. They do not give the total number 
of auditors or the number of the UK public companies who have on their boards of 
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directors a chartered accountant(s) because some listed companies have more than one 
CADRE on their boards. In other words, the columns total is not meaningful in Table 
5.2.1. A. This problem is discussed in more detail in section 5.4.1. 
Table 5.2.1. B: No of CADRE on Boards (%) 
No of 
CADRE 
per Accg 
Firm 
Alumni 
and Audit 
Client 
Alumni 
ýooý 
AA 105 21 20.00 
CL 212 58 27.36 
EY 144 38 26.39 
KPMG 216 66 30.56 
PW 174 39 22.41 
TR 126 31 24.60 
977 25 25.90 
Other 815 258 
Missing 163 14 
5 525 
Note: "Alumni and audit client" refers to the situation 
where a CADRE is audited by his ALMA MATER 
Figure 5.2.1. A: Alumni on boards 
Big-Six FCA Alumni 
No FCA AA CL 
8% 5% 11% 
EY 
7% 
Other KPMG 
43% 11% 
TR PW 
6% 9% 
Nevertheless, looking at the rows of the Table 5.2.1 . 
A, we observe that nearly 50% 
(977 out of 1,955) of the chartered accountants on the boards of directors trained and 
qualified with one of the Big-Six auditing firms or one of the Big-Six's predecessor. 
Adding the main diagonal in the table, it shows that 253 of them (25.90%) have as 
their auditors the firm that they have qualified with (see also Table 5.2.1. B). For the 
non-Big Six firms 815 out of 1,955 supplied the directors. 
Having explained the data that will be involved for the test in this section, we need to 
develop the tools with which to analyse the data (in the next subsection), before we 
move into performing the test itself. The following section, therefore, presents a 
detailed explanation of the chi-square test which will be used in the subsequent 
analysis. 
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5.2.2. An explanation of the chi-square test 
We use the chi-square distribution as an approximate sampling distribution to 
compare observed frequencies with those expected under the null hypothesis. We have 
used this distribution because the testing procedures are simplified when sampling is 
from populations whose elements can be classified into one or more categories. 
5.2.2.1. Tests of independence 
We use the chi-square distribution to conduct statistical tests of independence in order 
to explore the proposition that two criteria of classification are independent each other 
when applied to a population of subjects (or objects). Two criteria of classification are 
said to be independent if the distribution of one criterion in no way depends on the 
distribution of the other. 
Typically, we make decisions about whether criteria of classification in a population 
are related on the basis of sample data. A random sample is drawn from the 
population of interest and we cross-classify the subjects according to the criteria. The 
cross-classification is displayed in a table, called a contingency table. In a contingency 
table, the levels of one criterion provide row headings, and the levels of the other 
criterion provide the column headings. Having the data organised into a contingency 
table, the test is whether classification on the row variable is independent of 
classification on the column variable (this represents the null hypothesis). 
Table 5.2.2.1 
.A shows a contingency table 
in which a sample of n subjects has been 
cross-classified according to two criteria. There are r levels of the criterion forming 
the rows and c levels of the criterion forming the columns. We place the observed 
number Old of subjects that may be characterised by one level of each criterion in the 
cell formed by the intersection of the ith row and jth column. The cell entries are 
referred to as observed cell frequencies. 
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Table 5.2.2.1. A: Two-way classification of a sample of subjects 
First Criterion of Classification 
Level 
Level 123.... C Total 
1 O 012 013 
.... 
O, 
C 
R, 
Second 
2 021 022 023 
.... 
02c R2 
Criterion of 
3 03.032 033 .... 03c R3 
Classification 
r Orl Or2 Or3 
"" 
Orc Rr 
Total Cl C2 C3 .... Cc n 
The notation used in Table 5.2.2.1. A is as follows: 
Oil = number in the random sample observed to belong to ith row and jth 
column; first subscript, i, denotes row; second, j, column 
R, = total observed number in ith row; found by summing the frequencies in 
row i 
Cj = total observed number in jth column; found by summing the frequencies 
in column j 
rc 
n= sample size; the sum of the frequencies for all cells = Y_ R; =1 Cj 
i=1 j=1 
To test the hypothesis that the criteria of classification in the rows and columns are 
independent, i. e. calculate the chi-square statistic value, we compute an expected 
number of sample elements for each cell Eid and employ a x2 statistic that 
approximately follows the chi-square distribution. 
To find the expected cell frequencies (E! 3) needed to calculate the chi-square statistic 
value, the principles of probability are used. The expected cell frequencies are derived 
from the marginal frequencies (the marginal frequencies are the row and columns 
sums). These expected frequencies can be calculated using the formula: 
Eýý _ 
R. C. 
n 
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where: Eli = the expected frequency for cell in row i, column j 
The sums of the expected frequencies in each row and column must be equal to the 
marginal frequencies (or put it differently, both E Ri and E Cj must be equal to n). 
These restrictions determine the number of degrees of freedom to be (r - 1)(c - 1), 
where r is the number of rows and c is the number of columns. 
To perform the test, we find the contribution of each cell to the,. The contribution of 
the (i, j)th cell is (observed cell frequency - expected cell frequency)2 divided by the 
expected cell frequency. There are a total of rc such contributions, and the calculated 
/ is their sum, as given in the following equation. 
rc 
x2 
ý2 E. - 
E. 
º,. 
At some predetermined level of significance, the calculated chi-square is compared 
with the tabled value (or critical value). Only a one-tailed test is appropriate, with the 
rejection region in the right tail of the distribution of the test statistic. If the calculated 
statistic equals or exceeds the tabled value, the finding is significant and the 
hypothesis of independence is rejected; the row and the column variables are 
determined to be dependent at the specified level of significance. The exact 
interpretation will be dependent upon the nature of the row and column criteria. If the 
calculated statistic is smaller than the tabled value, no significant relationship between 
row and column variables has been determined to exist, and we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Further, in the application of this test which follows, I employ 5% or 1% as 
significance level. This means that under the null hypothesis that there is 
independence between the criteria, there is 1 in 20 (or 1 in 100) chance that I will 
erroneously conclude that there is a relationship between the criteria. 
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5.2.3. Performing the Broad-Broad Test 
This section performs the chi-square tests (discussed in the subsection 5.2.2.1 above) 
for the dataset described in section 5.2.1. We test the Table 5.2.1 .A in two stages, first 
for the Big-Six accountancy firms and next we repeat the same test for the non-Big 
Six firms. Each test is discussed in the following two subsections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2. 
5.2.3.1. The test for the Big-Six firms 
In order to test the hypothesis that the criteria of classification in the rows and 
columns of Table 5.2.1 .A are independent, and determine the critical value of X2, we 
must compute the chi-square statistic value. This subsection explores the proposition 
that there is an alumni effect among the Big-Six accountancy firms. 
To resume the discourse/exposition, therefore, presented with Table 5.2.1 . A, the first 
question one considers is whether the frequencies in Table 5.2.1 .A are merely the 
result of chance. In other words, for the Big-Six firms, is there an association between 
the ALMA MATER and the auditor of the company? Formally, the chi-square statistic 
is used to test the null hypothesis Ho 
Ho: there is independence between auditor and ALMA MATER, 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
H1: non-independence. 
Applying the chi-square test for independence to Table 5.2.1 . 
A, we test whether the 
two criteria of classification are independent. The two criteria of classifying CADRE 
Table 5.2.3.1. A: Bia-Six firms alumni on the boards (read horizontally onlv) 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Big-6 Subtotal 
AA 21 14 16 14 14 12 91 
ALMA CL 10 58 21 38 18 15 160 
MATER EY 7 26 38 22 11 15 119 
KPMG 10 35 22 66 16 19 168 
PW 8 26 13 40 39 17 143 
TR 4 17, 11 27 11 31 101 
Subtotal 60 176 121 207 109 109 782 
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in the Table 5.2.1 .A is by ALMA MATER and by auditor. We concentrate here on the 
Big-Six effect only, thus the Table 5.2.3.1 .A above jettisons several frequencies from 
the Table 5.2.1. A and focuses only on the Big-Six observations. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.2.3.1 .B 
where the expected frequencies appear in italics under the observed frequencies for 
each accountancy firm. The Table 5.2.3.1. B is a6x6 contingency table so that there 
are 25 degrees of freedom. 
Table 5.2.3.1. B: ALMA MATER * AUDITORS Crosstabulation 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Total 
AA Count 21 14 16 14 14 12 91 
Expected Count 7.0 20.5 14.1 24.1 12.7 12.7 91.0 
CL Count 10 58 21 38 18 15 160 
Expected Count 12.3 36.0 24.8 42.4 22.3 22.3 160.0 
ALMA EY Count 7 26 38 22 11 15 119 
MATER Expected Count 9.1 26.8 18.4 31.5 16.6 16.6 119.0 
KPMG Count 10 35 22 66 16 19 168 
Expected Count 12.9 37.8 26.0 44.5 23.4 23.4 168.0 
PW Count 8 26 13 40 39 17 143 
Expected Count 11.0 32.2 22.1 37.9 19.9 19.9 143.0 
TR Count 4 17 11 27 11 31 101 
Expected Count 7.7 22.7 15.6 26.7 14.1 14.1 101.0 
Total Count 60 176 121 207 109 109 782 
Expected Count 60.0 176.0 121.0 207.0 109.0 109.0 782.0 
The value of the test statistic is 144.470 (p < 0.001), compared to the critical value of 
the x2 with 99% confidence level and 25 degrees of freedom which is 
/' (0.99,25) = 44.314. Accordingly we reject Ho. The outcomes are not merely the result 
of chance. Moreover, examining the difference in the frequencies of the Table 
5.2.3.1. B, one cannot fail to notice the strong diagonal in Table 5.2.3.1. C below which 
indicates that for the Big-Six accountancy firms there is a strong association between 
Table 5.2.3.1.1 " Differences between observed & expected frequencies 
AUDI TORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR 
AA + - + - + - 
ALMA CL - + - - - - 
MATER EY - - + - - - 
KPMG - - - + - - 
PW - - - + + - 
TR - - - + - + 
96 
the auditor of the UK public company and the accountancy firm that the CADRE 
qualified with (i. e. alma mater). 
We have identified in Tables 5.2.1. A and 5.2.3.1. C above the main diagonal effect in 
the cross-classification as the principal pattern in the data. This means that there is a 
greater propensity for CADRE to have as their auditors the accounting firm that they 
trained with. The natural question to ask is whether this tendency varies by 
accountancy firm. For the Big-Six firms, the relevant data is set out in Table 5.2.1. B. 
Another hypothesis, therefore, to be examined here, is based on Table 5.2.1 . 
B, and 
looks only at those CADRE who have their ex-employer (i. e. "old" accountancy 
firm) as their auditor in connection with the total number of CADRE who have been 
trained by the Big-Six firms. In particular, the question here is whether the incidence 
of an "alumni and audit client" situation occurs proportional independently of the 
total number of the Big-Six CADRE/alumni. The "alumni and audit client" refers to 
the situation where a CADRE is audited by his/her ALMA MATER. Formally the 
chi-square statistic with 5 degrees of freedom is used to test the null hypothesis Ho 
Ho: the same proportion of CADRE have their alma mater as auditors, 
versus the alternative hypothesis H1 
H 1: different proportion of CADRE have their alma mater as auditors. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.2.3.1 .D 
below. The expected frequencies show the proportional number of CADRE trained by 
each firm. The Table 5.2.1 .B 
is a6x2 contingency table so that there are 5 degrees of 
freedom. 
The value of the test statistic proves to be 4.307 (p = 0.506), and the pertinent value of 
the x2 for a=0.05 and 5 degrees of freedom is 11.070. Accordingly the statistic is not 
significant at the 95% confidence level and the null hypothesis is accepted. In other 
words, the proportion of Big-Six CADRE who have their alma mater as auditors does 
not differ. The proportion is a constant parameter between audit firms - no individual 
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Table 5.2.3.1. D: Chi-aquare test based on Table 5.2.1. B 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
AA 21 27.2 -6.19 
CL 58 54.9 3.11 
EY 38 37.3 0.71 
KPMG 66 55.9 10.06 
PW 39 45.1 -6.06 
TR 31 32.6 -5.63 
Total 253 
firm has alumni who are more (or less) loyal to their alma mater than their 
competitors. 
5.2.3.2. The test for the non-Big Six firms 
Having established in the last subsection that there is an association for the Big-Six 
accounting firms between ALMA MATER and the auditor of the UK public company 
in which the CADRE is currently working as a director, this subsection explores 
whether a similar kind of association exists for the non-Big Six firms, in other words, 
for the non-Big Six firms, is there a significant relationship between the ALMA 
MATER and the auditor of the company? Formally, the chi-square statistic is used to 
test the null hypothesis H. 
Ho: there is independence between auditor and ALMA MATER, 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
H1: non-independence. 
Before we apply the chi-square test, we need first to show the table which includes the 
non-Big Six accountancy firms. Table 5.2.1 .A includes a row and a column named 
"other". "Other" means the non-Big Six accountancy firms. There are 258 CADRE in 
Table 5.2.1 
.A who 
have qualified with "other" (non-Big Six) firms and at the same 
time use as their auditors "other" (non-Big Six) accounting firms. Most of those 258 
CADRE are displayed below in the Table 5.2.3.2. A. 
The abbreviations used in the Table 5.2.3.2. A below represent the following non-Big 
Six accounting firms: 
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Non-Bix Six Audit Firms 
Baker Tilly (BT) Burnett Swayne (BS) Robson Rhodes (RR) 
BDO Stoy Hayward (BDO) Clark Whitehill (CW) Smailes Goldie (SG) 
Beavis Walker (BW) Grant Thornton (GT) Thomas May (TM) 
Binder Hamlyn (BH) Page Robt. A. & Co (PRA) Other (0) 
Blythens (B) Pannell Kerr Forster (PKF) 
Table 5.2.3.2. A: Non-Big Six firms alumni on the boards (read horizontally only) 
BT BDO BW BH B BS CW GT PRA PKF RR SG TM 0 Total 
BT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
BDO 0 4 0 4 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 7 20 
BW 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
BH 1 10 0 9 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 27 
B 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
BS 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
CW 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
GT 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 6 17 
PRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
PKF 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 3 11 
RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 0 3 9 
SG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
TM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Other 3 23 0 23 0 1 4 22 0 10 9 0 0 68 163 
Total 7 37 1 41 1 4 7 35 1 14 17 1 1 91 258 
Looking at the Table 5.2.3.2. A above, we notice that the majority of the observations 
have zero frequencies, indicating a threat to the validity of the chi-square test. Indeed, 
when the expected frequencies were calculated, 187 (95.40%) of the 196 cells had 
expected frequencies less than 5 and, therefore, Table 5.2.3.2. A does not meet the 
criterion which requires 80 percent of the cells having expected frequencies of 5 or 
more (Daniel and Terrell, 1995; Foster, 1998). An examination of the dataset does not 
allow us to combine adjacent rows and/or columns to satisfy the criterion, as such 
combination would violate the logic of the classification scheme. There is no logic 
behind collapsing, for example, Baker Tilly and BDO Stoy Hayward and/or other 
firm(s) into a single category, as after the test we would not be in a position to identify 
whether there is an association between ALMA MATER and the auditor. Why, for 
example, a CADRE qualified with Baker Tilly would have a predisposition to benefit 
BDO Stoy Hayward and/or other accounting firm(s) which we arbitrarily have merged 
into a single category/firm? In other words, it is not clear what, if anything, the new 
category represents. 
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However, we are in a position to replicate Table 5.2.1 .B for the non-Big Six audit 
firms. In other words, as it can be shown in Table 5.2.3.2. A above, there is a main 
diagonal effect which indicates for the non-Big Six accountancy firms that there is a 
strong association between CADRE and alma mater. The natural question to ask is 
Table 5.2.3.2. B: No of CADRE ner non-BiQ Six audit firms 
No of CADRE per 
non-Big Six Audit 
Firms 
Alumni and 
Audit Client 
Alumni (%) 
Baker Tilly 2 1 50.00 
BDO Stoy Hayward 20 4 20.00 
Beavis Walker 1 1 100.00 
Binder Hamlyn 27 9 33.33 
Blythens 1 1 100.00 
Burnett Swayne 2 1 50.00 
Clark Whitehill 2 1 50.00 
Grant Thornton 17 7 41.18 
Page Robt. A. & Co 1 1 100.00 
Pannell Kerr Forster 11 2 18.19 
Robson Rhodes 9 4 44.44 
Smailes Goldie 1 1 100.00 
Thomas May 1 1 100.00 
Neville Russell 2 1 50.00 
Latham Crossley & Davis 1 1 100.00 
98 36 36.73 
Other 160 60 
Total 258 96 
whether this diagonal effect varies by non-Big Six firm. Formally the chi-square 
statistic is used to test the null hypothesis Ho 
Ho: the proportion of CADRE who have their alma mater as auditors does not 
differ 
versus the alternative hypothesis HI 
H1: the proportion of CADRE differs. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.2.3.2. C. The 
expected frequencies show the proportional number of CADRE trained by each firm. 
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The Table 5.2.3.2. B is a 15 x2 contingency table so that there are 14 degrees of 
freedom. 
Table 5.2.3.2. C: Proportional CADRE per non-Big Six audit firm 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Baker Tilly 1 
.7 .3 
BDO Stoy Hayward 4 7.4 -3.4 
Beavis Walker 1 .4 .6 
Binder Hamlyn 9 9.9 -. 9 
Blythens 1 .4 .6 
Burnett Swayne 1 .7 .3 
Clark Whitehill 1 .7 .3 
Grant Thornton 7 6.2 .8 
Page Robt. A. & Co 1 .4 .6 
Pannell Kerr Forster 2 4.0 -2.0 
Robson Rhodes 4 3.3 .7 
Smailes Goldie 1 .4 .6 
Thomas May 1 .4 .6 
Neville Russell 1 .7 .3 
Latham Crossley & Davis 1 .4 .6 
Total 36 
The value of the test statistic proves to be 9.714 (p = 0.783), and the pertinent value of 
the, for a=0.05 and 14 degrees of freedom is 23.685. Accordingly the statistic is not 
significant at the 95% confidence level and the null hypothesis is accepted. In other 
words, the same proportion of non-Big Six CADRE have their alma mater as auditors. 
However, this result should be interpreted with care as more than 20% of the cells 
have expected frequencies with less than five. 
5.3. The Broad-Narrow test 
The previous section is very encouraging. The findings are that there is an alumni 
effect, and for the Big-Six firms 25.9% of CADRE have their ALMA MATER as 
auditors. This percentage does not significantly differ between Big-Six accountancy 
firms. To see if this results are robust with respect to Broad-Narrow definitions, this 
section merely counts those CADRE who have qualified with a founder firm. 
5.3.1. Specifying the data involved for the test 
This subsection presents a description of the data involved for the Broad-Narrow test. 
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In particular, in the light of the fact that there was (and apparently still is) an active 
merger activity among accounting practices and, therefore, many CADRE have 
qualified with a firm which no longer exists as an independent entry, but has been 
absorbed into a successor firm, I have grouped CADRE into two classes. They have 
been categorised into those who trained and qualified with a "founder firm", and those 
who trained with an accountancy firm that has been amalgamated or absorbed into one 
of the Big-Six audit firm (the disappeared firm)'. In this way, a better understanding 
of the nature of the relationship between auditors and client management can be 
drawn. 
I define what I have termed a" ounder firm" as one which has not been involved in 
mergers or if it has, its name has not disappeared as a result of the absorption2. For 
example, most of the Big-Six have amalgamated with other smaller accounting firms, 
however, their names have not been lost through the years. 
The broad-narrow test is discussed in this section in which the number of CADRE 
who qualified as chartered accountants with one of the Big-Six firm (as a founder 
firm) are merely counted. For example, EY has the smaller amount of CADRE on the 
boards, simply because EY has been created only recently (in September 1989 after 
the merger of Ernst & Whinney with Arthur Young). Every CADRE is designated a 
matrix position (i, j), where: 
i= the name of the accountancy firm with whom the CADRE trained (i. e. 
ALMA MATER) 
j= the name of the auditor of the CADRE's company. 
The summation/tabulation of these matrix positions for all CADRE (who satisfy the 
criterion laid down in the preceding paragraph) is the basis of constructing the 
contingency Table 5.3.1 .A presented 
below. 
1 However, the presentation and analysis of the data concerning the disappeared firms is not pursued in this study, 
mainly because more than 40% of the cells has observed and expected frequencies less than five. Nevertheless, 
appendix II presents the table with the observed frequencies of the disappeared firms. 
2 The above definition differs from the one given by Howitt (1966) who writing the history of ICAEW has defined 
the term "founder firm" as a firm which can claim continuous partnership descent from a signatory to the Charter 
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Table 5.3.1. A: CADRE qualified with a founder accountancy firm (read horizontally' 
FOUNDER FIRMS AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other 
Auditor TOTAL 
AA 20 9 15 11 11 12 78 9 2 89 
ALMA CL 3 17 8 14 2 8 52 15 0 67 
MATER EY 1 0 4 2 0 0 1 0 8 
KPMG 4 19 13 39 5 15 95 34 1 130 
PW 8 23 12 39 36 15 133 22 3 158 
TR 2 9 5 12 3 13 44 12 1 57 
Subtotal 409 509 
Other 41 97 83 162 87 72 258 15 815 
Missing 4 22 17 27 21 22 36 14 163 
TOTAL 79 174 140 279 144 135 351 22 1487 
The row total in the Table 5.3.1 .A gives the number of 
CADRE who trained with a 
founder accountancy firm, for example 89 CADRE with AA, 67 with CL, 8 with EY 
and so on. The name of the auditor that these CADRE employ is given by the 
columns. So, for Arthur Andersen, twenty CADRE use AA, nine CL, fifteen EY, 
eleven KPMG, eleven PW, twelve TR and nine "other" (non-Big Six) accountancy 
firms. Thus, out of 89 former employees of AA, twenty favour their alma mater. The 
same table shows that seventeen out of 67 CADRE who qualified with Coopers & 
Lybrand use them as auditors. Following a similar pattern for the rest of the Big-Six 
firms, the following table can be constructed. 
Table 5.3.1.8: No of CADRE qualified with a founder firm 
No of CADRE 
qualified with 
founder firm 
Alumni 
and 
Audit Client 
Alumni (%) 
AA 89 20 22.47 
CL 67 17 25.37 
EY 8 4 50.00 
KPMG 130 39 30.00 
PW 158 36 22.78 
TR 57 13 22.81 
-50 
129 25.34 
Note: "Alumni and audit client" refers to 
the situation where a CADRE is audited 
by his/her ALMA MATER. 
or a member of the first Council, or which had been in existence for at least 100 years in 1965 (p. 227). 
However, 
this terminology is not regarded as a recognised title (see also footnote 7 of Chapter IV). 
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It is important to note here that the columns in Table 5.3.1 .A give just the name of the 
accountancy firms that CADRE use as their auditor. They do not give the actual 
number of auditors or the number of the UK public companies who have on their 
boards of directors a chartered accountant(s). In other words, the columns total must 
be ignored in this table. The problem arises because some listed companies have more 
than one CADRE in their boards. This problem is discussed in more detail in section 
5.4.1. 
Another point to notice here is that the listing involving "other" in the alma mater 
classification in the table 5.3.1. A is by no means comprehensive and complete. In 
some cases the details in the entries regarding small firms is incomplete due to 
unavailability of information. Some small firms' histories could not be traced and as a 
result they appear in the founder Table 5.3.1. A notwithstanding our reservation for the 
possibility of containing false information. In other words, we don't know whether 
these small practices do still exist today or have merged and absorbed into other firms. 
Thus, considering the inappropriateness of the data in the "other" entry of the alma 
mater classification in the Table 5.3.1 . A, I have ignored the figures appear in this row 
in the subsequent analysis and concentrated only on the impact of qualifying as a 
chartered accountant with one of the Big-Six firms. 
Having explained the data that will be involved for the test in this section, we move 
now into performing the test itself. 
5.3.2. Performing the Broad-Narrow Test 
This section performs the chi-square test for the dataset described in the preceding 
section. In order to test the hypothesis that the criteria of classification in the rows and 
columns of the Table 5.3.1 .A are 
independent, and determine the critical value ofX2, 
we must compute the chi-square statistic value. This subsection explores the 
proposition that there is an alumni effect among the Big-Six accountancy firms. 
Due to inappropriateness of the data in the "other" row entry in the Table 5.3.1. A 
explained in the last paragraph of the preceding section, we concentrate here only on 
104 
the Big-Six firms, and therefore, the Table 5.3.1. A is transformed into the following 
Table 5.3.2. A: 
Table 5.3.2. A: Big-Six CADRE qualified with a founder firm (read horizontally only) 
FOUNDER FIRMS AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Big-6 Subtotal 
AA 20 9 15 11 11 12 78 
ALMA CL 3 17 8 14 2 8 52 
MATER EY 1 0 4 2 0 0 
KPMG 4 19 13 39 5 15 95 
PW 8 23 12 39 36 15 133 
TR 2 9 5 12 3 13 44 
Subtotal 38 77 57 117 57 63 409 
We question whether there is a significant association between the ALMA MATER 
and the auditor of the company, and formally, the chi-square statistic is used to test the 
null hypothesis Ho 
Ho: auditor and ALMA MATER are independent, 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
H1: auditor is dependent upon the ALMA MATER. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.3.2. B where 
the expected frequencies appear in italics under the observed frequencies for each 
accountancy firm. The Table 5.3.2. A is a6x6 contingency table so that there are 25 
degrees of freedom. 
We notice that 8 cells (22.22%) have expected count less than 5. This poses a possible 
threat to the validity of the chi-square test since more than 20% of the cells have 
expected frequencies of less than 5, and as are result the test statistic would not closely 
approximate a chi-square distribution (Daniel and Terrell, 1995; Roscoe, 1969). In 
view of this problem, we have decided to delete the cells (row) where the frequencies 
are low in order to satisfy the rule. We notice that 6 out of 8 cells that have expected 
frequencies less than 5 are in the row that represents EY. Thus, a new contingency 
table is constructed in which the alma mater EY row has been discarded from the 
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Table 5.3.2. B. 
Table 5.3.2. B: ALMA MATER * AUDITORS Crosstabulation No 1 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Total 
AA Count 20 9 15 11 11 12 78 
Expected Count 7.2 14.7 10.9 22.3 10.9 12.0 78.0 
CL Count 3 17 8 14 2 8 52 
Expected Count 4.8 9.8 7.2 14.9 7.2 8.0 52.0 
EY Count 1 0 4 2 0 0 7 
ALMA Expected Count 0.7 1.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.1 7.0 
MATER KPMG Count 4 19 13 39 5 15 95 
Expected Count 8.8 17.9 13.2 27.2 13.2 14.6 95.0 
PW Count 8 23 12 39 36 15 133 
Expected Count 12.4 25.0 18.5 38.0 18.5 20.5 133.0 
TR Count 2 9 5 12 3 13 44 
Expected Count 4.1 8.3 6.1 12.6 6.1 6.8 44.0 
Total Count 38 77 57 117 57 63 409 
Expected Count 38.0 77.0 57.0 117.0 57.0 63.0 409.0 
The Table 5.3.2. C is a5x6 contingency table and has only 2 cells (6.70%) with 
expected count less than 5. The test statistic closely approximates a chi-square 
distribution and its value is 85.063 (p < 0.00 1), compared to the critical value of the,, 
with 95% confidence level and 20 degrees of freedom which is %(0.95,20) = 31.410. 
Table 5.3.2. C: ALMA MATER * AUDITORS Crosstabulation No 2 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Total 
AA Count 20 9 15 11 11 12 78 
Expected Count 7.2 14.9 10.3 22.3 11.1 12.0 78.0 
CL Count 4 17 12 16 2 8 52 
ALMA Expected Count 4.8 10.0 6.9 14.9 7.4 8.1 52.0 
MATER KPMG Count 4 19 13 39 5 15 95 
Expected Count 8.7 18.2 12.5 27.2 13.5 14.9 95.0 
PW Count 8 23 12 39 36 15 133 
Expected Count 12.2 25.5 17.5 38.0 18.9 20.8 133.0 
TR Count 2 9 5 12 3 13 44 
Expected Count 4_0 8.4 5.8 12.6 6.2 6.9 44.0 
Total Count 37 77 53 115 57 63 402 
Expected Count 37.0 77.0 53.0 115.0 57.0 63.0 402.0 
Accordingly, we reject Ho. There is a significant relationship between ALMA 
MATER and auditor. This is a confirmatory result and despite the narrower definition 
of ALMA MATER, an alumni effect still exists. 
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Another hypothesis to be examined here, is based on Table 5.3.1 . B, and looks only at 
those CADRE who have their former employer (i. e. former accountancy firm) as 
their auditor in connection with the total number of CADRE who have been trained 
by the Big-Six (as founder firm). In particular, the question here is whether we can 
conclude from the Table 5.3.1. B that the Big-Six firms as auditors are not equally 
preferred by the CADRE. If there is no preference, one would expect to observe the 
same number of CADRE proportionally for each accountancy firm. In other words, 
one would expect the total number of CADRE (who use their alma mater as auditor) 
to be distributed proportional uniformly among the Big-Six (as founder firms). 
Pursuing this line of reasoning, we may conduct the chi-square statistic test with 5 
degrees of freedom to test the null hypothesis Ho 
Ho: the Big-Six firms (as founder firms) are proportional equally preferred, 
versus the alternative hypothesis H1 
H1: the Big-Six firms (as founder firms) are not proportional equally preferred. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.3.2. D below. 
The Table 5.3.1 .B is a6x2 contingency table so that there are 5 degrees of freedom. 
Table 5.3.2. D: Chi-square test based on Table 5.3.1. B 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
AA 20 22.6 -2.6 
CL 17 16.9 0.1 
EY 4 2.1 1.9 
KPMG 39 32.9 6.1 
PW 36 40.1 -4.1 
TR 13 14.4 -1.4 
Total 129 
The value of the test statistic proves to be 3.705 (p = 0.593), and the tabled value of 
the x2 for a=0.01 and 5 degrees of freedom is X2=15.086. Accordingly the statistic is 
not significant at the 99% confidence level and the null hypothesis is accepted. In 
other words, there is evidence that the same proportion of CADRE have their alma 
mater as auditors. 
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5.4. The Narrowl-Broad Test 
This section counts and tests one CADRE only per company. The following 
subsection discusses the data involved for the Narrow 1-Broad test and subsection 
5.4.2 performs the chi-square statistic test. 
5.4.1. Specifying the data involved for the test 
This subsection presents a description of the data involved for the Narrow 1-Broad 
test. One of the major problems in the CADRE association with his/her auditor we 
faced was the multiple CADREs on the boards of directors. There are public 
companies in the dataset that employ more than one CADRE on their boards. This 
posed the problem in section 5.2.1 that although we successfully computed the 
number of CADRE qualified with the Big-Six firms, we were unable to specify the 
number of quoted companies that had the Big-Six as auditors. We forced in Table 
5.2.1 .A to ignore the columns total representing the auditors of the public companies 
and to take into consideration from those columns only the name of the Big-Six firms 
that CADRE have as their auditor. 
However, an alternative way of looking at the data is by the number of companies. By 
adopting this procedure, companies appear only once in the dataset and in effect only 
one CADRE per company. In other words, companies that emerge in the dataset a 
couple of times because of the multiple CADRE on their boards have been 
deleted/deselected from the dataset and, as a result, columns and rows totals present 
real figures. This gives a slightly different perspective because it eliminates the 
problem of multiple CADREs on boards and allows us to test more realistically any 
association between ALMA MATER and auditor. 
However, by deselecting companies from the database, in essence CADRE are 
deselected as well. This poses another major problem. Which CADRE should be 
deselected? Let's take an illustration from the dataset itself and try to explain the 
problem and its solution adopted. National Express Group Plc, for example, has three 
directors (two executive and one non-executive) on its board who have qualified as 
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chartered accountants with three different accounting firms (the alma mater). The 
auditor of the National Express is Ernst & Young and the same accountancy firm has 
CADRE'S PUBLIC COMPANY DIRECTOR ALMA MATER AUDITOR 
NAME POSITION 
A National Express Group plc ExD, GrFD Ernst & Young Ernst & Young 
B National Express Group plc ExD, DChEx Moores Rowland Ernst & Young 
C National Express Group plc NExD Pannell Kerr Forster Ernst & Young 
trained the Group Finance Director of National Express. The procedure of selecting 
one CADRE per company presents quantitative analysis with the problem of which 
CADRE should be selected. In our illustration, director A, B, or C? 
In pursuing the correct answer to the above problem, the following solution has been 
adopted. Since one CADRE per company must be included according to the narrow 1 
definition, four different solutions have been taken up when there are multiple 
CADRE per company: (1) the CADRE who selected per company is the last one when 
they are listed in ascending alphabetical order (i. e. CADRE "C" in the example 
above), (2) the CADRE who selected per company is the last one when they are listed 
in descending alphabetical order (i. e. CADRE "A" in the example above), (3) the 
CADRE who selected per company is the eldest one and, finally, (4) the CADRE who 
selected per company is the youngest one. 
The above solutions have selected in view that if the chi-square statistical results that 
will be performed in the section 5.4.2 below hold for all the four different groupings 
of CADRE and their auditors, then any differences in the association of ALMA 
MATER and auditor due to different groupings are eliminated more or less. 
The two subsections below describe the data involved in the four different solutions 
adopted in the prior discussion. 
5.4.1.1. CADRE in ascending-order 
We describe the Narrow 1-Broad test in this section whereas according to the narrow 1 
definition, given in the introduction section of this chapter, only one CADRE per 
company is counted. This definition, however, caused the problem of which CADRE 
109 
r ; 7JrIiý %9ýp" 
is eliminated when there are more than one CADRE per company, and four solutions 
have been suggested in the last section 5.4.1. The first one is discussed in this 
subsection whereas the CADRE who selected per company is the last one when they 
are listed in ascending alphabetical order. According to the broad alma mater 
definition, founder and disappeared alma mater are counted for the test in this section. 
Every CADRE is designated a matrix position (i, j), where: 
i= the name of the accountancy firm with whom the CADRE trained (i. e. 
ALMA MATER) 
j= the name of the auditor of the CADRE's company. 
The summation/tabulation of these matrix positions for all CADRE (who satisfy the 
criteria laid down in the preceding paragraphs) is the basis of constructing the 
contingency Table 5.4.1.1 .A presented below. 
The column total in Table 5.4.1.1 .A gives the number of accountancy firms' clients. In 
other words, the number of the UK public companies that have one at least chartered 
accountant on their boards and use one of the accountancy firms as auditors appear in 
the column total. For example, AA has 68 clients that have one at least CADRE, CL 
has 193, EY has 141, and so on. The rows give the accountancy firms that those 
CADRE have qualified with. They also give the minimum number of CADRE in the 
dataset, that is one CADRE per company and since there are 1,277 quoted companies 
Table 5.4.1.1. A: Total number of quoted companies classified according to alma mater and auditors* 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other Auditor Total 
AA 13 10 12 7 10 6 9 2 69 
CL 6 36 14 27 11 10 33 3 140 
ALMA EY 4 14 23 17 7 7 19 2 93 
MATER KPMG 5 25 13 38 12 18 35 1 147 
PW 6 16 9 27 29 14 14 3 118 
TR 3 10 9 16 9 21 13 1 82 
Big-6 
Subtotal 37 111 80 132 78 76 514 
Other 28 67 50 102 52 38 174 10 521 
Missing 3 15 11 18 13 17 21 9 107 
Total 68 193 141 252 143 131 928 318 31 1277 
Note: The CADRE chosen to enter in the ALMA MATER classification listed in ascending order 
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with one CADRE on their boards, there are 1,277 CADRE too3. 
From the preceding paragraph, it follows that for Arthur Andersen, there are thirteen 
clients with AA on board, six with CL, four with EY, five with KPMG, six with PW, 
three with TR and twenty-eight with "other" (non-Big) Six firms. Hence, out of 68 
AA clients, thirteen clients have employed personnel from their auditors. The same 
table shows that thirty-six CL clients (out of 193) have CL qualified directors. 
Following a similar pattern for the rest of the Big-Six firms, that is looking at the main 
diagonal of the Table 5.4.1.1 . A, the Table 5.4.1.1 .B can be produced and is presented 
below. 
Looking at the columns of the Table 5.4.1.1. A, we note that 73% (928 out of 1.277) of 
the quoted companies in the UK (with a chartered accountant on their boards) have 
one of the Big-Six firms as their auditor. Adding up the main diagonal of the Table 
5.4.1.1 . A, it shows that for 160 of those 928 companies (17.24%), one at 
least of their 
directors trained and qualified with the same accountancy firm as their auditor. For the 
non-Big Six firms, 318 listed companies out of 1,277 use them as auditors. 
Table 5.4.1.1. B: Clients with one CADRE on boards (%o) 
No of 
Cer p 
Accg 
Clients ien 
Firm 
Clients 
with one 
CADRE 
on Boards 
Alumni 
(%) 
Total 
Alumni 
and Audit 
Client 
AA 68 13 19.12 21 
CL 193 36 18.65 58 
EY 141 23 16.31 38 
KPMG 252 38 15.08 66 
PW 143 29 20.28 39 
TR 131 21 16.03 31 
$ H2. Q 17.24 253 
Other 318 174 258 
Missing 31 9 14 
1277 343 -525 
Having described and analysed the data involved for the first solution adopted to deal 
We know, however, from section 5.2.1 that the actual number of CADRE in the database is 1,955, the difference 
is due to the multiple CADREs on boards of directors. 
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with the problem of multiple CADRE on boards, the next subsection presents the data 
for the next three solutions given to the problem of multiple CADRE. 
5 4.1.2. The next three solutions suggested 
In this subsection, we merely present the data involved in the other three solutions 
given to the problem of multiple CADRE on the boards without any further analysis. 
The reason for this is that the data in the other three solutions do not change much 
from the data analysed in the last subsection in order for it to require further analysis 
and discussion. As a result, the following Table 5.4.1.2. A, Table 5.4.1.2. B and Table 
Table 5.4.1.2. A: Total number of quoted companies classified according to alma mater and auditors* 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other Auditor Total 
AA 15 8 12 8 9 5 7 2 66 
CL 8 35 12 22 12 11 35 3 138 
ALMA EY 4 16 17 17 8 10 15 2 89 
MATER KPMG 5 28 13 45 8 13 31 1 144 
PW 5 17 8 25 28 12 13 3 111 
TR 3 11 9 17 7 19 17 2 85 
Big-6 
Subtotal 
40 115 71 134 72 70 502 
Other 26 62 57 100 57 47 178 11 538 
Missing 3 16 12 18 13 15 22 7 106 
Total 69 193 140 252 142 132 928 318 31 1277 
Note: The CADRE chosen to enter in the ALMA MATER classification listed in descending order 
Tah1p 5_d_1 I R" Tnta1 rnimhar of nnntprl rmminnnies classified according to alma mater and auditors 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other Auditor Total 
AA 13 9 12 4 10 4 9 2 63 
CL 8 34 15 19 11 10 27 3 127 
ALMA EY 4 16 15 15 9 8 16 2 85 
MATER KPMG 5 23 12 36 9 14 27 1 127 
PW 5 16 7 27 27 11 14 2 109 
TR 2 9 9 18 7 18 15 1 79 
Big-6 
Subtotal 
37 107 70 119 73 65 471 
Other 28 70 59 114 57 49 184 12 573 
Missing 3 16 12 19 13 17 26 8 114 
Total 68 193 141 252 143 131 928 318 31 1277 
Note: The CADRE chosen per company to enter in the ALMA MA itK ciassincauun arc UK; CLU L 11º113 
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5.4.1.2. C merely present the data without any further discussion. The reader can 
compare these tables with the Table 5.4.1.1. A analysed in the preceding section. 
Table 5.4.1.2.0: Total number of quoted comnaniec classified annnrrlinQ to alma mater anti aiirlitnrc* 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other No 
Auditor 
Total 
AA 18 9 13 9 9 8 7 2 75 
CL 6 38 12 25 14 12 41 3 151 
ALMA EY 3 15 27 19 6 9 16, 2 97 
MATER KPMG 6 27 12 50 9 16 37 1 158 
PW 6 17 10 25 30 13 16 3 120 
TR 3 10 8 14 8 21 14 2 80 
Big-6 
Subtotal 
42 116 82 142 76 79 53 
Other 24 62 48 93 53 38 167 10 495 
No FCA 3 15 10 17 13 15 20 8 101 
Total 69 193 , 140 , 252 142 132 , 928 318 31, 1277 
'Note: The CADRE chosen per company to enter in the ALMA MATER classification are the youngest ones 
5.4.2. Performing the Narrowl-Broad Test 
Section 5.4.1 has described and analysed the data involved for this test. The data are 
classified according to two criteria of classification, i. e. alma mater and auditor of the 
public company, in the Table 5.4.1.1 .A and 
Tables 5.4.1.2. A-C, and we would like 
here to know whether or not these criteria are independent of one another. To test this 
hypothesis, the chi-square statistic is employed and computed. The next subsection 
tests whether the hypothesis holds for the Big-Six firms only, and the subsection 
5.4.2.2 for the non-Big Six firms. 
5.4.2.1. The test for the Big-Six firms 
We test in this subsection whether there is a statistical association between the two 
criteria of classification. We focus only on the Big-Six firms here and the chi-square 
test of independence will be performed for each different solution given in the 
subsections 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.2. above. 
5.4.2.1.1. The test for the CADRE in ascending order 
Table 5.4.1.1 .A gives the number of public companies 
in the form of the numbers of 
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CADRE in cell of a two-way contingency table. We test the hypothesis Ho 
Ho: ALMA MATER and auditor (the Big-Six firms) are independent, 
versus the alternative hypothesis H1 
H1: auditor is dependent upon ALMA MATER. 
Remember here, that we test the Table 5.4.1.1 .A which has been constructed 
according to narrow 1 definition and the CADRE who selected per company was the 
last one when CADRE were listed in ascending alphabetical order. Also, we focus 
only on the Big-Six firms in this subsection, hence, the Table 5.4.1.1. A is transformed 
into the following Table 5.4.2.1.1. A. 
To test the above hypothesis, we compute the expected frequencies for each cell Ey 
and employ the chi-square statistic that approximately follows the chi-square 
distribution. 
Table 5.4.2.1.1. A: Big-Six auditor and CADRE in ascending order 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtota 
AA 13 10 12 7 10 6 58 
CL 6 36 14 27 11 10 104 
ALMA EY 4 14 23 17 7 7 72 
MATER KPMG 5 25 13 38 12 18 111 
PW 6 16 9 27 29 14 101 
TR 3 10 9 16 9 21 68 
Big-6 
Subtotal 37 111 80 132 78 76 514 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.4.2.1.1. B 
below where the expected frequencies appear in italics under the observed frequencies 
for each alma mater. The Table 5.4.2.1.1 .B is a6x6 contingency table so that there 
are 25 degrees of freedom. 
The value of the test statistic is 91.511 (p < 0.001), compared to the tabled value of 
the X2 with 99% significance level and 25 degrees of freedom which is 
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x2o. 99,2s> = 44.314. Accordingly we reject Ho. There is an association between ALMA 
MATER and the Big-Six auditors, when CADRE selected in the predetermined way 
discussed in the previous section. 
Table 5.4.2.1.1. B: ALMA MATER * AUDITORS Crosstabulation 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Total 
AA Count 13 10 12 7 10 6 58 
Expected Count 4.2 12.5 9.0 14.9 8.8 8.6 58.0 
CL Count 6 36 14 27 11 10 104 
Expected Count 7.5 22.5 16.2 26.7 15.8 15.4 104.0 
ALMA EY Count 4 14 23 17 7 7 72 
MATER Expected Count 5.2 15.5 11.2 18.5 10.9 10.6 72.0 
KPMG Count 5 25 13 38 12 18 111 
Expected Count 8.0 24.0 17.3 28.5 16.8 16.4 111.0 
PW Count 6 16 9 27 29 14 101 
Expected Count 7.3 21.8 15.7 25.9 15.3 14.9 101.0 
TR Count 3 10 9 16 9 21 68 
Expected Count 4.9 14.7 10.6 17.5 10.3 10.1 68.0 
Total Count 37 111 80 132 78 76 514 
Expected Count 37.0 111.0 80.0 132.0 78.0 76.0 514.0 
Moreover, examining the difference in the frequencies of the Table 5.4.2.1.1. B, one 
cannot fail to notice the strong diagonal in Table 5.4.2.1.1 .C which 
indicates that for 
Table 5.4.2.1.1. C: Differences between observed & expected frequencies 
AUDI TORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR 
AA + - + - + - 
ALMA CL - + - + - - 
MATER EY - - + - - - 
KPMG - + - 
+ 
- + 
PW - - - + + - 
TR - - - - - + 
the Big-Six accountancy firms there is a strong association between the auditor of the 
UK public company and the accountancy firm that the CADRE qualified with (i. e. 
alma mater). 
Another hypothesis to be examined here, is based on Table 5.4.1.1 . 
B, and looks only 
at those CADRE who have their ex-employer (i. e. "old" accountancy firm) as their 
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auditor in connection with the total number of public companies that have one at 
least CADRE on their boards and have selected one of the Big-Six firms as auditor. 
We notice in Table 5.4.1.1 .B that 
17.24% of the UK public companies have at least 
one Big-Six CADRE on their boards given that these companies employ as auditors 
one of the Big-Six firms. Does this proportionally differ among Big-Six clients? In 
particular, the question here is whether the incidence of an "alumni and audit client" 
situation occurs independently of the total number of the Big-Six clients. The 
"alumni and audit client" refers to the situation where a CADRE is audited by his/her 
ALMA MATER. Formally the chi-square statistic is used to test the null hypothesis 
Ho 
Ho: the Big-Six accounting firms are equally preferred (in proportion) by the 
public companies irrespective of the "alumni and audit client" situation 
versus the alternative hypothesis Hl 
Hl: the Big-Six are not equally preferred (in proportion). 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.4.2.1.1 .D 
below. The Table 5.4.2.1.1 .D 
is a6x2 contingency table so that there are 5 degrees 
of freedom. 
Table 5.4.2.1.1. D: Chi-square test based on Table 5.4.1.1. B 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
AA 13 11.7 1.3 
CL 36 33.3 2.7 
EY 23 24.3 -1.3 
KPMG 38 43.4 -5.4 
PW 29 24.7 4.3 
TR 21 22.6 -1.6 
The value of the test statistic proves to be 1.967 (p = 0.854), and the pertinent value of 
the X2 for a=0.01 and 5 degrees of freedom is 15.086. Accordingly the statistic is not 
significant at the 99% confidence level and the null hypothesis is accepted. The Big- 
Six firms do not differ in proportion of clients that have one at least Big-Six CADRE 
on their boards, and the tendency for the CADRE to have as their auditors the audit 
firm that trained with does not vary. 
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5.4.2.1.2. The test for the alternative solutions 
We run the chi-square statistic tests of independence for each of the tables presented 
in the subsection 5.4.1.2. The tables have been transformed to include only the Big- 
Six audit firms (not shown) and the results are only offered below. 
Second Solution: CADRE in descending order 
The value of the test statistic is 94.148 (p < 0.001), compared to the tabled value of 
the 2 with 1% significance level and 25 degrees of freedom which is 
x(0.99,25) = 44.314. Accordingly we reject Ho. There is an association between ALMA 
MATER and the Big-Six auditors, when CADRE selected in the predetermined way 
discussed in the previous section. 
Third Solution: CADRE selected are the eldest 
The value of the test statistic is 84.733 (p < 0.001), compared to the tabled value of 
the, 2 with 1% significance level and 25 degrees of freedom which is 
x(0.99,25) = 44.314. Accordingly we reject Ho. There is an association between ALMA 
MATER and the Big-Six auditors, when CADRE selected in the predetermined way 
discussed in the previous section. 
Fourth Solution: CADRE selected are the youngest 
The value of the test statistic is 131.398 (p < 0.001), compared to the tabled value of 
the/ with 1% significance level and 25 degrees of freedom which is 
x(0.99,25) = 44.314. Accordingly we reject Ho. There is an association between ALMA 
Table 5.4.2.1.2. A: Summary results of the Narrow 1-Broad test 
Solutions\Results Chi-square test Null Hypothesis Alumni Effect 
statistic Ho 
First Solution 
Second Solution 
Third Solution 
Fourth Solution 
91.511 rejected Yes 
94.148 rejected Yes 
84.733 rejected Yes 
131.398 rejected Yes 
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MATER and the Big-Six auditors, when CADRE selected in the predetermined way 
discussed in the previous section. 
We notice that all the tests yield exactly the same outcome and we can conclude, 
therefore, that it does not make any difference on how we select the CADRE when 
there are more than one CADRE per quoted company (see Table 5.4.2.1.2. A). There 
are no differences in the association of ALMA MATER and auditor due to different 
CADRE groupings. 
5.4.2.2. The test for the non-Big Six firms 
The last subsection has established that there is a significant relationship for the Big- 
Six audit firms between ALMA MATER and auditor of the UK public companies in 
which the CADRE works as a director. The ALMA MATER criterion of classification 
was based on the definition that only one CADRE per company is counted. 
This subsection explores whether the same hypothesis stands for the non-Big Six 
firms, in other words, for the non-Big Six firms, is there an association between 
ALMA MATER and auditor? Before we continue though, lets construct the 
contingency table for the non-Big Six firms and check whether any cells yield small 
expected frequencies. 
Table 5.4.2.2. A below displays most of the 174 CADRE qualified with a non-Big Six 
audit firm and have as auditor a non-Big Six firm. The following Table 5.4.2.2. A is an 
extension of the Table 5.4.1.1 .A where a row and a column named "other" are 
included there. "Other" was taken to mean the non-Big Six accounting firms in Table 
5.4.1.1. A. The abbreviations used in the table are the same used in the Table 
5.2.3.2. A. 
Furthermore, 160 (95.24%) out of the 174 cells in Table 5.4.2.2. A have expected 
frequencies less than 5 and, therefore, the rule that no more than 20% of the cells must 
have expected frequencies of less than 5 is not met (Daniel and Terrell, 1995; Foster, 
1998; Roscoe, 1969). The test statistic does not closely approximates a chi-square 
distribution and as a result, we abandon the test, as further analysis may affect the 
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correct decision to be taken. 
Table 5.4.2.2. A: Non-Big Six firms ALMA MATER and AUDITOR 
BT BDO BW BH B BS CW GT PRA PKF RR SG TM 0 Total 
BDO 0 2 0 4 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 17 
BW 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
BH 1 8 0 6 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 20 
B 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CW 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
GT 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 
PRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
PKF 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 7 
RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 4 
SG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
TM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
0 2 15 0 13 0 1 3 15 0 8 5 0 0 49 111 
Total 3 25 1 27 1 2 6 22 1 9 9 1 1 66 174 
However, we are in a position to replicate Table 5.4.1.1 .B for the non-Big Six audit 
firms. In other words, as it can be seen in Table 5.4.2.2. A above, there is a main 
diagonal effect which indicates for the non-Big Six accountancy firms that there is a 
strong association between CADRE and alma mater (see also Table 5.4.2.2. B). The 
Table 5.4.2.2. B: No of CADRE per non-Big Six audit firms 
No of CADRE per 
non-Big Six Audit 
Firms 
Alumni and 
Audit Client 
Alumni (%) 
BDO Stoy Hayward 17 2 11.76 
Beavis Walker 1 1 100.00 
Binder Hamlyn 20 6 30.00 
Blythens 1 1 100.00 
Clark Whitehill 1 1 100.00 
Grant Thornton 9 4 44.44 
Page Robt. A. & Co 1 1 100.00 
Pannell Kerr Forster 7 1 14.29 
Robson Rhodes 4 2 50.00 
Smailes Goldie 1 1 100.00 
Thomas May 1 1 100.00 
Neville Russell 1 1 100.00 
Latham Crossley & Davis 1 1 100.00 
65 23 35.38 
Other 109 43 
Total 174 66 
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natural question to ask is whether this diagonal effect varies by non-Big Six firm. 
Formally the chi-square statistic is used to test the null hypothesis Ho 
Ho: the proportion of CADRE who have their alma mater as auditors does not 
differ 
versus the alternative hypothesis H1 
H 1: the proportion of CADRE differs. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.4.2.2. C. The 
expected frequencies show the proportional number of CADRE trained by each firm. 
The Table 5.4.2.2. B is a 13 x2 contingency table so that there are 12 degrees of 
freedom. 
The value of the test statistic proves to be 12.755 (p = 0.387), and the pertinent value 
of the X2 for a=0.05 and 12 degrees of freedom is 21.026. Accordingly the statistic is 
not significant at the 95% confidence level and the null hypothesis- is accepted. In 
other words, the same proportion of non-Big Six CADRE have their alma mater as 
auditors. This result should be interpreted with caution, however, as more than 20% of 
the cells have expected frequencies with less than five. 
Table 5.4.2.2. C: Proportional CADRE per non-Big Six audit firm 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
BDO Stoy Hayward 2 6.0 -4.0 
Beavis Walker 1 .4 .6 
Binder Hamlyn 6 7.0 -1.0 
Blythens 1 .4 .6 
Clark Whitehill 1 .4 .6 
Grant Thornton 4 3.1 .9 
Page Robt. A. & Co 1 .3 .7 
Pannell Kerr Forster 1 2.4 -1.4 
Robson Rhodes 2 1.4 .6 
Smailes Goldie 1 .4 .6 
Thomas May 1 .4 .6 
Neville Russell 1 .4 .6 
Latham Crossley & Davis 1 .3 .7 
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5.5.1. Specifying the data involved for the test 
This subsection presents a description of the data involved for the Narrow 1-Narrow 
test. In particular, only one CADRE per listed company and only those CADRE who 
qualified with a founder audit firm are counted for this test. 
In section 5.4.1 we faced with the problem of which CADRE are selected when there 
are more than one of them per company. Four different solutions were offered when 
that problem propounded in section 5.4.1. Nevertheless we concluded, after the tests 
were run, in section 5.4.2.1.2 that all the solutions suggested for the problem give 
similar results and, therefore, we will present the data in this section according to the 
first solution given in that section. 
The first solution adopted in section 5.4.1 indicates that the CADRE who selected per 
company is the last one when they are listed in ascending alphabetical order. Also, 
according to the narrow alma mater definition, only founder alma mater are counted 
for this test. Every CADRE is designated a matrix position (i, j), where: 
i= the name of the accountancy firm with whom the CADRE trained (i. e. 
ALMA MATER) 
j= the name of the auditor of the CADRE's company. 
The summation/tabulation of these matrix positions for all CADRE (who satisfy the 
criteria laid down in the preceding paragraphs) is the basis of constructing the 
contingency Table 5.5.1. A presented below. 
The row total in the Table 5.5.1 .A gives the minimum number of CADRE who trained 
with a founder accountancy firm, since only one CADRE per company is selected, for 
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example, 61 CADRE with AA, 45 with CL, 6 with EY and so ono. The name of the 
auditor that these CADRE employ is given by the columns. So, for Arthur Andersen, 
twelve CADRE use AA, seven CL, twelve EY, seven KPMG, eight PW, six TR and 
seven "other" (non-Big Six) accountancy firms. Thus, out of 61 former employees of 
Table 5.5.1. A: Narrow I -Narrow criteria of classification 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other Auditor Total 
AA 12 7 12 7 8 6 52 7 2 61 
CL 2 12 5 10 1 5 35 10 0 45 
ALMA EY 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 1 0 6 
MATER KPMG 1 13 11 23 4 15 6 25 1 93 
PW 6 14 9 26 27 13 95 11 2 108 
TR 2 5 4 7 3 11 32 8 1 41 
Big-6 
Subtotal 23 51 44 75 43 50 286 62 6 354 
Note: The rows "other" and "missing" have been deleted from this table, due to inappropriateness of the 
data in those entries discussed in more detail in section 3.1. 
AA, twelve favour their alma mater. The same table shows that twelve out of 45 
CADRE who qualified with Coopers & Lybrand use them as auditors. Following a 
similar pattern for the rest of the Big-Six firms, the following Table 5.5. l. B can be 
constructed. 
The column total in Table 5.5.1 .A gives, also, the number of accountancy 
firms' 
clients. In other words, the number of the UK public companies that have one at least 
chartered accountant on their boards and use one of the accountancy firms as auditors 
appear in the column total. For example, AA has 23 clients that have one at least 
CADRE, CL has 51, EY has 44, and so on. From this, it follows that for Arthur 
Andersen, there are twelve of its clients with an AA CADRE on board, two with CL, 
zero with EY, one with KPMG, six with PW, and two with TR. Hence, out of 23 AA 
clients, twelve clients have employed personnel from their auditors. The same table 
shows that twelve CL clients (out of 51) have CL qualified directors. Following a 
similar pattern for the rest of the Big-Six firms, that is, looking at the main diagonal of 
the Table 5.5.1. A, the following Table 5.5.1. C can be produced. 
4 These figures are comparable to figures shown in Table 5.3.1 .A where all the CADRE (and not only one per 
company) who qualified with a founder firm were counted there. 
122 
Looking at the Table 5.5.1. A, the main diagonal shows that 88 of CADRE (24.86%) 
have as their auditors the firm that they trained with (see Table 5.5.1. B). Moreover, 
the same diagonal indicates that for 88 of those 286 listed companies (30.77%), one at 
least of their directors trained and qualified with the same accountancy firm as their 
auditor (see Table 5.5.1. C). 
Table 5.5.1. B: No of CADRE qualified with a 
founder firm on boards of directors 
Minimum No of 
CADRE Alumni (%) 
qualified with and 
founder firm client 
AA 61 12 19.67 
CL 45 12 26.66 
EY 6 3 50.00 
KPMG 93 23 24.73 
PW 108 27 25.00 
TR 41 11 26.83 
Big-6 
Subtotal 354 88 24.86 
Note: "Alumni and audit client" refers to the 
situation where a CADRE is audited by his/her 
ALMA MATER. 
Table 5.5.1. C: Clients with one CADRE on boards 
No of 
Clients per 
Accg Firm 
Clients with 
one 
CADRE on 
boards 
Alumni 
(%) 
AA 23 12 52.17 
CL 51 12 23.53 
EY 44 3 6.82 
KPMG 75 23 30.67 
PW 43 27 62.79 
TR 50 11 22.00 
Big-6 Subtotal 286 88 30.77 
Having explained the data that is provided for the test statistic, the following 
subsection computes the chi-square statistic to find out whether an alumni effect 
prevails under the narrow 1-narrow definitions. 
5.5.2. Performing the Narrowl-Narrow Test 
This subsection performs the chi-square test for the data described in the preceding 
subsection. We test whether there is an alumni effect among only the Big-Six audit 
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firms under the narrow 1-narrow definitions5. In order to do this, we must employ and 
compute the chi-square test of independence. 
The chi-square statistic is used to test the null hypothesis 
Ho: there is a non-association between ALMA MATER and the auditor, 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
HI: an association exists. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.5.2. A where 
the expected frequencies appear in italics under the observed frequencies for each Big- 
Six firm. The Table 5.5.1. A is a6x6 contingency table so that there are 25 degrees of 
freedom. The "other" column category in the Table 5.5.1 .A is 
discarded as we are 
interested in the association between alma mater and Big-Six auditor. 
Again here, as in section 5.3.2, we encountered the same problem with the expected 
frequencies when the test statistic was calculated, that is 30.6% (11 cells) had 
expected frequencies of less than 5. This violates the rule which requires no more than 
20% of the cells have expected frequencies of less than 5. Again here, all EY row 
entries contained expected frequencies of less than 5 and, therefore, they are deleted 
(as in section 5.3.2. ). As a result, the following Table 5.5.2. A presents the amended 
information (the EY alma mater is discarded). 
The Table 5.5.2. A is a5x6 contingency table and has 5 cells (16.7%) with expected 
frequencies less than 5. The test statistic, therefore, closely approximates a chi-square 
distribution and its value proves to be 61.626 (p < 0.001). The comparative critical 
value of the x2 with 99% confidence level and 20 degrees of freedom is 
x(0.99,20) = 37.566. Accordingly, we cannot accept the null hypothesis. There is a 
significant alumni effect among the Big-Six audit firms. 
5 Some of the histories of the non-Big Six firms could not be traced and, therefore, due to incompleteness of the 
data, it is not clear that we can employ the chi-square test for the non-Big Six firms (see section 5.3.1 for further 
details). 
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Table 5.5.2. A: ALMA MATER * AUDITORS Crosstabulation (Narrowl-Narrow) 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW 
.c . gis . 
TR 
.?;. »,. T 
Total 
AA Count 12 7 12 7 8 6 52 
Expected Count 4.3 9.4 7.6 13.5 8.0 9.3 52.0 
CL Count 2 12 5 10 1 5 35 
Expected Count2.9 6.4 5.1 9.1 5.4 6.2 35.0 
ALMA KPMG Count 1 13 11 23 4 15 67 
MATER Expected Count 5.5 12.2 9.8 17.4 10.3 11.9 67.0 
PW Count 6 14 9 26 27 13 95 
Expected Count 7.8 17.2 13.9 24.7 14.5 16.9 95.0 
TR Count 2 5 4 7 3 11 32 
Expected Count 2.6 5.8 4.7 8.3 4.9 5.7 32.0 
Total Count 23 51 41 73 43 50 281 
Expected Count23.0 51.0 41.0 73.0 43.0 50.0 281.0 
Further, analysing the difference in the frequencies of the Table 5.5.2. A, one cannot 
fail to observe that a strong main diagonal do prevail (see Table 5.5.2. B). This 
indicates that for the Big-Six accountancy firms there is a strong association between 
the auditor of the UK public company and the accountancy firm that the CADRE 
qualified with (i. e. alma mater). 
Table 5.5.2. B: Differences between observed & expected frequencies* 
AUDI TORS OF PUB LIC COMPANIES 
AA CL KPMG PW TR 
AA + - - +/- - 
ALMA CL - + + - - 
MATER KPMG - + + - + 
PW - - + + - 
TR - - - - + 
The column of EY entries has been eliminated in order for the main 
effect to be clearly shown 
In Table 5.5.1 
.A the main 
diagonal effect in the cross-classification has been 
identified as the principal pattern in the data. This means (1) that there is a greater 
propensity for CADRE to have as their auditor the accounting firm they qualified with 
(see Table 5.5.1. B), and (2) that there is a greater propensity for Big-Six clients to 
have employed CADRE from their incumbent auditor (see Table 5.5.1. C). Does the 
above tendencies vary proportionally by audit firm? 
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In answering the above question, the chi-square statistic is employed to test the 
following null hypothesis (1) 
Hol: the same proportion of CADRE have their alma mater a auditor 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
H11: disproportion, 
and the null hypothesis (2) 
Hoe: the distribution of Big-Six firms (as auditors) does not differ in proportion 
of Big-Six clients that have CADRE on their boards 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
H12: the distribution differs in proportion. 
The first hypothesis is based on Table 5.5.1. B, and the second hypothesis on Table 
5.5.1. C. The observed and expected frequencies for each hypothesis are displayed 
together in Tables 5.5.2. C and 5.5.2. D respectively. The number of degrees of 
freedom is 5 for both hypotheses. 
Table 5.5.2. C: Chi-square based on Table 
5.5.1. B 
Observed N Expected N 
AA 12 15.2 
CL 12 11.2 
EY 3 1.5 
KPMG 23 23.1 
PW 27 26.8 
TR 11 10.2 
Total 88 
Table 5.5.2. D: Chi-square based on Table 
5.5.1. C 
Observed N Expected N 
AA 12 7.1 
CL 12 15.7 
EY 3 13.6 
KPMG 23 23.0 
PW 27 13.2 
TR 11 15.4 
Total 88 
Computed value: 28.200 (p < 0.001) 
Computed value: 2.295 (p = 0.807) 
The value of the test statistic for the Table 5.5.2. C is 2.295 (p = 0.807), and for the 
Table 5.5.2. D is 28.200 (p < 0.001). The critical value of the chi-square for a=0.05 is 
11.070. Accordingly, the test statistic is not significant and the null hypothesis is 
accepted. In other words, the same proportion of CADRE have their alma mater a 
auditor. On the other test based on Table 5.5.2. D, the null hypothesis is rejected. The 
distribution of Big-Six firms does differ in proportion of clients that have one at least 
Big-Six CADRE on their boards. 
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5.6. The Narrow2-Broad Test 
Previous sections have selected CADRE in a pre-described way. However, the 
problem with these previous definitions was that we do not know who among the 
CADRE in a board of directors influences most the decision about appointment of 
auditors and audit fees to be paid. This section, therefore, takes the narrow2 definition 
for the auditor where only those directors who have been identified in the literature as 
the most influential directors regarding the decision about the auditor choice are 
considered, and the broad definition of alma mater as the founder and disappeared 
firm. In essence, the Narrow2-Broad test is analysed and computed. It involves 
describing the data that will be used for the test (in section 5.6.1) and performing the 
chi-square test (in section 5.6.2). 
5.6.1. Specifying the data involved for the test 
The data used for the Narrow2-Broad test is discussed in this section. The Finance 
Director, Chairman and/or Chief Executive who qualified as chartered accountants 
with one of the Big-Six audit firms or their predecessor(s) are merely counted. As we 
have explained in section 5.1, due to the number of problems in analysing the alumni 
effect between alma mater and auditor, we have closely monitored the definitions 
chosen and duplicated the analyses for alternative definitions. Therefore, the analysis 
in this section duplicates the analyses carried out in the previous sections under 
different definitions for auditor categories though. 
The Finance Director, Chairman and/or Chief Executive (FD, Ch, ChiefExec) have 
been selected under the narrow2 definition. This is in accordance with prior literature 
which indicates that these directors are basically responsible for the appointment of 
auditors (Hussey and Jack, 1994; Beattie and Fearnley, 1998). 
Every CADRE is designated a matrix position (i, j), where: 
i= the name of the accountancy firm with whom the CADRE trained (i. e. 
ALMA MATER) 
j= the name of the auditor of the CADRE's company. 
The summation/tabulation of these matrix positions for all CADRE (who satisfy the 
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criteria laid down in the preceding paragraphs) is the basis of constructing the 
contingency Table 5.6.1 .A presented below. 
The row total gives the number of CADRE (that is, FD, Ch and ChiefExec) who 
qualified with each audit firm and its predecessor(s). For example, 62 CADRE with 
AA, 95 with CL, 63 with EY, 109 with KPMG and so on. The columns give just the 
name of the accountancy firms that these CADRE use as their auditor. So, for AA, 
fourteen CADRE use AA, eight CL, nine EY, eight KPMG, eleven PW, seven TR and 
five "other" (non-Big Six) firms. Hence, out of 62 former employees of AA, fourteen 
favour their alma mater (22.58%). The same table shows that twenty-two out of 95 
CADRE who trained with CL use them as auditors (23.15%). Following a similar 
pattern for the rest of the Big-Six firms, the following Table 5.6.1 .B can be produced. 
Table 5.6.1. A: CADRE classified according to alma mater and auditors* 
AUDIT ORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other Total 
AA 14 8 9 8 11 7 57 5 62 
CL 6 22 7 18 8 10 71 24 95 
ALMA EY 3 12 16 9 3 7 50 13 63 
MATER KPMG 1 24 6 36 7 7 81 28 109 
PW 6 15 8 21 26 11 8 14 101 
TR 4 11 4 14 4 19 56 8 64 
Subtotal 402 494 
Other 21 42 36 75 38 29 116 357 
Total 55 134 86 181 97 90 208 851 
. CADRE chosen are the Finance Director, Chairman and Chief Executive only 
Again, the same caution applies here as in sections 5.2 and 5.4 about the information 
provided in the columns of Table 5.6.1. A. The columns give just the name of the audit 
firm that CADRE use as their auditor. They do not give the total number of auditors or 
the number of the UK public companies who have on their boards of directors a 
chartered accountant(s) because some listed companies have more than one CADRE 
(that is, FD and Chairman and Chief Executive) on their boards. In other words, the 
columns total is not meaningful in Table 5.6.1. A. This problem has been discussed in 
more detail in section 5.4.1. 
Besides the above caveat, we can still extract some very useful information from the 
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Table 5.6.1. A. We notice, for example, that 494 out of 851 (58%) Finance Directors, 
Chairman and Chief Executives have trained and qualified with one of the Big-Six 
accountancy firms or their predecessors. Summing the main diagonal in the Table 
5.6.1. A, it shows that 133 of them (26.92%) have as their auditors the accounting firm 
that they have qualified with as chartered accountants (see also Table 5.6.1. B). 
Table 5.6.1. B: No of CADRE on boards of directors* 
No of CADRE 
per Accg Firm 
Alumni 
and 
client 
(%) 
AA 62 14 22.58 
CL 95 22 23.16 
EY 63 16 25.39 
KPMG 109 36 33.02 
PW 101 26 25.74 
TR 64 19 29.68 
Big-6 
Subtotal A9A 133 26.92 
Other 357 116 
$5ý 249 
Note: "Alumni and audit client" refers to the 
situation where a CADRE is audited by his/her 
ALMA MATER. 
*CADRE chosen are the Finance Director, 
Chairman and Chief Executive only 
Having explained and analysed the data that is provided for the test statistic, the 
following subsection performs the chi-square statistic to find out whether an alumni 
effect prevails under the narrow2-broad definitions. 
5.6.2. Performing the Narrow2-Broad Test 
This subsection performs the chi-square test for the data described in the preceding 
subsection. We test whether there is an alumni effect among the accountancy firms 
under the narrow2-broad definitions. In order to do this, we must employ and compute 
the chi-square test of independence. The next subsection applies the test only for the 
Big-Six audit firms and subsection 5.6.2.2 for the non-Big Six firms. 
j. 6.2.1. The test for the Big-Six firms 
In order to test the hypothesis that there is relationship between auditor and alma 
mater in Table 5.6.1 . A, we must compute the chi-square statistic value. 
This 
subsection explores the proposition that there is an alumni effect among only the Big- 
Six firms. 
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The chi-square statistic is used to test the null hypothesis 
Ho: there is a non-association between alma mater and auditor 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
H1: an association exists. 
We concentrate in this subsection on Big-Six firms effect only, thus Table 5.6.2.1 .A 
below jettisons several cells from the Table 5.6.1. A. 
Table 5.6.2.1. A: Bit-Six CADRE classified according to alma mater and auditors* 
AUDIT ORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal 
AA 14 8 9 8 11 7 5 
CL 6 22 7 18 8 10 71 
ALMA EY 3 12 16 9 3 7 50 
MATER KPMG 1 24 6 36 7 7 81 
PW 6 15 8 21 26 11 87 
TR 4 11 4 14 4 19 56 
Subtotal 34 92 50 106 59 61 402 
'CADRE chosen are the Finance Director, Chairman and Chief Executive only 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.6.2.1 .B 
where the expected frequencies appear in italics under the observed frequencies for 
each Big-Six firm. The Table 5.6.2.1. A is a6x6 contingency table so that there are 
25 degrees of freedom. 
Table 5.6.2.1. B: ALMA MATER * AUDITORS Crosstabulation (Narrow2-Broad test) 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Total 
AA Count 14 8 9 8 11 7 57 
Expected Count 4.8 13.0 7.1 15.0 8.4 8.6 57.0 
CL Count 6 22 7 18 8 10 71 
Expected Count 6.0 16.2 8.8 18.7 10.4 10.8 71.0 
EY Count 3 12 16 9 3 7 50 
Expected Count 4.2 11.4 6.2 13.2 7.3 7.6 50.0 
ALMA KPMG Count 1 24 6 36 7 7 81 
MATER Expected Count 6.9 18.5 10.1 21.4 11.9 12.3 81.0 
PW Count 6 15 8 21 26 11 87 
Expected Count 7.4 19.9 10.8 22.9 12.8 13.2 87.0 
TR Count 4 11 4 14 4 19 56 
Expected Count 4.7 12.8 7.0 14.8 8.2 8.5 56.0 
Total Count 34 92 50 106 59 61 402 
Expected Count 34.0 92.0 50.0 106.0 59.0 61.0 402.0 
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The value of the test statistic proves to be 102.980 (p < 0.001). The comparative 
critical value of the x2 with 99% confidence level and 25 degrees of freedom is 
. 2'2.99,20) = 
44.314. Accordingly, we cannot accept the null hypothesis. There is a 
significant alumni effect among the Big-Six audit firms. 
Further, analysing the difference in the frequencies of the Table 5.6.2.1. B, one cannot 
fail to observe that a strong main diagonal prevails (see Table 5.6.2.1. C). This 
Table 5.6.2.1. C: Differences between observed & expected frequencies 
AUDI TORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR 
AA + - - - + - 
ALMA CL +/- + - - - - 
MATER EY - + + - - - 
KPMG - + - + - - 
PW - - - - + - 
TR - - - - - + 
indicates that for the Big-Six accountancy firms there is a strong association between 
the auditor of the UK public company and the Big-Six audit firm that the CADRE 
qualified with (i. e. alma mater). 
We have identified in Table 5.6.1 .A the main 
diagonal effect in the cross- 
classification as the principal pattern in the data. This means that there is a greater 
propensity for CADRE (that is, FD, Ch and ChiefExec) to have as their auditors the 
audit firm that they qualified with. The natural question to ask is whether this 
tendency varies by accountancy firm. For the Big-Six firms, the relevant data is set 
out in Table 5.6.1. B. 
Another hypothesis, therefore, to be examined here, is based on Table 5.6.1. B, and 
looks only at those CADRE (FD, Ch and ChiefExec) who have their ex-employer 
(i. e. alma mater) as their auditor in connection with the total number of CADRE (FD, 
Ch and ChiefExec) who have been trained by the Big-Six firms. In particular, the 
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question here is whether the incidence of an "alumni and audit client" situation 
occurs independently of the total number of the Big-Six CADRE/alumni. The 
"alumni and audit client" refers to the situation where a CADRE is audited by his/her 
ALMA MATER. Formally, the chi-square statistic is used to test the null hypothesis 
Ho 
Ho: the same proportion of CADRE (that is, FD, Ch and ChiefExec) have their 
alma mater as auditors, 
versus the alternative hypothesis H1 
H1: different proportion of CADRE have their alma mater as auditors. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.6.2.1 .D 
below. The expected frequencies show the proportional number of CADRE trained by 
each firm. The Table 5.6.2.1 .D 
is a6x2 contingency table so that there are 5 degrees 
of freedom. 
Table 5.6.2.1. D: Chi-square based on Table 5.6.1. B 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
AA 14 16.7 -2.7 
CL 22 25.6 -3.6 
EY 16 17.0 -1.0 
KPMG 36 29.3 6.7 
PW 26 27.2 -1.2 
TR 19 17.2 1.8 
Total 133 
The value of the test statistic proves to be 2.775 (p = 0.735), and the pertinent value of 
the chi-square for a=0.05 is 11.070. Accordingly the null hypothesis is accepted. In 
other words, the same proportion of CADRE (that is, FD, Ch and ChiefExec) have 
their alma mater as auditors and the number of CADRE is in proportion to the 
numbers trained by each audit firm. 
5.6.2.2. The test for the non-Big Six firms 
Having our thesis been proved in the last subsection that there is indeed an alumni 
effect among the Big-Six audit firms even when the CADRE selected are only the 
Finance Director, Chairman and Chief Executive, this subsection explores whether a 
similar kind of association exists for the non-Big Six firms. In other words, for the 
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non-Big Six firms, is there a significant relationship between the ALMA MATER and 
the auditor of the company? The CADRE chosen are only Finance Director, Chairman 
and Chief Executive for this test as well. 
Formally, the chi-square statistic is used to test the null hypothesis Ho 
Ho: there is independence between auditor (a non-Big Six firm) and ALMA 
MATER, 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
H 1: non-independence. 
Before we apply the chi-square test, we need first to show the table which includes the 
non-Big Six accountancy firms. Table 5.6.1 .A 
includes a row and a column named 
"other". "Other" means the non-Big Six audit firms. There are 116 CADRE in Table 
5.6.1 .A who have qualified with "other" (non-Big Six) firms and at the same time use 
as their auditors "other" (non-Big Six) accounting firms. Most of those 116 CADRE 
are-displayed below in the Table 5.6.2.2. A. 
Table 5.6.2.2. A: Non-Bie Six firms alumni on the boards (the narrow2-broad test) 
BT BDO BH BS CW GT PRA PKF RR SG TM NR LCD 0 Total 
BT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
BDO 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 11 
BH 0 3 5 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 12 
BS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
GT 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 
PRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
PKF 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 
RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 
SG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
TM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
NR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
LCD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Other 1 14 5 0 1 11 0 4 1 0 0 2 0 31 70 
Total 2 19 12 2 3 16 1 5 6 1 1 3 1 44 116 
The abbreviations used in the table above are the same used in the Table 5.2.3.2. A. 
Further, 178 out of 182 cells (97.8%) in the above table have expected frequencies 
less than 5 and, as a result, the rule that 80% of the cells must have expected 
frequencies of more than 5 is violated (Roscoe, 1969). No adjacent rows and/or 
columns can be combined (as any such combination would have been meaningless) 
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and, therefore, the test statistic does not closely approximates a chi-square 
distribution. The test is abandoned as further analysis may affect the correct decision 
to be taken. 
However, we are in a position to replicate Table 5.6.1. B for the non-Big Six audit 
firms. In other words, as it can be seen in Table 5.6.2.2. A above, there is a main 
diagonal effect which indicates for the non-Big Six accountancy firms that there is a 
strong association between CADRE and alma mater. The natural question to ask is 
Table 5.6.2.2. B: No of CADRE ner non-Bi¢ Six audit firmc* 
No of CADRE per 
non-Big Six Audit 
Firms 
Alumni and 
Audit Client 
Alumni (%) 
Baker Tilly 1 0 0.00 
BDO Stoy Hayward 11 2 18.18 
Binder Hamlyn 12 5 41.66 
Burnett Swayne 1 1 100.00 
Grant Thornton 7 2 28.58 
Page Robt. A. & Co 1 1 100.00 
Pannell Kerr Forster 6 1 16.66 
Robson Rhodes 3 2 66.66 
Smailes Goldie 1 1 100.00 
Thomas May 1 1 100.00 
Neville Russell 1 1 100.00 
Latham Crossley & Davis 1 1 100.00 
46 18 42.24 
Other 70 31 
Total 116 49 
ICADRE chosen are the Finance Director, Chairman and Chief Executive only 
whether this diagonal effect varies by non-Big Six firm. Formally the chi-square 
statistic is used to test the null hypothesis H. 
Ho: the proportion of CADRE (that is, FD, Ch and ChiefExec) who have their 
alma mater as auditors does not differ 
versus the alternative hypothesis H1 
H 1: the proportion of CADRE differs. 
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The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.6.2.2. C. The 
expected frequencies show the proportional number of CADRE trained by each firm. 
The Table 5.6.2.2. B is a 12 x2 contingency table so that there are 11 degrees of 
freedom. 
Table 5.6.2.2. C: Proportional CADRE per non-Big Six audit firm 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
BDO Stoy Hayward 2 4.4 -2.4 
Binder Hamlyn 5 4.8 .2 
Burnett Swayne 1 .4 .6 
Grant Thornton 2 2.8 -. 8 
Page Robt. A. & Co 1 .4 .6 
Pannell Kerr Forster 1 2.4 -1.4 
Robson Rhodes 2 1.2 .8 
Smailes Goldie 1 .4 .6 
Thomas May 1 .4 .6 
Neville Russell 1 .4 .6 
Latham Crossley & Davis 1 .4 .6 
Total 18 
The value of the test statistic proves to be 8.296 (p = 0.600), and the pertinent value of 
the x2 for a=0.05 and 11 degrees of freedom is 19.675. Accordingly the statistic is not 
significant at the 95% confidence level and the null hypothesis is accepted. In other 
words, the same proportion of non-Big Six CADRE have their alma mater as auditors. 
This result should be interpreted with care, however, as more than 20% of the cells 
have expected frequencies with less than five. 
5.7. The Narrow2-Narrow Test 
This section counts those CADRE who are Finance Director, Chairman and Chief 
Executive and also, have qualified only with a founder firm. The following subsection 
describes the data involved for the Narrow2-Narrow test and subsection 5.7.2 
performs the chi-square test. 
5.7.1. Specifying the data involved for the test 
The data used for the Narrow2-Narrow test is analysed in this subsection. In 
particular, 
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only CADRE who arc 
=15 -xw- Finance Directors, Chairman and Chief Executive and also, 
have qualified with a founder firm are merely counted6. 
Every CADRE is designated a matrix position (i, j), where: 
i= the name of the accountancy firm with whom the CADRE trained (i. e. 
ALMA MATER) 
j= the name of the auditor of the CADRE's company. 
The summation/tabulation of these matrix positions for all CADRE (who satisfy the 
criteria laid down in the preceding paragraphs) is the basis of constructing the 
contingency Table 5.7.1 .A presented below. 
The row total gives the number of CADRE (that is, FD, Ch and ChiefExec) who 
qualified with a founder audit firm, for example, 58 CADRE with AA, 37 with CL, 1 
Table 5.7.1. A: CADRE classified according to alma mater and auditors* 
AUDIT ORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other Total 
AA 14 6 9 7 10 7 53 5 58 
CL 1 8 3 8 2 5 27 10 37 
ALMA EY 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
MATER KPMG 1 15 3 20 1 7 4 19 66 
PW 6 13 8 20 23 10 80 12 92 
TR 2 6 2 7 1 9 2 1 28 
Subtotal 24 45 26 62 37 38 235 282 
Note: The row "other" has been deleted from this table, due to incompleteness of the data in those row 
entries discussed in more detail in section 5.3.1. 
*CADRE chosen are the Finance Director, Chairman and Chief Executive only 
with EY, 66 with KPMG and so on. The columns give the name of the auditor that 
these CADRE companies use. So, for AA, fourteen CADRE use AA as their auditor, 
six CL, nine EY, seven KPMG, ten PW, seven TR and five "other" (non-Big Six) 
accounting firms. Thus, out of 58 alumni of AA, fourteen favour their alma mater 
(24.14%). The diagonal in the Table 5.7.1 .A shows that eight out of 
37 CADRE who 
trained with CL have CL as their auditors. Following a similar pattern for the rest of 
the Big-Six firms, the Table 5.7.1 .B can be created below. 
6 For a definition of the founder firm, see section 5.3.1. 
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It is mentioned in the preceding paragraph that the columns give just the name of the 
audit firm that CADRE use as their auditor. The columns do not give the number of 
auditors or the number of the UK public companies who have on their boards of 
directors a chartered accountant(s) because some listed companies have more than one 
CADRE (that is, FD and Chairman and Chief Executive) on their boards. In other 
words, the columns total is not meaningful in Table 5.7.1. A. This problem has been 
discussed in more detail in section 5.4.1. 
However, we can still extract some very useful information from Table 5.7.1. A. We 
notice, for example, that 235 out of 282 (83.33%) Finance Directors, Chairmen and 
Chief Executives who have trained and qualified with one of the Big-Six accountancy 
firms (as founder firms) use as their auditors one of the Big-Six firms. Moreover, 
adding up the main diagonal in the Table 5.7.1 . 
A, it shows that 75 of them (26.59%) 
have as their auditors the accounting firm that they have qualified with as chartered 
accountants (see Table 5.7.1. B). 
Table 5.7.1. B: No of CADRE on boards of directors* 
No of CADRE 
per Accg Firm 
Alumni 
and 
client 
(%) 
AA 58 14 24.14 
CL 37 8 21.62 
EY 1 1 100.00 
KPMG 66 20 30.30 
PW 92 23 25.00 
TR 28 9 32.14 
Big-6 
Subtotal 282 Th 26.59 
Other 357 116 
ý3ý X91 
Note: "Alumni and audit client" refers to the 
situation where a CADRE is audited by his/her 
ALMA MATER. 
*CADRE chosen are the Finance Director, 
Chairman and Chief Executive only 
Having explained and analysed the data that is provided for the test statistic, the 
following subsection performs the chi-square statistic to find out whether an alumni 
effect prevails under the narrow2-narrow definitions. 
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5.7.2. Performing the Narrow2-Narrow Test 
This subsection performs the chi-square test for the data described in the preceding 
subsection. We test whether there is an alumni effect among the Big-Six audit firms 
under the narrow2-narrow definitions. In order to do this, we must employ and 
compute the chi-square test of independence. 
We investigate whether there is an association between the ALMA MATER and the 
auditor of the company that the CADRE is currently employed, and formally, the chi- 
square statistic is used to test the null hypothesis 
Ho: ALMA MATER and auditor are independent, 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
H1: non-independence. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Table 5.7.2. A where 
the expected frequencies appear in italics under the observed frequencies for each Big- 
Six firm. The Table 5.7.1 .A 
is a6x6 contingency table so that there are 25 degrees of 
freedom. The "other" column category in the Table 5.7.1 .A 
is discarded as we are 
interested in the association between alma mater and Big-Six auditor. 
When the expected frequencies were computed, 41.7% (15 cells) were proved to have 
expected frequencies of less than 5 (similar kind of problem with sections 5.3.2 and 
5.5.2). The rule that no more than 20% of the cells must have expected frequencies of 
less than 5 was not met (Daniel and Terrell, 1995). All EY row entries contained 
expected frequencies of less than 5 and, therefore, EY row and column were 
eliminated. However, even when the EY row and column were deleted, there was still 
a merely 24% (6 cells in the 5x5 contingency table) that had expected frequencies of 
less than 5. As a result, it was decided to jettison TR row and column from the 
contingency table. The test now will give us valid results. The following Table 5.7.2. A 
presents the amended information (the EY and TR alma mater and auditor are 
discarded). 
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Table 5.7.2. A: ALMA MATER * AUDITORS Crosstabulation (narrow2-narrow test) 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL KPMG PW Total 
AA Count 14 6 7 10 37 
Expected Count 5.3 10.0 13.1 8.6 37.0 
CL Count 1 8 8 2 19 
ALMA Expected Count2.7 5.1 6.7 4.4 19.0 
MATER KPMG Count 1 15 20 1 37 
Expected Count 5.3 10.0 13.1 8.6 37.0 
PW Count 6 13 20 23 62 
Expected Count8.8 16.8 22.0 14.4 62.0 
Total Count 22 42 55 36 155 
Expected Count22.0 42.0 55.0 36.0 155.0 
The Table 5.7.2. A is a4x4 contingency table and has 2 cells (12.5%) with expected 
frequencies less than 5. The test statistic, therefore, closely approximates a chi-square 
distribution and its value proves to be 46.767 (p < 0.001). The comparative critical 
value of the chi-square with 99% confidence level and 9 degrees of freedom is 
x(0.99,9) = 21.666. Accordingly, the null hypothesis is rejected. Auditor and alma mater 
are dependent each other and accordingly there is a significant alumni effect among 
the Big-Six audit firms. 
Another hypothesis to be examined here is based on the main diagonal of the 
contingency Table 5.7. LA. This diagonal has been identified as the principal pattern 
in the data. The extract from Table 5.7.1 .A 
is presented in Table 5.7.1. B. The question 
is whether the same proportion of CADRE have their alma mater as their auditor. 
In investigating the above issue, the chi-square statistic is employed to test the 
following null hypothesis 
Ho: the proportion of CADRE who have their alma mater as auditors does not 
differ 
H1: the proportion differs. 
The observed and expected frequencies are displayed together in Tables 5.7.2. B 
below. The number of degrees of freedom is 5. 
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Table 5.7.2. B: Chi-square test based on 5.7.1. B 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
AA 14 15.4 -1.4 
CL 8 9.9 -1.9 
EY 1 .3 .7 KPMG 20 17.6 2.4 
PW 23 24.4 -1.4 
TR 9 7.4 1.6 
Total 75 
The value of the test statistic is 2.879 (p = 0.719). The critical value of the chi-square 
for a=0.01 and 5 degrees of freedom is %ý0 95 5) = 11.070. Accordingly the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is evidence that the same proportion of CADRE 
have their alma mater as their auditors. 
5.8. Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to investigate whether there is an alumni effect in 
the UK audit market. The alumni effect has been defined as the association between 
the accountancy firm that the director of the UK public company has qualified with 
(as chartered accountant) and the auditor of the company that the director is currently 
employed. Because of the problems in the quantitative analysis of the alumni effect, 
several definitions were suggested and accordingly analyses were performed in order 
to see if the results are robust. 
Further, accountancy firms operate commercial services in the professional 
appointments-executive search and recruitment market. Chapter II explains that due to 
adoption of the up-or-out system, large accountancy firms outplace in prestigious jobs 
most of their employees who cannot make it for partnership. In this way, the audit 
firms have developed connections and networks through the dominant positions that 
their former employees hold in the UK boardrooms. Chapter II conjectures that an 
alumni effect does prevail in the UK audit market and that the alumni of the audit 
firms do act to advance the interests of the firm which trained them with regard to the 
provision of audit and non-audit services. 
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Table 5.8. A: Results of the chanter 
Big-Six audit firms Non-Big Six audit firms 
Secti 
ons 
Test 
Alumni 
Effect 
Alumni and 
Audit Client 
Alumni 
Effect 
Alumni and 
Audit Client 
2 Broad-Broad YES YES abandoned YES 
3 Broad-Narrow YES YES --- --- 
4 Narrowl-Broad YES YES abandoned YES 
5 Narrowl-Narrow YES YES --- --- 
6 Narrow2-Broad YES YES abandoned YES 
7 Narrow2-Narrrow YES YES --- --- 
Table 5.8. B: Summary results of the percentage of CADRE audited by their alma mater 
Table Test 
The % of CADRE who also have their previous 
accounting firm as auditors for various 
definitions of association 
5.2.1. B. Broad-Broad 25.90% 
5.3.1. B. Broad-Narrow 25.34% 
5.4.1.1. B. Narrow 1-Broad 17.24% 
5.5.1. B. Narrow 1-Narrow 24.86% 
5.6.1. B. Narrow2-Broad 26.92% 
5.7.1. B. Narrow2-Narrrow 26.59% 
The results of this chapter suggest that there is a significant relationship between 
CADRE's alma mater and the auditor that is used by the CADRE's company. Another 
finding of this chapter is that the alumni effect does not vary by large audit firm. 
These results hold for all definitions and tests performed (see tables above). The 
alumni effect, therefore, appears to be a potential and important variable in the 
considerable research effort that the academic community has devoted to the 
determinants of audit fee. This study also investigates whether the alumni effect has 
any effect on the audit pricing. The impact on audit fee, therefore, of the existence of 
chartered accountants on the UK boards of directors is modelled in Chapter IX. 
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CHAPTER VI 
AUDIT FEES., 
FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES 
AND SELECTION VARIABLES 
6.1. Hypotheses 
.1 
There is some evidence in the prior literature on audit fees that the market is 
segmented between large and small audit clients. For small companies the barriers to 
entry are not great and the differing competitive conditions lead to differing pricing 
equations (for example, Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1986a; Francis and Simon, 1987). 
The precise definition of large and small companies does vary somewhat among 
studies, but for the purposes of this study Table 3.4. A of Chapter III summarises the 
hypothesised audit fee determinants, and Appendix I presents the direction of the 
relationships found significant in previous studies. Appendix I summarises the results 
of 25 leading empirical studies into audit fees, and some 47 variables that have been 
employed in one or other of these studies. The hypotheses stated below test the 
"alumni effect" conjectured by this study. The tests also provide additional evidence 
on price differences (due to economies of scale and/or product differentiation) in the 
UK audit market varied by auditee size. 
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Hypotheses numbered 1 through 6 (which are stated in the null form) are concerned 
with product differentiation and economies of scale. Hypotheses numbered 7 through 
11 relate to the main objective of this study, and are developed from the theoretical 
analysis of the chapter H. This research is different from past studies in the focus that 
directs onto the alumni variable. This is not simply just another new variable to the 
audit fee studies to add to the variables already used, but a new sociometric to 
measure the effect of personal and professional networks in the market for 
accountancy services. It is important to see if the effects of alumni are reflected in 
audit prices. In Chapter II, the theory of human capital was adapted to explicate the 
role that alumni play in the large audit firm. Apart from sociological and 
organisational consequences for understanding UK business, the economic 
consequences are unknown. This research uses three levels of the audit firm size 
variable and two levels of the client size (large and small) in order to gauge the 
magnitude of the effects of product differences and economies of scale on audit fees. 
Hypotheses numbered 1 through 6 are a replication of prior studies. They are needed 
as a control for the association between alumni and audit firm. Thus, if there is a price 
differential in the sample due to Big-Six/non-Big Six firms, which was omitted in the 
test, and alumni are differently associated with Big-Six/non-Big Six audit firms, then 
what would appear as an alumni effect in the pricing equations would merely be due 
to alumni proxying for audit firm size. To identify any economic implications of 
alumni associations the problem of missing variables is acute. The strategy adopted is 
to control for all known alternative variables used in prior studies. 
Hyjotheses 1 through 6 that_ are related to product differentiation 
and/or_ economies. scale as below 
HI: for the large companies sub-sample, there will be no differential pricing 
of audit services between Big Six and non-Big Six accountancy firms. 
Hypothesis 1 assumes that lower prices due to economies of scale offset any Big Six 
premiums from product differentiation and/or that non-Big Six diseconomies balance 
any Big Six higher fee charges. A rejection of this hypothesis, on the other hand, may 
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imply that either product differentiation (in the case that Big Six charge higher prices) 
or economies of scale (in the case that Big Six charge lower prices) accruing to the 
Big Six in servicing companies in the large auditee market do prevail. 
H2: for the small companies sub-sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee 
than (or equal to) the non-Big Six firms. 
H3: for the small companies sub-sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee 
than (or equal to) the second-tier accountancy firms. 
H4: for the small companies sub-sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee 
than (or equal to) the local/regional accountancy firms. 
H5: for the small companies sub-sample, the second-tier firms charge lower 
audit fee than (or equal to) the local/regional accountancy firms. 
Hypotheses 2 through 5 deal with competition in the small companies audit market. 
The prior literature suggests that hypotheses 2 through 5 will not be accepted, 
consistent with price competition with differentiated product to the Big Six (or 
second-tier accounting firms) in the small companies segment. It should be noted here 
that if the coefficients of the audit firm variables (Big Six=1 & non-Big Six=O; 
second-tier=1 & other=O) are positive and significant across both segments (i. e., the 
large and small clients), then we may conclude that product differentiation prevails. 
On the other hand, if the auditor coefficients are only significantly positive for the 
small auditees market segment, then this may be interpreted as economies of scale 
dominating the large companies market with the effect of the differentiated product 
becoming more apparent as the analysis crosses a threshold to the smaller clients 
segment. 
H6: the pricing of audit services is related to the pricing of non-audit 
services 
According to the prior literature1, there is a significant and positive relationship 
between fees paid to the incumbent auditor for audit services and for non-audit 
services, and hence, it is expected that hypothesis 6 will be accepted. If, however, the 
above hypothesis will be rejected, then the result may indicate that the client 
management has responded to the potential impairment of the auditor's independence 
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(due to an increase on the level of incremental economic bonding between auditor and 
client) by reducing the purchases of recurring non-audit services. 
Hypotheses 7 through 11 that are related to "alumni effect" as below 
H7: for the large and small companies sub-sample, it makes no difference on 
audit fees when y director is an ex-employee of the auditor 
Hypothesis 7 assumes that the audit firms do not benefit or suffer from outplacing 
their alumni in industry and commerce, and more specifically, that the pricing of audit 
services is not related to the existence of an audit firm alumni on the board of 
directors. In other words, do alumni affect audit fees? Rejection of this hypothesis, on 
the other hand, may imply that the "alumni effect" has pricing consequences. 
H8: for the large and small companies sub-sample, on average it makes no 
difference on audit fees when a non-executive director is an ex-employee 
of the auditor 
Non-executive directors normally comprise the audit committees in companies. 
According to the Cadbury Report (1992), the audit committee makes only 
recommendations to the board on the appointment of auditors and the audit fee. 
Whether a non-executive director is alumni of the auditor should be irrelevant to the 
pricing of audit services and hence, the above hypothesis is expected to be accepted. A 
rejection of this hypothesis, on the other hand, may imply that the audit committees in 
the UK play a more important role in the everyday management of the companies2, 
and further, that all directors (executive and non-executive) have the same influential 
power to the appointment of auditors. 
H9: for the large and small companies sub-sample, there is no audit fee 
difference when the chairman, chief executive or finance director are an 
alumni of the auditor 
According to prior literature, the chairman, chief executive or finance director are 
principally responsible for the appointment of auditors (Hussey and Jack, 1994; 
See Chapter III. 
2 See for example Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) who provide evidence of positive stock returns around 
announcements of non-executive director appointments. This may confirm the notion that non-executive directors 
serve a unique and valuable function on the board. 
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Beattie and Fearnley, 1998). Whether this relationship is translated into higher or 
lower audit fees is a matter of question. 
H10: for the large and small companies sub-sample, the audit fee charged will 
not be lower or higher as the CADRE becomes older 
It is expected that hypothesis 10 will be accepted as the older the CADRE become the 
greater the chances that they will move to higher positions in company hierarchies 
such as managing directorships or members of the non-executive boards (Price 
Waterhouse Corporate Register, March 1999). These positions are assumed not to 
influence directly the audit fees. On the other hand, if the coefficient of the age of the 
CADRE is significant, then this may imply that the years since the CADRE were 
qualified as chartered accountants do not deteriorate the "alumni effect". 
Hi]: there is no different relationship between audit and non-audit fee because 
of existence of auditor alumni 
Hypothesis 11 implies that the existence of an auditor alumni on the board of directors 
of the company does not alter the pricing of audit services in connection with the 
provision of non-audit services. Rejection of this hypothesis, on the other hand, may 
indicate that the CADRE companies obtain non-audit services from their ALMA 
MATER in a discounted price. 
6.2. Selection of variables and operational proxies 
A body of literature exists on factors affecting the level of external audit fees (see 
Chapter III). The current study incorporates some independent variables found to be 
significantly associated with audit prices/fees in previous studies. These variables 
measure client and audit firm characteristics. Publicly available data was collected on 
the significant variables described in Chapter III. The variables and operational 
proxies collected are listed in the Table 6.2 at the end of this chapter. 
The independent variables are classified into two major categories: (1) control 
variables, and (2) test or focus variables. The control variables must be included in the 
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multivariate model to control for cross-sectional differences among client 
characteristics. Not controlling for these variables will result in model mis- 
specification and/or misleading results due to confounding effects of omitted 
variables. The focus variables are used to test the specific hypotheses of this study 
after controlling for cross-sectional differences among auditees. 
A brief description of the dependent and independent variables using the mnemonic 
symbols appears in Table 6.2 at the end of this chapter. The first eight variables below 
are the focus or test variables of this study. It is their relationship with audit prices 
which is tested in this research project. The remaining twenty variables are control 
variables, as suggested by prior research. 
Dependent Variable 
AFEE is the British sterling amounts paid to auditors for providing audit services. The 
audit fees (as well as all the independent variables that follow) are collected from the 
ONE-SOURCE cd-rom database and have been confirmed by double-checking the 
web-based FAME database. This continuous variable is transformed to the natural log 
to ensure a better fit to the regression line (see also the data transformations section in 
chapter VIII for more discussion). 
A regression linear in the log of the dependent variable is multiplicative in the 
independent factors, as follows: 
In y= ß(, +ßlx1 +12X2+... +ßkxk +u, 
e I"'' =e ßO+Q, X, +ß2X2 
+... +QA Xk +U 
y= eß0eßix, eß2X2 ... e/k'Xk eU 
where 
y= dependent variable (audit fees); 
x1,..., xk =k independent variables; 
u= stochastic disturbance term; 
e= base of natural logarithm. 
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As discussed below (as well as in the Chapter VIII) for statistical reasons the 
independent variables were also transformed, so that the final form of the model fitted 
is a Cobb-Douglas production function which in its stochastic form is expressed as 
_ /ý u y= ß0XAX ... Xk' e 
Each of the regression coefficients ßßl through ßk is then the (partial) elasticity of audit 
fees y with respect to independent variables xl through xk. 
In interpreting the magnitudes of the coefficients, this transformation needs to be 
recalled. 
Independent Variables 
Test or Focus Variables 
The direction as well as significance level of the auditor firm size variable is 
examined across auditee size categories to make inferences about observed price 
premiums being sensitive to mean auditee size categories examined. In more detail, 
BIG6 is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the auditor is a particular 
accountancy firm among the Big-Six, and zero otherwise. This dummy variable has 
primarily been used throughout the literature and is intended to control for any 
identifiable differences in the auditor fee functions across the two groups of 
accountancy firms. Prior literature has assumed that the Big-Six firms have the same 
level of audit quality and be performed relative to the same set of audit standards, a 
"world-wide audit guide", while non-Big Six firms deliver different level of audit 
quality or use different procedures than the Big-Six and, therefore, the fees charged by 
each group of firms may differ too3. However, the results are not consistent in the 
prior studies so far, and therefore, we do not hypothesise a direction for the 
relationship between AFEE and BIG6. 
NAFEE is the British sterling amounts paid to auditors for providing non-audit 
services. The non-audit fees are also collected from the ONE-SOURCE cd-rom 
database and have been confirmed by double-checking the web-based FAME 
database. This continuous variable is transformed to the natural log to ensure a better 
See Chapter VIII where a one-way analysis of variance is used to test whether the Big-Six individual audit firms 
are homogeneous with-in the group. 
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fit to the regression line (see chapter VIII for a discussion). According to prior studies, 
the hypothesised relationship between AFFE and NAFEE is positive 
ALUMNI4 is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the auditor of the public 
company is the same firm with the one that the CADRE has qualified with, and zero 
otherwise. This dummy variable measures the "alumni effect" related to the costs of 
delivering an audit. Does an alumni director lead to lower audit fees or does an alumni 
offset the need for discounting? There is no prediction of the sign of the coefficient. 
The relationship is indeterminate ex ante. 
ALMNEXD is dummy variable taking a value of one if the CADRE is a non- 
executive director and zero if the CADRE is an executive director. In principal, the 
shareholders are responsible for the appointment or dismissal of auditors, however, in 
practice the board of directors effectively appoint or dismiss the external auditor 
(McInnes, 1993). The presence now of an executive director who is also an alumni of 
the incumbent auditor makes the relationship between AFEE and ALMNEXD 
indeterminate ex ante. 
ALMNFD is dummy variable taking a value of one if the CADRE is finance director, 
chairman and/or chief executive and zero otherwise. It is known (see Hussey and Jack, 
1994; Beattie and Fearnley, 1998) that these directors are mainly associated with the 
auditor appointment, nevertheless, when these directors happen to be simultaneously 
chartered accountants and especially qualified with the auditor's firm, then the 
relationship between AFEE and ALMNFD is indeterminate ex ante. 
2NDTIER represents the second-tier accountancy firms. It is another dummy variable 
taking a value of one if the auditor is a second-tier firm (listed in Table 7.1 in the 
Chapter VII), and zero if the auditor has a local or regional practices. The non-Big Six 
firms category is partitioned further, therefore, after Francis and Simon (1987) which 
was the first study to partition the effect of second-tier audit firms. They did not find a 
° As discussed in Chapter V there are a variety of definitions for ALUMNI/CADRE. For hypotheses 1 through 6, 
we apply the first definition where the CADREIALUMNI selected per company is the last one when they are listed 
in ascending alphabetical order (for more details see section 5.4.1. in Chapter V). For hypotheses 7 through 11, 
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significant second-tier firms price premium over local/regional firms. The current 
study is the first to replicate this in a UK context, again the relationship between 
AFEE and 2NDTIER is indeterminate ex ante. 
AGECADRE represents the actual age of the CADRE. This variable captures any 
deterioration of the "alumni effect" over the years as the alumni of the audit firms 
become older. The relationship between AFEE and AGECADRE is indeterminate ex 
ante. 
Control Variables 
Auditee Size & Complexity: 
SALES used to control for the size of auditee operations, whereas SUBS, SIC, 
DEBTR, INV control for the complexity of client operations. These variables are 
hypothesised to be relevant for controlling cross-sectional differences in degree of 
audit difficulty. 
More specifically, SALES is a continuous variable measuring the net turnover (in UK 
£000's) of the auditor client. Sales have been used in this study as a size measure 
instead of total assets because assets are not measured consistently across similar 
otherwise companies. The main reason for this is the choice of accounting policy (e. g. 
treatment of goodwill, fixed assets revaluation, etc). Another problem of using total 
assets as a size measure is the possibility of multicollinearity that may arise with other 
complexity variables of the type which incorporate total assets directly in their 
calculation. Additionally, higher asset value may indicate a larger auditee or an 
auditee whose assets have been re-valued, but whose "size" remained unchanged. 
Note that the relation between auditee size and audit prices is expected to be non- 
linear; however, more discussion on this relationship will be held in the chapter 
dealing with the model specification (see Chapter VIII). The hypothesised relationship 
between AFEE and SALES is positive. 
however, all CADRE/ALUMNI are considered as the vector explaining the dependent variable changes with the 
introduction of the ALUMNI variable. 
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SUBS is the number of consolidated subsidiaries reported by the client firm. It is a 
measure of the complexity and decentralisation-diversity of the client. As a company 
grows in diversity and complexity, more labour, knowledge and effort are needed to 
complete an audit of a particular quality, which in turn are likely to lead to higher 
audit fees charged. Complexity and diversity may also increase litigation costs as the 
inherent and business risks of the company increase. As with size, a non-linear 
relationship between audit prices and the count of subsidiaries is hypothesised, but 
again this matter will be investigated in the Chapter VIII. The hypothesised 
relationship between AFEE and SUBS is positive. 
SIC is the number of different industrial sectors in which the auditee operates. This 
variable is based on Simunic's (1980) work and measures complexity and industry 
diversification. The greater the degree of industry diversification, the larger the degree 
of audit difficulty because of the resulting auditor's inability to treat accounting sub- 
populations as homogeneous and examine them as an aggregate since the underlying 
transactions are fundamentally different in their nature. The hypothesised relationship 
between AFEE and SIC is positive. 
DEBTR is a balance sheet composition ratio and is proxied by the proportion of the 
company's total assets that are represented by debtors. It is a measure of the 
complexity of the auditee since certain procedures such as establishing the existence 
of debtors and estimating the realisable value of the debt may be complex and difficult 
to be audited. The hypothesised relationship between AFEE and DEBTR is positive. 
INV is another balance sheet ratio that measures client complexity. It is calculated by 
dividing the total year-end stocks with the total year-end assets. The greater the 
relative sterling total of the auditee's stocks, the larger the auditee's complexity and 
consequently the larger the costs of auditing this certain type of current assets. The 
hypothesised relationship between AFFE and INV is positive. 
If any of the above variables which measure client complexity are collinear, the "best 
fit" variable, or the variable with the most explanatory power, will be employed for 
the model. 
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Auditee Risk (Profitability & Financial Distress): 
The variables ROI, LOSS, EARN, AUDQN, DE, DTA, ROCE and ROTA are 
intended to determine the loss sharing ratio between the auditor and the client since 
each can be held jointly and severely liable for defects in financial annual reports. 
These variables are constructs of factors that measure the amount of auditee financial 
distress (auditee risk). In more detail, ROI is the return on investment given as net 
income or net loss over total assets at year-end. It is hypothesised that the auditor's 
expected share of losses is simply a decreasing function of the auditee's accounting 
rate of return. Therefore, ceteris paribus in a cross-section, the auditor's total revenue 
(fees) from an engagement would vary inversely with the rate of return. The lower the 
return on investment then, the higher the audit fee. Alternatively, the relationship may 
not be continuous. A plausible point of significant discontinuity may be when the rate 
of return becomes negative, that is, the auditee incurs a loss (LOSS). The incidence of 
a loss in the current fiscal period (which in turn signals evidence of auditee financial 
distress and riskier operations) increases the risk of audit failure and also increases the 
posterior probability that the auditor will incur future losses because the auditee is 
bankrupt5. Consequently, the price charged by the audit firm is likely to reflect that 
and be higher. The hypothesised relationship between AFEE and ROI is negative, and 
between AFEE and LOSS is positive. 
EARN is a variable that predicts the failure of an enterprise (Altman, 1968). It is 
proxied by the proportion of the company's total assets that are represented by 
earnings before interest and taxes. Again here, the lower the rate of return the higher 
the audit fee. EARN is hypothesised to have a negative relationship with AFEE. 
DE is the total long-term debt to equity ratio and has been used as a measure of 
financial distress too. It is intended to address the company's long-run ability to meet 
its obligations. The higher the amount of long-term debt in the capital structure, the 
higher the audit fee. The hypothesised relationship between AFEE and DE is positive. 
Similarly, DTA is the long-term debt to total assets and measures the risk an auditor's 
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Another plausible measure of auditee risk which has primarily been used throughout 
the literature is the AUDQN. It provides the type of audit opinion rendered by the 
auditor on the financial statements for the current fiscal year ("clean" unqualified vs. 
qualified audit report). The auditor's issuance of a qualified opinion signals significant 
uncertainties associated with an auditee's operation, and accordingly, the auditee will 
pay a higher audit price. As an overall result, the hypothesised relationship between 
AFEE and AUDQN is positive. 
Finally, another two rate of returns have been utilised in this study, ROCE and ROTA. 
These variables are chosen because rate of return measures have been found useful in 
bankruptcy studies (Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968) for discriminating between "failed" 
and "non-failed" companies. As with ROI, ROCE and ROTA are hypothesised to 
have a negative relationship with AFEE. 
Auditee Risk (Gearing): 
TLBTA (total liabilities to total assets) and LTLBTA (long-term liabilities to total 
assets) measure the level of gearing of the client company. They are balance sheet 
measures of financial risk, and the higher levels of gearing, the higher the audit fees 
charged due to the greater riskiness of such companies. They are hypothesised to have 
a positive relationship with AFFE. 
Auditee Risk (Liquidity): 
CR (current ratio) and QR (quick ratio) have employed in this study as proxies for the 
level of the auditee liquidity. These liquidity ratios are a measure of the company's 
ability to meet its short-term financial obligations out of its current assets. Acceptable 
level of these measures will determine the level of audit fees charged by the auditor. 
5A potential problem with this variable is that an isolated net loss may indicate a temporary condition which does 
not significantly affect audit risk. A better measure might be consecutive losses over several fiscal years, 
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An apparently low ratio may indicate an unhealthy company and, hence, the risk of 
audit failure is greater. The hypothesised relationships between AFFE and CR, and 
AFEE and QR are negative. 
Auditee Risk (Nature of Business): 
The dummy variable AGECOMP measuring the risk of client failure is expected to 
affect audit fees because of the potential lack of developed internal control systems in 
companies incorporated in the last ten years and the higher probability of failure of 
such companies. The variable takes a value of one if the company is a young company 
(less than 10 years) and zero otherwise. The hypothesised relationship between AFEE 
and AGECOMP is positive. 
If any of the above control variables which measure auditee risk are collinear, the 
"best fit" variable, or the variable with the most explanatory power, will be employed 
for the model. 
Auditee - Audit Timing: 
BUSY is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the client's accounting year-end is 
in the periods November/December or March/April and zero otherwise. The 
clustering of these year-ends produces a busy period effect to the audit firm and, thus, 
it may affect the audit prices. The hypothesised relationship between AFEE and 
BUSY is positive. 
Auditee - Geographical Location: 
GEOLOC is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the geographical location of 
the auditee is in the pre-described region and zero otherwise. This variable, first used 
by Brinn et al (1994), is included in the model to test for the impact of different 
regions on differential audit fee pricing. There are eleven GEOLOC dummy variables 
(twelve regional classifications) 6. See Table 6.2. A for descriptions of the geographical 
locations. The companies' registered offices have been selected to construct the 
something that our dataset lacks. 
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dummy variables as these are the places where the CADRE work and take decisions 
about the company's financial future. The relationship between AFFE and 
GEOLOC 1-11 are indeterminate ex ante, although a London premium is suspected to 
exist (see Table 6.1 at the end of this chapter where the ratio of audit fees to sales by 
region is displayed). 
Takle 6.2. A: Oualitative variable-Gengranhical Location with 17 nllmhAr of ratPanru c 
Regional Mnemonic Definition 
----------------- 
Predicted 
Areas Name Sign 
Scotland GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1 if auditee's 
1 registered address is in Scotland, otherwise 0 
North GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1, if auditee's 
England 2 registered address is in North, otherwise 0 
North GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1, if auditee's 
West 3 registered address is in North West, otherwise 0 
North East GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1, if auditee's 
4 registered address is in West Midlands, otherwise 0 
West GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1, if auditee's 
Midlands 
5 registered address is in West Midlands, otherwise 0 
East GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1, if auditee's 
Midlands 
6 registered address is in East Midlands, otherwise 0 
East GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1, if auditee's 
Anglia 
7 registered address is in East Anglia, otherwise 0 
Greater GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1, if auditee's 
SouLondon- East 8 registered address is in London, otherwise 0 
+ 
South GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1, if auditee's 
West 
9 registered address is in South West, otherwise 0 
South GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1 if auditee's 
Coast 
10 registered address is in South Coast, otherwise 0 
Northern GEOLOG Geographical location, coded 1 if auditee's 
Ireland 
11 registered address in Northern Ireland, otherwise 0 
? 
Wales GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1 if auditee's 
12 registered address is in Wales, otherwise 0 
6 Note that when a qualitative variable has K categories we define K-1 dummy variables in order to code all the 
categories properly (Koutsoyiannis, 1977, p. 284; Daniel & Terrell, 1995, p. 569). 
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6.3. Additional variables 
Some independent variables used in prior research will not be examined in this study. 
These are: 
(i) Existence of foreign operations 
This variable was used by Simunic (1980) and Francis and Simon (1987) among 
others who all found the variable to be significant. A foreign operations measure is not 
available for the UK companies because the UK financial statements generally do not 
separate UK operations from the other European operations. 
(ii) Number of reports issued by the auditor 
Palmrose (1986) employed this measure and found it to be statistically significant. 
The number of audit reports will generally be one unless a subsidiary has a separate 
report or a separate report is issued on internal control or for management advice. If a 
separate report is issued the charges should not be included with the audit fee. Thus, 
this variable is not examined in the present study. 
(iii) Number of client locations, client participation, ownership of company 
Measures of the number of client locations requiring on site visits by the auditors, and 
amount of client participation in the audit were used by Palmrose (1986), but 
information on those variables are not publicly available and, therefore, will not be 
used in this study. Regarding the variable, ownership of company (public or non- 
public), this study focuses only on the "alumni effect" on the publicly owned 
companies. 
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Table 6.1 
Ratio of audit fees to sales (%) by region 
REGIONS AFEESALE 
--------- ---------- 
Scotland 0.13 
North West 1.09 
West midlands 0.26 
East Anglia 0.20 
Greater London/ 
South East 3.75 
Northern Ireland 0.01 
------------------------------ 
REGIONS AFEESALE 
-------- ---------- 
i 
North 
North 
East 
South 
South 
Wales 
0.09 
East 0.23 
Midlands 0.12 
West 0.74 
Coast 0.39 
0.04 
---------------- 
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Table 6.2 
Independent Variables and Operational Proxies 
(included in the audit fee determinants model) 
F CONTROL VARIABLES 
Mnemonic Definition 
----------------- 
Auditee Predicted 
Name Vector Sign 
SALES Total turnover of auditees Auditee size + 
SUBS Number of consolidated subsidiaries Auditee + 
complexity 
SIC Number of SIC codes minus 1, measures Auditee + 
industry diversification complexity 
GEOLOC Geographical location, coded 1 if auditee's + (for 
1-11 registered address in pre-described region, London) 
otherwise 0 (see Table 6.2. A) ? (for rest) 
DEBTR Total year-end debtors to total assets Auditee + 
complexity 
INV Total year-end inventories to total assets Auditee + 
complexity 
LOSS Coded 1 if auditee incurred a net loss in the Auditee fin. + 
current year, otherwise 0 distress(risk) 
EARN Earnings before interest & tax to total Auditee fin. - 
assets distress(risk) 
AUDQN Audit qualification, coded 1 if auditee Auditee fin. + 
received a "qualified report", otherwise 0 distress(risk) 
DE Debt to equity ratio Auditee fin. + 
distress(risk) 
DTA Total long-term debt to total assets Auditee fin. + 
distress(risk) 
QR Quick ratio Auditee - 
liquidity(risk) 
CR Current ratio Auditee - 
liquidity(risk) 
TLBTA Ratio of total liabilities to total assets Auditee + 
gearing(risk) 
LTLBTA Ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets Auditee + 
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gearing(risk) 
AGECOMP Coded 1 if auditee incorporated less than Auditee risk + 
10 years, otherwise 0 
BUSY Coded 1 if auditee's accounting year-end is Audit timing - 
Nov/Dec or Mar/April, otherwise 0 
ROCE Return on capital employed (%) Auditee - 
profitability 
ROTA Return on total assets (%) Auditee - 
profitability 
ROI Return on investment - 
Table 6.2: continued 
TEST OR Focus VARIABLES 
Predicted 
---------------- Name Definition 
Sign 
BIG6 Coded 1 if the auditor is a "Big Six" firm, ? 
otherwise 0 
NAFEE Fees paid for non-audit services + 
ALUMNI Coded 1 if there is an alumni of the auditor on ? 
the board of directors, otherwise 0 
ALMNEXD Coded 1 if the CADRE is executive director, ? 
otherwise 0 
ALMNFD Coded 1 if the CADRE is finance director, ? 
chairman or chief executive, otherwise 0 
AGECADRE Age of the CADRE ? 
2NDTIER Coded 1 if the non-Big Six auditor is a ? 
"second-tier" accountancy firm, otherwise 0 
ALMNNAFEE Fees paid for non-audit services and auditor ? 
alumni on the board of directors (if no auditor L 
alumni on the board of directors, then 0) 
159 
_ 
CHAPTER VII 
SAMPLE AND 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
7.1. The sample 
As we have discussed in Chapter IV, the basis for this study is the list of CADRE, the 
UK public companies in which those CADRE are employed as directors and their 
auditors comprising the May 1996 edition of the Corporate Register compiled by Price 
Waterhouse. This list includes 15,000 directors and 2,000 publicly held companies. 
Also, the list provides specific information about the companies and the directors such 
as the industrial sector the companies operate, the names of the executive and non- 
executive directors, the names of the auditors, the type of sex and the date of birth for 
directors and their qualifications among others. 
The database obtained by the Price Waterhouse contains 15,000 directors, as we 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 2,286 of whom have qualified as chartered 
accountants with one of the accountancy firms. We concentrate in this study only on 
those CADRE who hold the ICAEW qualification and, therefore, 1,955 were included 
in the project. However, of those 1,955 CADRE, 163 are missing as the necessary 
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information about alma mater could not be obtained from any other sources. The 
information collected and the procedures followed were described in the Chapter IV. 
We need also to mention here, that the financial information collected and used in the 
current study is for 1,172 UK quoted companies (1,277 originally, 105 of which are 
missing) and for the fiscal year 1995-1996. The number of listed companies is 
different from the number of CADRE (1,277 companies vs. 1,955 directors), simply 
because there are publicly held companies that have more than one CADRE on their 
boards. The implications of this and the discussion were offered in the Chapter V. 
We merely state here that the descriptive statistics presented in this chapter use the 
1,172 companies. This sample size is also applied for testing the hypotheses 1 through 
6, as these hypotheses form a replication of previous studies. However, the full sample 
(i. e. 1,955 companies) is used for testing the hypotheses 7 through 11. This is done 
because the total number of CADRE (i. e. 1,955 CADRE) is entered in the regression 
models. 
Table 7.1. A: Characteristics of the sample data 
Auditee Size Classes 
Auditor Sales below £251 MM Sales exceed £251 MM All Auditees 
Big-Six firm 650 
Non-Bix Six firm 286 
All auditors 936 
Auditee companies have been divided into four classes as described in Table 7.1. A. 
There are two classes for auditee size as measured by sales and two classes identifying 
the auditor as a "Big-Six" or a "non-Big Six" audit firm. The boundaries for the two 
auditee size classes represent approximately those points where the Herfindahl (H) 
index for the Big-Six firms increases sharply (see below the note in subsection 7.1.1 
for further discussion). The class boundaries are not contiguous so as to enhance any 
inter-class differences. 
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Of the 1,172 quoted companies, 868 have a Big-Six auditor and 304 have a non-Big 
Six auditor. Table 7.1. B presents a detailed classification by auditee size and by class 
of auditor in the auditee size group. Table 7.1 .C presents the number and proportion of 
audits performed by individual Big-Six auditors and Table 7.1 .D presents the number 
and proportion of audits performed by individual non-Big Six auditors (restricted to 
second-tier firms). Table 7.1. E lists the sample companies by class of auditor and by 
principal industry (SIC Code). Finally, to obtain an indication of the Big-Six audit 
firm's dominance in the UK, Table 7.1 at the end of this chapter lists the twenty 
accountancy firms with the largest UK income in 1995. 
Table 7.1. B: Detail classification of the sample data 
Auditee Size Big-Six Auditor Other Auditor Total 
sales <£ 15MM 164 143 307 
16MM to 50 MM 209 69 278 
51 MM to 100MM 137 44 181 
101 MM to 250MM 140 30 170 
251 MM to 1,900MM 155 18 173 
sales > £2,000MM 63 0 63 
Total 868 304 1172 
Table 7.1. C: Number of audits performed by the Big-Six audit firms 
Auditee Size Classes 
Sales C E25QMM Sales >£ 251 MM All Au ditees 
Au---ditor' Number % Number % Total No % of B6 
Big-Six Total 
AA 53 8.15 13 5.96 63 7.25 
CL 134 20.61 46 21.10 180 20.73 
EY 92 14.15 33 15.13 125 14.40 
KPMG 182 28.00 56 25.68 238 27.41 
PW 94 14.46 44 20.18 138 15.89 
TR 95 14.61 26 11.92 121 13.94 
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Table 7.1. D: Number of audits performed by the non-Big Six firms (only the 2nd-tier firms)' 
Auditee Size Classes 
MWV P 
,% 2511 l[ 1e > £25 MM All Aud itees 
Auditor: Number % Number % Total % of NB6 Non-Big Six No Total 
Gram Thojrntoh 22.22 37 12.17 
BDO Stoy Hayward 46 16.08 3 16.67 49 16.12 
Pannell Kerr Forster 17 x: 94 16.67 20 6.58 
Clark Whitehill 12 4.19 1 5.56 13 4.27 
cstn Impey 6 2.09 0 0.00 6 1.97 
Moore Stephens 4 1.39 0 0.00 4 1.32 
obso odi t,,,,, 5: 60 0.00 16 5.26 
Neville Russell 7 2.45 0 0.00 7 2.30 
Moores Rowland 8 2 79 0 0.00 8 2.63 
Baker Tilly 5 1.75 1 5.56 6 1.97 
Haines Watts 2 0.69 0 0.00 2 0.66 
Casson Beckman 6 2.09 0 0.00 6 1.97 
Saffery Champness 3 1.05 0 0.00 3 0.99 
Other 121 42.31 6 33.34 127 41.78 
7.1.1. A note on the boundaries for the auditee size classes 
As discussed in the audit fee literature review chapter (see Chapter II), the size cut- 
off determining "small" auditee has varied. For example, Simunic (1980) and Francis 
and Simon (1987) defined small auditees as companies with sales less than USA$125 
million. Palmrose (1986a) defined small clients as companies with total assets less 
than USA$150 million. These bounds are somewhat arbitrary and based on the 
assumption that the small auditee segment of the market is competitive while the large 
auditee segment is not competitive due to the high concentration of the Big-Six firms 
auditing large clients. Simunic (1980) observed that the marginal Big-Eight2 market 
share for clients with sales greater than USA$125 million approaches 90 percent. The 
sample partition represents a built-in design feature for making inferences about 
observed differences in the pricing of the audit services when examined across both 
1 The non-Big Six accounting firms that appear in Table 7.1. D are based on the information provided in Table 7.1 
at end of this chapter. 
2 Big-Eight then, Big-Six when the research was carried out, Big-Five now after the merger of Price Waterhouse 
and Coopers & Lybrand. 
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client segments. The small auditee market segment of the present study is defined as 
auditees with sales less than UK£251 million. 
Table 7.1. E: Industry classification by class of auditor3 
Index of Industry Classification 
Big-Six 
Auditor 
Other 
Auditor Total 
10 Mineral Extraction 
12 Extractive Industries 10 1 11 
15 Oil, Intergrated 1 0 1 
16 Oil Exploration & Production 6 1 7 
20 General Manufacturers 
21 Construction 49 14 63 
22 Building Materials, Engineering 38 8 46 
23 Chemicals 21 2 23 
24 Diversified Industrials 5 1 6 
25 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 41 16 57 
26 Engineering 86 20 106 
27 Engineering, Vehicles 11 5 16 
28 Paper, Packaging & Printing 33 5 38 
30 Consumer Goods 
31 Breweries, Pubs & Restaurants 15 16 31 
32 Alcoholic Beverages 4 0 4 
33 Food Producers 28 8 36 
34 Household Goods & Text 65 21 86 
36 Health Care 25 8 33 
37 Pharmaceuticals 8 2 10 
40 Services 
41 Distributors 54 18 72 
42 Leisure & Hotels 33 9 42 
43 Media 50 19 69 
44 Retailers, Food 12 5 17 
45 Retailers, General 34 17 51 
48 Support Services 81 38 119 
49 Transport 18 5 23 
60 Utilities 
62 Electricity 3 1 4 
66 Telecommunications 7 2 9 
68 Water 8 5 13 
70 Financials 
71 Banks, Retail 5 0 5 
72 Banks, Merchant 2 0 2 
73 Life Assurance 18 3 21 
74 Insurance 4 1 5 
77 Other Financial 29 9 38 
79 Property 63 34 97 
80 Investment Trust 45 14 59 
Total 912 308 1220 
For 44 auditees audited by a Big-Six firm and 4 companies audited by a non-Big Six firms, data is not missing 
regarding the industry sector into which they operate. 
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Let us pause here for a minute and attempt to justify our choice of the bound. We have 
followed Simunic's (1980) argument who calculated the concentration ratio of the 
Big-Eight firms by auditee size class and then noticed that the market dominance of 
the Big-Eight audit firms varies significantly with the size of the clients. The 
concentration ratio he used was simply the number of clients in each size class who 
were audited by one of the Big-Eight firms divided by the total number of companies 
in that class. Simunic viewed the low market penetration of the non-Big Eight firms 
when the size of companies exceeds about USA$ 100 million in sales as lack of 
competition and, therefore, higher prices for audit services in this large auditee market 
segment4. He then proposed to investigate, having assumed that the sub-market for 
audits of smaller clients is competitive, the effect of the difference in concentration by 
testing for differences in average prices charged by the Big-Eight audit firms, after the 
s effects of other price determinants were controlled. 
The Big-Six concentration ratios of auditee size class constructed using the data 
collected for the purposes of this study are as follows: 
Table 7.1.1. A: UK Big-Six auditor concentration ratios 
sales <£ 15MM 1 0.40 0.53 0.63 
1.6MM to 50MM 0.61 0.74 0.78 
51 MM to 100MM 0.61 0.75 0.77 
101 MM to 250MM I 0.69 j 0.82 0.83 
251 MM to 1,900MM 0.82 0.89 0.90 
sales > £2,000NM 
1 0.97 1 0.93 0.98 
The concentration ratio (CR6) measures the proportion of the total market accounted 
for by the Big-Six audit firms, the Herfindahl Index (HI) squares market shares, and 
4 However, as Simunic (1980) noted in his paper (p. 176), there is no theoretical basis to determine a minimum 
required market share, and thus, the bounds are somewhat arbitrary. 
5 For a further discussion of Simunic's work, see literature review Chapter III. 
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finally, the concentration ratio (CR6_S) which is based on Simunic's (1980) 
calculation. Following Moizer and Turley (1987 and 1989) recommendation, we also 
used audit fee information as the most suitable base on which supplier concentration 
is measured in calculating HI and CR6, whereas CR6_S were computed using the 
number of auditees (as in Simunic). 
We notice from the Table 7.1.1. A above, that all ratios provide similar results and that 
there are three substantially distinguished boundaries that can be drawn for three 
auditee size classes which are identical for all three different ratios. The three 
boundaries are below £ 15 million, between £ 16 and £250 million, and over £251 
million. However, the information presented in Table 7.1. A and thereafter is based on 
two only subgroups, those of small (sales < £250MM) and large (sales > £250MM) 
auditees. The reasons are to simplify exposition, be consistent with the previous 
literature, and most importantly, be in agreement with the assumption that a small 
market share implies numerous sellers of equal size and, therefore, a competitive audit 
market. 
7.2. Descriptive statistics 
This section presents the descriptive information when observations are classified by 
auditee size (subsection 7.2.1) and by auditor group (subsection 7.2.2). 
7.2.1. Descriptive statistics by auditee size 
Table 7.2.1. A provides descriptive statistics by auditee size for the variables used in 
this study. There are 936 observations on auditees with sales less than £251 million 
and 236 observations on auditees with sales greater than or equal to £251 million. The 
mean and standard deviation are provided for all continuous variables along with the 
minimum and maximum values. For the categorical (dummy) variables, the table 
shows the percentage of observations when a variable takes on a value of one (1). 
The mean audit fee and mean sales size for the small auditee size are £73,000 and 
£53,897,000 respectively. The mean number of consolidated subsidiaries (Subs) is 
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7.3; the mean number of different industrial sectors (Sic) is 1.89. The mean, standard 
deviation and range are also provided for the rest of the variables used in this study. 
The mean fee paid for non-audit services for the small auditee market segment is 
£74,000. 
The mean audit fee and mean sales size for the large auditee size are £936,000 and 
£2,064,607,000 respectively. The mean number of consolidated subsidiaries (Subs) is 
24.79; the mean number of different industrial sectors (Sic) is 2.74. The mean fee paid 
for non-audit services for the small auditee market segment is £716,000. 
In the large auditee sub-sample, 92 percent of the observations have one of the Big- 
Six firms as auditors compared to 69 percent in the small auditee sub-sample. Also, in 
the large auditee segment, 98 percent of the observations have received a "clean" 
unqualified opinion, 81 percent are with November/December or March/April fiscal 
year-end, and 19 percent have incurred loss in the current accounting year. This 
compares to 97 percent with a "clean" unqualified opinion, 68 percent with 
November/December or March/April year-end, and 22 percent with negative Profit 
and Loss Account figure in the small auditee segment. 
Table 7.2.1. A also presents a frequency distribution on the cross-classification of 
auditor size by a specific industry and geographical location for the total sample. Most 
of the observations are in the "Engineering" and "Support Services" industries, as well 
as the area of greater London has most of the observations. 
As Table 7.2.1 .A indicates, there 
is a sufficient number of observations as well as 
variability among them to test the hypotheses of this study. For the total sample, 75% 
of the companies have Big-Six auditors, 97% with "clean" unqualified opinion, 67% 
with November/December or March/April year-end, and 20% have shown a loss. 
Also, for the 1,172 UK quoted companies, 1 in 6 companies has a director that 
qualified as chartered accountant with the present auditor, 79% of the directors are 
executive directors, and 43% (of these 79%) are Finance Directors. 
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Table 7.2.1. A: Descriptive statistics b auditee size 
1172 Total, 938 nerv ti n' :s On 3 Observations on Observations dit'ees vi 
"<, 
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less, 
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I 
L. 
As, 
F 
111"I"'A 
Audilees 
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mate` r 
Man £25 
BM 
V 
X00 ) v m) 
AFEE Minimum 0 0 44 
Maximum 8,000 780 8,000 
Mean 246 73 936 
Std. Deviation 645 81 1,205 
BIG6 Percentage. 74.66% 69.49% 92,37% 
NAFEE Minimum 1 1 4 
Maximum 11,500 2,173 11,500 
Mean 211 74 716 
Std. Deviation 667 137 1,304 
EXD Percentaqe 78.64% 77.67% 86.38% 
2NDTIER Percentage 14.69% 17.48% 5.08% 
AGECADRE Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 76 76 71 
Mean 46.62 46.01 49.06 
Std. Deviation 12.57 12.83 9.73 
SALES Minimum 0 251,285 
Maximum 361O6,000 `, 260,030 36,106,000 
Mean 456,019 53,897 2,064,507 
Std. Dev ation , 1,765,431 59,076 3,517,715 
SUBS Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 144 45 144 
Mean 11.1 7.3 24.79 
Std. Deviation 14-59 6.95 2168 
SIC Minimum 
Maximum 6 
Mean 2.05 1.89 2.74 
Std. Deviation 1.26, ", 1.13 1.51 
DEBTR Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.98 0.98 0.97 
Mean 0.22 0.22 0.21 
Std. Deviation 0.19 0.19 0.17 
INV imum 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.99' 0.99 0.88 
Mean 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Std. Deviation 0.18 0.18 0.17 
ROI Minimum -58.03 -58.03 -12.17 
Maximum 16.38 3.8 16.38 
Mean -0.04 -0.07 0.08 
Std. Deviation 1,81 1.9 1.42 
LOSS Mean 20.39% 22.00% 19.17% 
EARN Minimum -39.86 -39.86 -8.47 
Maximum 49.49 7.25 49.49 
Mean 0.1 0.01 0.42 
Std. Deviation 2 1.35 3.54 
DE Minimum -33,79 -33.79 -6.1 
Maximum 38.65 38.65 35.39 
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Mean 0.42 
Std. Deviation 2.49 
DTA Minimum 0 
Maximum 4.31 
Mean 0.12 
Std. Deviation 0.21 
ROCE Minimum -1886.49 
Maximum 465.11 
Mean 8.44 
Std. Deviation 90.64 
ROTA Minimum -376.84 
Maximum 379.88 
Mean 4.25 
Std. Deviation 27.94 
TLBTA Minimum 0.01 
Maximum 5.6 
Mean 0.57 
Std. Deviation 0,35 
LTLBTA Minimum 0 
Maximum 4.31 
Mean 0.17 
Std. Deviation 0.23 
CR Minimum 0 
Maximum 95.44 
Mean 1.97 
Std. Deviation 4.52 
QR Minimum 0 
Maximum 95,44 
0.36 
2.38 
0 
4.31 
0.12 
0.22 
-1886.49 
465.11 
6.74 
99.78 
-376.84 
379.88 
3.33 
30.58 
0.01 
5.6 
0.55 
0.37 
0 
4.31 
0.15 
0.23 
0.02 
95.44 
2.11 
5.04 
0.02 
95.44 
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-370.48 
272.79 
15.49 
39.55 
-87.02 
62.26 
8.14 
12.31 
0.2 
2.69 
0.65 
0.25 
0 
2.16 
0,23 
0.22 
0.19 
4.33 
1.37 
0.65 
0.08 
3.91 
J. JJ /0 
2.08% 
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Percentage 7.95% 7.51% 9.58% 
Percentage 7.79% 7.82% 8,33% 
Percentage 4.75% 5.53% 2.08% 
SCORST Percentage 5.41% 5.94% 
The above figures are in UK sterling (pounds). The data is in thousands. 
Percentage 51.56% 48.80% 60.83% 
3.75% 
7.2.2. Descriptive statistics by auditor group 
Table 7.2.2. A presents the descriptive information by auditor group (Big-Six versus 
non-Big Six audit firms) for the variables used in this study. The mean audit fee 
charged by the Big-Six auditors is £308,000 with the maximum fee paid of £8 million. 
The mean sales audited by Big-Six firms is £585,560,000 and the mean number of 
consolidated subsidiaries is 12.60. The mean non-audit fee paid by the Big-Six clients 
is £262 thousand with a range of £1 thousand to £11,500 thousand. 
In comparison, the mean audit fee charged by non-Big Six audit firms 
is £72,000 with 
a range of £1 thousand to £1,400 thousand. The mean sales audited 
is £76,336,000 
with the biggest company having sales of £1,598,500 and the mean number of 
consolidated subsidiaries is 6.96. The mean non-audit fee paid by the non-Big 
Six 
clients is £54 thousand with a range of £1 thousand to £1,300 thousand. 
The 868 observations with Big-Six auditors consist of 68.42% with 
November/December or March/April fiscal year-end, 97.24% with 
"clean" 
qualifications, and 20.34% with current losses. The 304 observations with non-Big 
Six auditors, in comparison, consist of 64.56% with November/December or 
March/April year-end, 97.67% with "clean" unqualified report, and 
20.89% with loss 
in the Profit and Loss Account. 
Finally, the mean asset size is provided in the table as a mean of comparison 
with 
Simunic's (1980) study. The mean asset size for the Big-Six clients of 
£1,449,472,000 
(converted to USA dollars using the average exchange rate 
for 1998 it becomes 
$2,415,787,000) and £114,447,000 (US$190,745,000) 
for the non-Big Six clients are 
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reasonably comparable with Simunic's US Big-Eight sample average of $695,600,000 
and non-Big Eight sample average of $178,900,000, taking into consideration 
inflation and the nineteen years time lag between the two studies6. 
Table 7.2.2. A: Descriptive statistics by auditor 
868 Observations on 
.u 
it es using a 
Big-Six auditor 
c"0) 
304 Observations on 
Auditees using a 
non-Big Six auditor 
(£'000) 
AFEE Minimum 0 0 1 
Maximum 8; 000 8,000 1,400 
Mean 246 308 72 
Std. Deviation 645 735 144 
NAFEE Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 11,500 11,500 1,300 
Mean 211 262 54 
Std. Deviation 667 758 118 
EXD Percentage 78.64% 
ED PANRIIR .. F., 42.53% 
2NDTIER Percentage 14.69% 
SEXCADRE Percentage 97A 0% 
AGECADRE Minimum 0 
SALES 
SUBS 
SIC 
DEBTR 
INV 
ROI 
Maximum 76 
Mean 46.62 
Std. Deviation 12.57 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 38,106,000 
Mean 456,919 
Std. Deviation 1,765,431 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 144 
Mean 11.10 
Std. Deviation 14.59 
Minimum 'I 
Maximum 6 
Mean 2.05 
Std. Deviation 1.26 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 0.98 
Mean 0.22 
Std. Deviation 0.19 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 0.99 
Mean 0.16 
Std. Deviation 0.18 
Minimum -58.03 
79.08°, ßo 
42.81% 
0.00% 
97.31% 
0 
76 
46.38 
12.60 
0 
36,106,000 
585,560 
2,034,741 
0 
144 
12.60 
16 10 
1 
6 
2.12 
1.28 
0 
0.97 
0.21 
0.18 
0 
0.92 
0.16 
0.17 
-58.03 
77.71% 
42.36%0 
58.10% 
96.20% 
0 
76 
47.18 
11.63 
0 
1,598,500 
76,336 
192,453 
0 
55 
6.96 
7.46 
1 
6 
1.91 
1.18 
0 
0.98 
0.22 
0.19 
0 
0.99 
0.16 
0.19 
-3.77 
6 If there will be any conflicting results, however, in Simunic's (1980) work where no price premium was observed 
and our study, an explanation that can be offered is the auditee size differences, as pointed out by Francis and 
Stokes (1986). 
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2: 1 1,1 
Maximum 16.38 16.38 3.80 
Mean -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 Std. Deviation 1.81 2.10 0.41 
EARN Minimum -39.86 -39.86 
Maximum 49.49 49.49 
Mean 0.10 0.12 
Std. Deviation 2°00 2.32 
DE Minimum -33.79 -33.79 Maximum 38.65 38.65 
Mean 0.42 0.41 
Std. Deviation 2.49 2.38 
DTA Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 4.31 2.13 
Mean 0.12 0.13 
Std. Deviation 0.21 0.17 
ROCE Minimum -1,886.49 -550.89 
Maximum 465.11 465.11 
Mean 8.44 13.34 
Std Deviafi n 9(). 64 51 70 
ROTA Min; mum 3 6: 84 -262.51 
Maximum 379.88 62.26 
Mean 4.25 4.96 
Std. Deviation 27.94 21.66 
TLBTA Minümum 0.01 0.01 
Maximum 5.60 3.56 
Mean 0.57 0.57 
Std. Deviation 0.35 0.30 
LTLBTA Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 4.31 2.16 
Mean 017 0.17 
Std. Deviation 0,23 0.20 
CR Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 95.44 94.00 
Mean 1.97 1.87 
Std. Deviation 4,52 3.95 
OR Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 95.44 94.00 
Mean 1.51 1.41 
Std. Deviation 4.52 3.94 
AGECOMP Percentage 29.33% 29.27% 
-3.77 
2.40 
0.04 
0.40 
-20.67 
24.43 
0.41 
2.51 
0 
4.31 
0.12 
0.30 
-1,886.49 
272.79 
-8.04 
155.23 
-376.84 
379.88 
2.32 
41.47 
0.01 
5.60 
0.57 
0.47 
0 
4.31 
0.15 
0.31 
0.04 
95.44 
2.24 
5.93 
0.03 
95.44 
1.78 
5.95 
29.22% 
CONSTRCT Percentage 5.22% 5.34% 4.53% 
CHEMICAL Percentaqe 2.41% 2.84% 0.97% 
ENGINEER Percentage 9.80% 10.58% 8.09% 
APRPACK Percentage 3.05% 3.60% `t: Jb 
BREWRPUB Percentage 2.81©x® 2.07% 5.18% 
FODDPR.. - % 2.59% 
HOUSHLDG Percentaqe 7.07% 7.09% 6.80% 
DISTRBTR Percentage 5.86% 6.00% 5.83% 
MEDIA Percentage 5.62% 5.56% 6.15% 
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TAILER Percentage 5.54% 5.0°/a 712% 
SUPSERVI Percentage 9.88% 9.05% 12.30% 
UTILTIES Percentage 2.09% 1.96% 2.59% 
OTHERFIN Percentage 3.37% 3.16% 2.91% 
BUSY Percentage 67.19% 68.42% 64.56% 
0.97% 
NENGLD Percentage 279% 3.48% 0.65% 
NWEST Percentage, 730% 6.62% 9.09% 
NEAST Percentage 7.95% 9.20% 4.55% 
EMIDLNDS Percentage 
110: 
4.75% 
: 
4.49% 
1101 
5.84% 
GRTLONDN Percentage 51.56% 49.72% 56.49% 
SCOAST Percentage 5.41% 4.38% 8.44% 
TASSETS Minimum 155 155 192 
Maximum 170,000,000 170,000,000 6,205,141 
Mean 1,201,795 1,449,472 114,447 
Std. Deviation 9,283,334 9.836,473 597,986 
The above figures are in UK sterling (pounds). The data is i n thousands. 
The descriptive statistics provided in Tables 7.2.1 .A and 
7.2.2. A show that the Big- 
Six audit firms tend to audit larger and more complex companies than the non-Big Six 
firms, and this is reflected in the audit fee. Although audit services may not increase 
linearly with client size, in other words the quantity of audit services purchased by the 
auditees is hypothesised to increase at a decreasing rate with the size and complexity 
of the auditees, clearly bigger clients will purchase more services than smaller clients. 
Because of this association between fees paid for audit services and the auditee size, 
the dependent and certain independent variables in the linear model adopted are 
transformed to avoid problems of heteroscedasticity or non-constant (unequal) 
variance. The next chapter deals with the model specification and variables' 
transformations. 
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Table 7.1 
Income of Accounting Firms in the UK* 
Accounting Firm Fees 
£m 
Partners Professional 
Staff 
UK 
Offices 
1 Coopers & Lybrand 575 0 607 6268 36 
(now PwC)* . 
2 Arthur Andersen 539.5 389 4873 13 
3 KPMG 528.4 573 5998 38 
4 Ernst & Young 401.2 386 4389 27 
5 Price Waterhouse 2 383 399 3836 26 
(now PwC)** . 
6 Touche Ross 336.8 345 4303 22 
7 Grant Thornton 114.0 213 1516 46 
8 BDO Stoy Hayward 96.0 229 1391 34 
9 Pannell Kerr Forster 80.1 169 1272 35 
10 Clark Whitehill 57.5 231 1136 68 
11 Kidsons Impey 54.1 142 804 33 
12 Moore Stephens 40.6 136 688 47 
13 Robson Rhodes 40.6 70 445 9 
14 Neville Russell 33.6 87 493 18 
15 Moores Rowland 31.4 94 386 18 
16 Baker Tilly 29.1 67 345 13 
17 Smith & Williamson 27.7 61 275 3 
18 Haines Watts 21.7 51 293 22 
19 Casson Beckman 21.2 51 247 12 
20 Saffery Champness 16.2 42 205 10 
Accountancy, July 1995. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
174 
I4Ji 
..., ter,.. 
CHAPTER VIII 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURES 
AND "'BASIC"" AUDIT FEE MODEL 
Table 6.2 at the end of chapter VI summarises the hypothesised audit fee determinants 
and the direction of expected relationships. The test of determinants of audit fee is 
made by fitting a multiple linear regression model (OLS model), similar to those that 
have been used in prior research', to estimate the coefficients of the following 
function: 
AFEE = bl + b2BIG6 + b3NAFEE + b4ALUMNI + b5ALMNEXD + b6ALMNFD + 
b7AGECADRE + b8SALES + b9SUBS + b10SIC + bi 1DEBTR + b12INV + b13ROI + 
b14LOSS + b1SEARN + b16DE + b17DTA + b18AUDQN + b19ROCE + b20ROTA + 
b21TLBTA + b22LTLBTA + b23CR + b24QR + b25AGECOMP + b26BUSY + 
b27SCOTLAND + b28NENGLD + b29NWEST + b30NEAST + b31WMIDLNDS + 
b32EMIDLNDS + b33EANGLIA + b34GRTLONDN + b35SWEST + b36SCOAST + 
b37NIRELAND + Error 
1 See Table 3.3. A in Chapter III for the models used in prior research. 
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The dependent variable AFFE is to be predicted by independent variables representing 
perceptions of previous researchers and also our belief that each could have a 
significant effect on the AFEE. 
However, the above model violates some of the assumptions in the multiple 
regression analysis and some transformations must take place before we move on 
estimating the regression model and assessing the overall model fit. 
8.1. Assessing the assumptions of multiple regression 
The classical normal linear regression model is based on several assumptions about 
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables2. The most 
fundamental assumption in multivariate analysis is normality, referring to the shape of 
the data distribution for the variables and their correspondence to the normal 
distribution (Hair et al, 1998). In multivariate analysis, the individual variables are 
normal in a univariate sense but their combinations should also be normal. 
In reviewing, therefore, the univariate statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables used in this study, it appears that the distributions of AFEE, NAFEE and the 
distributions of the continuous variables which control for auditee size, profitability 
and liquidity are highly skewed to the right (except ROI, ROCE and ROTA which are 
skewed to the left). Normal distributions of the underlying variables are assumed by 
parametric test statistics (i. e. F, t, X2); therefore, this violation puts into question the 
distributions of the test statistics used to evaluate the results of the empirical analysis. 
Table 8. l. A shows only those individual variables that exhibit a departure from 
normality. Table 8.1 .A also suggests the appropriate remedy. 
In addition, a visual 
examination of the normal probability plots of the residuals allows us to check the 
normality of the error term distribution (see Figure 8.1 .A below). 
As shown in the 
Figure 8.1 
. A, the values 
do not fall along the straight diagonal line (created by the 
2 For a detailed discussion, see Gujarati (1995); Koutsoyiannis (1977); Hair et al (1998). 
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normal distribution); thus, the residuals are considered not to represent a normal 
distribution as it is assumed under the multiple regression analysis. 
Table 8.1. A: Distributional characteristics, testing for normality, and possible remedies 
Shape Descriptors Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov- Description Possible Skewness Kurtosis Smirnova of the Remedies Distribution 
Variable 
AFEE 
CR 
DE 
DEBTR 
DTA 
EARN 
INV 
NAFEE 
QR 
ROCE 
ROI 
ROTA 
SALES 
SUBS 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
6.2411 0.0571 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
51.3470 0.1141 
15.4301 0.0568 262.5821 0.1136 
3.2871 0.0569 110.6331 0.1137 
1.0797 0.0568 1.3850 0.1136 
7.9573 0.0569 131.8941 0.1137 
12.2559 0.0571 484.4092 0.1141 
1.5491 0.0568 3.1073 0.1136 
8.7920 0.0608 112.1694 0.1215 
15.6233 0.0568 266.8034 0.1136 
-12.3690 0.0572 210.3209 0.1144 
-26.0870 0.0569 980.5470 0.1137 
-4.9896 0.0568 104.5927 0.1136 
9.1555 0.0569 139.1932 0.1137 
3.5386 0.0591 19.4083 0.1181 
Statistic Sig. Transformation 
0.3411 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.3813 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.2281 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.4158 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.1060 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.1913 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.3365 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.1592 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.3613 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.2578 0.0000 
Negative 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.3152 0.0000 
Negative 
skewness 
Natural log 
3811 0 0.0000 
Negative Natural log 
. skewness 
0.2488 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Natural log 
0.2012 0.0000 
Positive 
skewness 
Square root 
aLilliefors Significance 
Correction 
Additionally, these highly skewed variables presented in Table 8.1 .A may result 
in 
heteroscedasticity (Hair et al, 1998). Heteroscedasticity is the condition of unequal 
(non-constant) variances of the error terms. Equal (constant) variances of the error 
terms is another assumption underlying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
Heteroscedasticity affects the significance of the individual coefficients estimates 
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because it affects the standard errors. Estimation using OLS regression with 
heteroscedasticity will result in biased standard errors and, thus, biased t statistics. 
Since we wish to examine the t statistics on the focus (or test) variables, it is important 
that the effects of heteroscedasticity are controlled. 
Figure 8.1. A: Normal probability plot, standardised residuals for the untransformed model 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
Dependent Variable: AFEE 
1.00 - 
0 
. 75 - 
. 50 - 
-0 0 I. - a 
E 
U 
. 25 
a) 
U 
(D 
w 0.00 
0. 00 
. 25 . 50 . 
75 1.00 
Observed Cum Prob 
Diagnosis of heteroscedasticity is made with the analysis of residual plots or simple 
statistical tests. Examining the residuals (studentised) in Figure 8.1 .B we notice that a 
pattern is emerging of increasing residuals. This finding indicates heteroscedasticity in 
the set of independent variables described above. Also, Spearman's rank correlation 
test (not shown) has also been calculated for each of the non-normal variables 
identified in the preceding paragraphs and the hypothesis of heteroscedasticity is not 
rejected. 
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Figure 8.1. B: Analysis of studentised residuals (for the untransformed model) 
Scatterplot 
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A final comment on the violation of the multiple regression assumptions is about the 
linearity of the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Inspection 
of the partial regression plots (and the studentised residual plots above) indicate some 
linearity problems between the dependent and independent variables. For example, 
some variables, such as SALES, NAFEE, SUBS, ROTA, ROCE, show a non-linear 
relationship (see Figure 8.2. A below). 
Having examined the data and the variables involved in the regression model 
described earlier, we conclude that the statistical assumptions underlying the 
regression analysis have been violated and, therefore, data transformations are 
necessary to correct those violations. This task is addressed further in the subsection 
below. Furthermore, these violations occur simultaneously and remedies for one of the 
violation often corrects problems in other areas as well. 
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8.2. Data transformations 
Having tested for and found evidence of non-normality and heteroscedasticity, this 
subsection revises the estimation techniques to account for those violations. 
Heteroscedasticity can be remedied only by transformation of the dependent variable 
(Hair et al, 1998). Transformations of the dependent variable will change the shape 
and spread of its distribution. In turn, they may correct the distribution of the error 
terms. Simultaneous transformations of one or more independent variables may also 
be needed to obtain or maintain a normal linear regression relation. 
In prior research, two different empirical model specifications have been used. Table 
3.3. A in Chapter III shows these models. (1) One is a natural log transformation of 
AFEE and the auditee size measure(s), and also the square root transformation on the 
count of subsidiaries. (2) The second is a scaling transformation achieved by dividing 
AFEE by the square root of the auditee size measure3. The reason for the 
transformations in these prior studies is the non-normal distributions of AFEE and the 
size measure. Both of these transformations seek to correct any violations of the 
regression model assumptions. 
However, both of these transformations discussed in the preceding paragraph are ad 
hoc. There is no theoretical basis for the resulting regression relationships, rather we 
are speculating about the nature of those relationships. Transforming variables by 
taking their natural logarithm, the resulting equation assumes a proportional 
relationship between the dependent and the independent variables (i. e. the coefficient 
of each of the independent variables measures the percentage change of the dependent 
variable AFEE for a percentage change of each of the independent variables). Scaling 
AFEE by the auditee size measure, the resulting equation assumes a relationship 
between the size measure and the other independent variables which may or may not 
exist. 
3 The square root of the auditee size measure was used because when the natural log of AFEE is regressed on the 
natural log of ASSETS or SALES, the estimated regression coefficient for the InASSET (or InSALES) variable is 
approximately 0.5 (for our data, 0.525 for InASSETS or 0.590 for 1nSALES). 
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Nevertheless, to be consistent with prior research, a transformation technique will be 
also implemented in the subsequent analysis. In other words, as Table 8.1 .A also 
suggested, the natural log transformation of AFEE and the auditee size, profitability 
and liquidity measures will be used. The natural log transformation cannot be used on 
SUBS, because this variable has a value of zero for some observations. The natural 
log of zero is undefined. As a result, the square root of SUBS is used which 
effectively removes the non-linearity. 
In addition, normal probability plots of the auditee measures with the audit fee for a 
square root and natural log transformation were examined in order to determine the 
appropriate transformation to control for heteroscedasticity. The best linear fit as 
determined by eye was the natural log transformation of both the audit fee and auditee 
size, profitability and liquidity variables (except the SUBS variable). 
Table 8.2. A: Distribution characteristics after transformation 
Shape Descriptors Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov- 
Skewness Kurtosis SmirnoV 
Variable Statistic Std. Statistic Std. Statistic Sig. 
Error Error 
InAFEE 0.3528 0.0571 0.3663 0.1141 0.0625 0.0000 
InCR 0.3856 0.0569 7.2033 0.1137 0.0937 0.0000 
InDE -0.7711 0.0632 1.0469 0.1262 0.1202 0.0000 
InDEBTR -1.5059 0.0582 2.3497 0.1162 0.1826 0.0000 
InDTA -1.1508 0.0621 1.2285 0.1241 0.1351 0.0000 
InEARN -1.2992 0.0622 8.2319 0.1242 0.1309 0.0000 
InINV -1.2880 0.0622 1.4389 0.1242 0.1739 0.0000 
InNAFEE 0.1248 0.0608 0.0426 0.1215 0.0388 0.0000 
InQR 0.5160 0.0569 5.8846 0.1137 0.1157 0.0000 
InROCE -0.6487 0.0620 1.4616 0.1239 0.0701 0.0000 
InROI -1.2663 0.0640 5.0051 0.1279 0.1142 0.0000 
InROTA -1.1970 0.0618 2.6136 0.1235 0.0979 0.0000 
InSALES -0.3268 0.0571 1.1999 0.1141 0.0549 0.0000 
SQRTSUBS 1.2076 0.0591 2.5312 0.1181 0.1100 0.0000 
aLilliefors Significa- 
nce Correction 
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The above variables have been transformed by taking the natural log or square root 
were necessary. In each case, the transformed variables demonstrate normality. Figure 
Original variable (SALES) 
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Figure 8.2. A: Transformation of variable SALES to achieve normalilty 
8.2. A demonstrates the effect of the transformation on SALES in achieving normality. 
The transformed variable SALES appears markedly more normal in both graphical 
portrayals, and the statistical descriptors are also improved (see Table 8.2. A). Some of 
the transformed variables in Table 8.2. A still show a slight negative skewness, 
however the departures from normality are not so extreme as in the original variables. 
In any case, all the techniques are quite sensitive in large samples (exceeding 1,000 
observations). 
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Using these transformations in the multiple regression model initially discussed, we 
obtain: 
1nAFEE = bi + b2BIG6 + b31DNAFEE + b4ALUMNI + bSALMNEXD + b6ALMNFD + 
b7AGECADRE + b81nSALES + b9SUBS0.5 + b10SIC + b111nDEBTR + b121nINV + 
b13lnROI + b14LOSS + b151nEARN + b16lnDE + b171nDTA + b18AUDQN + b191nROCE 
+ b201nROTA + b21TLBTA + b22LTLBTA + b23lnCR + b24lnQR + b25AGECOMP + 
b26BUSY + b27SCOTLAND + b28NENGLD + b29NWEST + b30NEAST + 
b31WMIDLNDS + b32EMIDLNDS + b33EANGLIA + b34GRTLONDN + b35SWEST 
+ b36SCOAST + b37NIRELAND + Error 
This model is a Cobb-Douglas production function and the regression coefficients for 
the auditee size, profitability and liquidity variables are elasticities of audit fees on the 
individual independent variables. That is, the coefficients are the percentage change in 
audit fees per one percent change in the independent variables. 
8.3. Collinearity 
Before we estimate the model and interpret the statistical results, the correlation 
among the independent variables must be assessed. Multicollinearity refers to high 
correlation between two or more independent variables. If multicollinearity exists in 
the regression model then the coefficients of the independent variables may be 
unstable and, thus, not generalisable. In other words, we may not be able to 
distinguish their separate influences on the dependent variable. In particular, the 
standard errors of the individual coefficients may be quite large, which means that 
these coefficients cannot be estimated with great precision or accuracy, and therefore, 
their individual t statistics will be fairly small. This does not mean that the overall 
regression will not be of value. We simply may not be able to estimate the individual 
effects of the independent variables (Gujarati, 1995). 
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Pearson's correlation matrix and Spearman's4 correlation matrix for the non- 
categorical variables presented in Tables 8.3. A and 8.3. B respectively provide 
confirming support for the results of the tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF) 
analyses as well as support for the results of the condition indices and decomposition 
matrix of the regression coefficient variance (not shown). All the above collinearity 
diagnostics show an indication of multicollinearity between ROCE and ROTA 
variables, between LTLBTA and TLBTA variables, and between DE and DTA 
variables5. As a result, collinear TLBTA, DTA and ROTA variables are omitted from 
subsequent analysis. Specification error or bias in the model by deleting these 
independent variables is not created as there are other variable(s) in the same vector to 
account for the specific auditee measure. 
In addition the correlation matrices presented in Tables 8.3. A and 8.3. B below reveal 
that the dependent variable AFEE shows a high correlation with most of the 
independent variables in the model as expected. 
4 The Spearman Rank correlation is a non-parametric measure which does not assume normality among the 
variables. 
5 Tolerance values found to be very close to zero, VIF are very high and definitely in excess of 10, condition 
indices more than 30 with variance proportions above 90 percent. 
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With the regression analysis specified in terms of dependent and independent 
variables, the sample deemed adequate for the objectives of the study and the 
assumptions assessed for the individual variables. The estimation of the "basic" 
regression model and assessment of overall model fit now proceeds. 
The results of the "basic" regression model for the total sample are presented in the 
following subsection, as well as other advanced diagnostic procedures such as 
residuals analysis and identification of influential observations. The regression results 
concerning the specific hypotheses of this study are discussed in the next chapter. 
8.4. Estimating the "basic" regression model for the total sample 
This section replicates the regression model used in prior research. Independent 
variables found to be significant in previous studies will be entered in the audit fee 
model. This represents the "basic" regression model. On this basic model, the "new" 
independent variables will be added in the next chapter where the hypotheses of this 
study will be tested. 
After the regression model has been estimated, the overall relationship of the 
dependent variable with the independent variables will be assessed. Finally, the 
observations will be examined to determine whether any observation should be 
deemed influential. Each of these issues are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The basic regression audit fee model6 presented below will be estimated in this 
section: 
InAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + b6GRTLONDN + 
b7InCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + b11lnINV + b121nNAFEE + b13lnQR + 
bl4lnROCE + b15lnROI + b16lnSALES + b17LTLBTA + b18NENGLND + b19SIC + 
b20SUBS°-5 + Error 
6The independent variable LOSS has been deleted from the analysis due to the SPSS error message warning that 
the LOSS variable appears to be a constant of the AFEE. 
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The results of the basic regression model for the total sample appear as shown in 
Table 8.4. A below. 
1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
bl 11nINV + b121nNAFEE + bl3lnQR + b141nROCE + b15lnROI + 
b161nSALES + b17LTLBTA + bi8NENGLND + b19SIC + b20SUBS0.5 + Error 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.924 0.854 0.850 0.4758 268.075 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -2.022 0.210 -9.619 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.001 0.041 0.000 -0.017 0.987 0.871 1.148 
AUDQN 0.168 0.173 0.013 0.973 0.331 0.957 1.045 
BIG6 0.088 0.041 0.030 2.126 0.034 0.859 1.164 
BUSY 0.075 0.037 0.027 2.037 0.042 0.946 1.057 
GRTLONDN 0.228 0.034 0.092 6.709 0.000 0.892 1.121 
LNCR -0.046 0.061 -0.019 -0.748 0.455 0.265 3.769 
LNDE -0.066 0.015 -0.094 -4.410 0.000 0.368 2.714 
LNDEBTR 0.041 0.021 0.041 1.936 0.053 0.375 2.669 
LNEARN 0.052 0.032 0.037 1.602 0.110 0.311 3.216 
LNINV 0.041 0.020 0.048 2.038 0.042 0.305 3.279 
LNNAFEE 0.212 0.017 0.242 12.312 0.000 0.434 2.303 
LNQR 0.212 0.052 0.102 4.062 0.000 0.263 3.797 
LNROCE 0.063 0.029 0.044 2.164 0.031 0.408 2.449 
LNROI -0.059 0.026 -0.057 -2.264 0.024 0.266 3.764 
LNSALES 0.422 0.015 0.572 27.372 0.000 0.383 2.610 
LTLBTA 1.438 0.212 0.170 6.794 0.000 0.268 3.732 
NENGLD -0.249 0.090 -0.038 -2.762 0.006 0.902 1.109 
SIC 0.072 0.013 0.078 5.321 0.000 0.770 1.298 
SQRTSUBS 0.074 0.012 0.101 6.080 0.000 0.605 1.653 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
Table 8.4. A: Results of the "basic" multiple regression model 
The basic regression model procedure for the total sample provides support for the 
descriptive validity of the variables explaining variation in the level of external audit 
fees. The model explains 85.4% of the variability in external audit fees (R Square 
equals 0.854) and, hence, the prediction single line fits the data remarkably well7. 
7 Prior studies have reported similar figures for R2. 
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16 (out of 20) of the individual coefficients are highly significant (p value < 0.10) and 
in the hypothesised direction with very low standard error of the estimates. The F 
statistic is statistically significant (p < 0.001), indicating that there is a linear 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables and that the regression 
model allows us to explain the dependent variable at greater than chance level. 
All variables controlling for size and complexity of auditee operations (i. e., 1nDEBTR, 
1nINV, 1nSALES, SIC and SUBS0.5) are positive and highly significant (p value < 
0.050) and in the hypothesised direction (i. e., a positive effect in audit fees). 
Three of the six variables controlling for different constructs of the profitability and 
financial distress of the auditee (i. e., 1nROCE, inROI, 1nDE) are highly significant (p 
< 0.03 1), but 1nROCE and 1nDE are not in the hypothesised direction. ROCE is 
positive indicating higher audit fees for higher returns, and DE is negative indicating 
lower audit fees for higher long-term debt to equity percentage. Both these directions 
in the sign cannot be explained given the fact that the auditor can be held jointly and 
severally liable for defective or misleading financial statements. If the client is 
insolvent, than all losses incurred by a third party as a result of relying on the 
defective financial statements may be sought from the auditor. Both ROCE and DE 
measure the degree of auditee's financial distress and, therefore, we would expect to 
see a different direction. The classification variable controlling for type of audit 
opinion (AUDQN) is not significant (p = 0.33 1) but in the hypothesised direction9. 
The variable EARN is positive (i. e. not in the hypothesised direction) and significant 
at only 11 % level (p = 0.110). 
The variable measuring the effect of the gearing level (LTLBTA) on external audit 
fees is highly significant (p < 0.001) and in the hypothesised direction (positive) for 
the total sample. 
8 The standard error of the estimate (SEE) reflects the average prediction error for the regression model. Our basic 
regression model SEE is near to zero, which means that there is nearly no prediction error and the model performs 
strikingly well. 
'There are only 44 observations on auditors' clients with a qualified report in the sample. 
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One of the two variables controlling for the level of auditee's liquidity (QR) is highly 
significant (p < 0.001) but not in the hypothesised direction for the full sample. The 
coefficient of the quick ratio was expected to be negative indicating lower audit fees 
for higher ratio. An explanation that can be offered for this difference in the sign of 
the QR direction, is that a low quick ratio may not necessarily be a bad sign for a 
company with a large reserve of untapped borrowing power. Hence, a low QR may 
not mean that higher audit fees are not unavoidable. The CR variable is negative as 
expected but not significant (p = 0.455). 
The variable AGECOMP is included in the model to control for the auditee risk of 
failing. Since a 10-year old or younger company has greater chances to fail (Brinn et 
al, 1994), it is hypothesised that those companies incorporated for less than 10 years 
will experience higher audit fees than companies whose business life appears to be 
more than 10 years. The coefficient is in the hypothesised direction (negative) but not 
statistically significant (p = 0.987). Companies, therefore, incorporated for more than 
10 years have less chances to fail and this is reflected in the audit fees. 
The variable BUSY is included in the basic regression model to control for peak audit 
pricing. Since 31st December or 31St March are the predominant fiscal year-ends1°, it is 
hypothesised that audits of clients with non-December/non-March year-ends will have 
lower audit costs than audits of clients whose year-ends coincide with the busy season 
for audit firms. The coefficient is significant and in the hypothesised direction 
(positive), as expected, indicating that December/March year-end companies pay 
higher audit fees than companies with year-ends that do not coincide with the audit 
firms high workload. 
Two of the eleven variables measuring the effect of auditee's geographical location on 
external audit fees found to be statistically significant (p < 0.006). Companies in 
London area are paying a higher premium (as expected) whereas companies situated 
in North England are charged lower audit fees probably awarded for being in an area 
10 The UK tax year-ends are on 31st March making this a common closing date for UK companies. In our dataset, 
22.8% of our sample companies have 31 S` March fiscal year-ends, and 37.6% have 31 S` December year-ends. 
.. _. 
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outside London. Further, the other geographical location categorical variables 
included in the model were not significant. 
Having selected the independent and dependent variables, assessed the individual 
variables for meeting the assumptions of regression, and applied the appropriate 
remedies where necessary, and also estimating the basic regression model, we turn 
now into evaluating the basic regression model for the assumptions of the regression 
analysis. 
8.4.1. Evaluating the model for the assumptions of the regression analysis 
In this section we discuss testing for the assumptions about the relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables that affect the statistical procedure used for 
multiple regression. In particular, two basic issues are addressed: (1) meeting the 
assumptions underlying regression, and (2) identifying the influential data points. 
8.4.1.1. Testing the assumptions of multivariate analysis 
The assumptions to examine are linearity, homoscedasticity, and normality. The 
principal measure used in evaluating the regression model is the residual - the 
difference between the actual dependent variable value and its predicted value. 
Homoscedasticity 
This assumption deals with the constancy of the residuals across values of the 
independent variables. Our analysis is through examination of the residuals (Figure 
8.4.1.1. A); plotting the residuals (studentised) against the predicted dependent values 
shows no pattern of increasing or decreasing residuals. This finding indicates 
homoscedasticity in the regression model. 
Linearity 
This assumption will be assessed again through an analysis of residuals and partial 
regression plots. Figure 8.4.1.1 .A does not exhibit any non-linear pattern 
to the 
residuals, thus ensuring that the overall regression model is linear. Using the partial 
191 
iYr4uý{'(iti.,,,,, 
ý ý. 
regression plots (see Appendix III), we see that the relationships for most of the 
independent variables are quite well defined, thus they have strong and significant 
$. 4.1.1. A: of studentised residuals 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
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effects in the regression model. Variables such as AGECOMP and CR are less 
defined, both in slope and scatter of the points, thus explaining its lesser effect in the 
model (evidenced by smaller coefficient, beta value, and significance level). For all 
independent variables, no non-linear pattern is shown, thus meeting the assumption of 
linearity for each independent variable. 
Normality 
The final assumption we will check is normality of the error term of the regression 
model with a visual examination of the normal probability plots of the residuals. As 
shown in Figure 8.4.1.1 . B, the values 
fall along the diagonal with no substantial or 
systematic departures; the residuals are considered to represent a normal distribution. 
The regression model, therefore, is found to meet the assumption of normality. 
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8.4.1.2. Identifying outliers as influential observations 
For our final analysis, we will identify any observations that are influential (having a 
disproportionate impact on the regression analysis) and assess their potential impact 
on the regression results. 
Several diagnostic statistics have been employed to assist us identifying outliers, 
leverage points, and influential observations. These procedures include analysis of 
residuals (standardised, studentised, and studentised deleted residuals), the hat matrix 
and Mahalanobis distance statistic, and finally, Cook's distance, COVRATIO and 
standardised DFFIT statistics". Across all the measures, seven observations have 
emerged as potentially negative influential points. These observations were 
consistently identified by all diagnostic tests performed and are deemed to be the cases 
with the most impact on improving the basic regression model. 
''For 
a detailed explanation of these diagnostic tests, see Hair et al (1998) and Neter et al (1983). 
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However, after a closely examination of the data, it is ascertained that these 
observations are not unrepresentative of the general population (to justify 
elimination), but simply represent an unlikely event. As a result, our decision is not to 
discard them from the estimation of the regression model. 
8.4.2. The nature of auditor effects 
Several prior studies, as Chapter III shows, have provided evidence on inter-auditor 
fee differences generally concluding that the Big-Six auditors as a group receive 
higher than expected audit fees relative to other auditors (e. g., Palmrose, 1986a; 
Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 1987; Chan et al, 1993). The intra-Big Six audit 
fee differences have also been investigated suggesting that specific large accountancy 
firms enjoy audit fee premiums (or discounts) in different countries and periods (e. g., 
Simunic, 1980; Firth, 1985 & 1997a; Simon, 1995; Moizer, 1997). 
The approach taken in this study, and as the Table 8.4. A with the regression reports 
shows, is to classify the audit firms into two distinct groups, as follows: 
1. Non-Big Six firms (constant-intercept) 
2. Big-Six firms (BIG6 = 1) 
As developed in Chapters III and VI, this approach involves a comparison of the 
prices paid to Big-Six firms relative to other auditors in the UK audit market. 
However, within these two auditor groups, firms may not be homogeneous (as 
suggested by prior research); in other words, within these group of auditing firms only 
certain firms may receive premium (or discounted) audit fees. As a test for 
homogeneity of the Big-Six firms, therefore, the number of observations, and the 
mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable, LnAFEE, for each individual 
auditor as well as for the non-Big Six firms as a group (for purposes of comparison), 
are shown in the Table 8.4.2. A below. 
Taking the Big-Six firms as a group, the differences among the means of the 
dependent variable for the individual firms are not statistically significant at the 0.05 
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Tahle 8.4.2. A: Prices charged by various auditors12 
Natural Logarithm 
of Audit fees No of 
Auditor Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
CL 4.71 1.45 193 
pW 4.70 1.44 143 
KPMG 4.64 1.35 250 
EY 4.60 1.49 139 
TR 4.36 1.24 131 
AA 4.30 1.22 69 
Non-Big Six 3.54 1.16 313 
level in an one-way analysis of variance (F = 0.984)13. In other words, there is no large 
difference between the means for any individual firm in the Table 8.4.2. A (that is, all 
means are hypothesised to be equal), thus in the regression analyses reported in Table 
8.4. A (and subsequently in the following chapter), no audit firm is separated from the 
other five dominant firms. On this basis, individual audit firm effects on the 
dependent variable are considered to be unlikely and there is no reason for modifying 
the model. 
'2 The firm effect is only approximated in the Table 8.4.2. A, since the means of the dependent variable, LnAFEE, 
reported in the table are not controlled for any differences in the average values of the other explanatory variables 
across auditors. 
1; The same holds for the non-Big Six firms (the table with the number of observations, mean and standard 
deviation of the dependent variable, LnAFEE, for each individual non-Big Six auditor is not shown); i. e., the 
differences among the means for the individual non-Big Six firms are not statistically significant at the 
0.05 level 
in an one-way analysis of variance (F = 1.380). 
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CHAPTER IX 
HYPOTHESES TESTING, 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Chapter VII explained the reason behind the partition of the sample into small and 
large companies. It also explained why the cut-off auditee size is taken to be £251 
million. This chapter investigates whether the alumni effect is reflected on audit 
prices. It does that by testing the hypotheses, developed in Chapter VI, in the large 
companies segment (section 9.1) and the small client segment (section 9.2) of the UK 
audit market. 
9.1. Hypotheses tested in the large companies segment of the market 
The hypotheses developed in Chapter VI are restated in the following paragraphs and 
tested. Hypothesis 1 which is tested in the large clients sub-sample (i. e., a sub-sample 
of observations on UK listed companies with sales greater than or equal to £251 
million) was stated as follows: 
Hl: for the large companies sub-sample, there will be no differential pricing 
ýýýx. 
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of audit services between Big Six and non-Big Six accountancy rms .ý 
Table 9.1 .A presents the results of the model of the audit fee in the large clients sub- 
sample with a dummy variable on the Big-Six audit firms after controlling for the 
variables hypothesised to affect the level of audit fees discussed in Chapter VI. 
Hypothesis 1 could not be rejected indicating no audit fee difference in this sample. In 
other words, the coefficient of BIG6 is positive but insignificant indicating no 
differential pricing of audit services between Big-Six and non-Big Six audit firms. 
This result is consistent with the results of prior studies (e. g., Simunic, 1980; Palmore, 
1986) which observed no audit fee difference in large companies sub-sample. It is 
possible that due to the small number of companies audited by the non-Big Six firms 
with sales greater than £251 million (just eighteen large companies, see Table 7.1. A of 
Chapter VII), an audit fee difference could not be detected. On the other hand, 
economies of scale accruing to large accountancy firms in the audits of large clients 
could offset higher audit fee charges due to a differentiated product. As a result, an 
insignificant audit firm size variable is observed in the large clients sub-sample. 
The overall descriptive validity of the model is maintained with an RSquare of 0.761. 
The F statistic is statistically significant indicating meaningful relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables. Further, the VIF and tolerance values are in 
acceptable levels. No VIF value exceeds 10.0 and the tolerance values are quite high 
indicating little collinearity. The other assumptions of the multivariate analysis are 
also met'. 
Most of the individual coefficients of the independent variables are highly significant 
and in the hypothesised direction. The variables controlling for the size and 
complexity of the large companies' operations (i. e. SALES, SUBS, SIC, DEBTR, 
INV) are significant. Apart from the variable INV these are all in the hypothesised 
direction. The financial distress and profitability variables DE and ROCE are 
significant and not in the hypothesised direction. ROCE and DE coefficients, as in the 
model for the total sample described in Chapter VIII, should have a different direction 
as the auditor can be held jointly and severally liable for misleading financial 
The model appears to be well specified and the tests described in Chapter VIII indicate no violations of the 
assumptions of the regression analysis. See section 8.4.1. 
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statements. AUDQN variable is not significant but in the hypothesised direction. The 
variable controlling for the level of gearing, LTLBTA, is found positive and 
significant. The CR variable is significant but not in the hypothesised direction, again 
1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H1] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
b1 11nINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16NENGLND + b17SIC + b18SUBS0.5 + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.872 0.761 0.727 0.5559 22.469 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -4.457 0.792 -5.629 0.000 
AGECOMP 0.049 0.132 0.017 0.370 0.712 0.804 1.244 
AUDQN 0.021 0.405 0.002 0.051 0.959 0.939 1.065 
BIG6 0.166 0.164 0.043 1.010 0.314 0.945 1.058 
BUSY -0.021 0.126 -0.008 -0.170 0.866 0.888 1.127 
GRTLONDN 0.246 0.098 0.115 2.504 0.013 0.830 1.205 
LNCR 0.286 0.137 0.132 2.086 0.039 0.437 2.289 
LNDE -0.113 0.043 -0.175 -2.624 0.010 0.392 2.552 
LNDEBTR 0.158 0.049 0.171 3.188 0.002 0.604 1.656 
LNEARN 0.111 0.102 0.089 1.088 0.278 0.259 3.861 
LNINV -0.067 0.046 -0.090 -1.445 0.151 0.449 2.228 
LNROCE 0.192 0.088 0.132 2.178 0.031 0.477 2.096 
LNROI -0.178 0.078 -0.203 -2.289 0.024 0.221 4.532 
LNSALES 0.604 0.054 0.593 11.248 0.000 0.627 1.596 
LTLBTA 2.139 0.600 0.273 3.564 0.001 0.296 3.375 
NENGLD -0.646 0.273 -0.108 -2.370 0.019 0.845 
1.183 
SIC 0.160 0.033 0.231 4.918 0.000 0.787 1.270 
SQRTSUBS 0.047 0.024 0.092 1.909 0.058 0.745 1.343 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.1. A: Results of the multiple regression model for the large clients sub-sample (236 observations 
with Sales >_ £251mm), Big-Six vis-a-vis non-Big Six firms, Hypothesis 1 tested 
as in the total sample model described in Chapter VIII. The variable controlling for the 
age of the company, AGECOMP, is positive and insignificant in this sub-sample 
indicating that young (less than 10 years) large companies are charged higher audit 
fees. BUSY is not in the hypothesised direction (but insignificant) indicating that a 
higher audit fee is not charged for the large clients whose year-end occurs during the 
198 
Testing_hy_ppthesis 6: 
Hypotheses 2 through 5 refer only to the small companies sub-sample and will 
discussed in the next section of this chapter. Hypothesis 6 was stated in Chapter VI as 
follows: 
H6: the pricing of audit services is related to the pricing of non-audit 
services 
Table 9.1 .B provides the model comparing the audit fee charged by the accountancy 
firms in the large clients sub-sample when non-audit services are provided by the 
auditor after controlling for other variables hypothesised to also affect the level of 
audit fees. Hypothesis 6 could not be rejected indicating an audit fee difference due to 
provision of non-audit services in this sample. In other words, there is a positive 
relationship between fees paid for audit services and fees paid for non-audit services. 
This result is consistent with the results of prior studies (e. g., Simunic, 1984; Ezzamel 
et al, 1996). In this study, the premium2 charged by the accountancy firms for the joint 
production of audit and other services to large clients is found to be 29.69%. Thus, the 
result being a significant non-audit fee variable in the large clients sub-sample. 
The overall descriptive validity of the model is increased with an RSquare of 0.803. 
The standard error of the estimate remains very low indicating no prediction error for 
the model and the F statistic is statistically significant indicating that the independent 
variables are significant explanatory factors of the variation in the dependent variable. 
Further, the VIF and tolerance values are in acceptable levels. The other assumptions 
of the multivariate analysis are also meta. 
2 Because the model used is a Cobb-Douglas production function, the percentage change in audit fees (d) accruing 
to incumbent auditor is calculated using the formula C= In (1+d) where C represents the value of the coefficient 
for the ALMNFD variable. See also section 3.3.1.1.1 in Chapter III for further discussion. 3 The model appears to be well specified and the tests described in Chapter VIII indicate no violations of the 
assumptions of the regression analysis. See section 8.4.1. 
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None of the coefficients sign of the other independent variables in the model has 
changed comparing with the model described earlier for the test of hypothesis 1. The 
reader, therefore, is advised to see the discussion held for the regression model testing 
the hypothesis 1. 
1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H6] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
b111nINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16NENGLND + b17SIC + b18SUBS0*5 +b191nNAFEE + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.896 0.803 0.773 0.5065 26.983 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
...... __. _... .................... __........... _. _. _........... _.. ___. _. _.. B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -2.969 0.821 -3.619 0.000 
AGECOMP 0.073 0.126 0.026 0.574 0.567 0.785 1.274 
AUDQN 0.024 0.374 0.003 0.064 0.949 0.930 1.075 
BIG6 0.070 0.159 0.019 0.438 0.662 0.924 1.082 
BUSY -0.094 0.122 -0.034 -0.774 0.441 0.874 1.144 
GRTLONDN 0.225 0.095 0.106 2.367 0.020 0.830 1.204 
LNCR 0.375 0.129 0.180 2.908 0.004 0.432 2.313 
LNDE -0.053 0.042 -0.083 -1.263 0.209 0.382 2.619 
LNDEBTR 0.131 0.047 0.145 2.786 0.006 0.609 1.642 
LNEARN 0.005 0.109 0.004 0.049 0.961 0.290 3.446 
LNINV -0.060 0.043 -0.085 -1.387 0.168 0.445 2.248 
LNROCE 0.150 0.085 0.105 1.765 0.080 0.470 2.126 
LNROI -0.105 0.075 -0.112 -1.402 0.163 0.259 
3.867 
LNSALES 0.429 0.061 0.427 7.053 0.000 0.452 2.212 
LTLBTA 1.098 0.591 0.143 1.856 0.066 0.277 3.605 
NENGLD -0.566 0.253 -0.100 -2.232 0.027 0.829 
1.206 
SIC 0.163 0.032 0.236 5.132 0.000 0.780 1.282 
SQRTSUBS 0.042 0.024 0.083 1.772 0.079 0.751 1.332 
LNNAFEE 0.260 0.052 0.303 5.055 0.000 0.460 2.176 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.1. B: Results of the multiple regression model for the large clients sub-sample (236 observations 
with Sales >_ £251mm), Hypothesis 6 tested 
Testing-hypothesis 7: 
Hypothesis 7 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
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H7: for the large companies sub-sample, it makes no difference on audit fees 
when any director is an ex-employee of the auditor 
Table 9.1 .C provides the model comparing the audit fee charged to the large clients 
that have on their board of directors an alumni of their auditor after controlling for the 
variables hypothesised to affect the level of audit fees discussed in Chapter VI. 
Hypothesis 7 could not be rejected indicating no audit fee difference in this sample. 
Although 1 in 6 directors are alumni of their auditors, this association by itself is not 
translated into different audit pricing. Neither audit firms benefit from outplacing their 
1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H7] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
bi 11nINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b14lnSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16NENGLND + b17SIC + b18SUBS0.5 + b191nNAFEE + b20ALUMNI + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.888 0.788 0.771 0.4917 45.232 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -2.916 0.614 -4.748 0.000 
AGECOMP 0.149 0.095 0.054 1.571 0.118 0.779 1.284 
AUDQN -0.179 0.302 -0.019 -0.592 0.554 0.894 1.118 
BIG6 0.074 0.117 0.020 0.630 0.529 0.882 1.134 
BUSY -0.032 0.085 -0.012 -0.369 0.712 0.856 
1.168 
GRTLONDN 0.300 0.068 0.146 4.401 0.000 0.831 1.203 
LNCR 0.393 0.095 0.194 4.148 0.000 0.420 2.379 
LNDE -0.072 0.032 -0.120 -2.215 0.028 
0.311 3.215 
LN DE BT R 0.101 0.035 0.111 2.854 0.005 0.612 1.634 
LNEARN 0.043 0.082 0.032 0.521 0.603 0.251 3.991 
LNINV -0.054 0.033 -0.079 -1.660 
0.098 0.402 2.489 
LNROCE 0.174 0.059 0.134 2.967 0.003 0.450 2.221 
LNROI -0.127 0.061 -0.140 -2.094 
0.037 0.206 4.851 
LNSALES 0.399 0.046 0.387 8.667 0.000 0.460 2.173 
LTLBTA 1.498 0.459 0.200 3.262 0.001 0.243 4.117 
NENGLD -0.595 0.183 -0.108 -3.251 
0.001 0.831 1.203 
SIC 0.141 0.025 0.200 5.700 0.000 0.742 1.349 
SQRTSUBS 0.060 0.019 0.115 3.222 0.001 0.714 1.401 
LNNAFEE 0.268 0.040 0.298 6.666 0.000 0.459 2.179 
ALUMNI -0.008 0.088 -0.003 -0.088 
0.930 0.916 1.092 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.1. C: Results of the multiple regression model for the large clients sub-sample 
(420 observations 
with Sales >_ £251mm), Hypothesis 7 tested 
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alumni by receiving higher audit fees nor the large companies benefit from having as 
directors alumni of their auditor by receiving a discount on audit fees. In other words, 
alumni of audit firms do not affect (positive or negative) audit fees when they are 
employed by the auditor clients. Thus, the result being an insignificant variable. 
The overall descriptive validity of the model is maintained with an RSquare of 0.788. 
The F statistic is statistically significant indicating that the independent variables are 
significant explanatory factors of the variation in the dependent variable. Further, the 
VIF and tolerance values are all in acceptable levels. The other assumptions of the 
multivariate analysis are also met4. 
Most of the individual coefficients of the independent variables are highly significant 
and in the hypothesised direction. As in the two previous models, the variables 
controlling for the size and complexity are significant and positive as expected, with 
the INV variable in this model only being significant too. The INV variable is 
negative indicating lower audit fees when the ratio of total year-end stocks to total 
year-end assets is high. No explanation is provided for this unexpected result. All the 
other independent variables have the same significance and sign in their coefficients 
as in the previous models and, therefore, no further analysis is provided here. Only the 
AUDQN has a different direction in the sign of the coefficient but it is insignificant in 
this model as well. 
Testing-hypothesis 
_8: 
Hypothesis 8 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H8: for the large companies sub-sample, on average it makes no difference on 
audit fees when a non-executive director is an ex-employee of the auditor 
Table 9. l. D provides the model comparing the audit fee charged to the large clients 
that have a non-executive director who is an alumni of their auditor after controlling 
for other variables hypothesised to also affect the level of audit fees. Hypothesis 8 
could not be rejected indicating no audit fee difference in this sample. In other words, 
it makes no difference on audit fees when a non-executive is an alumni of the 
4 ibid. 
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incumbent auditor in the large client segment of the UK audit market. It is possible 
that due to the small number of non-executive directors in this sub-sample (only 
18.70% of directors are non-executives), an audit fee difference could not be detected. 
1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H81 b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
b> >1nINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16NENGLND + b17SIC + b18SUBS0.5 + b191nNAFEE + b2OALUMNI + 
b21 ALMNEXD + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.888 0.789 0.771 0.4919 42.985 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -2.931 0.614 -4.771 0.000 
AGECOMP 0.139 0.096 0.050 1.452 0.148 0.770 1.298 
AUDQN -0.170 0.302 -0.018 -0.564 0.573 0.893 1.119 
BIG6 0.069 0.117 0.019 0.586 0.558 0.880 1.136 
BUSY -0.034 0.085 -0.013 -0.395 0.694 0.855 1.169 
GRTLONDN 0.301 0.068 0.146 4.406 0.000 0.831 1.203 
LNCR 0.385 0.095 0.190 4.052 0.000 0.418 2.395 
LNDE -0.071 0.032 -0.119 -2.192 0.029 0.311 3.216 
LNDEBTR 0.101 0.035 0.111 2.868 0.005 0.612 1.634 
LNEARN 0.046 0.082 0.034 0.556 0.579 0.250 3.996 
LNINV -0.053 0.033 -0.078 -1.636 0.103 0.402 2.491 
LNROCE 0.174 0.059 0.134 2.971 0.003 0.450 2.221 
LNROI -0.128 0.061 -0.141 -2.109 0.036 0.206 4.852 
LNSALES 0.402 0.046 0.390 8.721 0.000 0.458 2.185 
LTLBTA 1.492 0.459 0.200 3.250 0.001 0.243 4.117 
NENGLD -0.592 0.183 -0.107 -3.233 0.001 0.831 1.204 
SIC 0.140 0.025 0.199 5.668 0.000 0.741 1.350 
SQRTSUBS 0.060 0.019 0.116 3.225 0.001 0.714 1.401 
LNNAFEE 0.266 0.040 0.295 6.590 0.000 0.457 2.187 
ALUMNI 0.237 0.253 0.086 0.939 0.349 0.110 9.070 
ALMNEXD -0.273 0.264 -0.094 -1.033 0.303 0.110 9.085 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.1. D: Results of the multiple regression model for the large clients sub-sample (420 observations 
with Sales >= £251 mm), Hypothesis 8 tested 
Nevertheless, the sign of the coefficient is negative which may indicate that the 
auditor assesses lower levels of inherent risk and charges lower audit fees as a result 
of higher monitoring and lower agency costs associated with the presence of non- 
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executive directors (Gul et al, 1998). 
The overall descriptive validity of the model is maintained with an RSquare of 0.789. 
The standard error of the estimate remains very low indicating no prediction error for 
the model and the F statistic is statistically significant indicating that there is an 
underlying significant and linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. Further, the VIF and tolerance values are all in acceptable levels. The other 
assumptions of the multivariate analysis are also met5. The results in the sign and 
significance of the other independent variables are the same as discussed in the 
previous models. 
Testing_hy_ppthesis 9: 
Hypothesis 9 provides further evidence on the "alumni effect" and its interaction with 
those CADRE who are Finance Directors, Chairmen or Chief Executives in the large 
clients segment of the UK audit market for publicly traded companies. Hypothesis 9 
was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H9: for the large companies sub-sample, there is no audit fee difference when 
the chairman, chief executive or finance director are an alumni of the 
auditor 
Table 9.1. E provides the model (No 1) comparing the audit fee charged to the large 
clients that have a finance director, chairman and/or chief executive who is(are) an 
alumni of their auditor after controlling for the variables hypothesised to affect the 
level of audit fees discussed in Chapter VI. Hypothesis 9 could not be accepted 
indicating an audit fee difference in this sample. The human capital investment made 
by audit firms in training chartered accountants is paid off when their alumni become 
members of the boards of directors of their clients. This finding, however, is correct 
only for those chartered accountants who become Finance Directors, Chairmen or 
Chief Executives in the boards of the clients of their ex-employer (i. e. of the 
incumbent auditor). This finding does not hold for all alumni of audit firms who 
become CADRE, as we have seen when we tested the hypothesis 7 earlier in this 
chapter. Further, the ALMNFD variable is positive (and significant at 0.073 level) 
ibid. 
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Table 9.1. E: Re sults of the multiple regression model for the large clients sub-sample (420 observations with 
Sales >_ £251mm), Hypothesis 9 tested 
Model 1 Model 2 
B p value B p value 
t value t value 
(Constant) -2.940 0.000 -2.922 0.000 Model 1- H9 
-4.809 -4.826 
AGECOMP 0.130 0.174 0.138 0.145 1ýgFEE =bý+ b2AGECOMP + 
1.363 1.462 b3AUDQN QN + b4BIG6 +b BUSY + 
AUDQN -0.157 0.601 -0.121 0.686 b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE 
-0.524 -0.404 + b91nDEBTR + b1olnEARN + 
BIG6 0.090 0.442 0.119 0.307 bi 11nINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + 0.771 1.025 b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + BUSY -0.051 0.552 -0.061 0.471 b16NENGLND + b17SIC + 
-0.596 -0.721 0 5 
GRTLONDN 0.310 0.000 0.292 0.000 b18SUBS . + b191nNAFEE + 
4.550 4.308 b20ALUMNI + b21 ALMNEXD + 
LNCR 0.390 0.000 0.385 0.000 b22ALMNFD + Error 
4.126 4.104 
LNDE -0.068 0.037 -0.068 0.034 
-2.101 -2.133 
R 0.890 
LNDEBTR 0.097 0.006 0.100 0 005 R Square 0.791 . Adjusted R Square 0.772 2.755 2.852 Std. Error of the 0.4901 LNEARN 0.040 0.623 0.036 0.655 Estimate 
0.493 0.447 F 41.364 
LNINV -0.052 0.113 -0.048 0.135 Sig. < 0.001 
-1.592 -1.501 
LNROCE 0.174 0.003 0.180 0.002 
2.995 3.120 
LNROI -0.124 0.042 -0.127 -0.035 
-2.049 -2.115 
Model 2- H9 
LNSALES 0.398 0.000 0.397 0.000 1nAFEE = bl + b2AGECOMP + 
8.671 8.727 b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
LTLBTA 1.465 0.002 1.490 0.001 b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE 
3.203 3.289 + b9ln OEBTR +b1 °1nEARN + NENGLD -0.603 0.001 -0.590 0.001 b111nINV + b121nROCE + b131nROI + 
-3.308 -3.266 b141nSALES +b 15LTLBTA + SIC 0.139 0.000 0.138 0.000 
5.642 5.656 b16NENGLND + b17SIC + 
SQRTSUBS 0.060 0.001 0.060 0.001 b18SUBSO'S + b191nNAFEE + 
3.260 3.266 b20ALUMNI + b21 ALMNEXD + 
LNNAFEE 0.277 0.000 0.283 0.000 b22ALMNFD + b23FD + Error 
6.813 7.015 
ALUMNI 0.238 0.345 0.166 0.510 
0.947 0.659 R 0.893 
ALMNEXD -0.381 0.159 -0.355 0.185 
R Square 0.797 
-1.413 -1.330 
Adjusted R Square 0.777 
ALMNFD 0 314 073 0 0 460 0.013 
Std. Error of the 0.4846 
. . . Estimate 
1.802 2.506 F 40.680 FD 
----- ----- -0.158 0.020 Sig. < 0.001 
-2.342 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Figures in italics are t-statistics. 
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indicating that when the Finance Director, Chairman or Chief Executive is/are alumni 
of the incumbent auditor then this relationship leads to higher audit fees, i. e. the 
auditor earns a 36.89% premium. Thus, the result being a significant (given the 
increase in R2) moderator (interaction) effect and a significant alumni variable. 
The overall descriptive validity of the model is maintained with an RSquare of 0.791. 
The standard error of the estimate remains very low indicating no prediction error for 
the model and the F statistic is statistically significant indicating that there is an 
underlying significant and linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. Further, the VIF and tolerance values are all in acceptable levels. The other 
assumptions of the multivariate analysis are also meth. The results in the sign and 
significance of the other independent variables are the same as discussed in the 
previous models. 
A very interesting finding comes from the model 2 in Table 9.1. E. Model 2 extends 
the analysis of the "alumni effect" and considers whether there is any differential 
pricing of audit services when all Finance Directors, Chairmen and Chief Executives 
enter the equation, irrespective the fact of being an alumni of the existing firm of 
auditors (as in model 1). This independent categorical variable in model 2 (i. e. the FD 
variable) is significant at the 0.020 level and negative indicating that large companies 
pay lower audit fees when all CADRE who are Finance Directors, Chairmen or Chief 
Executives are considered (i. e. a 17.12% discount is offered). This result is very 
interesting. It implies that when the Finance Directors, Chairmen or Chief Executives 
have not qualified with the incumbent auditor but with another accountancy firm then 
this relationship leads to lower audit fees. However, when the Finance Directors, 
Chairmen or Chief Executives have trained and qualified with the auditor then this 
relationship drives the audit fees higher (see model 1 in Table 9.1. E). No other 
independent variable in model 2 differs from the previous models to require further 
discussion here. 
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Hypothesis 10 provides further evidence on the "alumni effect" and its influence with 
regard to the age of the CADRE. Hypothesis 10 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H10: for the large companies sub-sample, the audit fee charged will not be 
lower or higher as the CADRE becomes older 
Table 9.1 .F provides the model comparing the audit 
fee charged to the large clients 
that have older CADRE on their boards after controlling for other variables 
hypothesised to also affect the level of audit fees. Hypothesis 10 could not be rejected 
indicating no audit fee difference in this sample. In other words, the coefficient of 
AGECADRE is positive but insignificant indicating no differential pricing of audit 
services while the CADRE becomes older. As a result, an insignificant alumni 
variable is observed in the large clients sub-sample. 
The overall descriptive validity of the model is maintained with an RSquare of 0.798. 
The standard error of the estimate remains very low indicating no prediction error for 
the model and the F statistic is statistically significant indicating meaningful 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Further, the VIF and 
tolerance values are in acceptable levels. The other assumptions of the multivariate 
analysis are also met7. 
None of the coefficients sign of the other independent variables in the model has 
changed comparing with the models described earlier for the test of hypotheses. The 
reader, therefore, is advised to see the discussion held for the regression model testing 
the hypothesis 1. 
Testing_hy_pothesis 11: 
Hypothesis 11 provides further evidence on the "alumni effect" and its interaction 
with the fees paid for the provision of non-audit services. Hypothesis 11 was stated in 
Chapter VI as follows: 
HI I: there is no different relationship between audit and non-audit fee because 
of existence of auditor alumni 
`ý ibid. 
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1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H 10] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR +bI °1nEARN +b 111nINV + b121nROCE + bl3lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + b16NENGLND + b17SIC 
+ b18SUBS0.5 + b19lnNAFEE + b2OALUMNI + b21ALMNEXD + b22ALMNFD 
+ b23FD + b24AGECADRE + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.893 0.798 0.777 0.4847 38.933 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -3.041 0.618 -4.917 0.000 
AGECOMP 0.133 0.095 0.048 1.401 0.162 0.764 1.309 
AUDQN -0.141 0.299 -0.015 -0.471 0.638 0.886 1.129 
BIG6 0.124 0.117 0.034 1.061 0.290 0.860 1.163 
BUSY -0.060 0.085 -0.023 -0.712 0.477 0.842 1.187 
GRTLONDN 0.295 0.068 0.144 4.345 0.000 0.815 1.228 
LNCR 0.378 0.094 0.186 4.013 0.000 0.414 2.414 
LNDE -0.070 0.032 -0.117 -2.180 0.030 0.309 3.235 
LNDEBTR 0.105 0.035 0.115 2.960 0.003 0.595 1.680 
LNEARN 0.045 0.081 0.033 0.547 0.585 0.247 4.049 
LNINV -0.049 0.032 -0.071 -1.512 0.132 0.400 2.498 
LNROCE 0.179 0.058 0.138 3.100 0.002 0.449 2.226 
LNROI -0.133 0.060 -0.146 -2.203 0.029 0.203 4.916 LNSALES 0.398 0.046 0.386 8.739 0.000 0.456 2.191 
LTLBTA 1.495 0.453 0.200 3.300 0.001 0.242 4.125 
NENGLD -0.597 0.181 -0.108 -3.300 0.001 0.828 1.208 SIC 0.136 0.024 0.194 5.571 0.000 0.736 1.358 
SQRTSUBS 0.057 0.018 0.111 3.113 0.002 0.702 1.425 
LNNAFEE 0.280 0.040 0.311 6.952 0.000 0.444 2.250 
ALUMNI 0.162 0.251 0.058 0.645 0.520 0.109 9.213 
ALMNEXD -0.332 0.268 -0.115 -1.239 0.217 0.104 9.652 ALMNFD 0.453 0.184 0.098 2.466 0.014 0.565 1.769 
FD 
-0.151 0.068 -0.073 -2.221 0.027 0.833 1.200 AGECADRE 0.003 0.003 0.030 0.949 0.344 0.871 1.148 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.1. F: Results of the multiple regression model for the large clients sub-sample (420 observations 
with Sales >= £251 mm), Hypothesis 10 tested 
Table 9.1. G provides the model comparing the audit fee charged when there is 
purchase of non-audit services as well as an auditor alumni on the board of directors 
in the large clients sub-sample after controlling for other variables hypothesised to 
also affect the level of audit fees. Hypothesis 11 could not be rejected indicating no 
ibid. 
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audit fee difference in this sample. In other words, the coefficient of ALMNNAFE is 
negative but insignificant indicating no differential pricing of audit services when 
there is a provision of non-audit services by the auditor and simultaneously there is an 
alumni of the auditor on the board. As a result, an insignificant variable is observed in 
the large clients sub-sample. 
1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + bSBUSY + 
[Hill b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + bglnDE + b91nDEBTR +b1 °InEARN +b 111nINV + 
b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + b16NENGLND + b17SIC 
+ b18SUBS0.5 + b191nNAFEE + b20ALUMNI + b21ALMNEXD + b22ALMNFD 
+ b23FD + b24AGECADRE + b25ALMNNAFE + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.894 0.800 0.779 0.4831 37.661 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -3.195 0.624 -5.119 0.000 
AGECOMP 0.145 0.095 0.052 1.535 0.126 0.759 1.318 
AUDQN -0.140 0.298 -0.015 -0.471 0.638 0.886 1.129 
BIG6 0.136 0.117 0.037 1.164 0.245 0.856 1.168 
BUSY -0.064 0.085 -0.024 -0.753 0.452 0.842 1.188 
GRTLONDN 0.302 0.068 0.147 4.456 0.000 0.811 1.233 
LNCR 0.374 0.094 0.185 3.992 0.000 0.414 2.415 
LNDE -0.068 0.032 -0.113 -2.111 0.036 0.308 3.242 
LNDEBTR 0.094 0.036 0.103 2.632 0.009 0.575 1.738 
LNEARN 0.048 0.081 0.036 0.593 0.554 0.247 4.053 
LNINV -0.041 0.032 -0.061 -1.277 0.203 0.392 2.549 
LNROCE 0.184 0.058 0.142 3.190 0.002 0.448 2.233 
LNROI -0.136 0.060 -0.149 -2.258 0.025 0.203 4.921 
LNSALES 0.399 0.045 0.387 8.783 0.000 0.456 2.191 
LTLBTA 1.477 0.452 0.198 3.270 0.001 0.242 4.128 
NENGLD -0.608 0.180 -0.110 -3.370 0.001 0.826 1.210 SIC 0.136 0.024 0.194 5.606 0.000 0.736 1.358 
SQRTSUBS 0.057 0.018 0.110 3.103 0.002 0.701 1.426 
LNNAFEE 0.299 0.042 0.332 7.139 0.000 0.410 2.438 
ALUMNI 0.215 0.253 0.078 0.852 0.395 0.107 9.380 
ALMNEXD 
-0.317 0.267 -0.110 -1.186 0.237 0.103 
9.664 
ALMNFD 0.490 0.185 0.106 2.654 0.009 0.556 1.798 
FD 
-0.147 0.068 -0.071 -2.168 0.031 0.832 
1.202 
AGECADRE 0.003 0.003 0.034 1.050 0.295 0.868 1.152 
ALMNNAFE 
-0.0001 0.0001 -0.060 -1.580 0.115 0.622 
1.609 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.1. G" Results of the multiple regression model for the large clients sub-sample (420 observations 
with Sales >= £251mm), Hypothesis 11 tested 
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The overall descriptive validity of the model is maintained with an RSquare of 0.800. 
The F statistic is statistically significant indicating meaningful relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables. Further, the VIF and tolerance values are in 
acceptable levels. The other assumptions of the multivariate analysis are also met8. 
The results in the sign and significance of the other independent variables are the same 
as discussed in the previous models. 
9.2. Hypotheses tested in the small companies segment of the market 
Hypothesis 1 is tested only in the large client sub-sample and was discussed in the 
preceding section 9.1. Hypotheses 2 through 5 are tested only in the small clients sub- 
sample (i. e., a sub-sample of observations on UK listed companies with sales less than 
£251 million). 
Testing. hy_pothesis 2_ (Big Six vis-a-vis non-Big Six firms) 
Hypothesis 2 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H2: for the small companies sub-Sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee 
than (or equal to) the non-Big Six firms. 
Table 9.2. A provides the model comparing the audit fee charged by the Big-Six audit 
firms to that of non-Big Six firms in the small companies sub-sample after controlling 
for the variables hypothesised to affect the level of audit fees discussed in Chapter 
VI9. Hypothesis 2 was rejected. The audit firm size coefficient (coded "1" for Big-Six 
and "0" for non-Big Six firm) is positive and significant at less than 0.001 level 
indicating higher audit fees charged by the Big-Six than non-Big Six firms in the 
small client market. That is, the audit fee premium earned by the Big-Six auditing 
firms in this study is 22%. This result is consistent with the existence of a Big-Six 
auditor premium being observed in other studies (Francis, 1984; Chan et al, 1993; 
Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986) of small companies segment. As a result, a 
significant audit firm size variable is observed in the small clients sub-sample. 
R ibid. 
9 This model includes all the 936 observations in the small companies segment of the market. 
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The overall descriptive validity of the model is maintained with an RSquare of 0.684. 
The standard error of the estimate remains very low indicating no prediction error for 
the model and the F statistic is statistically significant indicating meaningful 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Further, the VIF and 
tolerance values are in acceptable levels. No VIF value exceeds 10.0 and the tolerance 
values are quite high indicating little collinearity. The other assumptions of the 
multivariate analysis are also metro 
m AFEE = bl + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H2] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
bl l1nINV + b121nROCE + bl3lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16SIC + b17SUBS0.5+ b18SWEST + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.827 0.684 0.672 0.4876 54.522 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.969 0.346 -5.688 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.107 0.057 -0.055 -1.884 0.060 0.874 1.144 
AUDQN 0.411 0.225 0.051 1.826 0.069 0.947 1.056 
BIG6 0.199 0.054 0.105 3.662 0.000 0.906 1.104 
BUSY 0.088 0.052 0.047 1.690 0.092 0.963 1.038 
GRTLONDN 0.271 0.049 0.157 5.491 0.000 0.906 1.103 
LNCR 0.122 0.053 0.075 2.315 0.021 0.699 1.431 
LNDE -0.027 0.022 -0.056 -1.250 0.212 0.371 2.695 LNDEBTR 0.064 0.024 0.098 2.678 0.008 0.550 1.818 
LNEARN 0.110 0.046 0.119 2.394 0.017 0.299 3.340 
LNINV -0.028 0.019 -0.051 -1.459 0.145 0.601 1.664 LNROCE 
-0.019 0.041 -0.021 -0.468 0.640 0.372 2.686 LNROI 
-0.056 0.038 -0.079 -1.471 0.142 0.256 3.904 LNSALES 0.506 0.025 0.676 19.958 0.000 0.643 1.555 
LTLBTA 0.841 0.309 0.142 2.727 0.007 0.272 3.672 
SIC 0.053 0.020 0.078 2.587 0.010 0.822 1.217 
SQRTSUBS 0.100 0.022 0.139 4.492 0.000 0.775 1.290 
SW EST -0.231 0.082 -0.065 -2.837 0.005 0.926 
1.080 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. A: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (936 observations 
with Sales <£251mm), Big-Six vis-a-vis non-Big Six firms, Hypothesis 2 tested 
"The 
model appears to be well specified and the tests described in Chapter VIII indicate no violations of the 
assumptions of the regression analysis. 
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Most of the individual coefficients of the independent variables are highly significant 
and in the hypothesised direction. Four of the five variables controlling for the size 
and complexity of the small companies' operations (i. e. SALES, SUBS, SIC, DEBTR) 
are significant and in the hypothesised direction. Only the variable INV is 
insignificant and not in the hypothesised direction. The variables measuring the 
profitability and financial distress of the small companies give contrast results. 
AUDQN is for the first time significant at 0.069 level and positive indicating higher 
audit fees when the auditor client has received a qualified audit report, as expected. 
EARN is another significant variable but not in the hypothesised direction. No 
explanation can be offered for this result. ROI and ROCE are both not significant but 
in the hypothesised direction. DE is not significant and not in the hypothesised 
direction. The variable controlling for the level of gearing, LTLBTA, is found positive 
and significant as expected. The CR variable is significant but not in the hypothesised 
direction' l 
The variable controlling for the age of the company, AGECOMP, is significant (at the 
0.060 level) but not in the hypothesised direction for this sub-sample. The coefficient 
is negative indicating that small companies incorporated for less than 10 years pay 
lower audit fees than companies which are in business for more than 10 years. This 
result is quite opposite to our expectation and no explanation is provided. The variable 
controlling for peak pricing, BUSY, is in the hypothesised direction and also 
significant (p = 0.092) indicating peakload audit pricing is indeed occurring in the 
small companies sub-sample. Finally, London area companies are charged higher 
audit fees and the NENGLD variable is not significant in this sub-sample. Instead, the 
SWEST categorical variable appears to be significant indicating lower audit fees are 
charged in this region to the UK small companies. 
Testing_hy_pothesis 3: (Big Six vis-a-vis second-tier firms) 
Hypotheses 3 through 5 which follow are tested by further partitioning the small 
clients segment of the UK audit market. Hypothesis 3 refers only to the audit fees 
11 For a detailed analysis of the multiple regression results, see discussion of the "basic" model results held 
in 
Chapter VIII. 
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charged by the Big-Six and second-tier audit firms. Hypothesis 3 was stated in 
Chapter VI as follows: 
H3: for the small companies sub-sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee 
than (or equal to) the second-tier accountancy firms. 
Table 9.2. B provides the model comparing the audit fee charged by the Big-Six audit 
firms to that of second-tier firms in the small companies sub-sample after controlling 
for other variables hypothesised to also affect the level of audit fees 12. Hypothesis 3 
1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4B6B 14 + b5BUSY + 
[H3] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
b111nINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16SIC + b17SUBS0.5+ b18SWEST + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.808 0.653 0.644 0.4858 67.721 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -2.189 0.299 -7.328 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.099 0.049 -0.052 -2.033 0.042 0.857 1.166 
AUDQN 0.363 0.192 0.047 1.895 0.059 0.929 1.076 
1361314 0.174 0.050 0.086 3.496 0.001 0.941 1.063 
BUSY 0.124 0.043 0.070 2.873 0.004 0.957 1.045 
GRTLONDN 0.245 0.042 0.147 5.779 0.000 0.880 1.137 
LNCR 0.172 0.047 0.108 3.674 0.000 0.659 1.518 
LNDE -0.046 0.019 -0.098 -2.407 0.016 0.343 2.912 LNDEBTR 0.078 0.021 0.126 3.817 0.000 0.525 1.906 
LNEARN 0.048 0.042 0.049 1.138 0.255 0.304 3.294 
LNINV 
-0.040 0.018 -0.071 -2.241 0.025 0.559 1.788 LNROCE 0.003 0.036 0.003 0.076 0.939 0.367 2.728 
LNROI 
-0.026 0.032 -0.037 -0.792 0.429 0.267 
3.749 
LNSALES 0.520 0.022 0.681 23.828 0.000 0.694 1.440 
LTLBTA 1.004 0.257 0.187 3.908 0.000 0.249 4.018 
SIC 0.036 0.017 0.057 2.131 0.033 0.796 1.257 
SQRTSUBS 0.095 0.018 0.142 5.202 0.000 0.763 1.311 
SW EST 
-0.262 0.085 -0.077 -3.089 0.002 0.921 
1.086 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. B: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (818 observations 
with Sales < £251mm), Big-Six vis-ä-vis second-tier firms, Hypothesis 3 tested 
12 The local/regional audit firms are excluded from this model. This model includes only the Big-Six and second- tier firms, i. e. 818 observations in the small companies segment of the market. 
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was rejected. The audit firm size coefficient (coded "1" for Big-Six and "0" for 
second-tier firms) is positive and significant at 0.001 level indicating higher audit fees 
charged by the Big-Six than second-tier firms in the small client segment of the UK 
audit market for publicly traded companies. That is, the audit fee premium earned by 
the Big-Six auditing firms is 19%. This result is consistent with the study of Francis 
and Simon (1987) which represents the first study to use three classes of audit firm 
size in addition to the Big-Six/non-Big Six dichotomy13. Francis and Simon (1987) 
provide evidence to support the existence of a significant Big-Eight price premium 
over second-tier accountancy firms (of 29.7%) of as well as other local/regional firms 
(of 27.1 %). Furthermore, they found no evidence of a second-tier firms price premium 
over the local/regional auditors when their model was run on a sub-sample of 
companies having only second-tier or local/regional accountancy firms. Our findings 
are consistent with Francis and Simon's results. See tests of hypotheses 4 and 5 below 
as well. The results in the sign and significance of the independent variables are the 
same as discussed in the previous model. 
Testing_hy_pothesis 4; 
-(Big 
Six vis-a-vis local/regional firms) 
Hypothesis 4 refers only to the audit fees charged by the Big-Six and other 
local/regional audit firms. Hypothesis 4 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H4: for the small companies sub-sample, the Big Six charge lower audit fee 
than (or equal to) the local/regional accountancy firms. 
Table 9.2. C provides the model comparing the audit fee charged by the Big-Six audit 
firms to that of local/regional firms in the small companies sub-sample after 
controlling for other variables hypothesised to also affect the level of audit fees 14 
Hypothesis 4 was rejected. The audit firm size coefficient (coded "1" for Big-Six and 
"0" for local/regional firms) is positive and significant at less than 0.001 level 
indicating higher audit fees charged by the Big-Six than local/regional audit firms in 
the small client segment of the UK audit market for publicly traded companies. That 
is, the audit fee premium charged by the Big-Six accountancy firms is 26.36%. This 
"Francis 
and Simon (1987) have used the Big-Eight vs. non-Big Eight categorical (dummy) variable instead of Big-Six vs. non-Big Six audit firms. 1a The second-tier audit firms are excluded from this model. This model includes only the Big-Six and local/regional firms, i. e. 779 observations in the small companies segment of the market. 
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pill 
result is consistent with the study of 
Francis and Simon (1987) as indicated above. 
InAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4B6OTHER + b5BUSY + 
[H4] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
b111nINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16SIC + b17SUBS0,5+ b18SWEST + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.796 0.634 0.622 0.4919 56.439 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.863 0.319 -5.840 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.082 0.050 -0.045 -1.639 0.102 0.874 1.144 
AUDQN 0.348 0.224 0.041 1.554 0.121 0.971 1.030 
B60THER 0.234 0.066 0.096 3.566 0.000 0.912 1.096 
BUSY 0.095 0.047 0.054 2.038 0.042 0.945 1.058 
GRTLONDN 0.241 0.045 0.146 5.327 0.000 0.879 1.138 
LNCR 0.101 0.051 0.063 1.990 0.047 0.652 1.534 
LNDE -0.045 0.019 -0.096 -2.312 0.021 0.381 2.627 
LNDEBTR 0.065 0.022 0.103 2.941 0.003 0.539 1.855 
LNEARN 0.099 0.040 0.118 2.453 0.014 0.285 3.511 
LNINV -0.010 0.019 -0.017 -0.502 0.616 0.560 1.785 
LNROCE -0.002 0.036 -0.002 -0.043 0.966 0.394 2.541 
LNROI -0.057 0.035 -0.085 -1.660 0.097 0.250 3.992 
LNSALES 0.491 0.023 0.643 21.046 0.000 0.708 1.413 
LTLBTA 1.040 0.273 0.187 3.809 0.000 0.275 3.638 
SIC 0.026 0.018 0.040 1.429 0.154 0.831 1.203 
SQRTSUBS 0.111 0.019 0.173 5.900 0.000 0.771 1.297 
SWEST -0.207 0.087 -0.064 -2.373 0.018 0.916 1.092 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. C: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (779 observations 
with Sales < £251mm), Big-Six vis-a-vis local/regional firms, Hypothesis 4 tested 
Testing_hy_pothesis 5: (Second-tier vis-a-vis local/regional firms) 
Hypothesis 5 refers only to the audit fees charged by the second-tier and local/regional 
audit firms. Hypothesis 5 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H5: for the small companies sub-sample, the second-tier firms charge lower 
audit fee than (or equal) to the local/regional accountancy firms. 
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Table 9.2. D provides the model comparing the audit fee charged by the second-tier 
audit firms to that of local/regional 
firms in the small companies sub-sample after 
controlling for the variables hypothesised to affect the level of audit fees discussed in 
Chapter VI15. Hypothesis 5 could not be rejected. The audit firm size coefficient 
(coded "1" for second-tier and "0" for local/regional firms) is not significant 
indicating no audit fee difference between second-tier and local/regional auditors in 
the small client segment of the UK audit market for publicly traded companies. Again, 
this result is consistent with the study of Francis and Simon (1987). 
m AFEE = bl + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4B 14OTHER + b5BUSY + 
[H5] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + bglnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
bl 11nINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16SIC + b17SUBS0.5+ b18SWEST + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.879 0.772 0.750 0.4687 35.455 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
........ ........... .......... ........... _.... _.. _ B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -2.901 0.523 -5.542 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.319 0.100 -0.138 -3.209 0.002 0.697 1.435 
AUDQN 0.433 0.415 0.047 1.043 0.298 0.644 1.553 
B140THER 0.058 0.074 0.030 0.785 0.433 0.883 1.132 
BUSY 0.170 0.074 0.085 2.296 0.023 0.936 1.069 
GRTLONDN 0.185 0.074 0.099 2.492 0.014 0.817 1.224 
LNCR 0.138 0.081 0.077 1.699 0.091 0.619 1.615 
LNDE -0.014 0.033 -0.028 -0.433 0.666 0.302 
3.317 
LNDEBTR 0.004 0.037 0.005 0.104 0.917 0.494 2.026 
LNEARN -0.071 0.071 -0.073 -1.002 0.318 0.241 
4.151 
LNINV -0.026 0.027 -0.044 -0.976 0.330 0.639 
1.565 
LNROCE 0.038 0.064 0.037 0.596 0.552 0.327 3.058 
LNROI 0.073 0.059 0.098 1.237 0.218 0.203 4.933 
LNSALES 0.596 0.041 0.792 14.469 0.000 0.428 2.339 
LTLBTA 0.661 0.486 0.103 1.360 0.176 0.223 4.481 
SIC 0.094 0.029 0.135 3.240 0.001 0.739 1.354 
SQRTSUBS 
-0.004 0.038 -0.005 -0.105 0.917 
0.581 1.722 
SW EST -0.132 0.191 -0.026 -0.692 0.490 
0.896 1.116 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. D: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (291 observations 
with Sales < £251 mm), Second-tier vis-ä-vis local/regional firms, Hypothesis 5 tested 
15 The Big-Six audit firms are excluded from this model. This model includes only the second-tier and local/regional firms, i. e. 291 observations in the small companies segment of the market. 
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Table 92E: Summary of regression estimates, 
Hypotheses 2 through 5 
B coefficient/ Sig. B coefficient/ Sig. B coefficient/ Sig. B coefficient/ Sig. 
t value t value t value t value 
H2 H3 H4 H5 
(Constant) -i "Uov V. VVV 
-5.688 
AGECOMP -0.107 0.060 
-1.884 
AUDQN 0.411 0.069 
1.826 
BUSY 0.088 0.092 
1.690 
GRTLONDN 0.271 0.000 
5.491 
LNCR 0.122 0.021 
2.315 
LNDE -0.027 0.212 
-1.250 
LNDEBTR 0.064 0.008 
2.678 
LNEARN 0.110 0.017 
2.394 
LNINV -0.028 0.145 
-1.459 
LNROCE -0.019 0.640 
-0.468 
LNROI -0.056 0.142 
-1.471 
LNSALES 0.506 0.000 
19.958 
LTLBTA 0.841 0.007 
2.727 
SIC 0.053 0.010 
2.587 
SQRTSUBS 0.100 0.000 
4.492 
SW EST -0.231 0.005 
-2.837 
BIG6 0.199 0.000 
3.662 
B6B14 ----- 
B60THER 
----- 
B140THER 
----- 
R 0.827 
R Square 0.684 
Adjusted R 0.672 
Square 
F 54.522+ 
Sample size 936 
Figures in italics are t-statistics. + indicates 
-L. 1 V7 V. VVV 
-7.328 
-0.099 0.042 
-2.033 
0.363 0.059 
1.895 
0.124 0.004 
2.873 
0.245 0.000 
5.779 
0.172 0.000 
3.674 
-0.046 0.016 
-2.407 
0.078 0.000 
3.817 
0.048 0.255 
1.138 
-0.040 0.025 
-2.241 
0.003 0.939 
0.076 
-0.026 0.429 
-0.792 
0.520 0.000 
23.828 
1.004 0.000 
3.908 
0.036 0.033 
2.131 
0.095 0.000 
5.202 
-0.262 0.002 
-3.089 
0.174 0.001 
3.496 
0.808 
0.653 
0.644 
67.721 
818 
: he F-value is significant at 
-I . UUJ U. 000 
-5.840 
-0.082 0.102 
-1.639 
0.348 0.121 
1.554 
0.095 0.042 
2.038 
0.241 0.000 
5.327 
0.101 0.047 
1.990 
-0.045 0.021 
-2.312 
0.065 0.003 
2.941 
0.099 0.014 
2.453 
-0.010 0.616 
-0.502 
-0.002 0.966 
-0.043 
-0.057 0.097 
-1.660 
0.491 0.000 
21.046 
1.040 0.000 
3.809 
0.026 0.154 
1.429 
0.111 0.000 
5.900 
-0.207 0.018 
-2.373 
0.234 0.000 
3.566 
0.796 
0.634 
0.622 
56.439+ 
779 
the 0.01 % level. 
-L. t, u I U. 000 
-5.542 
-0.319 0.002 
-3.209 
0.433 0.298 
1.043 
0.170 0.023 
2.296 
0.185 0.014 
2.492 
0.138 0.091 
1.699 
-0.014 0.666 
-0.433 
0.004 0.917 
0.104 
-0.071 0.318 
-1.002 
-0.026 0.330 
-0.976 
0.038 0.552 
0.596 
0.073 0.218 
1.237 
0.596 0.000 
14.469 
0.661 0.176 
1.360 
0.094 0.001 
3.240 
-0.004 0.917 
-0.105 
-0.132 0.490 
-0.692 
0.058 0.433 
0.785 
0.879 
0.772 
0.750 
35.455+ 
291 
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-AMMER Table 9.2. E summarises the regression results from testing the hypotheses 2 through 5. 
The evidence from the Table 9.2. E supports the existence of a Big-Six 
price premium over all other auditors in the small client segment of the UK audit 
market. The findings imply price competition in small companies market with 
differentiatied product to the Big-Six audit firms' 6. Price competition is assumed in 
the small companies segment due to large number of suppliers (see analysis of 
concentration ratios in Chapter VII). Big-Six product differentiation is inferred 
because of the positive (and significant) coefficients of the different auditor variables. 
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 has already been tested for the large companies segment of the market. 
The finding in the large client segment of the UK audit market for publicly traded 
companies was that there is a positive relationship between fees paid for audit services 
and fees paid for non-audit services. We test here whether the same finding prevails in 
the small client sub-sample. Hypothesis 6 was stated as follows: 
H6: the pricing of audit services is related to the pricing of non-audit 
services 
Table 9.2. F provides the model comparing the audit fee charged by the accountancy 
firms in the small clients sub-sample when non-audit services are provided by the 
auditor after controlling for other variables hypothesised to also affect the level of 
audit fees. Hypothesis 6 could not be rejected indicating an audit fee difference due to 
provision of non-audit services in this sample. In other words, there is a positive 
relationship between fees paid for audit services and fees paid for non-audit services 
in the small clients segment of the UK audit market. This result is consistent with the 
results of prior studies (e. g., Simunic, 1984; Ezzamel et al, 1998, among others). 
Accountancy firms charge a premium of 18.4% for the joint production of audit and 
other services to small clients. Thus, the result being a significant non-audit fee 
variable in the small client sub-sample as well as in the large clients segment. 
16 See also Table 3.2. A in Chapter III. 
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1nAFEE = bl + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H6] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARzv + 
b11lnINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16NENGLND + b17SIC + b18SUBS0.5 +b191nNAFEE + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.837 0.700 0.692 0.4539 80.937 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coeff icients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.630 0.277 -5.880 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.087 0.046 -0.046 -1.914 0.056 0.842 1.188 
AUDQN 0.160 0.207 0.017 0.771 0.441 0.966 1.035 
BIG6 0.120 0.043 0.066 2.811 0.005 0.879 1.137 
BUSY 0.134 0.040 0.075 3.333 0.001 0.939 1.064 
GRTLONDN 0.196 0.039 0.118 5.004 0.000 0.872 1.147 
LNCR 0.068 0.043 0.042 1.583 0.114 0.672 1.487 
LNDE -0.052 0.017 -0.112 -3.119 0.002 0.370 2.704 
LNDEBTR 0.074 0.019 0.116 3.859 0.000 0.530 1.888 
LNEARN 0.047 0.035 0.054 1.341 0.181 0.302 3.312 
LNINV 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.080 0.936 0.602 1.661 
LNROCE 0.021 0.033 0.023 0.636 0.525 0.369 2.710 
LNROI -0.014 0.029 -0.020 -0.465 0.642 0.262 3.814 
LNSALES 0.421 0.022 0.548 19.498 0.000 0.608 1.645 
LTLBTA 1.129 0.240 0.201 4.708 0.000 0.265 3.779 
SIC 0.037 0.016 0.056 2.302 0.022 0.810 1.235 
SQRTSUBS 0.074 0.017 0.111 4.374 0.000 0.750 1.334 
SW EST -0.279 0.081 -0.079 -3.433 0.001 
0.917 1.090 
LNNAFEE 0.184 0.019 0.251 9.774 0.000 0.728 1.374 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. F: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (936 observations 
with Sales < £251mm), Hypothesis 6 tested 
Hypothesi0 
Hypotheses 7 through 11 have already been tested for the large companies segment of 
the market. Hypotheses 7 through 11 refer to the existence of an "alumni effect" in the 
UK audit market. Only hypothesis 9 found to be significant in the large clients sub- 
sample, that is the audit fees charged are higher when the Finance Director, 
Chairman 
or Chief Executive is/are alumni of the incumbent auditor. We test here whether an 
"alumni effect" exists in the small client segment of the UK audit market. 
Hypothesis 
7 was stated as follows: 
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VIA, H7: for the small companies sub-sample, it makes no difference on audit fees 
when director is an ex-employee of the auditor 
Table 9.2. G provides the model comparing the audit fee charged to the small clients 
that have on their board of directors an alumni of their auditor after controlling for the 
variables hypothesised to affect the level of audit fees discussed in Chapter VI. 
Hypothesis 7 could not be rejected indicating no audit fee difference in this sample. 
Although 1 in 6 directors are alumni of their auditors, this association is not translated 
into different audit pricing in small companies segment. Neither audit firms benefit 
1nAFEE = bl + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H7] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
b111nINV + b121nROCE + b131nROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16NENGLND + bl7SIC + bl8SUBS0*5 + b19lnNAFEE + b20ALUMNI + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.837 0.700 0.691 0.4541 76.291 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Coilinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.635 0.277 -5.894 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.090 0.046 -0.047 -1.979 0.048 0.838 1.193 
AUDQN 0.162 0.207 0.017 0.781 0.435 0.966 1.036 
BIG6 0.124 0.043 0.068 2.884 0.004 0.873 1.146 
BUSY 0.135 0.040 0.076 3.350 0.001 0.939 1.065 
GRTLONDN 0.195 0.039 0.117 4.982 0.000 0.871 1.148 
LNCR 0.069 0.043 0.043 1.588 0.113 0.672 1.487 
LNDE -0.054 0.017 -0.116 -3.190 0.001 0.368 2.717 
LNDEBTR 0.075 0.019 0.119 3.919 0.000 0.528 1.895 
LNEARN 0.047 0.035 0.053 1.329 0.184 0.301 3.319 
LNINV 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.062 0.951 0.602 1.661 
LNROCE 0.023 0.033 0.024 0.676 0.500 0.369 2.713 
LNROI 
-0.013 0.029 -0.019 -0.450 0.653 0.261 3.825 LNSALES 0.422 0.022 0.550 19.503 0.000 0.608 1.645 
LTLBTA 1.159 0.241 0.206 4.805 0.000 0.262 3.812 
SIC 0.037 0.016 0.057 2.342 0.020 0.808 1.238 
SQRTSUBS 0.073 0.017 0.109 4.285 0.000 0.749 1.335 
SWEST 
-0.282 0.081 -0.080 -3.469 0.001 0.916 
1.091 
LNNAFEE 0.184 0.019 0.251 9.752 0.000 0.729 1.372 
ALUMNI 
-0.056 0.050 -0.025 -1.127 0.260 0.968 
1.033 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. G: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (1396 observations 
With Sales < £251 mm), Hypothesis 7 tested 
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from outplacing their alumni by receiving higher audit fees nor the small companies 
benefit from having as directors alumni of their auditor by receiving a discount on 
audit fees. In other words, alumni of audit firms do not affect (positive or negative) 
audit fees when they are employed by the auditor clients. This conclusion holds for the 
large companies segment of the UK audit market too (see test of the same hypothesis 
for the large companies sub-sample in section 9.1 of this chapter). 
Testing_hy_pothesis 
_8: 
Hypothesis 8 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H8: for the small companies sub-sample, on average it makes no difference on 
audit fees when a non-executive director is an ex-employee of the auditor 
Table 9.2. H provides the model comparing the audit fee charged to the small clients 
that have a non-executive director who is an alumni of their auditor after controlling 
for other variables hypothesised to also affect the level of audit fees. Hypothesis 8 
could not be rejected indicating no audit fee difference in this sample. In other words, 
it makes no difference on audit fees when a non-executive is an alumni of the 
incumbent auditor in the small client segment of the UK audit market, as expected. It 
is possible that due to the small number of non-executive directors in this sub-sample 
(only 23.60% of directors are non-executives), an audit fee difference could not be 
detected. 
Testing. hy_pothesis 9: 
Hypothesis 9 provides further evidence on the "alumni effect" and its interaction with 
those CADRE who are Finance Directors, Chairmen or Chief Executives in the small 
clients sub-sample. Hypothesis 9 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H9: for the small companies sub-sample, there is no audit fee difference when 
the chairman, chief executive or finance director are an alumni of the 
auditor 
Table 9.2.1 provides the model comparing the audit fee charged to the small clients 
that have a finance director, chairman and/or chief executive who is(are) an alumni of 
their auditor after controlling for the variables hypothesised to affect the level of 
audit fees discussed in Chapter VI. Hypothesis 9 could not be rejected indicating no 
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1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
ýHg] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b9lnDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
b11lnINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16NENGLND + b17SIC + b18SUBS0,5 + b191nNAFEE + b20ALUMNI + 
b21 ALMNEXD + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Sauare the Estimate 
0.837 0.700 0.691 0.4542 72.474 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coeff icients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.627 0.278 -5.861 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.091 0.046 -0.048 -1.988 0.047 0.838 1.193 
AUDQN 0.158 0.208 0.017 0.763 0.446 0.965 1.036 
BIG6 0.123 0.043 0.067 2.854 0.004 0.872 1.147 
BUSY 0.135 0.040 0.076 3.340 0.001 0.939 1.065 
GRTLONDN 0.196 0.039 0.117 4.982 0.000 0.871 1.148 
LNCR 0.068 0.043 0.042 1.576 0.116 0.672 1.487 
LNDE -0.054 0.017 -0.117 -3.217 0.001 0.368 2.720 
LNDEBTR 0.076 0.019 0.120 3.962 0.000 0.526 1.903 
LNEARN 0.046 0.035 0.052 1.288 0.198 0.301 3.326 
LNINV 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.033 0.974 0.601 1.663 
LNROCE 0.021 0.033 0.023 0.625 0.532 0.367 2.722 
LNROI -0.012 0.029 -0.017 -0.405 0.686 0.261 3.836 
LNSALES 0.422 0.022 0.550 19.494 0.000 0.608 1.645 
LTLBTA 1.163 0.241 0.207 4.820 0.000 0.262 3.813 
SIC 0.037 0.016 0.057 2.317 0.021 0.807 1.239 
SQRTSUBS 0.073 0.017 0.109 4.291 0.000 0.749 1.335 
SW EST -0.283 0.081 -0.080 -3.482 0.001 0.916 1.092 
LNNAFEE 0.184 0.019 0.251 9.747 0.000 0.729 1.372 
ALUMNI -0.155 0.129 -0.069 -1.202 0.230 0.147 6.815 
ALMNEXD 0.113 0.136 0.048 0.829 0.407 0.147 6.798 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. H: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (1396 observations 
with Sales < £251mm), Hypothesis 8 tested 
audit fee difference in this sample. Although the finance director, chairman and/or 
chief executive are responsible for the appointment of the auditor and negotiations 
over the audit fee charged, the fact that these directors are alumni of the current 
auditor makes no difference on the audit fee in the small companies segment of the 
UK audit market for publicly traded companies. 
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Furthermore, when the variable FD entered in the model, its coefficient was not 
significant in the small clients sub-sample, as it was in the large companies market 
(see section 9.1 of this chapter). 
1nAFEE = bi + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H9] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR + b101nEARN + 
b11lnINV + b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + 
b16NENGLND + b17SIC + b18SUBS0.5 + b191 nNA FEE + b20ALUMNI + 
b21 ALMNEXD + b22ALMNFD + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.837 0.701 0.691 0.4538 69.233 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.604 0.278 -5.771 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.093 0.046 -0.049 -2.045 0.041 0.837 1.195 
AUDQN 0.171 0.208 0.018 0.822 0.412 0.964 1.038 
BIG6 0.126 0.043 0.069 2.930 0.004 0.869 1.151 
BUSY 0.128 0.041 0.072 3.161 0.002 0.927 1.078 
GRTLONDN 0.193 0.039 0.116 4.925 0.000 0.870 1.150 
LNCR 0.068 0.043 0.042 1.570 0.117 0.672 1.487 
LNDE -0.054 0.017 -0.117 -3.219 0.001 0.368 2.720 
LNDEBTR 0.076 0.019 0.120 3.955 0.000 0.526 1.903 
LNEARN 0.046 0.035 0.052 1.299 0.195 0.301 3.326 
LNINV 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.021 0.983 0.601 1.663 
LNROCE 0.020 0.033 0.022 0.604 0.546 0.367 2.723 
LNROI -0.012 0.029 -0.017 -0.400 0.689 0.261 3.836 
LNSALES 0.420 0.022 0.548 19.421 0.000 0.607 1.649 
LTLBTA 1.153 0.241 0.205 4.778 0.000 0.262 3.817 
SIC 0.038 0.016 0.058 2.367 0.018 0.806 1.240 
SQRTSUBS 0.073 0.017 0.108 4.262 0.000 0.749 1.335 
SW EST -0.287 0.081 -0.081 -3.528 0.000 0.915 1.093 LNNAFEE 0.184 0.019 0.251 9.754 0.000 0.729 1.372 
ALUMNI 
-0.155 0.128 -0.069 -1.206 0.228 0.147 
6.815 
ALMNEXD 0.183 0.144 0.077 1.266 0.206 0.130 7.695 
ALMNFD 
-0.140 0.098 -0.043 -1.423 0.155 0.521 
1.918 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2.1: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (1396 observations 
with Sales < £251 mm), Hypothesis 9 tested 
Testing_hypothesis 10_ 
Hypothesis 10 provides further evidence on the "alumni effect" and its influence with 
223 
MIRIOJj pq,,, 
regard to the age of the CADRE. Hypothesis 10 was stated in Chapter VI as follows: 
H1O: for the small companies sub-sample, the audit fee charged will not be 
lower or higher as the CADRE becomes older 
Table 9.2. J provides the model comparing the audit fee charged to the auditor small 
clients that have older CADRE on their boards after controlling for other variables 
1nAFEE = bl + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + bSBUSY + 
[H 10] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR +b1 °1nEARN +bt 11nJNV + 
b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + b15LTLBTA + b16NENGLND + b17SIC 
+ b18SUBS0.5 + b19lnNAFEE + b20ALUMNI + b21ALMNEXD + b22ALMNFD 
+ b23AGECADRE + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.839 0.703 0.693 0.4526 66.648 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.762 0.287 -6.135 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.085 0.046 -0.045 -1.870 0.062 0.831 1.203 
AUDQN 0.162 0.207 0.017 0.782 0.435 0.963 1.038 
BIG6 0.131 0.043 0.072 3.060 0.002 0.866 1.155 
BUSY 0.128 0.040 0.072 3.157 0.002 0.927 1.079 
GRTLONDN 0.197 0.039 0.119 5.040 0.000 0.868 1.153 
LNCR 0.059 0.043 0.036 1.355 0.176 0.665 1.503 
LNDE -0.059 0.017 -0.126 -3.469 0.001 0.362 2.766 
LNDEBTR 0.077 0.019 0.120 3.988 0.000 0.526 1.903 
LNEARN 0.045 0.035 0.051 1.283 0.200 0.301 3.326 
LNINV 0.003 0.016 0.006 0.212 0.832 0.596 1.677 
LNROCE 0.022 0.033 0.024 0.657 0.511 0.367 2.725 
LNROI 
-0.012 0.029 -0.017 -0.405 0.685 0.261 3.836 LNSALES 0.418 0.022 0.545 19.359 0.000 0.605 1.652 
LTLBTA 1.207 0.242 0.215 4.988 0.000 0.259 3.861 
SIC 0.038 0.016 0.058 2.366 0.018 0.806 1.240 
SQRTSUBS 0.071 0.017 0.106 4.183 0.000 0.748 1.338 
SWEST 
-0.295 0.081 -0.083 -3.629 0.000 0.913 
1.095 
LNNAFEE 0.185 0.019 0.253 9.855 0.000 0.728 1.374 
ALUMNI 
-0.189 0.129 -0.084 -1.466 0.143 0.144 
6.927 
ALMNEXD 0.236 0.146 0.100 1.614 0.107 0.126 7.935 
ALMNFD 
-0.131 0.098 -0.041 -1.340 0.181 
0.520 1.922 
AGECADRE 0.003 0.002 0.049 2.096 0.037 0.893 1.120 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. J: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (1396 observations 
with Sales < £251mm), Hypothesis 10 tested 
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hypothesised to also affect the level of audit fees. Hypothesis 10 was rejected 
indicating an audit fee difference in this sample. In other words, the coefficient of 
AGECADRE is positive and significant at 0.037 level indicating differential pricing of 
audit services while the CADRE becomes older. This finding is contrary to the finding 
about the AGECADRE variable in the large clients segment of the audit market. 
Testing hypothesis 11: 
Hypothesis 11 provides further evidence on the "alumni effect" and its interaction 
with the fees paid for the provision of non-audit services. Hypothesis 11 was stated in 
Chapter VI as follows: 
HI I: there is no different relationship between audit and non-audit fee because 
of existence of auditor alumni 
Table 9.2. K provides the model comparing the audit fee charged when there is purchase of 
non-audit services as well as an auditor alumni on the board of directors 
in the small client segment of the market after controlling for other variables 
hypothesised to also affect the level of audit fees. Hypothesis 11 could not be rejected 
indicating no audit fee difference in this sample. In other words, the coefficient of 
ALMNNAFE is negative but insignificant indicating no differential pricing of audit 
services when there is a provision of non-audit services by the auditor and 
simultaneously there is an alumni of the incumbent auditor on the board of directors. 
As a result, an insignificant variable is observed in the small clients sub-sample. The 
same finding holds for the large companies market segment. 
9.2.1. A final note in the small companies segment 
In the light of the contradictory results in Simunic (1980) and Palmrose (1986) about a 
Big-Eight auditor price premium in the small client segment of the US audit market 
for publicly-traded companies, Francis and Simon (1987) used three auditor size 
classes to test the association between auditor size and audit fees. Their study reported 
a Big-Eight premium that exists with respect to both second-tier and local/regional 
firms. They provided no evidence of a second-tier price premium with respect to 
local/regional auditors. 
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1nAFEE = bl + b2AGECOMP + b3AUDQN + b4BIG6 + b5BUSY + 
[H 11 ] b6GRTLONDN + b7lnCR + b8lnDE + b91nDEBTR +b1 °InEARN +b 11 lnINV + 
b121nROCE + b13lnROI + b141nSALES + bl5LTLBTA + bl6NENGLND + b17SIC 
+ b18SUBS0*5 + b191nNAFEE + b20ALUMNI + b21ALMNEXD + b22ALMNFD 
+ b23AGECADRE + b24ALMNNAFE + Error 
Note: QR variable was highly collinear with the CR variable in this sub-sample, and it was deleted from the model 
above as a result. 
RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error of F Sig. 
Square the Estimate 
0.839 0.705 0.693 0.4522 63.959 0.000 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Coefficients Coeff icients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.740 0.287 -6.052 0.000 
AGECOMP -0.094 0.046 -0.050 -2.047 0.041 0.817 1.224 
AUDQN 0.127 0.208 0.014 0.611 0.542 0.951 1.052 
BIG6 0.133 0.043 0.073 3.095 0.002 0.865 1.155 
BUSY 0.127 0.040 0.071 3.138 0.002 0.927 1.079 
GRTLONDN 0.194 0.039 0.117 4.959 0.000 0.865 1.156 
LNCR 0.060 0.043 0.037 1.376 0.169 0.665 1.503 
LNDE -0.060 0.017 -0.128 -3.523 0.000 0.361 2.769 
LNDEBTR 0.076 0.019 0.119 3.929 0.000 0.525 1.906 
LNEARN 0.046 0.035 0.052 1.295 0.196 0.301 3.326 
LNINV 0.004 0.016 0.006 0.228 0.820 0.596 1.678 
LNROCE 0.022 0.033 0.024 0.654 0.514 0.367 2.725 
LNROI -0.013 0.029 -0.019 -0.435 0.664 0.261 
3.838 
LNSALES 0.419 0.022 0.546 19.404 0.000 0.605 1.653 
LTLBTA 1.201 0.242 0.214 4.969 0.000 0.259 3.862 
SIC 0.037 0.016 0.056 2.302 0.022 0.805 1.243 
SQRTSUBS 0.070 0.017 0.104 4.098 0.000 0.745 1.342 
SW EST -0.292 0.081 -0.082 -3.596 0.000 
0.913 1.096 
LNNAFEE 0.178 0.019 0.243 9.157 0.000 0.680 1.472 
ALUMNI -0.258 0.137 -0.115 -1.877 0.061 
0.127 7.844 
ALMNEXD 0.228 0.146 0.096 1.559 0.120 0.126 7.947 
ALMNFD -0.122 0.098 -0.038 -1.242 0.215 
0.518 1.930 
AGECADRE 0.003 0.002 0.049 2.111 0.035 0.893 1.120 
ALMNNAFE 0.001 0.001 0.047 1.457 0.146 0.460 2.176 
Dependent Variable: InAFEE 
Table 9.2. K: Results of the multiple regression model for the small clients sub-sample (1396 observations 
with Sales < £251mm), Hypothesis 11 tested 
The current study has replicated Francis and Simon tests using as well three auditor 
size classes in the small clients segment. This has been done, as we have explained at 
the beginning of this chapter and Chapter VI, in order to better control for the 
association between alumni and audit firms. The replicated models for testing the 
hypotheses 3 through 5 have been discussed in the last section. In addition, three extra 
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regression models are considered in this section. Each of these models uses a different 
auditor size class each time and also all the alumni variables that used in testing the 
hypothesis 11. The empirical results from these tests are presented in the Table 9.3. C 
at the end of the chapter. So, for example, HI l(l) in Table 9.3. C represents the test of 
hypothesis 11 using only the Big-Six and second-tier audit firms (i. e. 818 firms); 
H11(2) represents the test of hypothesis 11 using only the Big-Six and local/regional 
accountancy firms (i. e. 779 observations); and, H 11(3) represents the test of 
hypothesis 11 using only the second-tier and other local/regional accountancy 
practices (i. e. 291 firms). 
From the empirical results shown in Table 9.3. C at the end of the chapter, it is worth 
mentioning the following: when the H 11(2) is tested, the ALUMNI variable is 
significant and negative indicating that the small companies benefit from having as 
directors alumni of their auditor by receiving a discount of 29.56% on audit fees. 
Although testing the hypothesis 4, we concluded that the Big-Six firms charge a 
premium of 26.36% comparing with the local/regional firms prices, however, this Big- 
Six premium seems to evaporate when there is an alumni of the incumbent auditor on 
the boards of directors of the small publicly traded companies. Further, testing the 
H 11(3), the AI. MNEXD is significant indicating a positive audit fee difference of 
69% in the presence of non-executive directors. This may be interpreted as non- 
executive directors having a more important role in the everyday management of the 
business and thus, being able to negotiate and decide the level of audit fees paid to 
auditor. A more likely explanation seems to be, however, the small number of non- 
executive directors on the small companies boardrooms. The minor role and lower 
monitoring power of non-executives, therefore, may lead the auditor to assess higher 
levels of inherent risk and as a result to charge higher audit fees. Finally, the age of the 
CADRE is significant and positive in testing the hypotheses H 11(1) and H 11(2), 
although the coefficients are marginally above zero. This indicates a pricing 
differential of audit services while the CADRE becomes older. No other alumni 
variables are significant in testing the H 11(1), H 11(2) and H 11(3). 
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4_ý_ Summary of regression results 
Tables 9.3. A and 9.3. B summarise the results taken from the regression models when 
the hypotheses of this study were tested in the two preceding sections of this chapter. 
The hypotheses which were developed in Chapter VI were tested in two different sub- 
samples, that is the large companies and the small companies segment of the UK audit 
market for the publicly traded companies. 
Briefly speaking here the results indicate a significant difference between audit prices, 
or fees, charged by the Big-Six and those charged by the non-Big Six accounting 
firms. A summary and implications of these results together with a discussion of the 
best way or ways to explain the pricing differential follows in the next chapter. 
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Summary of regression estimates for large clients sub-sample 
B Coefficient 
t value 
H1 H6 H7 H8 H9(1) H9(2) H10 H11 
(Constant) 
AGECOMP 
AUDQN 
BIG6 
BUSY 
GRTLONDN 
LNCR 
LNDE 
LNDEBTR 
LNEARN 
LNINV 
LNROCE 
LNROI 
LNSALES 
LTLBTA 
NENGLD 
SIC 
SQRTSUBS 
LNNAFEE 
ALUMNI 
ALMNEXD 
ALMNFD 
FD 
AGECADRE 
ALMNNAFE 
-4.457" 
-5.629 
0.049 
0.370 
0.021 
0.051 
0.166 
1.010 
-0.021 
-0.170 
0.246** 
2.504 
0.286** 
2.086 
-0.113* 
-2.624 
0.158* 
3.188 
0.111 
1.088 
-0.067 
-1.445 
0.192** 
2.178 
-0.178** 
-2.289 
0.604* 
11.248 
2.139* 
3.564 
-0.646* 
-2.370 
0.160* 
4.918 
0.047*** 
1.909 
-2.969* 
-3.619 
0.073 
0.574 
0.024 
0.064 
0.070 
0.438 
-0.094 
-0.774 
0.225** 
2.367 
0.375* 
2.908 
-0.053 
-1.263 
0.131* 
2.786 
0.005 
0.049 
-0.060 
-1.387 
0.150*** 
1.765 
-0.105 
-1.402 
0.429* 
7.053 
1.098*** 
1.856 
-0.566** 
-2.232 
0.163* 
5.132 
0.042*** 
1.772 
0.260* 
5.055 
-2.916* 
-4.748 
0.149 
1.571 
-0.179 
-0.592 
0.074 
0.630 
-0.032 
-0.369 
0.300* 
4.401 
0.393* 
4.148 
-0.072** 
-2.215 
0.101* 
2.854 
0.043 
0.521 
-0.054 
-1.660 
0.174* 
2.967 
-0.127** 
-2.094 
0.399* 
8.667 
1.498* 
3.262 
-0.595* 
-3.251 
0.141* 
5.700 
0.060* 
3.222 
0.268* 
6.666 
-0.008 
-0.088 
-2.931 * 
-4.771 
0.139 
1.452 
-0.170 
-0.564 
0.069 
0.586 
-0.034 
-0.395 
0.301 * 
4.406 
0.385* 
4.052 
-0.071 ** 
-2.192 
0.101* 
2.868 
0.046 
0.556 
-0.053 
-1.636 
0.174* 
2.971 
-0.128*" 
-2.109 
0.402* 
8.721 
1.492* 
3.250 
-0.592* 
-3.233 
0.140* 
5.668 
0.060* 
3.225 
0.266* 
6.590 
0.237 
0.939 
-0.273 
-1.033 
-2.940* 
-4.809 
0.130 
1.363 
-0.157 
-0.524 
0.090 
0.771 
-0.051 
-0.596 
0.310" 
4.550 
0.390* 
4.126 
-0.068** 
-2.101 
0.097* 
2.755 
0.040 
0.493 
-0.052 
-1.592 
0.174* 
2.995 
-0.124** 
-2.049 
0.398* 
8.671 
1.465* 
3.203 
-0.603* 
-3.308 
0.139* 
5.642 
0.060* 
3.260 
0.277* 
6.813 
0.238 
0.947 
-0.381 
-1.413 
0.314*** 
1.802 
-2.922* 
-4.826 
0.138 
1.462 
-0.121 
-0.404 
0.119 
1.025 
-0.061 
-0.721 
0.292* 
4.308 
0.385* 
4.104 
-0.068** 
-2.133 
0.100* 
2.852 
0.036 
0.447 
-0.048 
-1.501 
0.180* 
3.120 
-0.127** 
-2.115 
0.397* 
8.727 
1.490* 
3.289 
-0.590* 
-3.266 
0.138* 
5.656 
0.060* 
3.266 
0.283* 
7.015 
0.166 
0.659 
-0.355 
-1.330 
0.460** 
2.506 
-0.158** 
-2.342 
-3.041 
-4.917 
0.133 
1.401 
-0.141 
-0.471 
0.124 
1.061 
-0.060 
-0.712 
0.295* 
4.345 
0.378* 
4.013 
-0.070** 
-2.180 
0.105" 
2.960 
0.045 
0.547 
-0.049 
-1.512 
0.179* 
3.100 
-0.133** 
-2.203 
0.398* 
8.739 
1.495* 
3.300 
-0.597' 
-3.300 
0.136* 
5.571 
0.057* 
3.113 
0.280* 
6.952 
0.162 
0.645 
-0.332 
-1.239 
0.453** 
2.466 
-0.151 ** 
-2.221 
0.003 
0.949 
R 0.872 0.896 0.888 0.888 0.890 0.893 0.893 
R Square 0.761 0.803 0.788 0.789 0.791 0.797 0.798 
Adj R Square 0.727 0.773 0.771 0.771 0.772 0.777 0.777 
F 22.469+ 25.818+ 45.232+ 42.985+ 41.364+ 40.680+ 38.933+ 
-3.195* 
-5.119 
0.145 
1.535 
-0.140 
-0.471 
0.136 
1.164 
-0.064 
-0.753 
0.302* 
4.456 
0.374* 
3.992 
-0.068** 
-2.111 
0.094* 
2.632 
0.048 
0.593 
-0.041 
-1.277 
0.184* 
3.190 
-0.136** 
-2.258 
0.399* 
8.783 
1.477* 
3.270 
-0.608* 
-3.370 
0.136* 
5.606 
0.057* 
3.103 
0.299* 
7.139 
0.215 
0.852 
-0.317 
-1.186 
0.490* 
2.654 
-0.147** 
-2.168 
0.003 
1.050 
0.000 
-1.580 
0.894 
0.800 
0.779 
37.661 + 
Figures in italics are t-statistics. indicates the t-value of coefficients are significant at the 
1%, 517, and 
spectively (two-tailed test). + indicates the F-value is significant at the 
0.01 % level. 
229 
Table 9.3. B: Summary of regression estimates for small clients sub-sample 
B Coefficient 
t value 
H2 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H11 
(Constant) -1.969* -1.630* -1.635* -1.627* -1.604* -1.762 --1.740* 
-5.688 -5.880 -5.894 -5.861 -5.771 -6.135 -6.052 
AGECOMP -0.107*** -0.087*** -0.090** -0.091** -0.093** -0.085*** -0.094** 
-1.884 -1.914 -1.979 -1.988 -2.045 -1.870 -2.047 
AUDQN 0.411 *** 0.160 0.162 0.158 0.171 0.162 0.127 
1.826 0.771 0.781 0.763 0.822 0.782 0.611 
BUSY 0.088*** 0.134* 0.135* 0.135* 0.128* 0.128* 0.127* 
1.690 3.333 3.350 3.340 3.161 3.157 3.138 
GRTLONDN 0.271 * 0.196* 0.195* 0.196* 0.193* 0.197* 0.194* 
5.491 5.004 4.982 4.982 4.925 5.040 4.959 
LNCR 0.122** 0.068 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.059 0.060 
2.315 1.583 1.588 1.576 1.570 1.355 1.376 
LNDE -0.027 -0.052* -0.054* -0.054* -0.054* -0.059* -0.060* 
-1.250 -3.119 -3.190 -3.217 -3.219 -3.469 -3.523 
LNDEBTR 0.064* 0.074* 0.075* 0.076* 0.076* 0.077* 0.076* 
2.678 3.859 3.919 3.962 3.955 3.988 3.929 
LNEARN 0.110** 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.046 
2.394 1.341 1.329 1.288 1.299 1.283 1.295 
LNINV -0.028 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.004 
-1.459 0.080 0.062 0.033 0.021 0.212 0.228 
LNROCE -0.019 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.022 
-0.468 0.636 0.676 0.625 0.604 0.657 0.654 
LNROI -0.056 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 
-1.471 -0.465 -0.450 -0.405 -0.400 -0.405 -0.435 
LNSALES 0.506* 0.421 * 0.422* 0.422* 0.420* 0.418* 0.419* 
19.958 19.498 19.503 19.494 19.421 19.359 19.404 
LTLBTA 0.841 * 1.129* 1.159* 1.163* 1.153* 1.207* 1.201 * 
2.727 4.708 4.805 4.820 4.778 4.988 4.969 
SIC 0.053* 0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 0.038** 0.038** 0.037** 
2.587 2.302 2.342 2.317 2.367 2.366 2.302 
SQRTSUBS 0.100* 0.074* 0.073* 0.073* 0.073* 0.071 * 0.070* 
4.492 4.374 4.285 4.291 4.262 4.183 4.098 
SWEST -0.231 * -0.279* -0.282* -0.283* -0.287* -0.295* -0.292* 
-2.837 -3.433 -3.469 -3.482 -3.528 -3.629 -3.596 
BIG6 0.199* 0.120* 0.124* 0.123* 0.126* 0.131* 0.133* 
3.662 2.811 2.884 2.854 2.930 3.060 3.095 
LNNAFEE ----- 0.184* 0.184* 0.184* 0.184* 0.185* 0.178* 
9.774 9.752 9.747 9.754 9.855 9.157 
ALUMNI ----- ----- -0.056 -0.155 -0.155 -0.189 -0.258*** 
-1.127 -1.202 -1.206 -1.466 -1.877 
ALMNEXD 
----- ----- ----- 0.113 0.183 0.236 0.228 
0.829 1.266 1.614 1.559 
ALMNFD 
----- ----- ----- ----- -0.140 -0.131 -0.122 
-1.423 -1.340 -1.242 
AGECADRE 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.003** 0.003** 
2.096 2.111 
ALMNNAFE 
---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.001 
1.457 
R 0.827 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.839 0.839 
R Square 0.684 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.701 0.703 0.705 
Adjusted R 0.672 0.692 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.693 0.693 
Square 
F 54.522+ 80.937+ 76.291 + 72.474+ 69.233+ 66.648+ 63.959+ 
Figures in italics are t- 
statistics. *, **, *** 
indicates the t-value of 
coefficients are significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively (two-tailed 
test). + indicates the F-value 
is significant at the 0.01 % 
level. 
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C: Regression estimates of hypotheses 3-5 for small clients sub-sample 
incorporating the alumni variables 
H3 H4 H5 H11(1) H11(2) H11(3) 
(Constant) -2.189* -1.863* -2.901 * -1.917* -1.568* -1.688* 
-7.328 -5.840 -5.542 -6.305 -4.858 -2.941 
AGECOMP -0.099** -0.082 -0.319* -0.089*** -0.064 -0.261 * 
-2.033 -1.639 -3.209 -1.843 -1.280 -2.637 
AUDQN 0.363*** 0.348 0.433 0.151 0.119 ------ 
1.895 1.554 1.043 0.728 0.565 
BUSY 0.124* 0.095** 0.170** 0.127* 0.119* 0.167** 
2.873 2.038 2.296 2.990 2.587 2.350 
GRTLONDN 0.245* 0.241 * 0.185** 0.217* 0.212* 0.051 
5.779 5.327 2.492 5.235 4.820 0.673 
LNCR 0.172* 0.101** 0.138*** 0.096** 0.032 0.081 
3.674 1.990 1.699 2.077 0.651 1.026 
LNDE -0.046** -0.045** -0.014 -0.061 * -0.065* 0.009 
-2.407 -2.312 -0.433 -3.302 -3.444 0.294 
LNDEBTR 0.078* 0.065* 0.004 0.089* 0.075* 0.017 
3.817 2.941 0.104 4.408 3.426 0.475 
LNEARN 0.048 0.099** -0.071 0.019 0.071 *** 0.025 
1.138 2.453 -1.002 0.469 1.858 0.372 
LNINV -0.040** -0.010 -0.026 -0.020 0.016 0.008 
-2.241 -0.502 -0.976 -1.088 0.870 0.308 
LNROCE 0.003 -0.002 0.038 0.038 0.011 0.031 
0.076 -0.043 0.596 1.042 0.313 0.508 
LNROI -0.026 -0.057*** 0.073 -0.004 -0.033 0.057 
-0.792 -1.660 1.237 -0.134 -1.004 0.996 
LNSALES 0.520* 0.491 * 0.596* 0.426* 0.403* 0.463* 
23.828 21.046 14.469 18.747 17.027 9.810 
LTLBTA 1.004* 1.040* 0.661 1.189* 1.289* 0.341 
3.908 3.809 1.360 4.652 4.788 0.726 
SIC 0.036** 0.026 0.094* 0.032*** 0.017 0.103* 
2.131 1.429 3.240 1.932 0.942 3.526 
SQRTSUBS 0.095* 0.111 * -0.004 0.078* 0.081 * -0.034 
5.202 5.900 -0.105 4.392 4.376 -0.930 
SW EST -0.262* -0.207** -0.132 -0.323* -0.271 * -0.173 
-3.089 -2.373 -0.692 -3.809 -3.087 -0.977 
B6B14 0.174* 0.104** ----- ----- 
3.496 2.038 
B60THER 0.234* ------ 0.164** ----- 
3.566 2.549 
B140THER 0.058 ------ ----- 0.051 
0.785 0.688 
LNNAFEE ----- ----- ----- 0.179* 0.176* 0.206* 
8.625 7.977 5.786 
ALUMNI ----- ----- ----- -0.145 -0.259*** -0.621 
** 
-0.972 -1.702 -2.512 
ALMNEXD ----- ----- ----- 0.095 0.255 0.525*** 
0.608 1.590 1.753 
ALMNFD 
----- ----- ----- -0.112 -0.147 
0.091 
-1.121 -1.395 0.309 
AGECADRE 
----- ----- ----- 0.003*** 0.004** 
0.001 
1.864 2.044 0.339 
ALMNNAFE 
----- ----- ----- 0.001 0.001 
0.003 
1.281 1.245 0.890 
R 0.808 0.796 0.879 0.830 0.826 0.897 
R Square 0.653 0.634 0.772 0.689 0.682 0.805 
Adjusted R 0.644 0.622 0.750 0.676 0.667 0.777 
Square 
F 67.721 + 56.439+ 35.455+ 53.210+ 47.038+ 28.837+ 
Figures in italics are t- 
statistics. *, **, *** 
indicates the t-value of 
coefficients are significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively (two-tailed 
test). + indicates the F-value 
is significant at the 0.01 % 
level. In H 11(3), audit 
qualification variable is 
deleted from the estimated 
model as it became a 
constant. 
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CHAPTER X 
SY ARYL DISCUSSION, 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter provides a brief summary and discussion of the principal findings of 
the research. The market structure for the audits is offered as an explanation of the 
audit pricing differences observed in the UK audit market. In addition, the 
implications of the findings and limitations of the study are also discussed. In the last 
section of this chapter, I suggest possible areas for future research to extend the 
present results. 
10.1. Summary of the study 
Researchers have examined the form of the auditor fee function in many studies over 
the last two decades. These studies use data samples mainly from the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia. Generally, the results are consistent with the audit 
fee being a function of client factors, such as size and complexity, client risk to fail, 
and audit firm factors such as size, tenure, specialisation, provision of non-audit 
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services. These factors are related to the audit fees through their influence on the costs 
delivering the audit. 
While prior research has thoroughly examined most of the possible factors affecting 
the audit fee, none of the previous studies has looked at the possible interaction 
between the audit fee and the alumni of the accounting firms. That is, whether a 
director(s), who is(are) simultaneously chartered accountant(s) qualified with an 
accountancy firm, is(are) associated with the audit fee. This association would exist if 
the director-chartered accountant's (i. e. the CADRE's) present employer uses as 
auditor the CADRE's alma mater (i. e. CADRE's qualifying audit firm). Such an 
association may affect the costs of delivering an audit and those costs may be passed 
to the client in the audit fee. This study contributes to the existing auditor fee function 
literature by trying to establish the existence of this association. The results of this 
study provide some evidence that these factors, which have to do with the internal 
structure of the large accountancy firms and their high staff turnover, are associated 
with the audit fee. This study examines the association of auditors' alumni with their 
alma mater and how this association may affect the audit fee. This study is also the 
first to use particular measures of this variable. 
Prior to testing the specific hypotheses of this study on -main effects as well as 
interaction effects in Chapter IX, Chapter II provided a theoretical analysis and 
explanation of the "alumni effect" as well as insights into the direction of the sign of 
the "alumni effect" in relation to the setting of audit fees level. Chapter II has 
described how the internal structure of the accountancy firms is tied together due to 
the existence of a profit sharing model, up-or-out personnel policy and firm-specific 
human capital. It also showed theoretically why the alumni of the audit firms might 
continue an association with their alma mater years after having been outplaced by 
drawing on sociological and psychological research. Finally, Chapter II has illustrated 
how the bond potentially formed between trainee and firm is then maintained to 
translate into action with certain economic effects years later. Chapter III offered a 
review of the audit market research and the factors found to affect audit fees. The time 
consuming steps in the process of collecting and building the dataset are described in 
Chapter IV. In the same chapter some descriptive statistics about the CADRE and a 
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historical reference to Big-Six predecessor firms are made. Having identified the 
importance of the alumni for the audit firms from a theoretical, human capital and 
managerial incentives perspective (Chapter II), and having reviewed the relevant audit 
fee literature (Chapter III), Chapter V explored whether any "alumni effect" is 
reflected in audit prices. Specifically, it investigated the association between 
CADRE's auditor and CADRE's ALMA MATER for different definitions of CADRE 
and ALMA MATER. The results are consistent among the different definitions. The 
major finding is that such an association does exist in the UK audit market for 
publicly traded companies. In other words, an "alumni effect" prevails the UK market 
for accountancy and audit services. The question of whether this association leads to 
higher or lower audit fees or does not influence the audit fee charged at all was asked 
in Chapter IX (see below). Meanwhile, Chapter VI offered the formulation of 
hypotheses to be tested in this study and a description of the variables selected to test 
the hypotheses. 
Chapter VII provided descriptive statistics by auditee size sub-samples and by auditor 
group (i. e. Big-Six vs. non-Big Six firms) sub-samples. The large companies sub- 
sample of the current study was defined as auditees with sales greater than or equal to 
£251 million, whereas the small client market segment was defined as companies with 
sales less than £251 million. This is consistent with the sharp increase of the 
Herfindahl Index around the boundary of £251 million. See Tables 7.2.1 .A and 
7.2.2. A of Chapter VII for a summary of the descriptive statistics. 
The development of the research design and the tests performed to detect violations of 
assumptions underlying the multiple regression analysis were presented in Chapter 
VIII. The "basic" regression model was applied to the total sample of observations to 
assess its descriptive validity prior to using the model on client size sub-samples to 
test the specific hypotheses of this study. Table 8.4. A of Chapter VIII presents the 
"basic" multiple regression model for the total sample. The model supports the overall 
descriptive validity of the variables used to explain the level of external audit fees. 
The model explains 85.40% of the variability in audit fees. Most of the variables are 
individually significant and in the hypothesised direction, except as discussed in that 
section (i. e. section 8.4 of Chapter VIII). Further, the examination of the residuals and 
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identification of outliers as influential observations did not provide evidence to 
indicate the assumptions underlying the multivariate analysis were seriously violated. 
Furthermore, the variance inflation factors (VIF) and the correlation matrix were 
examined and did not detect existence of multicollinearity. See the correlation 
matrices in Tables 8.3. A and 8.3. B and VIF measures in Table 8.4. A of Chapter VIII. 
The main hypotheses developed in Chapter VI were tested in client size sub-samples 
in Chapter IX. The basic method of data analysis in the research is a series of 
regressions of observed audit prices (i. e. fees paid to auditors) on a set of hypothesised 
explanatory variables. Table 10.1 .A 
below provides a summary of the hypotheses 
tested in the current study. Hypotheses 1 through 6 are a replication, while hypotheses 
7 through 11 are the main hypotheses of the thesis'. Hypothesis 1 was accepted 
indicating no audit fee difference among the Big-Six and non-Big Six firms in the 
large companies market segment. See Table 9.1 .A of 
Chapter IX for the model used to 
test the hypothesis 1. Hypotheses 2 through 5 were tested only in the small client 
segment of the UK audit market. Hypothesis 2 was rejected, with a positive and 
significant (p value < 0.001) audit firm size coefficient, indicating that there is a Big- 
Six audit fee premium over the non-Big Six firms charged to small quoted companies 
in the small client sub-sample. See Table 9.2. A of Chapter IX for the model used to 
test the hypothesis 2. Hypotheses 3 through 5 provided a richer test of the association 
between auditor size and audit fee in the small client segment by using three audit 
firm size categories. The non-Big Six accountancy firm category was partitioned 
further into the second-tier audit firms and all other firms having local or regional 
offices/practices. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were rejected at less than 0.001 significance 
level indicating that the Big-Six firms charge a premium over the second-tier firms as 
well as over the local/regional firms in the small audit market. See Tables 9.2. B and 
9.2. C of Chapter IX for the models used to test the hypotheses 3 and 4 respectively. 
Hypothesis 5 could not be rejected, with ap value of 0.433, indicating no second-tier 
firms price premium over the local/regional accounting practices. See Table 9.2. D of 
Chapter IX for the model used to test the hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 6 was accepted at 
less than 0.001 significance level in both large and small client sub-samples indicating 
an audit fee difference due to provision of non-audit services. See Tables 9.1 .B and 
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9.2. F of Chapter IX for the models used to test the hypothesis 6 in the large and small 
company audits respectively. 
Table 10.1. A: Summary and results of hypotheses tested 
Findings in 
Hypotheses 
Large 
clients 
sub-sample 
-------------- 
Small 
clients 
---------- --- 
sub-sample 
--------------- 
H1 there will be no differential accepted not tested 
pricing of audit services between 
Big Six and non-Big Six accountancy 
firms. 
H2 the Big Six charge lower audit fee not tested rejected 
than (or equal to) the non-Big Six 
firm. 
H3 the Big Six charge lower audit fee not tested rejected 
than (or equal to) the second-tier 
accountancy firms. 
H4 the Big Six charge lower audit fee not tested rejected 
than (or equal to) the 
local/regional accountancy firms. 
H5 the second-tier firms charge lower not tested accepted 
audit fee than (or equal to) the 
local/regional accountancy firms. 
H6 the pricing of audit services is accepted accepted 
related to the pricing of non-audit 
services. 
H7 it makes no difference on audit fees accepted accepted 
when any director is an ex-employee 
of the auditor. 
H8 on average it makes no difference on accepted accepted 
audit fees when a non-executive 
director is an ex-employee of the 
auditor. 
H9 there is no audit fee difference rejected accepted 
when the chairman, chief executive 
or finance director are an alumni of 
the auditor. 
H10 the audit fee charged will not be accepted rejected 
lower or higher as the CADRE becomes 
older. 
Hil there is no different relationship accepted accepted 
between audit and non-audit fee 
because of existence of auditor 
alumni. 
Hypotheses 7 through 11 refer to the existence of the "alumni effect" on audit fees. 
Chapter V has shown that there is an "alumni effect" in the UK audit market, 
in other 
See Chanter VI for a discussion of the hypotheses. 
236 
WZ17 4-M , 7M, 
words that there is an association between CADRE's auditor and CADRE's alma 
mater. However, this association does not appear to have an influence on the audit 
fees charged in both small and large client segment of the audit market. As a result, 
hypothesis 7 could not be rejected in both sub-samples. See Tables 9.1 .C and 9.2. G of 
Chapter IX for the models used to test the hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 8 could not be 
rejected in both sub-samples too indicating no audit fee difference when a non- 
executive is an alumni of the incumbent auditor in both small and large client segment 
of the UK audit market. See Tables 9.1 .D and 9.2. H of Chapter IX for the models used 
to test the hypothesis 8. 
Contrary outputs were given when the hypothesis 9 and 10 were tested in the two sub- 
samples. Hypothesis 9 relating to the "alumni effect" and its interaction with those 
CADRE who are finance directors, chairmen and chief executives was rejected in the 
large companies sub-sample. The variable ALMNFD was found to be significant (at 
the 0.073 level) and positive indicating higher audit fees when the finance director 
and/or chairman and/or chief executive turn(s) out to be an alumni of the incumbent 
auditor. However, hypothesis 9 was not rejected in the small client segment of the 
market. See Tables 9.1. E and 9.2.1 of Chapter IX for the models used to test the 
hypothesis 9. Hypothesis 10 was rejected in the small auditee sub-sample at the 0.037 
level of significance indicating an audit fee difference while the CADRE becomes 
older. However, hypothesis 10 was not rejected in the large client segment of the UK 
audit market. See Tables 9.1 .F and 
9.2. J of Chapter IX for the models used to test the 
hypothesis 10. Finally, hypothesis 11 could not be rejected in both sub-samples of the 
audit market indicating no audit fee difference when there is purchase of non-audit 
services and at the same time there is an alumni of the incumbent auditor on the board 
of directors. See Tables 9.1 .G and 
9.2. K of Chapter IX for the models used to test the 
hypothesis 11. 
In addition, hypothesis 11 was tested in Chapter IX by incorporating the three 
different auditor size classes used in testing the hypotheses 3 through 5. This has been 
done in order to examine the direction and significance of the alumni variables in 
different auditor settings. The main findings are: When the Big-Six and local/regional 
firms were included in the model the ALUMNI variable was significant and negative 
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10.2. The market structure for audits2 
The results of this study indicate significant different audit prices (or fees) in the UK 
audit market when different factors hypothesised to affect audit fees are taken into 
consideration. This pricing differential may be explained in four ways: 
(1) it reflects pricing collusion among the Big-Six audit firms, 
(2) it reflects barriers to entry by the non-Big Six firms into the Big-Six firms 
audit segment, 
(3) it reflects successful product differentiation of the Big-Six relative to non- 
Big Six audit firms, and/or 
(4) it reflects the existence of alumni of the accountancy firms on the boards of 
companies. 
Following is a discussion of the best way or ways to explain the audit pricing 
differential (or no differential). 
10.2.1. The collusion explanation 
A collusion explanation of the Big-Six firms pricing differential consists of four 
propositions: (i) The audit market is highly concentrated. Ninety-seven percent of 
public companies with sales greater then £2 billion and eighty-two percent of 
companies with sales between £251 and £1,900 million were audited by the Big-Six 
2 See also Yardley et al (1992) for a specific discussion on the structure of market for audit services, and 
Scherer 
and Ross (1990), Waterson (1985), Cubbin (1988) for a general discussion on the market structure and industrial 
organisation. 
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firms in 1996 3. (ii) Since the likelihood of collusion (i. e. co-operative pricing) 
increases with the concentration ratio, there must be a presumption that the Big-Six 
firms engage in collusive pricing. (iii) This collusion in turn can be presumed to lead 
to price-setting power above marginal cost; or, as it is sometimes put, to excess 
"monopoly" profits. (iv) The collusion can also be presumed to make it possible only 
for the Big-Six firms to charge higher prices than the non-Big Six firms. 
Proposition two is at best problematical with industrial organisation economists 
viewing sceptically its validity. The positive association between industry profitability 
and seller concentration has been spurious (Scherer and Ross, 1990), meaning that 
high concentration does not necessarily leads to collusive behaviour. 
The third proposition is also problematical. Above cost pricing4, or monopoly pricing, 
is a function not only of the combined market share of leading dominant firms (i. e. the 
Big-Six audit firms), but also of potential supply from either smaller existing rival 
companies or new competitors that could enter the industry. As Samuelson (1965) 
pointed out, a one-firm industry's concentration ratio would be 100 percent, and yet 
the ability to hold prices above marginal cost of that one-firm could be zero if the 
potential supply elasticity were great enough. In other words, the fact that the 
incumbents (i. e. a cartel of large auditors) may co-ordinate their behaviour (i. e. 
collude) does not necessarily mean that above cost pricing will occur. 
Finally, the fourth proposition does not hold too. If the Big-Six and the non-Big Six 
accountancy firms sell audit services in the same concentrated market, the non-Big 
Six firms are free to match the prices charged by the Big-Six firms. There is nothing 
in the nature of collusion that says only the big players (i. e. Big-Six auditors) can 
enjoy the fruits of collusion. In fact, monopoly (that is, joint profit-maximising) prices 
are "umbrella" prices. Everybody gets to charge them. Indeed, as we just saw, that is 
why the third proposition does not follow. 
These percentages are based on our sample. See section 7.1.1 of Chapter VII for a complete table of the 
UK Big- 
Six auditor concentration ratios. These percentages do not differ from other studies'. 4 Above cost pricing refers to pricing with profits greater than normal profits. 
239 
In summary, the collusive explanation is clearly a weak explanation of audit fee 
differential. 
10.2.2. The barriers to entry explanation 
The barriers to entry explanation of the pricing differential in the UK audit market 
tells a different story than the collusion explanation. The barriers to entry explanation 
requires the following propositions: (i) The large audit (i. e. the Big-Six) firms 
increasingly dominate large company audits and this fact may be explained by two 
major cost advantages that Big-Six firms enjoy over the prospective non-Big Six 
entrants into the market for audit services to large companies segments. The first 
advantage is that Big-Six firms have already expended the capital necessary to 
produce these services6. The second advantage is the accumulation of goodwill or 
brand "image" or reputation that Big-Six firms have succeeded over the years. (ii) 
These competitive advantages cannot be overcome unless comparable investment of 
capital and expenditures necessary for name recognition to be built are made by each 
non-Big Six audit firm. (iii) The prospective non-Big Six firms do not enter the large 
companies segment of the market since they do not have the resources to meet the 
above requirements. (iv) Given these barriers into the market, the Big-Six auditors are 
free to raise audit prices significantly above cost without attracting entry. (v) If no 
pricing above cost occurs, then the established Big-Six firms may enjoy certain 
economies of scale which at least partially are passed through in the form of lower 
prices to clients. 
With regard to the second proposition, it is argued that the long history of each of the 
Big-Six firms together with their heavy advertising expenditure' facilitate the building 
up of the consumer loyalty to their products, and that the loyalty created in this way 
makes entry difficult for newcomers or smaller existing players (Waterson, 1985; 
Scherer and Ross, 1990). Also, advertising contributes to brand image formation 
` Other categories of barriers (apart from legal exclusions) are product differentiation advantages and economies of 
scale (Waterson, 1985; Scherer and Ross, 1990). Product differentiation will be discussed in the next section. We 
do not follow Stigler's (1968) definition which is also adopted by Dopuch and Simunic (1982) and which in 
essence precludes economies of scale as barriers to entry. 6 Capital costs may include costs such as offices, libraries, training centres, and so on, and also transaction costs 
for recruitment, training and communication networks. 
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which in turn may create monopoly power. Further, no other accounting firm appears 
to have reached the world-wide "credibility" image of the Big-Six firms and the 
reason for this inequality, implied by Dopuch and Simunic (1980), is that the 
formation of each of the Big-Six firms preceded the adoption of the advertising 
prohibition rule. 
Nevertheless, this restriction in advertising has been lifted nowadays and remains to 
see whether other accountancy firm(s) will join the dominant tier8. Non-Big Six firms 
are legally capable9 and also appear to be financially capable of entering the large 
client segment of the market which is dominated by the large audit firms. Moreover, 
from the data in Table 7.2.2. A of Chapter VII, where the descriptive statistics are 
provided, is evident that there is much crossover between the Big-Six and non-Big Six 
clients and the non-Big Six audit firms are in market for large client audits. Thus, the 
third proposition is still questionable. 
The fourth proposition is also problematical. Even if we grant the fact that there are 
barriers to entry into the large companies segment of the UK audit market and, 
therefore, the large established (i. e. Big-Six) firms are permitted to hold prices above 
their own costs without attracting new entrants or fringe rival expansion (i. e. non-Big 
Six audit firms) (Scherer and Ross, 1990; McConnell and Brue, 1993), the evidence 
from testing the hypothesis 1 in Chapter IX suggests that there is not differential 
pricing of audit services between Big-Six and non-Big Six audit firms in the large 
clients market segment. 
Finally, proposition five may explain the existence of no differential pricing of audit 
services in the large company audits. Each of the Big-Six firms have built strong 
brand names and loyalties (Craswell et al, 1995), and also have succeeded in 
7 Especially after the easing of the accountancy profession's restrictions on member firms advertising in 1983. 
Craswell et al (1997) also suggest that the changes in professional rules (i. e. removing the ban on advertising) 
should have reduced the ability of the Big-Eight firms to charge a premium. Their evidence does not support their 
argument though. Conversely, Davis et al (1999) find a reduction in the Big-Six firms fee premium in the mid- 
1980's when the relaxation of the restrictive regulations took place. 9 In both the UK and the USA, the legal requirement to render audit services as a sole practitioner or a firm partner 
is a certification through examination of competence and the fulfilment of experience requirements necessary to 
obtain certification or licencing. 
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differentiating their audits relative to the audits of the non-Big Six firms10. Both these 
elements may permit Big-Six auditors to charge higher audit prices and entry barriers 
to be emerged, according to the industrial economics theory. Yet due to the existence 
of scale economies accruing to large dominant accountancy firms in the audits of large 
clients, higher audit fee charges due to product differentiation and brand name 
recognition are offset resulting in observing no audit fee difference between Big-Six 
and non-Big Six audit firms in the large companies segment of the UK audit market. 
Put another way, non-Big Six diseconomies of scale in the large company audits offset 
Big-Six premiums (due to product differentiation and brand name recognition) 
resulting in no significant differences in audit fees. Moreover, the same brand loyalties 
and economies of scale in product differentiation may raise barriers to entry of new 
competition, explaining perhaps the dominance (i. e. high market shares) of the Big- 
Six firms in the large company audits overtime. 
In conclusion, the barrier to entry explanation appears to be better than the collusion 
explanation in describing the lack of differential pricing in the large company segment 
between the Big-Six and non-Big Six accountancy firms. 
10.2.3. The product differentiation explanation 
The product differentiation explanation of the pricing differential in the UK audit 
market consists of four propositions: (i) For the purposes of understanding the Big-Six 
firms pricing differential in the small company audits it is best to think of the audit 
services market as essentially homogeneous". (ii) In this market the Big-Six audit 
firms succeed in differentiating the audit (and non-audit) services they provide relative 
to the services of the non-Big Six firms. Big-Six auditors manage to do this by adding 
"features" to their product, for example maintain large and well-trained staff, supply 
enhanced accounting and auditing knowledge which includes industry expertise, offer 
world-wide "locational" convenience. Also, Big-Six firms differentiate their products 
by aggressively promoting the product by some combination of direct selling and 
10 See next section below for further discussion on Big-Six product differentiation. 
Product or service homogeneity prevails when the offerings of competing sellers (i. e. provision of audit services 
by the accountancy firms) are alike so that they are virtually perfect substitutes in the mind of consumers (i. e. 
auditors' clients). 
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advertising and in effect they impose the subjective image which in turn is impressed 
on the client's mind. The effect of this differentiation is to increase the demand for the 
Big-Six product relative to what it would otherwise be12. (iii) The Big-Six firms 
choose to exploit their successful product differentiation effort by charging a premium 
relative to the price charged by the non-Big Six firms for their product13. (iv) Whether 
this premium charged by the Big-Six firms results in a significant mark-up of prices 
over costs depends on the additions to these costs generated by the differentiation 
effort. 
Proposition three may explain the audit price premium found in the small client 
market segment of this study. That is, the Big-Six and non-Big Six audit firms have 
differentiated products and the Big-Six charge a premium for their product. On the 
other hand, buyers (i. e. audit clients) are willing to pay a higher price for that Big-Six 
firms' differentiated products than they would for the otherwise comparable products 
of new entrants or fringe small audit firms. 
With regard to the fourth proposition, we argue that the existence of audit price 
differential reflects product differentials but not necessarily profit above zero for the 
Big-Six accounting firms. There may be costs associated with the Big-Six firms' 
product differentiation. These costs may result in cost function differences between 
the Big-Six and the non-Big Six firms, making it necessary for the Big-Six firms to 
charge a premium than non-Big Six firms while both may realise zero profits. This 
costly product differentiation allows for price differences but not necessarily profit 
differences between the Big-Six and the non-Big Six firms. The Big-Six firms would 
charge more than the non-Big Six firms because of their higher costs14. This explains 
a price differential without, however, an above cost price. 
There are two alternative explanations concerning the fourth proposition. The first 
argument, explained in the preceding paragraph, illustrates that there is competition in 
12 Note here that the "lemons problem" may arise if the Big-Six accountancy firms cannot distinguish themselves 
from the non-Bix Six and consequently the non-Bix Six firms hide the quality of their product (because they 
find it 
in their interest) (Akerlof, 1970; Wilson, 1980). 
13 Klein and Leffler (1981) explain the fee premium as product superiority. "See 
next section for a discussion of the reasons cited as explanation for the Big-Six 
firms having higher audit 
costs. 
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the small company market segment with differentiated product to the Big-Six firms 
which nevertheless have a different cost function from the non-Big Six firms (due to 
the costs of product differentiation). This allows for price differences but not 
necessarily profits above zero for the Big-Six firms. The other alternative talks about 
product differentiation with the Big-Six and non-Big Six firms having the same cost 
function. This alternative allows for price differentials and profits above zero for the 
Big-Six auditors. 
It must be noted here that the above two alternatives cannot be tested due to the lack 
of availability of cost data for the accountancy firms. We have postulated that the Big- 
Six audit firms may have a higher cost per unit of audit for the differentiated service 
they provide necessitating higher audit prices to cover the costs. The following section 
cites the reasons to justify our belief that the Big-Six audit firms may have higher 
audit costs. 
10.2.3.1. Big-Six firms associated with higher audit costs 
This section mentions possible (anecdotal) reasons why the Big-Six accountancy firms 
may have higher audit costs than the non-Big Six firms. 
The Big-Six audit firms market and maintain industry expertise. This requires 
extensive marketing costs such as brochures, seminars, attendance at meetings, 
newsletters and so on. This industry specialisation must be demonstrated as well, 
which requires the Big-Six auditors to have extensively trained employees with 
industry specific knowledge and experience, requiring larger and specialised training 
and recruiting costs. This industry expertise must be kept up to date too, which 
requires the Big-Six auditors to develop and maintain valuable communications 
networks including interpersonal communications with clients, government officials, 
and educators. 
The Big-Six audit firms are trying to develop new business opportunities. They are 
able to do so by marketing their ability to deal with complex accounting transactions 
(for example, sophisticated accounting, auditing and information systems matters, 
etc. ) and offering other services (for example, corporate planning, 
international tax, 
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pensions, insolvency, actuarial services, etc. )15 . Companies themselves grow and 
demand expanded services from their advisors. Companies select the Big-Six firms 
for their ability, knowledge and facilities to provide the audit and other services 
demanded. For the Big-Six auditors to obtain and maintain such an unmatched 
expertise requires them to have specialised staff with the resulting training and 
recruiting costs. 
The Big-Six firms market their ability to provide timely (as soon after year-end as 
possible) audit reports to their clients. Timeliness of information is important to 
clients' management and shareholders but may be costly for accounting firms to 
provide. It is necessary to maintain peak season staffing year around which may result 
in costly under-utilised staff during non-busy periods. On the other hand, the non-Big 
Six firms may target clients that are relatively less demanding about the timeliness of 
the audit report allowing for a more uniform workload throughout the year which in 
turn may result in lower costs. In this study the year-end variable, BUSY, is indeed 
significant and positive in the small client segment of the UK audit market. 
The Big-Six accountancy practices have intense global coverage and provide services 
to clients with diverse geographical locations (Noyelle and Dutka, 1986). Our sample 
companies have on average eleven subsidiaries and operate on average into two 
different industrial sectors' 6. The multiple location audits may be more costly to co- 
ordinate and conduct. Also, multiple location require costly quality controls to ensure 
a constant level of audit quality and a single world-wide audit technique across 
different offices and countries. 
Finally, the Big-Six professional firms have cultivated a world-wide "premium" 
image and established credibility in the market. It needs time and is costly for the large 
dominant firms to maintain their reputation. The Big-Six firms have extensive public 
relations and advertising campaigns such as providing seminars, organising 
15 Another example that the large accounting firms diversify their offerings is Belgium where the practice of 
legal 
counsel is largely unregulated and the Big-Six firms have developed in-house legal departments to advise clients 
on legal matters (Noyelle and Dutka, 1986). 16 See the descriptive statistics on Table 7.2.2. A of Chapter VII. 
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conferences, offering research grants a nd seminars for academics, and attending social 
gatherings to market their existing clients and attract potential ones. 
In summary, the Big-Six firms appear to have higher costs in producing differentiated 
products and as a result, they charge more than the non-Big Six to cover their costs. 
This would explain the Big-Six premium observed in the small client segment of the 
UK audit market without, however, necessarily indicating above cost pricing. 
10.2.4. The "alumni effect" explanation 
The "alumni effect" explanation of the pricing differential in the UK audit market tells 
a different story than the collusion explanation, barriers to entry explanation and 
product differentiation explanation discussed in the preceding sections. The "alumni 
effect" explanation requires the following propositions: (i) Accounting firms devise 
and implement an effective alumni policy. By saying this, we mean that the 
accounting firms maintain contact and make every effort to keep in touch with their 
alumni (Denney, 1983). We can also speculate on the sincere and continuous effort 
the audit firms make to continue some kind of pleasant and constructive relationship 
with their alumni. (ii) Since accounting firms' alumni become potential clients 
(because of the existence of alumni policy), there must be a presumption that the 
accountancy firms expect to be benefited by their alumni. (iii) The alumni in turn can 
be presumed to lead to higher audit prices, or fees, for the accountancy firms relative 
to what it would otherwise be. 
With regard to the first proposition, accountancy firms have a large number of alumni 
as a result of the high staff turnover which in turn is due to the up-or-out policy 
implemented by the accountancy firms17. Accountancy firm alumni are important 
assets for audit firms. Some of the alumni may wind up as prospects or clients, others 
could be excellent sources of information. If a firm burns its bridges with its alumni, it 
will someday also see some new business go up in smoke as a result (Denney, 1983). 
Accounting firms themselves do recognise the marketing potential associated with 
17 Detailed discussion why the accountancy firms choose to apply an up-or-out employment policy can 
be found in 
Chapter II. 
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their alumni and they expend time and resources to develop and maintain their links 
with the alumni (Iyer et al, 1997; Iyer, 1998). 
Proposition number two is the key proposition in the "alumni effect" explanation. 
Recent literature (for example, Marxen, 1996; Iyer et al, 1997) has identified the 
predisposition of accountancy firms' alumni to benefit their past employer (i. e. 
alumni's alma mater). Accountancy firms' alumni are prospective customers of the 
audit firms and they will, soon or later, help bring additional business to the firm. It 
seems that accountancy firms themselves appear to realise that and exploit their ability 
to manage their alumni asset in order, in the short or long term, to maximise the 
benefits derived from their alumni base. 
On the other hand, employees working for accountancy firms are also benefited. Apart 
from gaining the qualification of being chartered accountants and becoming a 
professional, the wealth of the audit firms' experience is used as a stepping stone in a 
career path to other positions in private industry, academia, or commerce (Marxen, 
1996). The accountancy training gives them the mobility to move into highly qualified 
and sought after jobs. Accountants are normally well outplaced when they leave the 
accountancy profession and this can only create positive feelings toward their alma 
mater. Moreover, the processes of socialisation inside the audit firms and the alumni 
relations programmes incorporated by these firms make sure that an organisational 
identity is created and established for the audit firms' employees. The stronger the 
alumni's identification with their former accounting firm, the higher the likelihood the 
alumni will benefit the audit firm when the opportunity arises. 
The findings in this study are consistent with the "alumni effect" explanation. Those 
alumni, who become Finance Directors, Chairmen or Chief Executives in the UK 
large quoted companies (with sales greater than £251 million) and simultaneously 
have as their auditor the accountancy firm that they have qualified with, benefit their 
alma mater by agreeing to pay higher audit fees than otherwise be. Propositions two 
primarily and three, therefore, may explain the audit price difference found in this 
study. 
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Summarising overall this section, the market structure for audits has been discussed 
and the audit price difference found in this study is explained by: (1) Collusive 
behaviour and pricing among the Big-Six audit firms in the large company audits. 
This does not seem feasible explanation (as discussed in subsection 10.2.1. above), 
and collusion alone would not necessarily allow for audit price differential. (2) 
Barriers to entry for the non-Big Six firms into the large company segment of the audit 
market which is dominated by the Big-Six firms. There does not appear to be 
significant barriers to entry to the non-Big Six firms to prevent them from entering the 
large company segment of the market and the barriers to entry explanation alone 
seems to be a weak explanation. However, the barriers to entry explanation combined 
with the existence of economies of scale accruing to the Big-Six firms in the audits of 
large clients help explain the audit fee indifference observed between the Big-Six and 
non-Big Six firms in the large companies segment of this study. (3) Product 
differentiation with the Big-Six firms charging a premium for their product. The Big- 
Six firms may be producing a different product from the non-Big Six firms and may 
have a higher cost per unit of audit for this product necessitating higher audit prices to 
cover the costs. This explanation appears to be a strong candidate in explaining the 
price premium detected in the small client segment of the UK audit market. (4) 
Finally, the alumni of the accountancy firms who have an inclination to benefit their 
alma mater. This explanation seems to be persuasive enough and the findings of this 
study support the existence of audit fee differences in the large client audits due to the 
placement of audit firms' alumni on the boards of large clients. 
10.3. Conclusions 
Before we embarked on the current investigation, we knew that this was a novel 
investigation. There had been no serious empirical investigation in the past in the 
manner we were proposing to suggest an "alumni effect" would be found. It was pure 
curiosity driven piece of research. Neither were we aware that there was any current 
theory predicting that alumni relationships would have any commercial or economic 
importance. At that point there was only anecdotal evidence and supposition that 
professional and social relationships ought to be a factor in the market for accountancy 
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services. We have attempted to measure whether there are any overall patterns in the 
association of CADRE with their ALMA MATER and whether these patterns 
translate into price effects. 
Subsequently we put together different existing theories of economics and industrial 
organisation as well as theories on sociology and psychology, and we succeeded in 
building an explicit theoretical framework which explains how the particular 
organisational structure of the accountancy firms may help them to undertake 
continuing connections with their alumni, and why the accountancy firms ought to 
regard their alumni as significant and important source of future business. Our theory 
also predicts that there might be asymmetrical advantages from the alumni effect in 
the price of audit services provided by the accountancy firms. 
The findings of the current study are somewhat mixed. Although the investigation has 
revealed that there is an "alumni effect", that is there are strong associations between 
alumni and accountancy firms, it has also shown that not all these associations are 
priced. In particular, it has shown that on average it makes a difference in audit fees 
when a finance director, chairman or chief executive deal with their former audit firm 
in obtaining audit services. That is to say, the fact of this relationship is to mean that 
the audit firm exploits its client when a finance director, chairman or chief executive's 
personal preferences and associations are entered in the equation. 
On the other hand, however, no alumni impact has been found when all the UK 
chartered accountants-directors were considered. That is, the competitive outcomes 
are no different although there is evidence of an association between auditor and 
client. 
Clearly the non-price aspect of competition, that is the "alumni effect", has proved to 
have a more important role in accountancy practice development than it was thought 
before. The returns from training chartered accountants would need to be re- 
considered by the accountancy firms, and to explicitly implement an alumni policy. 
Small audit firms are at a competitive disadvantage because of the lack of an 
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influential body of alumni. These firms need to re-evaluate their human resource 
policies, in view of the evidence of networking in marketing. 
Further, personal and professional networks have proved to be an important aspect of 
business life. Personal friendships between auditor and clients may stave off other 
audit firms without the equivalent established client networking from obtaining new 
clients. For example, the chartered accountant-finance director is more likely to prefer 
his/her alma mater. S/he does that because s/he knows the audit approach of his/her 
alma mater and, therefore, s/he would be better placed to know what can be "got away 
with". The alma mater is also preferred because the finance director knows more 
about his/her alma mater than any other audit firm and thus, feels that there is less risk 
in employing the "devil that you know". Of course the above are speculations beyond 
the statistical evidence. However, it has been proved in this study that the "alumni 
effect", a non-price factor, is important and significant, and the accountancy 
profession may find necessary to assess the implications. This study also provides 
evidence which may be used to support calls for more independent regulation of the 
audit profession, and/or for a ban on non-audit services from the incumbent auditors, 
and/or for automatic rotation of auditors. 
As a final comment, the findings of this study suggest that researchers may need to 
control for the "alumni effect" variable in the analysis of audit fee determinants. 
10.4. Limitations of the study 
The following are offered as limitations of the current study: 
1. The study underestimates the "alumni effect". A number of chartered accountants- 
directors have trained and qualified with small firms of accountants, moving for 
post-qualifying experience to the larger accountancy firms. The research design of 
the present study has only identified the initial training firm, and consequently 
under-estimates the association with larger accountancy firms. This research design 
under-estimates any effect. 
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In other words, this study has found that there is an "alumni effect" between 
accountancy firms and their clients, and ceteris paribus this effect will be stronger 
in the real world, since there are accountants-directors in the sample who have been 
qualified with small accountancy firms and have also been associated later in their 
career with larger accountancy firms, but as a result of the research design, they 
have been listed only against the first training firms. 
2. The research design of the present study has not detected an "anti-alumni effect", in 
which a CADRE is not merely indifferent to the accountancy firm he/she once 
worked for, but has a negative preference. 
3. The study has not shown whether the alumni just help bring additional business to 
their alma mater. The study has provided no evidence of an "alumni effect" when 
all CADRE were considered. In other words, there is no audit fee difference 
irrespective of the fact that chartered accountants sit on the boards of the incumbent 
auditor clients. However, this does not necessarily imply that there is no change in 
auditor when there is a change of director, and although there may be no change in 
audit fees from a client perspective, the CADRE may help the alma mater to 
receive an additional client. 
4. The present study has not measured the number of years that CADRE have worked 
for the accountancy firm before leaving public practice for a business career. 
Tenure is hypothesised to affect alumni perceptions about the employer (Iyer et al, 
1997) and, therefore, a strong association between CADRE and alma mater is 
expected the longer CADRE have stayed in the accountancy profession. 
Allowing for the above limitations, the evidence presented in this study must be 
viewed as indicative rather than conclusive. Further research is needed to corroborate 
that the professional allegiance of the accounting firm alumni has indeed a measurable 
influence on the market for accountancy and audit services. 
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for future research Suggestions 10.5. 
This research project is the first one to systematically investigate the links between the 
training of chartered accountants, their subsequent advancement in industry and 
commerce and whether they act to advance the interests of the firm which trained 
them. Future research is surely needed to assess whether other non-price aspects of 
competition play an important role in determining the level of audit fees, how audit 
firms are chosen by their clients, how auditors are appointed and re-appointed and 
perhaps more significantly how they retain the audit. 
More specifically, during the course of this research project, several interesting and 
related topics for future research emerged. The following suggestions, therefore, are 
offered: 
(1) Directors may have multiple affiliations gained post-qualifying. A number of 
accountant-directors have trained and qualified with small firms of accountants, 
moving for post-qualifying experience to larger accountancy firms. Instead of using 
the initial training firm to explore the auditor-director relationship, future research 
could seek details of any post-qualifying affiliation. 
Using in-house alumni records it would be possible to identify former employees who 
joined post-qualifying, and who are now on boards of companies. The estimation of 
the alumni effect in this manner would require access to the records of a number of 
accountancy firms. Or alternatively, the researcher could directly make a search for 
any prior audit firm affiliation from a sample of company directors. 
(2) Competition in the market for accountancy services has also been studied in 
respect of auditor switching decisions. The literature deals mainly with the US market. 
Explanatory variables examined include changes in auditor cost structures (Johnson 
and Lys, 1990), auditors pressurised to suppress financial data (Knapp and Elikai, 
1990), disagreements (McConnell, 1984), qualified audit opinions (Chow and Rice, 
1982; Smith, 1986; Craswell, 1988), financial distress (Schwartz and Menon, 1985), 
fee levels (Eichenseher and Shields, 1983; Simon and Francis, 1988), agency costs 
(Francis and Wilson, 1988; De Frond, 1992; Albrecht et al, 1993), length of tenure 
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(Williams, 1988; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988), and initial public offerings (Menon 
and Williams, 1991; Firth and Smith, 1992). Haskins and Williams (1990) built a 
contingent model for intra-Big Eight auditor changes. Healy and Lys (1986) 
investigated audit firms mergers and subsequent auditor switches. UK studies include 
Moizer and Turley (1989), Citron and Taffler (1992), Beattie and Fearnley (1993; 
1995; 1998). The questions are here: How are alumni factors implicated in auditor 
(non)switching decisions? Is change of director associated with change of auditor? Do 
replacement directors have the same professional associations as retiring directors? Of 
interest would also be which accountancy firms were losing clients and which firms 
were gaining clients. 
(3) Another area for future research is to measure the reverse "alumni effect", i. e. the 
accountant leaving the accountancy profession is more likely to join a client than a 
non-client, making use of his personal (and the firm's) network. The researcher can 
track who the auditors of the company were when the chartered accountant joined that 
company. Some client personnel are recruited at a relatively junior level and ideally, 
the research should match the auditor of the company with the initial/first job of the 
chartered accountant after s/he left the profession. 
(4) Finally, future research may assess other non-price aspects of competition such as 
the clients' respect for auditor non-audit activities. For example, the accountancy firm 
that assists heavily in community services, charity fund drives, educational support, 
etc. may be able to charge higher audit prices or to stave off other competitors who do 
not attain such a high image for non-audit activities. 
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of Subsidiaries (overseas subs) 
nSubsidiaries/total subs + NS 
n subs/total assets NS 
SIC Codes + 
sTotal Assets NS 
n assets/total assets 
on Assets 
on Total Assets 
on Capital Employed 
Liabilities/ Total Assets 
term Liabilities/ Total Assets 
Ratio 
t ratio NS 
is Period NS 
previous period NS 
in both this & previous period + - 
age 
timing-busy period + NS NS 
raphical location + 
9status (public-non public) + + 
ification measure (Herfindahl 
on Shareholders Equity 
otal Assets NS 
term debt/total assets + NS 
vables+stock-payables)/total 
+ + 
assets growth 
sore 
probt 
change (1=change to B8, 
9e to NB8) 
" debtors 
assets/total assets + 
(1), continuing (0) audit 
debt ratio 
- NS 
NS 
'ýit reports 
of audit repo 
being industry specialist NS - 
-. -ý +ý 
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APPENDIX II: 
Disappeared firms table 
Table 1 
CADRE qualified with a DISAPPEARED accountancy firm* 
DISAPPEARED FIRMS 
AUDITORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
AA CL EY KPMG PW TR Subtotal Other Auditor TOTAL 
AA 1 5 1 3 3 0 13 3 0 16 
ALMA CL 7 41 13 24 16 7 108 34 3 145 
MATER EY 6 26 34 20 11 15 112 22 2 136 
KPMG 6 16 9 27 11 4 73 13 0 86 
PW 0 3 1 1 3 2 10 5 1 16 
TR 2 8 6 15 8 18 5 11 1 69 
TOTAL 22 99 64 90 52 46 373 88 7 468 
* The rows give the number of CADRE who qualified with a disappeared firm, i. e. with a predecessor 
of the Big-Six audit firms. The columns do not necessarily give the actual number of auditors or public 
companies, as some companies have more than one CADRE on their boards. 
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APPENDIX III: 
Partial regression plots of the "basic" regression model 
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Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
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Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
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Partial Regression Plot 
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Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
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Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
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Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
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Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
1.5 
1.0 
.5 
0.0 
-. 5 
-1.0 
W 
w 
-1.5 
z 
-2.0 
3 
13 
13 
Do 
Död: P %E3 ED ö 13 E3 
13 
°°0pp° 
Qp a 1313° Qp 
13 ,°pppO 
18 13 13ý E33 Op 
rP E3 
° 
pEP 191 ° °ý 
D 11103 13 M 13 
°Q°°Q 
13 13 
° 
O 13 
Q C3 pa 
AP 
E'ikfl EDu 
O° 
0Q QO 
°° 13 aa 
a 
aQ 
C3 QQ 
4 
-4 -3 -2 -1 
u 
LNROI 
O 
O 
O 
EP 
288 
Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
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Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
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Partial Regression Plot 
Dependent Variable: LNAFEE 
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APPENDIX IV: 
List of accountancy firms that have trained the CADRE of the 
data sample 
I Nov 98 SPSS 
for MS WINDOWS Release 6.0 
ACCYFIRM2 (consolidation of duplicate -na 
Valid Cum 
Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1 212 10.8 10.8 10.8 
fey & Lish 
2 1 .1 .1 10.9 
4, r, Bates, 
Ledsam 3 2 .1 .1 11.0 
gar, Bates, 
Neal, K 4 2 .1 .1 11.1 
;: bert Goodman 
& Co 5 1 .1 .1 11.1 
A; exander, Sagar. &C 
6 2 .1 .1 11.2 
Alfred N. Emanuel & 
7 1 .1 .1 11.3 
j1an, Charlesworth 8 
2 .1 .1 11.4 
11en A. & Scot 9 
1 . 1. .1 11.4 
n. 1en Baldry Holman 
10 1 .1 .1 11.5 
ýi, 1en T, W. 
11 1 .1 .1 11.5 
111fields 12 
4 .2 .2 11.7 
Alliott Peirson & Co 13 1 .1 .1 
11.8 
Anisdon, Cossart & We 14 1 .1 .1 
11.8 
pngus, Campbell & Co 15 1 .1 .1 
11.9 
Aanan, Dexter & Co 16 3 .2 .2 12.0 
Armitage & Norton 17 9 .5 .5 
12.5 
Arthur Andersen & Co 18 86 4.4 
4.4 16.9 
Arthur Goddard & Co 19 1 .1 .1 16.9 
Arthur Young 20 11 .6 .6 
17.5 
Arthur Young, McClel 21 17 .9 .9 
18.4 
Ashmole, Edwards &G 22 1 .1 .1 
18.4 
Ashworth, Mosley &C 23 1 .1 .1 
18.5 
Aspinall Ivan G. &C 24 1 .1 .1 
18.5 
Atkin & Co 25 1 .1 .1 
18.6 
Auerbach, Hope & Co 26 a .2 .2 
18.8 
Ault& Co 27 1 .1 .1 
18.8 
Ault Fred. J. & Co 28 1 .1 .1 
18.9 
Saber, Owen & Co 29 1 .1 .1 
18.9 
3aker & Co 30 1 .1 .1 
19.0 
3aker Rooke ý1 -' 
i 1 ,1 19.0 
3aker Sutton & Co 32 3 2 .2 
19 2 
Baker, Rooke & Amsdo. 33 1 .1 .1 
19.2 
3aker, Toduran & Co 34 1 .1 .1 
19.3 
, all, Baker Deed & 35 3 .2 .2 
19.4 
, ? anner, Spencer, Wal 36 1 .1 1 
.1 
1 
19.5 
19.6 : arker Cohen 37 1 
1 
. 
1 
. 
,1 
19.6 3arnes Ro ffe 
& Cc Barr Andw W 
38 
39 1 .1 .1 
9.7 1 
. . 3arron & Barron 40 1 .1 .1 
19.7 
9arron Rowles &: Co. 41 1 .1 .1 
19.8 
, 3arrow R W & Co 42 1 .1 .1 
19.8 
. . 3arrowcliff C. Percy 43 4 .2 .2 
20.0 
Barton H M Sir 44 1 .1 .1 
20.1 
. . 3arton, Mayhew & Co 45 11 .6 .6 2 
20.6 
20 8 300 Binder Hamlyn 46 4 .2 1 
. 
1 
. 
20.9 3eattie Frank & Co 47 1 . . 
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10 Nov 98 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.0 
ACC`1F'3 ACCYFIRM2 (consolidation of duplicate-na 
BeaviS, Walker & Co 48 2 .1 .1 21.0 
Bedell & Blair 49 2 .1 .1 21.1 
Bee T&H. P. 50 1 .1 .1 21.1 
Beevers & Adgie 51 2 .1 .1 21.2 
Bennett Robert & Par 52 1 .1 .1 21.3 
Beresford Lye & Co 53 1 .1 .1 21.3 
Bertram, Kidson & Co 54 1 .1 .1 21.4 
Best, Lawson & Co 55 1 .. 1 .1 21.4 
Bexley & Co 56 1 .1 .1 21.5 
Bilsons, Cullen & Co 57 1 .1 .1 21.5 
Binder Hamlyn 58 30 1.5 1.5 23.1 
Bird Luckin & Sheldr 59 1. .1 .1 23.1 
Bird, Potter &. Co 60 1 .1 .1 23.2 
Black Geoghegan & Ti 61 3 .2 .2 23.3 
Blackburns, Robson C 62 5 .3 .3 23.6 
Blackburn s, Robson, 63 5 .3 .3 23.8 
, Blaikie 
R. M. & Co 64 1 .1 .1 23.9 
, Blair, Sanders & Co 65 1 .1 .1 23.9 
Blease, Lloyd & Co 66 1 .1 .1 24.0 
Blick Rothenberg &N 67 1 .1 .1 24.0 
Blythen Stanley & Co 68 2 .1 .1 24.1 
Blythens 69 1 .1 .1 24.2 
Bolton, Wawn & Co 70 1 .1 .1 24.2 
Bourne Thomas & Co, 71 1 .1 .1 24.3 
Bourner, Bullock &C 72 1 .1 .1 24.3 
Bowen, Dawes, Wags to 73 2 .1 .1 24.5 Boyce, Welch & Co 74 3 .2 .2 24.6 
Bradshaw Johnson &C 75 1 .1 .1 24.7 
Brebner, Allen & Tra 76 1 .1 .1 24.7 
Brewer & Co 77 1 .1 .1 24.8 
Brief S. & Co 78 1 .1 .1 24.8 
Bright, Grahame, Mur 79 1 .1 .1 24.9 
Broads, Paterson &C 80 3 .2 .2 25.0 
Bromhead C. D. & Co 81 1 .1 .1 25.1 Brooking, Knowles & 82 1 .1 .1 25.1 
Brown Alfred H. 83 1 .1 .1 25.2 
Brown, Butler & Co 84 1 .1 .1 25.2 Brown, Fleming & Mur: 85 3 .2 .2 25.4 Bryce, Hanmer & Co, 86 1 .1 .1 25.4 Buckland Sidney H. & 87 1 .1 .1 25.5 Burgess, Hodgson &C 88 1 .1 .1 25.5 
Burgis &. Bullock 89 1 .1 .1 25.6 Burne Phillips 90 2 .1 .1 25.7 Burnett, Swayne & Co 91 2 .1 .1 25.8 
Buzzacott & Co 92 2 .1 .1 25.9 Calverley & Calverle 93 1 .1 .1 25.9 Cape & Dalgleish 94 2 .1 .1 26.0 Carlill, Burkinshaw 95 1 .1 .1 26.1 Carlisle, Ray & Co 96 1 .1 .1 26.1 Carlyle & Co 97 1 .1 .1 26.2 Carston, Poley, Morr 98 1 .1 .1 26.2 
294 
10 Nov 98 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.0 
ACCYF3 ACCYFIRM2 (consolidation of duplicate. na 
Carter, Chaloner &K 99 1 .1 .1 2.6.3 
Carter, Son & White 100 1 .1 .1 26.3 
Cash, Stone & Co 101 1 .1 .1 26.4 
Cassleton Elliott & 102 1 .1 .1 26.4 
Casson Beckman 103 2 
* .1 . 
1. 26.5 
Chalmers, Impey & Co 104 5. .3 .3 26.8 
Chsapness J. H. , Cord 105 3 .2 .2 27.0 
Charles Wakeling &C 106 1 .1 .1 27.0 
Chas Richards & Co 107 1 .1 .1 27.1 
Citroen, Wells & Co 108 2 .1 .1 27.2 
Clark Pixley 109 1 .1 .1 27.2 
Clark Whitehill 110 3 .2 .2 27.4 
Clark, Battams & Co 111 2 .1 .1 27.5 Clarke Leslie 0. &C 112 1 .1 .1 27.5 Clarke, Eckersley, P 113 1 .1 .1 27.6 Clements Hakim & Co 114 1 .1 .1 27.6 
Clifford Towers, Tem 115 1 .1 .1 27.7 Clough & Co 116 1 .1 .1 27.7 Coates Richard & Cc 117 1 .1 .1 27.8 Cole, Dickin and Hil 118 2 .1 .1 27.9 Collingwood, Burrows 119 1 .1 .1 27.9 Cook & Co 120 2 .1 .1 29.0 Cook, Sutton & Co 121 2 .1 .1 28.1 Cookson, Topham & Co 122 1 .1 .1 28.2 Cooper & Cooper 123 1 .1 .1 28.2 Cooper Basden & Adam 124 1 .1 .1 28.3 Cooper Brothers & Co 125 35 1.8 1.8 30.1 
Cooper Cozens & Co 126 1 .1 .1 30.1 Coopers & Lybrand 127 57 2.9 2.9 33.0 
Coward (Frank) & Cc 128 1 .1 .1 33.1 Cowgill, Holloway & 129 1 .1 .1 33.1 Cox & Furs e 130 1 .1 .1 33.2 Crabtree (Cresswell) 131 1 .1 .1 33.2 Crane Christmas & Cc 132 1 .1 .1 33.3 Crombie, Lacon & Ste 133 2 .1 .1 33.4 Crossley & Davis 134 1 .1 .1 33.4 Crompton, Homer & Co 135 1 .1 .1 33.5 Curtis, Jenkins, Cor 136 1 .1, .1 3" .5 Daffern & Co 137 1 .1 .1 33.6 Dangerfield, Brewis 138 2 .1 .1 33.7 Davidson J. W., Cooks 139 2 .1 .1 33.8 Davie, Parsons & Co 140 2 .1 .1 33.9 Davies Richard & Co 141 1 .1 .1 33 .9 Davies, Watson & Co 142 1 .1 .1 34.0 Dawson & Gordon 143 1 .1 .1 34.0 Dawson R. S. & Co 144 1 .1 .1 34.1 de Zoete & Bevan? 145 1 .i .1 34.2 Dearden Farrow 146- 8 .4 .4 34.6 dec 1985 Hallo L. J. 147 1 .1 .1 34.6 Deloitte Haskins &S 148 66 3.4 3.4 38.0 
Denton Basil L. & Co 149 1 .1 .1 38.0 
295 
10 Nov 98 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.0 
ACCYF'3 ACCYFIRM2 (consolidation of duplicate na 
Derbyshire & Co 150 2 .1 .1 38.1 
Derek Lawrence & Co : 151. 1 .1 .1 38.2 
Derek Webster & Co 152 1 .1 .1 38.2 
Dixon Wilson & Co 153 5 .3 .3 38.5 
Douglas T. H. & Co 154 1 .1 .1 38.5 
Downham & Co 155 1 .1 .1 38.6 Dryden, Dorrington & 156 1 .1 .1 38.6 Duart-Smith, Baker & 157 1 .1 .1 38.7 
Duthie & Son 158 1 . 1. .1 38.7 Eastwood, Townend & 159 1 .1 .1 38.8 Edelman Gerald & Co 160 1 .1 .1 38.8 
Edward Moore & Sons 161 1 .1 .1 38.9 
Edward Myers, Clark, 162 1 .1 .1 38.9 Edwards, Trew & Co 163 1 .1 .1 39.0 
eida 1980-87 exam li 164 4 .2 .2 39.2 Eller, Reeve & Co 165 1 .1 .1 39.3 Elliott (Cassleton) 166 1 .1 .1 39.3 Elliott, Mortlock, B 167 1 .1 .1 39.4 Elliott, Norman, Jac 168 3 .2 .2 39.5 Elliott, -Templeton S 169 3 .2 .2 39.7 Ellis & Newal l 170 1 .1 .1 39.7 Ellis H. G., Kennewel 171 1 .1 .1 39.8 Ernest Francis & Son 172 1 .1 .1 39.8 Ernst & Whinney 173 24 1.2 1.2 41.0 
Eras t& Young 174 6 .3 .3 41.3 Essex, Abel, Hodgkin 175 1 
.1 .1 41.4 Evans, Rankin & Co 176 1 .1 .1 41.4 Everett Pinto & Co 177 1 .1 .1 41.5 Fairbairn, Wingfield 178 1 .1 .1 41.6 Fairclough W. R. & Co 179 1 .1 .1 41.6 Fairhurst John & Tyr 180 1 .1 .1 41.7 Farrow, Middleton & 181 5 .3 .3 41.9 Fenton & Co 182 2 .1 .1 42.0 Finn Leonard & Co 183 1 .1 .1 42.1 Finnie & Co 184 6 .3 .3 42.4 Fisher, Conway, Fent 185 1 .1 .1 42.4 Fitzpatrick, Graham 186 2 .1 .1 42.5 Folkes & Campbell 187 1 .1 .1 42.6 Ford, Bull, Ellis & 188 3 .2 .2 42 .7 Forrester, Boyd Co 189 1 .1 .1 42.8 Foster & Stephens 190 1 .1 .1 42.8 Fox, Hoare, Harris & 191 1 .1 .1 42.9 Franklin, Wild & Co 192 1 .1 .1 42.9 Frankson, Wiles & Co 193 1 .1 .1 43.0 Fraser, Threlford, C 194 1 .1 .1 43.0 Frazer, Whitting & CC 195 3 .2 .2 43.2 Freeman Rich 196 1 .1 .1 43.2 Freeman, Sutton & Co 197 1 .1 .1 43.3 French W. H. & Co 198 1 .1 .1 43.3 Fryer Whi t ehi l l& Co 199 1 .1 .1 43.4 Fuller, Jenks, Beecr 200 1 .1 .1 43.4 
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ACCYF3 ACCYFIBM2- (consolidation of duplicate na 
Gale & Partners 201 1 .1 .1 43.5 
Gee Jackson, Nelson : 202 2 .1 .1 43.6 
Garbutt & Elliott 203 1 .1 .1 43.6 
Garnett, Crewdson & 204 2 .1 .1 43.7 
George Hay & Co 205 1 .1 .1 43.8 
George Henry L L. & Ar 206 1: .1 .1 43.8 
Gerald Brown & Co 207 1 .1 .1 43.9 
Gerald Edelman 208 2 .1 .1 44.0 
Gilbert W W. J J. & Co 209 1 .1 .1 44.1 
Gilbert, Shepherd, 0 210 1 .1 .1 44.1 
Gilberts, Hallett & 211 1 .1 .1 44.2 
Gilchrist, Tash, Wil 212 2 44.3 
Gillings (W. H. ) & Co 213 1 .1 .1 44.3 
Glass Duncan & Co 214 1 .1 .1 44.4 
Goldstein LB. & Co 215 1 .1 .1 44.4 
Goodier, Smith & Wat 216 1 .1 .1 44.5 Goodman Albert & Co 217 2 .1 .1 44.6 
Gordon John, Harri so 218 3 .2 .2 44 7 Gould H. P. &. Son 
1 219 2 
.1 .1 
. 
44.8 
Grace, Darbyshire & 220 2 .1 .1 44.9 Grant Thornton 221 2 .1 .1 45.0 Graves, Causer & Co 222 1 .1 .1 45.1 Graves, Goddard & Ho 223 1 .1 .1 45.1 
Gray, Stainforth &C 224 1 .1 .1 45.2 Green F. & Co 225 1 
.1 .1 45.2 Greene Clements Blis 226 2 .1 .1 45.3 Greenslade & Co, and 227 1 .1 .1 45.4 Gresham, Whitehead & 228 1 .1 .1 45.4 Griffith & Jennings 229 1 .1 .1 45.5 Griffith R. O. & Co 230 1 .1 .1 45.5 Gruber, Levinson, Fr 231 1 .1 .1 45.6 Gubbay & Co 232 1 .l .1 45.6 Haines Watts 233 1 .1 .1 45.7 Hall Ernest & Co 234 1 .1 .1 45.7 Halpern & Woolf 235 1 .1 .1 45.8 Halpern Cecil & Co 236 1 .1 .1 45.8 Ham, Jackson & Brown 237 2 .1 .1 45.9 Hands H. R. & Co 238 1 .1 .1 46.0 Harcourt, Picken &C 239 1 .1 .1 46.0 Hare A. C. R. & Co 240 1 .1 .1 46.1 Hare Wilson & Co 241 1 .1 .1 46.1 Harmood Banner & Co 242 14 .7 .7 46.9 Harper A. J. & Co 243 1 .1 .1 46.9 Harrison, Styler &C 244 1 .1 .1 47.0 Hart, Moss, Copley & 245 1 .1 .1 47.0 Hartleys, Wilkins &. 246 2 .1 .1 47.1 Harvey Preen & Co 247 1 .1 .1 47.2 Haskew, Twist & Co 248 1 .1 .1 47.2 Hatfield, Dixon, Rob 249 1 .1 .1 47.3 Haworth & Wheatley J 250 1 .1 .1 47.3 Hawson W. G. , Wing & 251 1 .1 .1 47.4 
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Hayes Kenneth & Co 252 1 . 1. .1 47.4 
gays Allan . 253 3 .2 .2 47.6 
Heap, Harrison & Co 254 1 .1 .1 47.6 
Henry Smith, Hamer & 255 1 .1 .1 47.7 
Hepburn & Son 256 1 .1 .1 47.7 
Herbert Parnell & Co 257 1 .1 .1 47.8 
Herbert Pepper & Rud 258 1. .1 .1 47.8 
Hereward Scott Davie 259 1 .1 .1 47.9 
Herring J. M. & Co 260 1 .1 .1 47.9 
Hesketh, Hardy, Hirs 261 2 .1 .1 48.0 
Hill & Vellacott 262 2 .1 .. 1 48.1 
Hillier, Hopkins &C 263 2 .1 48.2 
Hilton, Sharp & Clar 264 1 .1 .1 48.3 
Hines & Clowes 265 1 .1 .1 48.3 
Hodgson Harris 266 1 .1 .1 48.4 
Hodgson Impey 267 2 .1 .1 48.5 
Hodgson, Morris & Co 268 6 .3 .3 48.8 Hogg, Bullimore, Gun 269 4 .2 .2 49.0 Holden, Howard & Co, 270 1 .1 .1 49.1 
Hope, Agar & Co 271 3 .2 .2 49.2 Hope, Halstead & Co 272 1 .1 .1 49.3 
Horne H. R. & Partner 273 1 .1 .1 49.3 Howard, Howes & Co 274 1 .1 .1 49.4 Howard, Smith, Thomp 275 1 .1 .1 49.4 Howle, Sewell & Neep 276 1 .1 .1 49.5 Hubbart., Durose & Pa 277 2 .1 .1 49.6 Hudson, Smith, Brigg 278 2 .1 .1 49.7 Hughes, Allen, Soole 279 2 .1 .1 49.8 Hunt, Hopkins & Lori 280 1 .1 .1 49.8 Jackson, Pixley & Co 281 2 .1 .1 49.9 Jackson, Taylor, Abe 282 2 .1 .1 50.0 James & Cowper 283 1 .1 .1 50.1 James Barlow & Son 284 1 .1 .1 50.1 James Christie & Co 285 1 .1 .1 50.2 James, Edwards, Dang 286 2 .1 .1 50.3 Jennings & Co 287 1 .i .1 50.3 Jennings, Johnson & 288- 2 .1 .1 50.4 Jennings, Living &C 289 1 .1 .1 50.5 Jewi tt , Sparrow & Sw 290 1 .1 .1 50.5 John (A. Owen) & Co 291 1 .1 .1 50.6 John Wilkie & Co 292 1 .1 .1 50.6 Jones & Jasper 293 1 .1 .1 50.7 Jones David J. & Co 294 1 .1 .1 50.7 Jones, Hutchinson & 295 1 .1 .1 50.8 Jordan, Brookes & Co 296 2 .1 .1 50.9 Josolyne Layton-Benn 297 5 .3 .3 51.1 Josolyne, Miles & Co 298 3 .2 .2 51.3 Keelings 299 1 .1 .1 51.4 Keen W. B. & Co 300 2 .1 .1 51.5 Keens, Shay, Keens & 301 2 .1 .1 51.6 KemP, Chatteris & Co 302 4 .2 .2 51.8 
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Kennedy, Fox, Oldfie 303 2 .1 .1 51.9 
Kevan Pilling & Co -304 1 .1 .1 51.9 
Keys Clement & Son. 305 1 .1 .1 52.0 
Kidson Bertram & Co 306 1 .1 .1 52.0 
jidsons 307- 7 .4 .4 52.4 
King L. & Co 308 1 .1 . 1. 52.4 
Kingdon, Marbeck, An 309 1 .1 .1 52.5 
Kingsford, Garlant & 310 2 .1 .1 52.6 
Kingston Smith & Co 311 1 .1 .1 52.6 
Kirby Norman F. & Co 312 1 .1 .1 52.7 
KHG Thomson McLintoc 313 4 .2 .2 52.9 
Kaeeshaw, Moffat &C 314 1 .1 .1 52.9 
Knill, Padgham & Gra 315 1 .1 .1 53.0 
Knox, Cropper, Gedge 316 1. .1 .1 53.0 
Knox, Franklin & Co 317 2 .1 .1 53.1 
KPMG 318 123 , 
6.3 6.3 59.4 
Lancaster, King, Rid 319 1 .1 .1 59.5 
Landau, Morley & Par 320 2 .1 .1 59.6 
Lane, Heywood & Co 321 1 .1 .1 59.6 Larking & -Larking 322 1 .1 .1 59.7 
Latham Wm. & Co 323 1 .1 .1 59.7 Lawson & Walker 324 1 .1 .1 559.8 
Layton-Bennett, Bill 325 5 .3 .3 60.0 
Leach, Johnson, Trav 326 2 .1 .1 60.1 Leech, Peirson, Evan 327 2 .1 .1 60.2 
Leeds, Barlow & Co, 328 1 .1 .1 60.3 Lei thead, Jennings & 329 1 .1 .1 60.3 Lewis Bloom & Co 330 1 .1 .1 60.4 Lewis Golden & Co 331 1 .1 .1 60.4 
Limebeer & Co 332 1 .1 .1 60.5 Linde Gerard van de 333 1 .1 .1 60.5 Lingard, Wilson & Co 334 1 .1 .1 60.6 Lishman, Sidwel 1, Ca 335 1 .1 .1 60.6 Lithgow, Nelson & Co 336 1 .1 .1 60.7 Lithgow, Perkins &C 337 1 .1 .1 60.7 Little Geo. , Sebire 338 1 1 .1 60.8 Locking Johnson & Wa 339 1 .1 .1 60.8 Longcrofts 340 9 .5 .5 61.3 Lord, Foster & Co 341 1 .1 .1 61.4 Lubbock, Fine & Co 342 3 .2 .2 61.5 Maclntyre, Hudson & 343 1 .1 .1 61.6 Macnair, Mason, Evan 344 2 .i .1 61.7 Mann Judd & Co 345 7 .4 .4 62.0 Manners, Elman, Dunc 346 1 .1 .1 62.1 many with different 347 2 .1 .1 62.2 March R. H. , Son & Co 348 2 .1 .1 62.3 Marks, Bloom & Co 349 1 .1 .1 62.3 Martin & Acock 350 1 .1 .1 62.4 Mason & Son 351 1 .1 .1 62.4 Mason Percy & Co 352 1 .1 .1 62.5 Maw, Ellis, Warne & 353 1 .1 .1 62.5 
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Mayhew-Sanders & Co 354 1 .1 .1 62.6 McBride & Co 355 1 .1 .1 62.6 McCabe & Ford 356 1. .1 .1 62.7 McClelland, Moores & 357 1 .1 .1 62.7 McEwan, Wallace, How 358 1 .1 .1 62.8 Meacock Walter & Co 359 1 .1 . 1. 62.8 Meeson, Makinson 360 1' . 1. .1 62.9 Mellors, Basden & Co 361 4 .. 2 .2 63.1 Melman Pryke &Co 362 2 .1 .1 63.2 member in practice 363 3 .2 .2 63.3 Menzies (post qualif 364 1 
.1 .1 63.4 Merchant H. A. & Co 365 1 .1 .1 63.5 Merrett, Son & Stree 366 1 .1 .1 63.5 Messik, Arthur & Co 367 1 
.1 .1 63.6 Middleton &. Middleto 36a 1 .1 .1 63.6 Middleton C. F. & Co, 369 1 
.1 .1 63.7 Midgley, Snelling & 370 1 
.1 .1 63.7 Miles, Watson & Co, 371 1 
.1 .1 63.8 Mills, Hawes, Harper 372 3 
.2 .2 63.9 Mitchell & Plummer 373 1 
.1 .1 64.0 Mitchell, Dowd, Walt 374 1 
.1 .1 64.0 Monkhouse, Stoneham 375 1 
.i .1 64.1 Moore Edward & Sons 376 1 
.1 .1 64.1 Moore, Fletcher, For 377 1 
.1 .1 64.2 Moore, Stephens & Co 378 2 
.1 .1 64.3 Moores, Carson & Wat 379 1 
.1 .1 64.3 Morgan, Brown & Hayn 380 1 ,1 "1 64.4 Morison Stoneham &C 381 1 1 
.1 64.4 Morison, Rutherford 382 1 1 
.1 64.5 Morley & Sharpe 383 1 
.1 .1 64.5 Morris Crocker & Co 384 1 .1 .1 64.6 Morris I. M. & Co 385 1 
.1 .1 64.6 Morris, Gregory & Co 386 3 .2 .2 64.8 Mosley & Co 387 1 
.1 .1 64.8 Moss, Swallow & Isle 388 1 
.1 .1 64.9 Muras, Baker, Jones 389 2 
.1 .1 6 5.0 Murray H. N. & Co 390 1 
.1 .1 65.0 Nash Broad & Co 391 1 .1 .1 65.1 Nasmith, Coutts & Co 392 2 .1 .1 65.2 Needham J. & cc) 393 1 .1 .1 65.2 Nevi l l, Hovey, Gardn 394 6 
.3 .3 65.5 Neville Russell 395 .3 .3 65.8 Newman & Partners 396 1 .1 .1 65.8 Newman D. W. 397 1 .1 .1 65 9 Newman Harris & Co 398 1 .1 .1 
. . 66.0 
Vewnan, Biggs & Co 399 1 .1 .1 66.0 Nicholson Chas 0. & 400 1 .1 .1 66.1 Norton Keen & Co 401 1 .1 .1 66.1 Norton, Slade & Co 402 2 .1 .1 66.2 Nuttall C., Shenton 403 1 .1 .1 66.3 Oddy & Fox 404 1 .1 .1 66.3 
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Ogle Newman, Bevan & 405 1 .1 .1 66.4 
pury Walter H. & Co . 
406 2 .1 .1 66.5 
Overton H, Salt & Co 407 1 .1 .1 66.5 
Owen D. A. & Co 408 1 .1 .1 66.6 
Owen West & McGregor 409 1 .1 .1 66.6 
Page Robt. A.. & Co 410 1. .1 .1 66.7 
Pa=ell Fitzpatrick 411 6 .3 .3 67.0 
pa=ell Kerr Forster 412 5 .3 .3 67.2 
pa=ell, Crewdson & 413 1 .1 .1 67.3 
Parkinson, Mather & 414 1 .1 .1 67.3 
partridge, Cox & Cc 415 1 .1 .1 67.4 
Paul, Dowd & Co 416 1 .1 .1 67.4 
pawley & Malyon 417 1 .1 .1 67.5 
Peat Marwick McLinto 418 9 .5 .5 67.9 
Peat, Marwick, Mitch 419 17 .9 .9 68.8 
Peat, Marwick, Mitch 420 1 .1 .1 68.9 
Pepper Herbert & Rud 421 1 .1 .1 68.9 Peters, Elworthy &M 422 1 .1 .1 69.0 
Pettitt, Maddox & Co 423 1 .1 .1 69.0 Phillips :& Drew 424 1 .1 .1 69.1 
Pike, Russell & Cc 425 2 .1 .1 69.2 Pinner, Darlington & 426 1 .1 .1 69.2 Pitt & Co, or Revell 427 1 .1 .1 69.3 
Pittman, Wood & Co 428 i .1 .1 69.3 
Plummer, Parsons &C 429 1 .1 .1 69.4 
Polak & Carpenter 430 1 .1 .1 69.4 
Pontefract & Porritt 431 1 .1 .1 69.5 Porter, Matthews &M 432 1 .1 .1 69.5 Poulsom & Co 433 1 -i .1 69.6 
Price Waterhouse 434 149 7.6 7.6 77.2 
Price William & Co 435 1 .1 .1 77.2 Prideaux, Frere, Bro 436 1 .1 .1 77.3 Pridie, Brewster &G 437 2 .1 .1 77.4 Prior & Palmer 438 1 .1 .1 77.4 Private Practice 439 1 .1 .1 77.5 Quilter Goodison &C 440 1 .1 .1 77.5 Radford, Sons & Co 441 2 .l .1 77.6 Randle G. N. & Co 442 1 .1 .1 77.7 Rawlinson & Hunter 443 2 .1 .1 77.8 Rawlinson, Greaves & 444 3 .2 .2 77.9 Reads & Co 445 .1 .1 78.0 Reads, Drury Theobal 446 ? .1 .1 78.1 Rensburg & Co 447 1 .1 .1 78.1 Revell, Ward & Co 448 1 .1 .1 78.2 Reynolds & Lane 449 1 .1 .1 78.2 Rhodes & Rhodes 450 2 .1 .1 78.3 Richards, Russam &C 451 1 .1 .1 78.4 Rickitt Mitchell &P 452. 1 .1 .1 78.4 Ridsdale, Cozens &P 453 4 .2 .2 78.6 Rivington, Lawrence 454 1 .1 .1 78.7 Roberts, White, & Co 455 1 .1 .1 78.7 
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Robinson J. F. W. & Co 456 1 .1 .1 78.8 
Robson Laidler : 457 1 .1 .1 78.8 
Robson Rhodes 458 11 .6 .6 79.4 
Robson Taylor Barlow 459 1 .1 .1 79.4 
Roffe, Swayne & Co 460 1 .1 .1 79.5 
Ross Jack & Co 461 1: .1 .1 79.5 
Rowland & Co 462 1 .1 .1 79.6 
Rowland, Nevill & Co 463. 1 .1 .1 79.6 
Rowley, Pemberton & 464 1 .1 .1 79.7 
Royce, Peeling, Gree 465 2 79.8 
Rupert Lindley & Son 466 1 .1 .1 79.8 
Russell Tillett & Co 467 1 .1 .. 79.9 
Russell, Durie Kerr, 468 1 1 .1 79.9 
Ryden Harry & Co 469 1 .1 .1 80.0 
Saffery, Sons & Co 4-70 a .2 .2 80.2 
Saint & Co 471 1 .1 .1 80.2 Salmon H. T. & Co 472 1 .1 .1 80.3 
Salvage M. R. Co 473 1 .1 .1 80.3 
Sanders, Millichamp 474 1 .1 .1 80.4 Sayers A. G., Seaton 475 2 .1 .1 80.5 
Sayers Butterworth 476 1 .1 .1 80.6 Scott E. L. & Co 477 1 .1 .1 80.6 Scott G. H. & Co 478 1 .1 .1 80.7 Scrutton, Goodchild 479 1 .1 .1 80.7 
see List before 1970 480 1 .1 .1 80.8 Sharpe Fairbrother 481 2 .1 .1 80.9 Shaw W. H. & Sons 482 1 .1 .1 80.9 Sheard Fred & Sons 483 1 .1 .1 81.0 
Sheen Stickland & Co 484 1 .1 .1 81.0 Shelley Ronald C. & 485 1 .1 .1 81.1 Shepherd Joseph W. & 486 1 .1 .1 81.1 Sherwood H. H. & Co 487 2 .1 .1 81.2 Shipley, Blackburn, 488 1 .1 .1 81.3 Sibbald James, Forsy 489 3 .2 .2 81.4- Silver, Altman & Co 490 2 .1 .1 81.5 Simpkins Edwards &C 49 1 1 .1 .1 81.6 Simpson, Wood & Co 492 1 .1 .1 81.6 Sinclair, de Mescuit 493 1 .1 .1 81.7 Singleton, Fabian, D 494 8 .4 .4 82.1 Smailes, Goldie & Co 495 3 .2 .2 82.2 Smallfield, Fitzhugh 496 2 .1 .1 82.3 Smallfield, Rawlins 497 1 .1 .1 82.4 Smith & Garton 498 3 .2 .2 82.5 Smith Evans, Boothro 499 1 .1 .1 82.6 Smith Frank i& Co 500 1 .1 .1 82.6 Smith Howard, Thomps 501 1 .i .i 82.7 Smith, Wheeler & Hay 502 1 .1 .1 82.7 Smith, Willcox & Co, 503 1 .1 .1 82.8 Smith, Forshaw & Harp 504 1 .1 .1 82.8 Snow A. B., Wood & Co 505 1 .1 .1 82.9 Solomon Hare & Co 506 2 .1 .1 83.0 
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Spain Brothers, McNa 507 5 .3 .3 83.3 
Spencer T. W. & Co 508 1 .1 .1 83.3 
Spicer & Oppenheim 509 2 -1 .1 83.4 
Spicer & Pegler 510 36 1.8 1.8 85.2 
Springer Alexander & 511. 1 .1 .1 85.3 
Sproull, Goddad. &. C 512 1 .1 .1 85.3 
Stacey W. E. & H. R. 513 1 .1 .1 85.4 
Stafford Rudkin & Co 514 1 .1 .1 85.5 
Stanley A. Spofforth 515 1 .1 .1 85.5 
Stansfield John, Wes 516 2 .1 .1 85.6 
Stephens F. W. & Co 517 1 .1 .1 85.7 Stoy Hayward 518 22 1.1 1.1 86.8 
Streets J. S. & Co 519 1 .1 .1 86.8 Stubbs, Parkin &. Sou 520 1. .1 .1 86.9 Sturges, Fraser, Cav 521 1 .1 .1 86.9 Sugden B. & Co 522 1 .1 .1 87.0 Sully J. & A. W. & Co 523 1 .1 .1 87.0 Sunderland 0. & Sons 524 1 .1 .1 87.1 Sutcliffe Arthur L. 525 1 .1 .1 87.1 Sydenham, Snowden, N 526 1 .1 .1 87.2 Tansley Witt & Co 527 4 .2 .2 87.4 Temple, Gothard & Co 528 3 .2 .2 87.5 Thei Maurice & Co 529 1 .1 .1 87.6 Thomas Bourne & Co, 530 1 .1 .1 87.6 Thomas May &Co 531 2 .1 .1 87 .7 Thomson McLintock & 532 25 1.3 1.3 89.0 
Thomson W. Y. & co 533 1 .1 .1 89.1 Thornton & Thornton 534 2 .1 .1 89.2 Thornton Baker 535 43 2.2 2.2 91.4 
Tildesley Cecil & To 536 1 .1 .1 91.4 Torgersen, Nicholson 537 1 .1 .1 91.5 Touche (George A. ) & 538 2 .1 .1 91.6 Touche Ross & Co 539 52 2.7 2.7 94.2 
Towers & Na i smi th 540 1 .1 .1 94.3 Train Scott 541 1 .1 .1 94.3 Trent Raymond & Co 542 1 .1 .1 9 4,4 Tribe, Clarke & Co, 543 2 .1 .1 94.5 Tribe, Clarke, Paint 544 2 .1 .l 94.6 Turk & Brandes, and 545 1 .1 .1 94.6 Turner, Easdale & Co 546 1 .1 .1 94.7 Turquand, Youngs &C 547 10 .5 .5 95.2 Tyson, Westall & Co 548 1 .1 .1 95.3 Vale W. Vincent & Co 549 1 .1 .1 95.3 Valiance, Lodge & Co 550 1 .1 .1 95.4 Vincent & Goodrich 551 1 .1 .1 95.4 Viney, Price & Goody 552 1 .1 .1 95.5 Voisey & Co 553 1 .1 .1 95.5 Wagstaff Lees & Co 554 1 .1 .1 95.6 Walker & Co 555 1 .1 .1 95.6 Walker, Fullerton, H 556 1 .1 .1 95.7 Walker, Weller & Roy 557 1 .1 .1 95.7 
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Wallace Cash & Co 558 2 .1 .1 95.8 
Walter Moore & Co 559 1 .1 . 1. 95.9 
Walton W. T. & Son 560 2 .1 . 1. 96.0 
Walton, Watts & Co 561 1 . 1. .1 96.0 
Ward Revell & Co 562 1 .1 .1 96.1 
Ward Robert J. & Co 563 1'. .1 .1 96.1 
Warley & Warley 564 1 .1 .1 96.2 
Warmsley, Henshall & 565 1 .1 . 1. 96.2 
Watling & Partners 566 1 .1 .1 96.3 
Wells W. & Co 567 1 .1 .1 96.3 
Wells, Richardson & 568 1 .1 .1 96.4 
Wenn Townsend & Co 569 2 .1 .1 96.5 
West, Wake, Price & 570 3 .2 .2 96.6 
Westcott Wilson 571 1 .1 .1 96.7 
Weston R. J. & Co 572 1 .1 .1 96.7 
Weyman John &. Co 573 1 .1 .1 96.8 
Wheawill & Sudworth 574 3 .2 .2 96.9 
Wheeler, Whittingham 575 2 .1 .1 97.0 
Whinney Murray & Co 576 19 1.0 1.0 98.0 
White Edmund D. & So 577 2 .1 .1 98.1 
Whitehead & Aldrich 578 2 .1 .1 98.2 
Whitehill Marsh Jack 579 2 .1 .1 98.3 
Whitley, Stimpstone 580 1 .1 .1 98.4 
Whitting & Partners 581 1 .1 .1 98.4 
Whittingham, Riddell 582 1 .1 .1 98.5 
Whyatt, Pakeman, Par 583 1 .1 .1 98.5 
Wigley Norman J. &P 584 1 .1 .1 98.6 Wilkins, Kennedy &C 585 1 .1 .1 98.6 Williams E. J. & Co 586 1 .1 .1 98.7 
Williams G. B. , Ross 587 1 .1 .1 98.7 
Williams T. O. & Davi 588 1 .1 .1 98.8 
Wilson Wright & Co 589 2 .1 .1 98.9 Wilson, Davis & Co 590 1 .1 .1 98.9 Wilson, De Zouche & 591 2 .1 .1 99.0 Wilson, Green, Gibbs 592 1 .1 .1 99.1 Wilson, Powell & Co 593 1 .1 .1 99.1 Windsor, Stead & Co 594 2 . 1. .1 99.2 Winter John M. & Son 595 3 .2 .2 99.4- 
' Winter, Robinson, Si . 
596 2 .1 .1 99 .5 Wood A. & Co 597 1 .1 .1 99.5 Wood, Albery & Co 598 1 .1 .1 99.6 Woodthorpe, Bevan & 599 1 .1 .1 99.6 Worley James & Sons 600 1 .1 .1 99.7 Worshipful - 601 1 .1 .1 99.7 Wortley Joshua & Son 602 1 .1 .1 99.8 Wright, Stevens & Ll 603 2 .1 .1 99.9 Wykes & Co 604 2 
---- 
.1 
------- 
.1 
------- 
100.0 
- 
Total 
-- 
1959 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 1959 Missing cases 0 
v 
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